Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions: A Uniqueness Result

Riedel F, Wolfstetter E (2006)
Economic Theory 29(3): 721-726.

Journal Article | Published | English

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Riedel F, Wolfstetter E. Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions: A Uniqueness Result. Economic Theory. 2006;29(3):721-726.
Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E. (2006). Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions: A Uniqueness Result. Economic Theory, 29(3), 721-726.
Riedel, F., and Wolfstetter, E. (2006). Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions: A Uniqueness Result. Economic Theory 29, 721-726.
Riedel, F., & Wolfstetter, E., 2006. Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions: A Uniqueness Result. Economic Theory, 29(3), p 721-726.
F. Riedel and E. Wolfstetter, “Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions: A Uniqueness Result”, Economic Theory, vol. 29, 2006, pp. 721-726.
Riedel, F., Wolfstetter, E.: Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions: A Uniqueness Result. Economic Theory. 29, 721-726 (2006).
Riedel, Frank, and Wolfstetter, E. “Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions: A Uniqueness Result”. Economic Theory 29.3 (2006): 721-726.
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