Hidden symmetries and focal points

Alos-Ferrer C, Kuzmics C (2013)
Journal Of Economic Theory 148(1): 226-258.

Journal Article | Published | English

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We provide a general formal framework to define and analyze the concepts of focal points and frames for normal form games. The information provided by a frame is captured by a symmetry structure which is consistent with the payoff structure of the game. The set of symmetry structures has itself a clear structure (a lattice). Focal points are strategy profiles which respect the symmetry structure and are chosen according to some meta-norm, which is not particular to the framed game at hand. (C) 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Alos-Ferrer C, Kuzmics C. Hidden symmetries and focal points. Journal Of Economic Theory. 2013;148(1):226-258.
Alos-Ferrer, C., & Kuzmics, C. (2013). Hidden symmetries and focal points. Journal Of Economic Theory, 148(1), 226-258.
Alos-Ferrer, C., and Kuzmics, C. (2013). Hidden symmetries and focal points. Journal Of Economic Theory 148, 226-258.
Alos-Ferrer, C., & Kuzmics, C., 2013. Hidden symmetries and focal points. Journal Of Economic Theory, 148(1), p 226-258.
C. Alos-Ferrer and C. Kuzmics, “Hidden symmetries and focal points”, Journal Of Economic Theory, vol. 148, 2013, pp. 226-258.
Alos-Ferrer, C., Kuzmics, C.: Hidden symmetries and focal points. Journal Of Economic Theory. 148, 226-258 (2013).
Alos-Ferrer, Carlos, and Kuzmics, Christoph. “Hidden symmetries and focal points”. Journal Of Economic Theory 148.1 (2013): 226-258.
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