The Relationship between Eugenics and the so-called ‘Euthanasia Action’ in Nazi Germany: A Eugenically Motivated Peace Policy and the Killing of the Mentally Handicapped during the Second World War

In the early stages of research into the so-called ‘euthanasia action’ in Nazi Germany, historians have traced the clinical killing of the mentally handicapped back to a eugenic ideology. The argument was made that the killing of so-called ‘lives not worth living’ (lebensunwertes Leben) was the ‘ultimate form’ of negative eugenics (Schmuhl 1987; see also Klee 1983; Friedlander 1995: 21, 127). However, in rejection of this theory, some scholars have argued that the killing of the handicapped had no ‘systemic place’ in the ideology of race hygienists and eugenicists (Weingart/Kroll/Bayertz 1988: 524; Reyer 1991: 115; Schwartz 1996: 614). Neither from the logic of ‘selection’ nor out of fear of ‘degeneration’, their argument ran, could the killing of human beings have been justified by a eugenic ideology.

A closer look at the sources supports this second view. Before 1939, the majority of eugenicists and race hygienists did not support the systematic killing of the mentally handicapped. They did not foresee any positive racial improvement in the elimination of handicapped people. They believed that there were more effective means of
In Germany socialist, liberal and Catholic eugenicists in particular had argued against the killing of the mentally handicapped when, after the First World War, the professor of law Karl Binding and the psychiatrist Alfred Hoche launched a campaign for the killing of the so-called ‘lives not worth living’ (for an overview see Schwartz 1998). In fact even the great majority of leading right-wing eugenicists and race hygienists drew a clear line between eugenic measures like sterilization and marriage prohibition and the killing of the handicapped. For example in 1913, the Permanent International Eugenics Committee rejected the idea of killing the handicapped. In a programme developed by the Norwegian race hygienist Alfred Mjøen (1914: 140; for more details see Kühl 1997: 36) the international organization claimed that there was a fundamental difference between the right to live and the right to give life. While the first was a fundamental human right, the second should be a privilege only for selected, ‘genetically suitable’ couples.

By accepting this clear-cut distinction between laws concerning reproduction and the actual killing of the mentally handicapped in the former discourse of eugenicists, historians have to explain the actual behaviour of race hygienists and eugenicists when faced with the killing of mentally handicapped people in Germany. Leading members of the German race hygienist movement did participate in the so called ‘T4 killing action’, or at least they accepted the bureaucratised killings without protest (see Müller-Hill 1984; Friedlander 1995: 128; Kühl 1997: 165 and especially Massin 1996: 816–17). For example, Fritz Lenz, the first professor for race hygiene in Germany, participated in 1940 in the attempt to legalize the killing of handicapped people. He was a member of the committee that drafted a ‘euthanasia law’. Ernst Rudin, director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Psychiatry in Munich and long-time president of the International Federation of Eugenic Organizations, collaborated with leading figures of the euthanasia action to redefine the role of psychiatry in Germany. In 1942 he declared his agreement in principle with the killing of the mentally handicapped. Kurt Pohlisch, professor of psychiatry in Bonn and one of the German members of the International Federation of Eugenic Organizations, was one of the medical advisers who during the mass murder operations decided which of the handicapped would be killed. Werner Villinger, one of the leading eugenicists within the scientific community of psychiatrists, was another of the medical experts for adult euthanasia.

In the complex decision-making processes which led to the organized killing programme in Germany the behaviour of the race hygienists needs particular consideration. Why did they accept drastic measures which they had rejected earlier? What was the qualitative turning point from ‘hereditary and racial welfare’ to the systematic extermination programmes? In this essay I shall argue that it required a profound sense of disappointment amongst race hygienists about Germany’s unsuccessful peace policy to secure their acceptance and support for the comprehensive killing programmes. I want to show that the ‘destruction’ of their vision of a stable and peaceful state of ‘superior’ human beings laid them open to proposals for drastic measures which hitherto did not have a systemic place in their programme. To reconstruct this vision of an ‘international eugenic peace order’ I must focus on the place of eugenicists and race hygienists in international politics. The historiography of eugenics has traditionally concentrated on their attitudes towards questions of domestic policy. Their commitment to subsidies for ‘genetically valuable’ couples (positive eugenics) and to the prevention of the reproduction of handicapped people through marriage restrictions, sterilization and imprisonment in asylums (negative eugenics) have been extensively described by historians. Without doubt, eugenicists had their greatest influence on these matters. Their professional background in psychiatry, medicine, genetics, anthropology or population science made them experts in ‘solving’ the social problems of poverty, alcoholism, mental illness, criminality and prostitution. But their focus was not at all limited to domestic policy. Eugenics and race hygiene were comprehensive ideologies, claiming to provide solutions for every question facing mankind. In the first half of the twentieth century, eugenicists in different countries developed proposals for resolving problems of international relations. This vision became more and more the result of the interaction among eugenicists from different nationalities. The eugenically motivated peace policy developing in the 1910s and 1920s shows how eugenicists in Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, Germany, Austria, Norway and Sweden were linked by their common worry about the contra-selective effects of the First World War.

