Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts

Haake C-J, Klaus B (2009)
ECONOMIC THEORY 41(3): 393-410.

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Zeitschriftenaufsatz | Veröffentlicht | Englisch
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Abstract / Bemerkung
We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (in A Econ Rev, 95(4), 913-935, 2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable. Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence. In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.
Erscheinungsjahr
Zeitschriftentitel
ECONOMIC THEORY
Band
41
Zeitschriftennummer
3
Seite
393-410
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Haake C-J, Klaus B. Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts. ECONOMIC THEORY. 2009;41(3):393-410.
Haake, C. - J., & Klaus, B. (2009). Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts. ECONOMIC THEORY, 41(3), 393-410. doi:10.1007/s00199-008-0399-8
Haake, C. - J., and Klaus, B. (2009). Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts. ECONOMIC THEORY 41, 393-410.
Haake, C.-J., & Klaus, B., 2009. Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts. ECONOMIC THEORY, 41(3), p 393-410.
C.-J. Haake and B. Klaus, “Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts”, ECONOMIC THEORY, vol. 41, 2009, pp. 393-410.
Haake, C.-J., Klaus, B.: Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts. ECONOMIC THEORY. 41, 393-410 (2009).
Haake, Claus-Jochen, and Klaus, Bettina. “Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts”. ECONOMIC THEORY 41.3 (2009): 393-410.