Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control

Çiftçi B, Dimitrov D (2006) Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics; 384.
Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.

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In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.
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Çiftçi B, Dimitrov D. Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 384. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics; 2006.
Çiftçi, B., & Dimitrov, D. (2006). Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control (Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 384). Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics. doi:10.2139/ssrn.948414
Çiftçi, B., and Dimitrov, D. (2006). Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 384, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
Çiftçi, B., & Dimitrov, D., 2006. Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, no.384, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics.
B. Çiftçi and D. Dimitrov, Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, vol. 384, Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2006.
Çiftçi, B., Dimitrov, D.: Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 384. Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld (2006).
Çiftçi, Baris, and Dimitrov, Dinko. Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control. Bielefeld: Center for Mathematical Economics, 2006. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. 384.
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