Evolutionary game theory and typology: A case study

Jäger G (2007)
Language 83(1): 74-109.

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This article deals with the typology of the case marking of semantic core roles. The competing economy considerations of hearer (disambiguation) and speaker (minimal effort) are formalized in terms of EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY. It is shown that the case-marking patterns that are attested in the languages of the world are those that are evolutionarily stable for different relative weightings of speaker economy and hearer economy, given the statistical patterns of language use that were extracted from corpora of naturally occurring conversations.
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Jäger G. Evolutionary game theory and typology: A case study. Language. 2007;83(1):74-109.
Jäger, G. (2007). Evolutionary game theory and typology: A case study. Language, 83(1), 74-109.
Jäger, G. (2007). Evolutionary game theory and typology: A case study. Language 83, 74-109.
Jäger, G., 2007. Evolutionary game theory and typology: A case study. Language, 83(1), p 74-109.
G. Jäger, “Evolutionary game theory and typology: A case study”, Language, vol. 83, 2007, pp. 74-109.
Jäger, G.: Evolutionary game theory and typology: A case study. Language. 83, 74-109 (2007).
Jäger, Gerhard. “Evolutionary game theory and typology: A case study”. Language 83.1 (2007): 74-109.
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