On Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: From Discrete to Continuous Time

Staudigl M, Steg J-H (2014) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 525.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

Download
OA 303.23 KB
Working Paper | Published | English
Abstract
Motivated by recent path-breaking contributions in the theory of repeated games in continuous time, this paper presents a family of discrete-time games which provides a consistent discrete-time approximation of the continuous-time limit game. Using probabilistic arguments, we prove that continuous-time games can be defined as the limit of a sequence of discrete-time games. Our convergence analysis reveals various intricacies of continuous-time games. First, we demonstrate the importance of correlated strategies in continuous-time. Second, we attach a precise meaning to the statement that a sequence of discrete-time games can be used to approximate a continuous-time game.
Publishing Year
ISSN
PUB-ID

Cite this

Staudigl M, Steg J-H. On Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: From Discrete to Continuous Time. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 525. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2014.
Staudigl, M., & Steg, J. - H. (2014). On Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: From Discrete to Continuous Time (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 525). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Staudigl, M., and Steg, J. - H. (2014). On Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: From Discrete to Continuous Time. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 525, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Staudigl, M., & Steg, J.-H., 2014. On Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: From Discrete to Continuous Time, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.525, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
M. Staudigl and J.-H. Steg, On Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: From Discrete to Continuous Time, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 525, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2014.
Staudigl, M., Steg, J.-H.: On Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: From Discrete to Continuous Time. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 525. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2014).
Staudigl, Mathias, and Steg, Jan-Henrik. On Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring: From Discrete to Continuous Time. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2014. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 525.
Main File(s)
File Name
Access Level
OA Open Access
Last Uploaded
2016-04-14T14:11:14Z

This data publication is cited in the following publications:
This publication cites the following data publications:

Export

0 Marked Publications

Open Data PUB

Search this title in

Google Scholar