Among the numerous conceptions of autonomy, three are particularly important: Kant's notion of humans' being subject, and subject only, to moral laws they gave themselves, Frankfurt's idea of persons' willing and acting deriving from the essential character of their wills, and the popular conception of persons' being master over whether others do or do not certain things to them. Kant's moral conception of autonomy, it is argued, is untenable because the moral character of a law and its self-givenness are incompatible. Frankfurt's idea suffers from the fact that we cannot give substance to talk of the essential character of one's will. The third conception is practically irrelevant: there is no principle requiring people to be master over what others do to them. Thus autonomy may have to be dropped from our self-conception. To some this will appear a grave loss. In fact it is not.
Bittner R. Autonomy, and then. Philosophical Explorations. 2002;5(3):217-228.
Bittner, R. (2002). Autonomy, and then. Philosophical Explorations, 5(3), 217-228. doi:10.1080/10002002108538734
Bittner, R. (2002). Autonomy, and then. Philosophical Explorations 5, 217-228.
Bittner, R., 2002. Autonomy, and then. Philosophical Explorations, 5(3), p 217-228.
R. Bittner, “Autonomy, and then”, Philosophical Explorations, vol. 5, 2002, pp. 217-228.
Bittner, R.: Autonomy, and then. Philosophical Explorations. 5, 217-228 (2002).
Bittner, Rüdiger. “Autonomy, and then”. Philosophical Explorations 5.3 (2002): 217-228.
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