Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement

Mouraviev I (2013) Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers; 494.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

Download
OA 440.61 KB
Working Paper | Published | English
Author
Abstract
The article seeks to fi…ll the gap between tacit and explicit collusion in a setting where fi…rms observe only their own output levels and a common price, which includes a stochastic component. Without communication, …firms fail to discriminate between random shocks and marginal deviations, which constrains the scope for collusion. By eliminating uncertainty about what has happened, communication facilitates detection of deviations but reduces collusive pro…fits due to the risk of exposure to legal sanctions. With the optimal collusive strategy, …firms communicate only if the market price falls somewhat below the trigger price. Moreover, they tend to communicate more often as they become less patient, a cartel grows in size, or demand uncertainty rises.
Publishing Year
ISSN
PUB-ID

Cite this

Mouraviev I. Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. Vol 494. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2013.
Mouraviev, I. (2013). Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement (Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 494). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Mouraviev, I. (2013). Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 494, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Mouraviev, I., 2013. Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, no.494, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
I. Mouraviev, Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement, Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, vol. 494, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2013.
Mouraviev, I.: Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers, 494. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2013).
Mouraviev, Igor. Explicit Collusion under Antitrust Enforcement. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2013. Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers. 494.
Main File(s)
File Name
Access Level
OA Open Access
Last Uploaded
2016-03-22T15:36:44Z

This data publication is cited in the following publications:
This publication cites the following data publications:

Export

0 Marked Publications

Open Data PUB

Search this title in

Google Scholar