First, I shall demonstrate how the attitude of eugenicists towards war shifted from a positive attitude to a much more critical position. Secondly, I shall show that the experiences of the First World War shaped their perception of war as highly ‘dysergetic’ and stimulated extensive discussion among them. Thirdly, I shall show how the
question of war and peace was linked to the question of the mentally handicapped. Fourthly, I want to point out how the informal international contacts amongst eugenicists became more and more institutionalized. Lastly, I shall show that the Nazi government in Germany took up this international debate and used it to present their race policy as an effective peace policy. I shall try to demonstrate how this eugenically motivated peace vision could ultimately lead to an acceptance of the killing of mentally handicapped people during the Second World War.

War and the ‘Struggle for Survival’

At the turn of the century many scientists involved in the developing eugenics movement tended to see war as an effective means for selecting the superior qualities of a race. Adopting Darwin’s concept of the struggle for existence they stressed the positive influence war had in the selection process. In Germany anthropologists and biologists like Otto Ammon and Heinrich Ernst Ziegler believed in the healthy, hygienically positive effects of war. They assumed that the struggle for survival in war was to prevent social and moral degeneration (Ammon 1895; Ziegler 1893; see also Kröner 1980: 45; Weindling 1989: 99). In Great Britain it was mostly the biometrician Karl Pearson who propagated war as an effective means for race improvement. In November 1900, at the climax of the Boer War, Pearson claimed that the struggle for existence meant suffering, but that this was the mechanism of all progress: ‘This dependence of progress on the survival of the fittest race, terribly black as it may seem to some of you, gives the struggle for existence its redeeming features; it is the fiery crucible out of which comes the finer metal’ (Pearson 1905: 26-7; see also Semmel 1958). Very much in line with the militarist thinking of the time, he claimed that if wars ceased ‘mankind would no longer progress’. There would be nothing to check the fertility of ‘inferior stock’. The relentless ‘law of heredity’ would no longer be controlled and guided by natural selection. As the British historian Geoffrey Searle has pointed out, Pearson’s conviction led to a rapprochement between certain British eugenicists and militarists campaigning for compulsory military service. Colonel Melville, professor of hygiene at the Royal Army Medical College, stated that military service would be eugenically useful because it inculcated in men the ideals of physical fitness, efficiency, courage and patriotism.

He argued that an ‘occasional war’ might be of service because in times of danger ‘the nation looks to the virility of its citizens’ (Melville 1910/11: 54; see also Searle 1976: 37). In the United States it was Roland Campbell Macfie who claimed in several newspapers that wars had an eugenically positive effect on the stock. He took the view that the principal eugenic consequence of wars would be a ‘shortage of men’ and therefore a more ‘careful weeding of women’ was necessary: ‘War means... not so much a martial selection of men by blind bullets and impartial bombs as a deliberate stringent matrimonial selection of women by the critical eyes of men’ (Macfie 1917a: 442). Ultimately war would lead to an improvement in the ‘health and beauty of the combatant races’ (Macfie 1917a: 442; see also Macfie 1917b). The thinking of Ammon and Ziegler in Germany, of Pearson and Melville in the United Kingdom, and of Macfie in the United States was the blatant application of Darwin’s concept of the survival of the fittest to international relations. It fitted well into the militarist, imperialist thinking of the period and linked eugenicists with nationalist movements within the different countries.

Yet by at the beginning of the century other eugenicists started to think differently. Especially in the United States eugenicists were eager to stress the ‘contra-selective’ or - to use the technical term of eugenicists - ‘dysgenic’ effects of war. Vernon Kellogg, a leading American eugenicist and founder of the famous cornflakes, attacked the assumption of eugenic militarists that war’s high mortality was a proof of war’s benefice to the race. He claimed that, on the contrary, ‘military selection is as far as possible removed from natural selection’. In his view, war was ‘peculiarly unnatural’ (Kellogg 1913: 102-6):

I simply cannot see the eugenic advantages of war. On the contrary, not only do I think I can see from the standpoint of the biologist and student of heredity a plausible, logical case for the dysgenic effect of war and military service, but I also believe that we have accessible, actual statistical proof of the deplorable effect.

