Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods

Klaus B, Dimitrov D, Haake C-J (2006)
ECONOMICS LETTERS 93(1): 106-110.

Journal Article | Published | English

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We study efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by bundling goods in her endowment. Even if agents' preferences are additive, no such rule exists. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.
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Klaus B, Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods. ECONOMICS LETTERS. 2006;93(1):106-110.
Klaus, B., Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C. - J. (2006). Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 93(1), 106-110.
Klaus, B., Dimitrov, D., and Haake, C. - J. (2006). Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods. ECONOMICS LETTERS 93, 106-110.
Klaus, B., Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C.-J., 2006. Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 93(1), p 106-110.
B. Klaus, D. Dimitrov, and C.-J. Haake, “Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods”, ECONOMICS LETTERS, vol. 93, 2006, pp. 106-110.
Klaus, B., Dimitrov, D., Haake, C.-J.: Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods. ECONOMICS LETTERS. 93, 106-110 (2006).
Klaus, Bettina, Dimitrov, Dinko, and Haake, Claus-Jochen. “Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods”. ECONOMICS LETTERS 93.1 (2006): 106-110.
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