A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions

Dimitrov D, Haake C-J (2008)
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 30(4): 571-579.

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Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Abstract / Bemerkung
We consider hedonic coalition formation games that are induced by a simple TU-game and a cooperative solution. For such models, Shenoy's (Int J Game Theory 8:133-164, 1979) absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions provides a sufficient condition for core existence. We present three different versions of his condition in order to compare it to the top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (Social Choice Welfare 18:135-153, 2001) that guarantees nonemptiness of the core in more general models. As it turns out, the top coalition property implies a condition in which Shenoy's paradox is not present for at least one minimal winning coalition. Conversely, if for each non-null player Shenoy's paradox is not present for at least one minimal winning coalition containing that player, then the induced hedonic game satisfies the top coalition property.
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Zeitschriftentitel
SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
Band
30
Zeitschriftennummer
4
Seite
571-579
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Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE. 2008;30(4):571-579.
Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C. - J. (2008). A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 30(4), 571-579. doi:10.1007/s00355-007-0266-8
Dimitrov, D., and Haake, C. - J. (2008). A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 30, 571-579.
Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C.-J., 2008. A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, 30(4), p 571-579.
D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, “A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions”, SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE, vol. 30, 2008, pp. 571-579.
Dimitrov, D., Haake, C.-J.: A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE. 30, 571-579 (2008).
Dimitrov, Dinko, and Haake, Claus-Jochen. “A note on the paradox of smaller coalitions”. SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE 30.4 (2008): 571-579.