Like Kellogg, David Starr Jordan (1910: 95; see also Jordan 1915), president of Stanford University, feared the ‘inevitable impoverishment of the stock’ by the effects of the war. The ‘strongest and best men’ would be the ones who were killed or injured and who would leave few or no children. The ‘weaklings alive’ would stay at home and beget children. Jordan and Kellogg were supported by British eugenicists like Edgar Schuster (1912: 231) from University College.
London and Dean William R. Inge (1913/14) of St. Paul’s Cathedral. The stronghold of a eugenic-minded peace policy, however, was without doubt in the United States. Irving Fisher, professor of political economy at Yale University, warned of the waste of germ plasm (see Haller 1963: 88). Along with other eugenicists like Edward A. Ross and Andrew Carnegie, he supported an initiative of Frank Smith, a member of the House of Representatives, for a ‘eugenic peace’. Smith demanded cooperation between Britain, France, Germany and the United States to ensure ‘the spread of the superior human elements’. The ‘omnipotent Anglo-French-German-American-League of Civilization’ would in his opinion be the ‘royal road to disarmament’ (Smith 1914: 2–3; see also Lenz 1914/15).

Eugenicists who saw peace as a necessary condition for improving the racial stock did not automatically reject war as ‘dysgenic’. Alfred Ploetz, who was one of the first German race hygienists pointing to the contra-selective effects of war, also proposed in 1895 that the ‘worst individuals’ should be drafted for military service. In the case of war ‘especially bad specimens’ should be used as ‘cannon fodder’ (Ploetz 1895: 147; see also Lutzhoft 1971: 335). Paul Popeneoe and Roswell Johnson (1933: 210), authors of the main eugenic textbook in the United States, claimed that theoretically it would be possible to reform the process of war so that it would be mainly eugenic in effect. This ‘eugenic war’ would be fought with ‘elderly men as officers and with mental defectives in the ranks’. And even Kellogg (1914: 48), main promoter of a eugenically motivated peace policy, admitted that military selection might be of biological advantage if it were the whole population that was exposed.

Many eugenicists demanding a eugenic peace order agreed that there was something like a biologically determined tendency in human beings to fight wars. Fritz Lenz (1923: 51–3) wrote that ‘most people have a belligerent instinct’. Albert E. Wiggam (1923: 218), an American writer and popularizer of the idea of eugenic peace, stated that human beings naturally wanted, like animals, war, and that there was no peace in nature. Along with this assumption about the ‘nature’ of human beings, eugenicists claimed in general that the war between ‘primitive tribes’ had to this day a positive selective effect. Lenz (1923: 53), for example, stated that war between ‘primitive people’ led to the expansion of the more capable group. Furthermore, within this superior group the men fittest for active service would in general have more children than the weaker men. A similar argument is used by the British biologist J. Arthur Thomson:

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old Roman stock was for the most part banished or exterminated through wars: 'The Romans were gone and that was the end of it; while the sons of slaves, camp-followers, scullions, and peddlers filled the eternal city' (Jordan 1913: 140). From the perspective of Jordan and Kellogg, Napoleon’s difficulties in the later years of the Wars of the Empire paralleled the earlier Roman conditions. In order to make his conscription net gather its necessary load of men, he first had to reduce, in 1799, the minimum height of conscripts fit for service from 1,624 mm to 1,598 mm. In 1804 he lowered it to 1,544 mm (Kellogg 1912: 226). Kellogg concluded:

The actual results in racial modification due to the removal from the breeding population of France of its able-bodied male youth, leaving its feeble-bodied youth and senescent maturity at home to be the father of the new generation, is plainly visible in the condition of the conscript of later years. From the recruiting statistics, as officially recorded, it may be stated with confidence that the average height of the men of France began notably to decrease with the coming of age in 1813 and on, of the young men born in the years of the Revolutionary Wars, and that it continued to decrease in the following years with the coming of age of youths born during the Wars of the Empire. (Kellogg 1914: 46-7)

Kellogg stated that the average height of the annual conscription contingent born during the Napoleonic Wars was about 1,625 mm in size, and increased only with those born after the war. Other examples, more or less underlined by scientific data, were the decline of the Spanish Empire during the seventeenth century, the dysgenic effects of the Civil War in the United States, and the 'inferior' German and French babies born during the war of 1870-71 (Jordan 1910: 102; Jordan 1913: 140).

