Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures

Haake C-J (2009)
International Game Theory Review 11(1): 15-32.

Journal Article | Published | English

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Abstract
We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential.
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Haake C-J. Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. International Game Theory Review. 2009;11(1):15-32.
Haake, C. - J. (2009). Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. International Game Theory Review, 11(1), 15-32.
Haake, C. - J. (2009). Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. International Game Theory Review 11, 15-32.
Haake, C.-J., 2009. Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. International Game Theory Review, 11(1), p 15-32.
C.-J. Haake, “Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures”, International Game Theory Review, vol. 11, 2009, pp. 15-32.
Haake, C.-J.: Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. International Game Theory Review. 11, 15-32 (2009).
Haake, Claus-Jochen. “Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures”. International Game Theory Review 11.1 (2009): 15-32.
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