The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets

Lahkar R, Riedel F (2015)
Games and Economic Behavior 91: 268-282.

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Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Abstract / Bemerkung
We define the logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets and establish its fundamental properties, namely, the existence of a logit equilibrium, its convergence to a Nash equilibrium as the perturbation factor becomes small, and existence, uniqueness and continuity of solution trajectories. We apply the dynamic to the analysis of potential games and negative semidefinite games. We show that in a restricted state space of probability measures with bounded density functions, solution trajectories of the logit dynamic converge to logit equilibria in these two classes of games. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Erscheinungsjahr
Zeitschriftentitel
Games and Economic Behavior
Band
91
Seite
268-282
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Lahkar R, Riedel F. The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets. Games and Economic Behavior. 2015;91:268-282.
Lahkar, R., & Riedel, F. (2015). The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets. Games and Economic Behavior, 91, 268-282. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.009
Lahkar, R., and Riedel, F. (2015). The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets. Games and Economic Behavior 91, 268-282.
Lahkar, R., & Riedel, F., 2015. The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets. Games and Economic Behavior, 91, p 268-282.
R. Lahkar and F. Riedel, “The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets”, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 91, 2015, pp. 268-282.
Lahkar, R., Riedel, F.: The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets. Games and Economic Behavior. 91, 268-282 (2015).
Lahkar, Ratul, and Riedel, Frank. “The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets”. Games and Economic Behavior 91 (2015): 268-282.