Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices

Andonie C, Kuzmics C (2012)
Journal Of Economic Behavior & Organization 84(2): 681-700.

Download
Es wurde kein Volltext hochgeladen. Nur Publikationsnachweis!
Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
Autor
;
Abstract / Bemerkung
In the unique attainable equilibrium of a voting model with one minority candidate and two similarly appealing majority candidates, majority voters are unable to coordinate their support and the minority candidate (Condorcet loser) is elected. Suppose a random sample of voters is asked about their preferences prior to the election. We show that there always exists an equilibrium of this two stage game in which all poll participants are truthful, resulting in a high likelihood of a majority candidate winning the election. This equilibrium is unique if the sample size of the poll is Poisson distributed or fixed and odd. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Erscheinungsjahr
Zeitschriftentitel
Journal Of Economic Behavior & Organization
Band
84
Zeitschriftennummer
2
Seite
681-700
ISSN
PUB-ID

Zitieren

Andonie C, Kuzmics C. Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices. Journal Of Economic Behavior & Organization. 2012;84(2):681-700.
Andonie, C., & Kuzmics, C. (2012). Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices. Journal Of Economic Behavior & Organization, 84(2), 681-700. doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2012.09.014
Andonie, C., and Kuzmics, C. (2012). Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices. Journal Of Economic Behavior & Organization 84, 681-700.
Andonie, C., & Kuzmics, C., 2012. Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices. Journal Of Economic Behavior & Organization, 84(2), p 681-700.
C. Andonie and C. Kuzmics, “Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices”, Journal Of Economic Behavior & Organization, vol. 84, 2012, pp. 681-700.
Andonie, C., Kuzmics, C.: Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices. Journal Of Economic Behavior & Organization. 84, 681-700 (2012).
Andonie, Costel, and Kuzmics, Christoph. “Pre-election polls as strategic coordination devices”. Journal Of Economic Behavior & Organization 84.2 (2012): 681-700.