The discussions among eugenicists at the beginning of the twentieth century about the dysgenic or eugenic effects of war were highly controversial. At the first International Congress for Eugenics in 1912, eugenicists from different nationalities discussed under the pressure of the tense international situation the factors which make for racial improvement or decay’ (Eugenics Education Society n.d.: 4). In the section entitled ‘Sociology and Eugenics’, Vernon Kellogg presented his thesis that modern war was dysgenic and had to be prevented:

The whole army is a group of individuals not chosen at random from the population, representing both sexes, all ages, and weak and strong alike, but is already, by the very conditions of its organization, a part of the population selected first for sex and then for ripe youth, full stature and strength, and freedom from infirmity and disease. (Kellogg 1912: 223)

His speech was attacked particularly by eugenicists with personal or professional links to the military. A German general claimed that ‘military service is not injurious to the body but healthy, and not depressing to mind and spirit but inspiring’ (quoted according to Kellogg 1913: 108). Arnold White, representing the British National Service League, drew attention to the ‘eugenic effect of discipline, of training, of obedience, and of learning the secret of willingness to die for a principle’ (quoted according to Searle 1976: 37).

This discussion among eugenicists was influenced by disagreement about whether acquired traits could be inherited. The ‘eugenic militarists’ often based their argument on the Lamarckian assumption that the impact of the environment could improve the gene structure of human beings. Their opponents focused their criticism on this premise, which was becoming increasingly discredited among scientists. The American eugenicist, Roswell H. Johnson, claimed that only ‘by a strange confusion of cause and effect’ had it been assumed in some quarters that the ‘waste of virility from war’ could be repaired by universal military drill. He categorically denied that physical and mental vigor increased by training would be passed on to future offspring. His colleague Jordan stated that traits desirable in the soldier such as physical strength, agility, courage and patriotism were lost in the race which enforced the destruction of the soldierly: The delusion that war in one generation sharpens the edge of warriorhood in the next generation, has no biological foundation. It is the man who is left who always determines the future (Jordan 1910: 96).

However, despite the decline of Lamarckian thinking at the beginning of the twentieth century, it was only because of the devastating consequences of the First World War that eugenicists from different countries developed a common position towards war.

The Impact of the First World War

Because of the controversy about the eugenic and dysgenic effects of war, the eugenics societies in Germany, France, Great Britain and the United States refrained from formulating a unified position on this question. It was not until the outbreak of the First World War that this situation changed. Although the different national societies
accepted their patriotic obligations, more and more of their members started to worry about the 'dysgenic' effects of the war. The Eugenics Review (7, 1915: 131) remarked that in Great Britain the subject of 'eugenics and the War' was treated 'in many parts of the country and by different speakers'. In its pages, Edward B. Poulton (1916: 39-40) and Leonard Darwin (1917), president of the British eugenics society, agreed that 'war unquestionably killed off the better types, and was therefore highly dysgenic'. Poulton was especially concerned that 'the young men who have willingly gone forth from Oxford and from Cambridge for their country and for the liberty of the world' were dying in the trenches. Because their courage was, 'intellectual and moral rather than physical' these were the men needed for the coming 'social reconstruction' (see also: Eugenics News, 1, 1916: 43-4). In the United States, the outbreak of the First World War motivated many eugenicists to link themselves with efforts for a fast ending of the war. Johnson (1915: 548) summarized the position of many of his colleagues in the American Journal of Heredity. He stated that because of the war the 'inherent quality' of the human species declined 'faster than in any previous similar length of time'. When, in 1917, Roland Campbell Macfie claimed that the killing of 500 of the best individuals would lead to an improvement of the stock because women would have greater choice among men he was immediately criticized by several of his colleagues. In Italy and Austria eugenicists also became critical of the war. The Italian Marcello Boldrini saw three reasons for the 'racially damaging' effects of the war. First of all, the people fighting in the trenches were lost to the selection process. Secondly, the people of low physical and mental calibre who had been rejected for military service became fathers. Thirdly, because of the war, tuberculosis, malaria and mental illness could spread (Boldrini 1921; also Sergi 1917; Archiv für Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie 14, 1921: 228; Eugenics Review 10, 1918: 113). In Austria, the anatomist Julius Tandler described the war as a 'monumental concentration of the struggle for existence'. He stressed the negative effects of the 'widespread mixture of races' which was an indirect consequence of the war. (Tandler 1916; see also Byer 1988: 73-5) In Germany, race hygienists had been strongly influenced by imperialist and militarist thinking. However, in the course of the war, their position changed fundamentally. Ernst Haeckel, honorary member of the German Society for Race Hygiene and before 1914 a glorifier of selection through war, was shocked by modern warfare:

The longer the terrible war of the nations lasts and the greater the values which it destroys in human lives, in cultural acquisitions and in material possessions, the more urgent grows the desire on all sides for the immediate establishment of peace.... Our aim is to prevent the inevitable... 'competitive struggle' from degenerating into a bloody and murderous 'struggle for existence'. The higher civilized nations should exercise mutual tolerance towards each other and combine for higher common cultural work in the service of true humanity. (Haeckel 1916: 104-5; see also Semmel 1958: 123)

Géza von Hoffmann (1916), the Hungarian link between the German race hygienists and American eugenicists, regretted that a considerable part of 'the best, the most courageous and the healthiest had been eradicated forever'. At the end of the war, the Archiv für Rassen-und Gesellschaftsbiologie assessed this change in thinking among German race hygienists. It claimed that even the race hygienists who had stressed the positive effects of wars before 1914 no longer denied the devastating contra-selective results of modern warfare any longer (Schweisheimer 1918/21: 11; see also Propping/Heuer 1991).

