Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples

Haake C-J, Klaus B (2010)
THEORY AND DECISION 69(4): 537-554.

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Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Abstract / Bemerkung
We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (J Econ Theory 21: 75-106, 2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market, there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets, the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable.
Erscheinungsjahr
Zeitschriftentitel
THEORY AND DECISION
Band
69
Zeitschriftennummer
4
Seite
537-554
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Haake C-J, Klaus B. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. THEORY AND DECISION. 2010;69(4):537-554.
Haake, C. - J., & Klaus, B. (2010). Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. THEORY AND DECISION, 69(4), 537-554. doi:10.1007/s11238-008-9122-2
Haake, C. - J., and Klaus, B. (2010). Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. THEORY AND DECISION 69, 537-554.
Haake, C.-J., & Klaus, B., 2010. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. THEORY AND DECISION, 69(4), p 537-554.
C.-J. Haake and B. Klaus, “Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples”, THEORY AND DECISION, vol. 69, 2010, pp. 537-554.
Haake, C.-J., Klaus, B.: Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. THEORY AND DECISION. 69, 537-554 (2010).
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Klaus, Bettina. “Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples”. THEORY AND DECISION 69.4 (2010): 537-554.