Compromises are arrived at when, in spite of the efforts of those participating to mediate and defend their position in a rationally acceptable manner, each remains with his judgment while, at the same time, a decision must be made without further delay. What this means is that the parties agree to an option about which they are not, in their heart of hearts, entirely convinced. This article examines the notion of moral compromise, concentrating thereby on the case of political praxis. It asks whether, in view of the complexity and multiplicity of morally relevant decisions encountered in a pluralist society, it is at all realistic to expect much else from political institutions than what Rawls dismissively refers to as a modus vivendi and whether a conception of justice that is true or reasonable only given the reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines is still a conception of justice, and not simply a compromise between the contending doctrines.
Zanetti V. Justice, Peace and Compromise. Analyse & Kritik. 2011;2011(2):423-439.
Zanetti, V. (2011). Justice, Peace and Compromise. Analyse & Kritik, 2011(2), 423-439.
Zanetti, V. (2011). Justice, Peace and Compromise. Analyse & Kritik 2011, 423-439.
Zanetti, V., 2011. Justice, Peace and Compromise. Analyse & Kritik, 2011(2), p 423-439.
V. Zanetti, “Justice, Peace and Compromise”, Analyse & Kritik, vol. 2011, 2011, pp. 423-439.
Zanetti, V.: Justice, Peace and Compromise. Analyse & Kritik. 2011, 423-439 (2011).
Zanetti, Véronique. “Justice, Peace and Compromise”. Analyse & Kritik 2011.2 (2011): 423-439.
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