Ironically, the First World War brought eugenicists from different countries closer together. They intensified their informal contacts in spite of the fact that international gatherings ceased to take place between 1914 and 1918 and that the Permanent International Eugenics Committee stopped its activities during this time (Laughlin 1934: 2). They corresponded, reviewed each other's work and discussed their concerns about the dysgenic effects of the war. Eugenicists from different countries started to meet again immediately after the end of the war. Only the German and Austrian race hygienists and the Russian eugenicists were excluded from this. The first informal meeting took place in January 1919 and the first meeting of the Permanent International Eugenics Committee took place in October 1919. Eugenicists from the United States, Belgium, Great Britain, Australia, Denmark, France, Italy and Norway agreed to hold an international congress of eugenics as soon as possible. When in September 1921 more than 300 participants gathered in New York for the Second International Congress for Eugenics, the dysgenic effects of the World War was one of the major topics. The invitation for the Congress stated:

Since the First International Congress the world war has come and gone and the question in more than one country is whether the finest racial stocks have not been so depleted by it that they are in danger of
Eugenicists did not hesitate to claim that they had a direct contribution to make towards 'securing the peace which the leading civilized nations are anxious to obtain for the world' (Bedwell 1923: 429). At his opening address, the American eugenicist Henry Fairfield Osborn (1921: 311), president of the congress, claimed that there had never before been a moment in the world's history when an 'international conference on race character and betterment' had been more important. Europe, he continued, had lost, in 'patriotic self-sacrifice', the heritage of centuries of civilization which can never be regained. In certain parts of Europe 'the worst elements of society' had gained the ascendancy and threatened the 'destruction of the best'.

Despite the desperation about the devastating effects of the war, eugenicists saw an extraordinary chance for developing and propagating their eugenic programme. Paul Popenoe, an influential eugenicist from California, stated that the war had forced people to think about 'race value' and 'artificial selection' and that eugenic thinking had gained a new popularity in the United States (Popenoe 1923/1924: 196; see also Popenoe/Johnson 1933: v). In Germany, as the historian Paul Weindling has pointed out, virtually every aspect of eugenic thought and practice—from 'euthanasia' of the unfit and sterilization to positive welfare—developed between 1918 and 1924 (Weindling 1989: 307).

The Eugenically Minded Peace Order and the Question of the 'Inferior Members' of Society

Impressed by the devastating effects of the First World War, eugenicists agreed on two ways of addressing the dysgenic effects of war. First, eugenicists saw themselves as obliged to try and prevent another war. Ignaz Kaup, an influential race hygienist from Munich, claimed the fashionable flirtation with the idea of 'the wild struggle for existence' represented a serious danger for civilization. He demanded that German race hygiene should break with this thinking 'once and for all'. (Kaup 1922: 15) The programme commission of the Eugenics Society of the United States claimed that the effort to prevent future wars was 'a matter of fundamental eugenic concern' (see Eugenic News, 8 (1923): 72). Secondly, eugenicists understood the need to make up for the loss of 'valuable stock' during the war. In 1917, the Berlin Society for Race Hygiene had already presented a memorandum to the Reichstag in favour of making medical examination compulsory before marriage. With this 'certification of fitness' German race hygienists wanted to reduce the dysgenic effects of the war (Ellis 1919: 110). Georges Papillault (1921; see also Eugenic News, 7, 1922: 6) claimed before the French Society for Eugenics that the Great War had confirmed the laws of eugenics and that the reproduction of 'inadequates' had to be prevented more urgently than ever before.

Eugenicists linked their peace policy directly with the question of the so-called 'inferior members' of society. Especially after the First World War they saw warfare and welfare as directly intertwined. Irving Fisher, a prime mover in the American eugenics movement, demanded, as immediate consequences of the war: first a league of nations to prevent another war, and secondly the prevention of inmates of mental hospitals from procreating. The British eugenicist Havelock Ellis (1919: 120–1) claimed that the war has rendered the 'relation of the fit members of the community to the unfit' far more acute: 'Never before has it been so urgent a demand on us to do all in our power to prevent the breeding of the unfit and to limit the breeding of the less fit members of society.'

