Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2

Wolff M (2010)
Journal for General Philosophy of Science 41(2): 359-371.

Journal Article | Published | German

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Abstract
In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 341-355) I have compared Aristotle's syllogistic with Kant's theory of "pure ratiocination". "Ratiocinia pura" (aEuroreine Vernunftschlusse") is Kant's designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called 'perfect'. In Kant's view they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant's view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant's view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle's view concerning perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant's logical theory. As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article published in J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357-365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 199-213 (cf. Ebert's answer in the same issue pp. 215-231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 365-372). I shall argue, that Kant's principle 'nota notae est nota rei ipsius' and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant's logical theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations.
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Wolff M. Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2. Journal for General Philosophy of Science. 2010;41(2):359-371.
Wolff, M. (2010). Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 41(2), 359-371.
Wolff, M. (2010). Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 41, 359-371.
Wolff, M., 2010. Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 41(2), p 359-371.
M. Wolff, “Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, vol. 41, 2010, pp. 359-371.
Wolff, M.: Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2. Journal for General Philosophy of Science. 41, 359-371 (2010).
Wolff, Michael. “Vollkommene Syllogismen und reine Vernunftschlüsse: Aristoteles und Kant. Eine Stellungnahme zu Theodor Eberts Gegeneinwänden. Teil 2”. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 41.2 (2010): 359-371.
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