Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games

Sun L (2016) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 557.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

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Diskussionspapier | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
Abstract / Bemerkung
In this paper, we propose a definition of Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE) for general signaling games with non-Bayesian players nested by an updating rule according to Hypothesis Testing model characterized by Ortoleva (2012). An HTE may be different from a sequential Nash equilibrium because of the dynamic inconsistency. However, when player 2 only takes zero-probability message as an unexpected news, an HTE is a refinement of sequential Nash equilibrium and it survives Intuitive Criterion, but not vice versa. We provide existence theorem covering a broad class of signaling games often studied in economics, and the constrained HTE is unique in such signaling games.
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557
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45
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Sun L. Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 557. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2016.
Sun, L. (2016). Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 557). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Sun, L. (2016). Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 557, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Sun, L., 2016. Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.557, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
L. Sun, Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 557, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2016.
Sun, L.: Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 557. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2016).
Sun, Lan. Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2016. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 557.
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2016-05-30T08:49:52Z

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