The strategy which eugenicists used to link their peace policy with the question of the unfit was the transfer of the selection process from the level of the group or state to that of the reproductive cells (Weindling 1989: 125). They stressed that the struggle for existence did not cease to exist with a eugenically minded peace policy. It would only be more rationally planned. The process of selection and survival of the fittest would be transferred to the level of the individual. In the thinking of eugenicists, the systematically organized struggle for existence was much more promising than the wild fights favoured by social Darwinists in the second half of the nineteenth century. Fritz Lenz stressed that collective or group selection brought positive results only among primitive people. With the modernization of society, group selection through wars would lose its positive effects. Therefore, it was fundamental to move from that level to a systematic selection on the individual level (Lenz 1923: 53; see also Ploetz 1895: 230).

Not without reason were the mentally handicapped and the 'fight' against them now described with military analogies. After the First
World War, the eugenicists saw their countries invaded by an 'army of the unfit'. The social democratic eugenicist Alfred Grotjahn from Berlin saw the isolation of the army of beggars, alcoholics, criminals, prostitutes, psychopaths, epileptics, mental invalids, feebleminded, and cripples as central for the recreation of the German people. The American eugenicist Edward Grant Conklin claimed that the 'armies of defective and delinquent persons in every nation and race' testified to the fact that 'there is an urgent need for racial improvement'.

Herman Lundborg, the leading race hygienist from Sweden, described the 'internal enemies' - the 'inferior' members of society - as extremely dangerous because they would be responsible for the degeneration of a race. He demanded that doctors and sociologists should lead the fight against them (Lundborg 1926: 3).

The First World War influenced the discussion about the medical killing of 'lives not worth living'. The debate about the so-called 'euthanasia' of mentally handicapped people which began in Germany immediately after the war was dominated by the contrasting images of 'valuable' soldiers dying in the trenches and 'lives not worth living' vegetating in mental institutions (Schmuhl 1987: 107). The German lawyer Karl Binding, one of the main proponents of the killing of the mentally handicapped, wrote that he was deeply disturbed by the 'sharp discord' between a 'battlefield full of thousands of dead youths' and 'mental institutions with their care for their living inmates'. The psychiatrist Alfred Hoche with whom in 1920 Binding published an influential book about the destruction of life not worth living, changed his opinion regarding 'euthanasia' only after the experience of the First World War. Germany's defeat in the war and the loss of one of his own sons made him one of the most aggressive promoters of the killing of mentally handicapped people (Binding/Hoche 1920; see also Lifton 1986: 47; Weindling 1989: 394-5).

Interestingly enough, the debate about 'euthanasia' took place mostly outside the German race hygiene movement (see Weingart/Kroll/Bayerzt 1988: 524). Also the eugenic movements in Great Britain, France and the United States did not become active in the discussion of the killing of 'lives not worth living'. Fritz Lenz (1932: 307) wrote in the main race hygienist textbook that 'euthanasia' was from a eugenic point of view not very effective and that, therefore, race hygienists should not support corresponding initiatives. The American Eugenic News claimed that there were only small practical applications of eugenics in euthanasia. It warned against placing them together in the same programme of social reform: 'For the ancient Spartan and for the animal-breeding world euthanasia is a practical technique for breed-improvement, but in eugenics mankind has something more basic, less cruel and much more effective for purging racial and family stocks of degenerate qualities' (Eugenic News 20 (1935): 38-9).

However, the race hygienists and eugenicists agreed with some of the basic assumptions of the proponents of euthanasia. They both condemned the disastrous effects of the World War and they both tried to prevent so-called 'inferior life'. Therefore, eugenicists generally did not attack Binding, Hoche and their supporters on the grounds that they were supporting the murder of human beings, but instead argued that a 'selection process' should terminate the production of 'inferior' offspring and not the existence of already living people. The German eugenicist Karl H. Bauer (1926: 27) stated that in the selection process the death of the individual is not of central importance, because 'we all must die'. Rather the 'number and hereditary value of the offspring' should be the central focus.

