A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution

Trockel W (2002)
Social Choice and Welfare 19(3): 581-586.

Journal Article | Published | English

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Abstract
This paper follows van Damme (1986) in presenting a meta bargaining approach that justifies the Nash bargaining solution. But in contrast to van Damme's procedure our meta bargaining game is universal in the sense that all bargaining solutions are allowed as strategic choices in the meta bargaining game. Also our result holds true for any number n of players.
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Trockel W. A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare. 2002;19(3):581-586.
Trockel, W. (2002). A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare, 19(3), 581-586.
Trockel, W. (2002). A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare 19, 581-586.
Trockel, W., 2002. A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare, 19(3), p 581-586.
W. Trockel, “A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution”, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19, 2002, pp. 581-586.
Trockel, W.: A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare. 19, 581-586 (2002).
Trockel, Walter. “A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution”. Social Choice and Welfare 19.3 (2002): 581-586.
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