Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems

Haake C-J, Raith MG, Su FE (2002)
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 19(4): 723-749.

Download
Es wurde kein Volltext hochgeladen. Nur Publikationsnachweis!
Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
Autor
; ;
Abstract / Bemerkung
We develop a procedure for implementing an efficient and envy-free allocation of m objects among n individuals with the possibility of monetary side-payments, assuming that players have quasi-linear utility functions. The procedure eliminates envy by compensating envious players. It is fully descriptive and says explicitly which compensations should be made, and in what order. Moreover, it is simple enough to be carried out without computer support. We formally characterize the properties of the procedure, show how it establishes envy-freeness with minimal resources, and demonstrate its application to a wide class of fair-division problems.
Erscheinungsjahr
Zeitschriftentitel
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
Band
19
Zeitschriftennummer
4
Seite
723-749
ISSN
eISSN
PUB-ID

Zitieren

Haake C-J, Raith MG, Su FE. Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE. 2002;19(4):723-749.
Haake, C. - J., Raith, M. G., & Su, F. E. (2002). Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 19(4), 723-749. doi:10.1007/s003550100149
Haake, C. - J., Raith, M. G., and Su, F. E. (2002). Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 19, 723-749.
Haake, C.-J., Raith, M.G., & Su, F.E., 2002. Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 19(4), p 723-749.
C.-J. Haake, M.G. Raith, and F.E. Su, “Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems”, SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, vol. 19, 2002, pp. 723-749.
Haake, C.-J., Raith, M.G., Su, F.E.: Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE. 19, 723-749 (2002).
Haake, Claus-Jochen, Raith, Matthias G., and Su, Francis E. “Bidding for envy-freeness: A procedural approach to n-player fair-division problems”. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 19.4 (2002): 723-749.