The International Organization of Eugenicists against War

In the 1920s the informal international contacts among eugenicists dealing with the eugenic and dysgenic consequences of war became more and more institutionalized. In 1927 the International Federation of Eugenic Organizations - the successor of the Permanent International Eugenics Committee - decided to form an international committee on eugenics and war. The initiative came from American eugenicists, particularly from Charles Davenport and Irving Fisher. Davenport, who was president of the International Federation, thought that a strong committee on this subject might influence governments in their attitude towards warfare. The Italian eugenicist, Corrado Gini, who had strong links to a special bureau at the Italian Ministry of War, became chairman of the committee and was responsible for coordinating research on the eugenic and dysgenic effects of the First World War. The committee, which consisted of eugenicists from France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Japan, Great Britain, Bulgaria, India, Hungary, Austria and the United States, planned a systematic investigation in every nation that had participated in the First World War. Although the committee never succeeded in presenting a common report, its members presented...
their investigations at several international gatherings. The German population scientist, Friedrich Burgdörfer, and the French eugenicist, Henry Briand, gave talks at the International Congress of Population Science in Rome in 1931. At the 1932 International Congress for Eugenics in New York, Harrison Hunt (1934: 244; see also Hunt 1930), one of the American committee members, claimed that his research had illustrated the dysgenic effects of war. Theodore Szél (1934: 252), a eugenicist from Hungary, used the same occasion to state that there could be no doubt that the 'eugenic effects of the World War, which in certain respects were beneficial, had become completely dwarfed by the dysgenic effects'. Gini (1934: 299) himself gave a differentiated picture of the eugenic and dysgenic effects. He concluded, however, that the 'selection which occurred among the soldiers during the war period has had an unfavourable effect from the eugenic point of view'.

With the growing international tensions of the 1930s the international eugenics movement became more and more active in propagating a eugenic peace order. In 1934 eugenicists from twelve countries met in Zurich to discuss recent developments in eugenics. Ernst Rudin, successor of Davenport as president of the International Federation of Eugenic Organizations, welcomed the participants and stressed that the 'will for peace between the people' was an important 'common tie' between eugenicists from all nations. He stated that 'all eugenicists know that war would mean an awful eradication of the most capable and valuable elements of a nation' (International Federation of Eugenic Organizations 1934: 4). Besides an evaluation of the new German race policies, the potentially negative effects of a new world war were the main topic at the conference. Initiated by Alfred Ploetz, the conference passed a resolution expressing its condemnation of the new German race policies, the potentially negative effects of a new world war were the main topic at the conference. Initiated by Alfred Ploetz, the conference passed a resolution expressing its punishment of the soldiers during the war period has had an unfavourable effect from the eugenic point of view'.

The Nazi race politicians completely adopted the eugenic argument against war. Their propaganda claimed that German race policies were central for ensuring peace among the different nations. Walter Gross, head of the Racial Political Office of the NSDAP, speaking before diplomats, described 'race policy as peace policy'. The aim to improve the German race would force Nazi Germany to be a peaceful nation: 'Because Nazi Germany thinks racially, it wants peace. The National Socialist ideology represents the most peaceful one, because it is the only one which sees its aim as the preservation of the racial essence of the people.' He concluded that even a victory in a potential war would be a defeat biologically (Gross 1935: 1–6). The race hygienists in Nazi Germany developed the vision that only a community of healthy people could develop a stable peace order. In the second edition of the commentary to the German sterilization law, Arthur Gütt, Ernst Rudin and Falk Ruttké expressed their hope that 'Germany's struggle for hereditarily healthy offspring' would lead to 'true community of the healthy and strong people'. Only this community would be able to 'give the world a new and better form' and would result in the 'true peace' among the most valuable (Gütt/Rudin/Ruttké 1936: 72; see also Steinwallner 1937: 251). Hitler himself stood for this vision of 'peace among the selected people'. He took over the eugenic claim that every war would only destroy the most valuable and that therefore the National Socialists' will for peace was their 'deepest ideological conviction' (see Frercks 1937: 45–6).
This propaganda for 'race policy as peace policy' was the ideological matrix within which the Nazis could justify the killing of the handicapped. The specific connection made between the extraordinary situation of war and the 'special' sacrifice of the mentally handicapped was already obvious in the discussion about compulsory sterilization. Gross (1935) justified mass sterilization in Nazi Germany by the fact that a state demanding the lives of its soldiers could also demand from certain people that they should give up their right to procreate. Ruttké (1934) claimed that the Germans had seen more than once that for the 'public welfare' the state had asked its 'best citizens' to sacrifice their lives. Therefore, it would be 'strange' if it could not ask a much smaller sacrifice from 'hereditarily inferior people'. When in 1935 Eugen Stahle (1935: 1; see Bock 1997), an administrator in the Ministry of the Interior of Württemberg, had to explain the deaths resulting from compulsory sterilization, he defended them by comparing them to the soldiers dying in the First World War. Later, Stahle who was active in carrying out the murder of mentally handicapped people, used the same argument to justify the Nazi killing programme: 'If during the war we ask thousands of young and healthy people to sacrifice their lives for the community, we can ask the same sacrifice from the incurably ill.' After 1945, Hermann Pfannmüller, another central figure in the killing programme, justified his participation in a very similar way. He put on record that he just could not bear the fact that 'the best, the flower of our youth' lost their lives at the front 'in order that feebleminded and asylums' (quoted according to Schmidt 1965: 34). This 'deeper psychological relationship between "euthanasia" and war' had a strong influence on the killing process (Lifton 1986: 63). This 'deeper psychological relationship between "euthanasia" and war' had a strong influence on the killing process (Lifton 1986: 63).

