Constrained interactions and social coordination

Staudigl M, Weidenholzer S (2014)
Journal of Economic Theory 152: 41-63.

Journal Article | Published | English

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We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2 x 2-coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that if agents may only support a limited number of links payoff dominant conventions will emerge in the long run, contrasting the case of unconstrained interactions where risk dominant conventions arise for a wide range of parameters. Under constrained iterations, already a small number of agents choosing the payoff dominant action enables agents - by linking up to those agents and choosing the payoff dominant action - to secure themselves the highest possible payoff. We extend our model by discussing constrained interactions in the context of general m x m games, convex payoff functions, heterogeneous constraints, and frictions in link formation. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Staudigl M, Weidenholzer S. Constrained interactions and social coordination. Journal of Economic Theory. 2014;152:41-63.
Staudigl, M., & Weidenholzer, S. (2014). Constrained interactions and social coordination. Journal of Economic Theory, 152, 41-63.
Staudigl, M., and Weidenholzer, S. (2014). Constrained interactions and social coordination. Journal of Economic Theory 152, 41-63.
Staudigl, M., & Weidenholzer, S., 2014. Constrained interactions and social coordination. Journal of Economic Theory, 152, p 41-63.
M. Staudigl and S. Weidenholzer, “Constrained interactions and social coordination”, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 152, 2014, pp. 41-63.
Staudigl, M., Weidenholzer, S.: Constrained interactions and social coordination. Journal of Economic Theory. 152, 41-63 (2014).
Staudigl, Mathias, and Weidenholzer, Simon. “Constrained interactions and social coordination”. Journal of Economic Theory 152 (2014): 41-63.
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