Procrastination and projects

Külpmann P (2015) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 544.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

Download
OA
Diskussionspapier | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
Abstract / Bemerkung
In this paper I analyze a dynamic moral hazard problem in teams with imperfect monitoring in continuous time. In the model, players are working together to achieve a breakthrough in a project while facing a deadline. The effort needed to achieve such a breakthrough is unknown but players have a common prior about its distribution. Each player is only able to observe their own effort, not the effort of others. I characterize the optimal effort path for general distributions of breakthrough efforts and show that, in addition to free-riding, procrastination arises. Furthermore, in this model, procrastination is not a result of irrational behavior and is even present in the welfare-maximizing solution.
Erscheinungsjahr
Band
544
Seite
31
ISSN
PUB-ID

Zitieren

Külpmann P. Procrastination and projects. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 544. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2015.
Külpmann, P. (2015). Procrastination and projects (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 544). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Külpmann, P. (2015). Procrastination and projects. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 544, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Külpmann, P., 2015. Procrastination and projects, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.544, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
P. Külpmann, Procrastination and projects, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 544, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2015.
Külpmann, P.: Procrastination and projects. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 544. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2015).
Külpmann, Philipp. Procrastination and projects. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2015. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 544.
Alle Dateien verfügbar unter der/den folgenden Lizenz(en):
Copyright Statement:
This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. [...]
Volltext(e)
Access Level
OA Open Access
Zuletzt Hochgeladen
2016-03-16T12:27:10Z

Export

Markieren/ Markierung löschen
Markierte Publikationen

Open Data PUB

Suchen in

Google Scholar