A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution

Trockel W (2002)
Social Choice and Welfare 19(3): 581-586.

Download
Es wurde kein Volltext hochgeladen. Nur Publikationsnachweis!
Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
Abstract / Bemerkung
This paper follows van Damme (1986) in presenting a meta bargaining approach that justifies the Nash bargaining solution. But in contrast to van Damme's procedure our meta bargaining game is universal in the sense that all bargaining solutions are allowed as strategic choices in the meta bargaining game. Also our result holds true for any number n of players.
Erscheinungsjahr
Zeitschriftentitel
Social Choice and Welfare
Band
19
Zeitschriftennummer
3
Seite
581-586
ISSN
eISSN
PUB-ID

Zitieren

Trockel W. A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare. 2002;19(3):581-586.
Trockel, W. (2002). A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare, 19(3), 581-586. doi:10.1007/s003550100133
Trockel, W. (2002). A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare 19, 581-586.
Trockel, W., 2002. A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare, 19(3), p 581-586.
W. Trockel, “A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution”, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19, 2002, pp. 581-586.
Trockel, W.: A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution. Social Choice and Welfare. 19, 581-586 (2002).
Trockel, Walter. “A universal meta bargaining implementation of the Nash solution”. Social Choice and Welfare 19.3 (2002): 581-586.