Bunt gemeint, doch farblos gesagt. Wann wird die Farbe eines Objektes nicht benannt?

Weiß P, Mangold R (1997)
SPRACHE & KOGNITION 16(1): 31-47.

Journal Article | Published | German

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Within the psychology of language and cognition, a problem is demonstrated that is generally important and that relates to object references: On the one hand, there is good cause to speak in a detailed way in order to supply the communication partner with lots of information. On the other hand, there are assumptions, e.g. the principle of informativity (Grice, 1979), according to which it appears desirable to enrich one's utterances with no more information than needed. However, if we look at object references, we often find more attributes specified than would be necessary with respect to the partner's unambiguous identification of the intended object. In many cases, this additional specification of certain attributes (e.g., color) facilitates the partner's identification of the object in question. However, facilitation is effective only in cases in which the additionally specified attribute is perceptually salient and the partner's field of search is narrowed as well. This condition holds if the object to be named involves a value on the specified attribute that distinguishes the object from at least some of the other objects in its context. Empirical studies revealed the color of an object to be most important among the redundant, but salient attributes that are often specified additionally. However, the color of an object tends to be not specified in cases where it is characteristic of the object and, therefore, can be easily inferred by the partner. We report on two experiments from which we learned three things: (1) The color of an object is specified more frequently if it allows for the discrimination of the object from (at least some) other objects in the context. (2) The color of an object is specified less frequently if it is characteristic of the object. (3) The aforementioned result remains unchanged if an experimental manipulation is introduced that makes the speakers doubt whether the partner can easily infer the color of the object. Thus, the specification of attributes when naming objects appears to be systematic, but more complicated than was previously assumed.
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Weiß P, Mangold R. Bunt gemeint, doch farblos gesagt. Wann wird die Farbe eines Objektes nicht benannt? SPRACHE & KOGNITION. 1997;16(1):31-47.
Weiß, P., & Mangold, R. (1997). Bunt gemeint, doch farblos gesagt. Wann wird die Farbe eines Objektes nicht benannt? SPRACHE & KOGNITION, 16(1), 31-47.
Weiß, P., and Mangold, R. (1997). Bunt gemeint, doch farblos gesagt. Wann wird die Farbe eines Objektes nicht benannt? SPRACHE & KOGNITION 16, 31-47.
Weiß, P., & Mangold, R., 1997. Bunt gemeint, doch farblos gesagt. Wann wird die Farbe eines Objektes nicht benannt? SPRACHE & KOGNITION, 16(1), p 31-47.
P. Weiß and R. Mangold, “Bunt gemeint, doch farblos gesagt. Wann wird die Farbe eines Objektes nicht benannt?”, SPRACHE & KOGNITION, vol. 16, 1997, pp. 31-47.
Weiß, P., Mangold, R.: Bunt gemeint, doch farblos gesagt. Wann wird die Farbe eines Objektes nicht benannt? SPRACHE & KOGNITION. 16, 31-47 (1997).
Weiß, Petra, and Mangold, Roland. “Bunt gemeint, doch farblos gesagt. Wann wird die Farbe eines Objektes nicht benannt?”. SPRACHE & KOGNITION 16.1 (1997): 31-47.
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