A note on apportionment methods

Shellshear E (2007) Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics; 391.
Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.

Download
OA
Working Paper | Published | English
Author
Abstract
This paper investigates the suitability of apportionment methods based on the idea of preserving the coalition function of the simple game represented by the populations of the states. The results show that an apportionment method which satisfies desirable properties such as population monotonicity, house monotonicity, etc., does not exist. A classification of simple voting games via winning coalitions is also given.
Publishing Year
ISSN
PUB-ID

Cite this

Shellshear E. A note on apportionment methods. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 391. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2007.
Shellshear, E. (2007). A note on apportionment methods (Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 391). Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Shellshear, E. (2007). A note on apportionment methods. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 391, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Shellshear, E., 2007. A note on apportionment methods, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, no.391, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
E. Shellshear, A note on apportionment methods, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, vol. 391, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2007.
Shellshear, E.: A note on apportionment methods. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 391. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2007).
Shellshear, Evan. A note on apportionment methods. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2007. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. 391.
Main File(s)
File Name
Access Level
OA Open Access
Last Uploaded
2016-01-19T15:53:49Z

This data publication is cited in the following publications:
This publication cites the following data publications:

Export

0 Marked Publications

Open Data PUB

Search this title in

Google Scholar