Stable governments and the semistrict core

Dimitrov D, Haake C-J (2008)
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 62(2): 460-475.

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Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Abstract / Bemerkung
We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of power within winning coalitions. These distributions induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the semistrict core, depending on conditions we impose on the solution concept. A bounded power condition, which connects exogenous weights and the solution, turns out to be crucial. It generalizes a condition termed "absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions" that was previously used to derive core existence results. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Erscheinungsjahr
Zeitschriftentitel
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Band
62
Zeitschriftennummer
2
Seite
460-475
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Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Stable governments and the semistrict core. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. 2008;62(2):460-475.
Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C. - J. (2008). Stable governments and the semistrict core. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 62(2), 460-475. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.003
Dimitrov, D., and Haake, C. - J. (2008). Stable governments and the semistrict core. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 62, 460-475.
Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C.-J., 2008. Stable governments and the semistrict core. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 62(2), p 460-475.
D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, “Stable governments and the semistrict core”, GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, vol. 62, 2008, pp. 460-475.
Dimitrov, D., Haake, C.-J.: Stable governments and the semistrict core. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. 62, 460-475 (2008).
Dimitrov, Dinko, and Haake, Claus-Jochen. “Stable governments and the semistrict core”. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 62.2 (2008): 460-475.