Evolution, Correlated Equilibrium, and Strictness

Koch-Metzger L (Submitted)
Economic Theory.

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Abstract / Bemerkung
A set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to monotonic evolutionary dynamics if the players receive correlated signals. In this paper boundedly rational agents condition the choice of strategies on the signals. A set of conditional strategies is asymptotically stable only if it represents a strict (correlated-)equilibrium set. There are correlated equilibria that cannot be represented by an asymptotically stable signal contingent strategy. For generic games it is shown that if signals are endogenous, no player has an incentive to manipulate the signal generating process and if the signal contingent strategy is asymptotically stable, then and only then, the outcome must be a strict Nash equilibrium.
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Economic Theory
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Koch-Metzger L. Evolution, Correlated Equilibrium, and Strictness. Economic Theory. Submitted.
Koch-Metzger, L. (Submitted). Evolution, Correlated Equilibrium, and Strictness. Economic Theory
Koch-Metzger, L. (Submitted). Evolution, Correlated Equilibrium, and Strictness. Economic Theory.
Koch-Metzger, L., Submitted. Evolution, Correlated Equilibrium, and Strictness. Economic Theory.
L. Koch-Metzger, “Evolution, Correlated Equilibrium, and Strictness”, Economic Theory, Submitted.
Koch-Metzger, L.: Evolution, Correlated Equilibrium, and Strictness. Economic Theory. (Submitted).
Koch-Metzger, Lars. “Evolution, Correlated Equilibrium, and Strictness”. Economic Theory (Submitted).
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2012-04-04T16:35:33Z

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