How and to what end may consciousness contribute to action? Attributing properties of consciousness to an embodied, minimally cognitive artificial neural network

Cruse H, Schilling M (2013)
Frontiers in Psychology 4: 324.

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Abstract / Bemerkung
An artificial neural network called reaCog is described which is based on a decentralized, reactive and embodied architecture developed to control non-trivial hexapod walking in an unpredictable environment (Walknet) while using insect-like navigation (Navinet). In reaCog, these basic networks are extended in such a way that the complete system, reaCog, adopts the capability of inventing new behaviors and – via internal simulation – of planning ahead. This cognitive expansion enables the reactive system to be enriched with additional procedures. Here, we focus on the question to what extent properties of phenomena to be characterized on a different level of description as for example consciousness can be found in this minimally cognitive system. Adopting a monist view, we argue that the phenomenal aspect of mental phenomena can be neglected when discussing the function of such a system. Under this condition, reaCog is discussed to be equipped with properties as are bottom-up and top-down attention, intentions, volition, and some aspects of Access Consciousness. These properties have not been explicitly implemented but emerge from the cooperation between the elements of the network. The aspects of Access Consciousness found in reaCog concern the above mentioned ability to plan ahead and to invent and guide (new) actions. Furthermore, global accessibility of memory elements, another aspect characterizing Access Consciousness is realized by this network. reaCog allows for both reactive/automatic control and (access-) conscious control of behavior. We discuss examples for interactions between both the reactive domain and the conscious domain. Metacognition or Reflexive Consciousness is not a property of reaCog. Possible expansions are discussed to allow for further properties of Access Consciousness, verbal report on internal states, and for Metacognition. In summary, we argue that already simple networks allow for properties of consciousness if leaving the phenomenal aspect aside.
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Frontiers in Psychology
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4
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324
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Article Processing Charge funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and the Open Access Publication Fund of Bielefeld University.
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Cruse H, Schilling M. How and to what end may consciousness contribute to action? Attributing properties of consciousness to an embodied, minimally cognitive artificial neural network. Frontiers in Psychology. 2013;4:324.
Cruse, H., & Schilling, M. (2013). How and to what end may consciousness contribute to action? Attributing properties of consciousness to an embodied, minimally cognitive artificial neural network. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 324. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00324
Cruse, H., and Schilling, M. (2013). How and to what end may consciousness contribute to action? Attributing properties of consciousness to an embodied, minimally cognitive artificial neural network. Frontiers in Psychology 4, 324.
Cruse, H., & Schilling, M., 2013. How and to what end may consciousness contribute to action? Attributing properties of consciousness to an embodied, minimally cognitive artificial neural network. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, p 324.
H. Cruse and M. Schilling, “How and to what end may consciousness contribute to action? Attributing properties of consciousness to an embodied, minimally cognitive artificial neural network”, Frontiers in Psychology, vol. 4, 2013, pp. 324.
Cruse, H., Schilling, M.: How and to what end may consciousness contribute to action? Attributing properties of consciousness to an embodied, minimally cognitive artificial neural network. Frontiers in Psychology. 4, 324 (2013).
Cruse, Holk, and Schilling, Malte. “How and to what end may consciousness contribute to action? Attributing properties of consciousness to an embodied, minimally cognitive artificial neural network”. Frontiers in Psychology 4 (2013): 324.
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2013-07-22T15:30:16Z

3 Zitationen in Europe PMC

Daten bereitgestellt von Europe PubMed Central.

ReaCog, a Minimal Cognitive Controller Based on Recruitment of Reactive Systems.
Schilling M, Cruse H., Front Neurorobot 11(), 2017
PMID: 28194106
Mental representation and motor imagery training.
Schack T, Essig K, Frank C, Koester D., Front Hum Neurosci 8(), 2014
PMID: 24904368
A hexapod walker using a heterarchical architecture for action selection.
Schilling M, Paskarbeit J, Hoinville T, Hüffmeier A, Schneider A, Schmitz J, Cruse H., Front Comput Neurosci 7(), 2013
PMID: 24062682

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