Trading bargaining weights

Ervig U, Haake C-J (2005)
JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 41(8): 983-993.

Journal Article | Published | English

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We consider a model, in which two agents are engaged in two separate bargaining problems. We introduce a notion of bargaining weights (bargaining power), which is basically given by asymmetric versions of the Perles-Maschler bargaining solution. Thereby, we view bargaining power as ordinary goods that can be traded in an exchange economy. With equal initial endowment of bargaining power there exists a Walrasian equilibrium in this exchange economy such that the utility allocation in equilibrium coincides with the Perles-Maschler bargaining solution of the aggregate bargaining problem. Equilibrium prices are given by the primitives of the two bargaining problems. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Ervig U, Haake C-J. Trading bargaining weights. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS. 2005;41(8):983-993.
Ervig, U., & Haake, C. - J. (2005). Trading bargaining weights. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 41(8), 983-993.
Ervig, U., and Haake, C. - J. (2005). Trading bargaining weights. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 41, 983-993.
Ervig, U., & Haake, C.-J., 2005. Trading bargaining weights. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, 41(8), p 983-993.
U. Ervig and C.-J. Haake, “Trading bargaining weights”, JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS, vol. 41, 2005, pp. 983-993.
Ervig, U., Haake, C.-J.: Trading bargaining weights. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS. 41, 983-993 (2005).
Ervig, U, and Haake, Claus-Jochen. “Trading bargaining weights”. JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICAL ECONOMICS 41.8 (2005): 983-993.
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