Bargaining with incomplete information - An axiomatic approach

Rosenmüller J (1997)
Theory and Decision 42(2): 105-146.

Journal Article | Published | English

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Abstract
Within this paper we consider a model of Nash bargaining with incomplete information. In particular, we focus on fee games, which are a natural generalization of side payment games in the context of incomplete information. For a specific class of fee games we provide two axiomatic approaches in order to establish the Expected Contract Value, which is a version of the Nash bargaining solution.
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Rosenmüller J. Bargaining with incomplete information - An axiomatic approach. Theory and Decision. 1997;42(2):105-146.
Rosenmüller, J. (1997). Bargaining with incomplete information - An axiomatic approach. Theory and Decision, 42(2), 105-146.
Rosenmüller, J. (1997). Bargaining with incomplete information - An axiomatic approach. Theory and Decision 42, 105-146.
Rosenmüller, J., 1997. Bargaining with incomplete information - An axiomatic approach. Theory and Decision, 42(2), p 105-146.
J. Rosenmüller, “Bargaining with incomplete information - An axiomatic approach”, Theory and Decision, vol. 42, 1997, pp. 105-146.
Rosenmüller, J.: Bargaining with incomplete information - An axiomatic approach. Theory and Decision. 42, 105-146 (1997).
Rosenmüller, Joachim. “Bargaining with incomplete information - An axiomatic approach”. Theory and Decision 42.2 (1997): 105-146.
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