The outbreak of the Second World War gave Hitler immediate cause for launching a programme for the systematic extermination of the mentally handicapped. In his notorious 'euthanasia' decree he empowered Philipp Bouhler and Karl Brandt to administer the killing programme (translation according to Lifton 1986: 63): 'Reich Leader Bouhler and Dr. Brandt are charged with the responsibility for expanding the authority of physicians, to be designated by name, to the end that patients considered incurable according to the best available human judgement of their state of health, can be granted a mercy death.'

Although the decree was actually issued at the end of October 1939 it was symbolically back-dated to 1 September, the day when Nazi Germany invaded Poland. The association of the killing programme with the outbreak of the Second World War was more than clear. Hitler and his colleagues took up the connection between war and peace and the question of the 'inferior members' of the German people.

German race hygienists were confronted with the dissociation of their peace and race policy. For them the apparent rationale, system and logic of race policies during peacetime seemed to end. They felt that the Second World War interrupted their biological mission and that, therefore, extraordinary measures were justified. Already in 1935 Alfred Ploetz had claimed that in the case of war the state had to make up for war's contra-selective effects through the 'increase of the extermination and selection quotas' (Ploetz 1936: 618). Rüdin stated at the end of 1939 that the English government had begun the war despite the efforts of German race hygienists and their colleagues in other countries to prevent a war between the European nations. So Germany had to fight back and at the same moment continue its race hygienist mission (Rüdin 1939: 443-5; see also Weber 1993: 233). Hermann Ernst Grobig, one of Rüdin's collaborators at the German Institute for Psychiatry in Munich, claimed in 1943 that the 'race hygienist and race political measures should in no way take a second place behind the war efforts'. On the contrary, because of the war, the measures for race improvement had to be intensified. This strategy, Grobig stated, was central to many for the outcome of the war as for the 'consolidation of the victory' (Grobig 1943; see also Weber 1993: 268).

Similar arguments were made by the population scientist Friedrich Burgdörfer. In 1942, he argued that from a eugenic point of view the war was disastrous not only for the German people but also for the English and French 'who had already been biologically on a steeply sloping road' (Burgdörfer 1942: 5). He described it as a patriotic obligation for the Germans to improve their racial values. Every 'hereditarily healthy' couple that neglected its reproductive obligations should be held responsible for 'national desertion'. Burgdörfer added that, besides winning the war, the preservation and increase of 'people power' should be a principal goal. Only this way could Germany pass the 'biological endurance test' (Burgdörfer 1942: 29, 39).

It is in this context that we must view the attitudes of influential eugenicists like Otmar von Verschuer, Eugen Fischer, Fritz Lenz and
Ernst Rüdin towards the mass killing. The contrast between their utopian vision of a eugenic peace order of superior human beings and the devastating results of the Second World War made them completely immune to moral scruples about the killing of mentally handicapped people. They saw the necessity not only for an economic and military mobilization, but especially for a biological one. This could only mean a further radicalization of their race hygiene policy. The killing programme was the symbiosis of an economic, military and race hygienic mobilization at the 'home front'. In the perverse logic of race hygienists the killing programme helped to save economic resources, created hospital beds for injured soldiers and could counteract the supposedly 'racial degeneration' of the German people.

Conclusion

The leading eugenicists in Nazi Germany did not object to killing in principle. The starting point for their peace policy was not a rejection of killing for humanitarian reasons but the contra-selective effects of certain forms of killings. For them killing was a neutral issue subordinated to the higher goal of race improvement. Therefore, eugenicists could imagine a eugenically perfect war. They could consider wars between primitive people as positive from a eugenic point of view. They thereby distinguished themselves from all other pacifist movements in the early twentieth century. For eugenicists, the outbreak of the Second World War meant the destruction of a proper eugenic situation. They saw their utopian ideals, which seemed to come true under the Nazis, destroyed by the war. In this situation they considered extraordinary means to be legitimate. In this light the death of tens of thousands of mentally handicapped people was partly due to the unfulfilled utopian vision of a 'eugenic peace' among peoples of superior racial stock.

Notes

1. For a good introduction to the problems of the historiography of the killing of 'lives not worth living', see Nowak (1988) and Burleigh (1991 and 1994).
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