Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms

Dawid H, MacLeod WB (2008)
Games and Economic Behavior 62(1): 26-52.

Journal Article | Published | English

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The purpose of this paper is to explore the evolution of bargaining norms in a simple production problem with two-sided relationship specific investments and competition. The puzzle we wish to address is why efficient bargaining norms do not evolve even though there exist efficient sequential equilibria. Conditions under which stochastically stable bargaining conventions exist are characterized, and it is shown that there is a hierarchy of norms, with a stochastically stable division rule that is independent of the long run investment strategy. Due to this independence, efficient sequential equilibria are not in general stochastically stable. This result may help us understand why institutions, such as firms, may be needed to ensure efficient relationship specific investments. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Dawid H, MacLeod WB. Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms. Games and Economic Behavior. 2008;62(1):26-52.
Dawid, H., & MacLeod, W. B. (2008). Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(1), 26-52.
Dawid, H., and MacLeod, W. B. (2008). Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms. Games and Economic Behavior 62, 26-52.
Dawid, H., & MacLeod, W.B., 2008. Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms. Games and Economic Behavior, 62(1), p 26-52.
H. Dawid and W.B. MacLeod, “Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms”, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 62, 2008, pp. 26-52.
Dawid, H., MacLeod, W.B.: Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms. Games and Economic Behavior. 62, 26-52 (2008).
Dawid, Herbert, and MacLeod, W. Bentley. “Hold-up and the evolution of investment and bargaining norms”. Games and Economic Behavior 62.1 (2008): 26-52.
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