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Life Course Risks and Welfare States' Risk Management

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1 Introduction

For many years, the formative influence of the welfare state on the life course has been subject of life course theory and research (see, e.g., Mayer and Müller 1986). Indeed, the complex intersections between the life course and welfare state were important motivations for the collection of extensive longitudinal data on a large scale. More such data than ever have become available over the last two decades, allowing for in-depth cross-national and historical analyses in this field. But despite the opportunities such data provide, there is still considerable uncertainty about how best to conceptualize the influences of the welfare state on the life course and how to make full use of the concepts that life course research has to offer.

Given that there is no overarching life course theory and that there are a variety of approaches to examine welfare state influences, the question is, what concepts might be most suitable for elucidating features of welfare states and their consequences for the life course? If these concepts are to be used to study welfare states, they must give due consideration not only to the diversification and historical transformation of political economies that result from specific policies, but also to the fact that such specific policies are embedded within the welfare state agencies that develop and implement them and that consist of relatively stable laws, institutions, and cultures (Kaufmann 2012). If they are also to be used to study the life course, such concepts must give equal consideration not only to the direct and immediate influences of institutions and policies on people but also to the longer-term temporal patterns of influences over and above the immediate intended ones. That is, to the side effects on other life domains, and possible consequences for the significant others of the individuals to whom policy interventions are aimed. In other words, researchers must take into account the fundamental principles of the life course approach to be able to study the causal nexus between states and events over lifetimes, interdependent developments in different life domains, and linked lives (see Elder 1995).

In this essay I use the concepts 'life course risks' and 'risk management by the welfare state' because they offer a promising approach to study the relationship between welfare states and life courses in general and the production of social inequalities in particular. The life course risk concept is not new; rather, it is based on the work of several scholars whose concepts I will develop further, with a focus on how the life course risk concept can contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms behind the major impact the state has on stratification. I first introduce the life
course risk concept and its distinction from life course adversity (Part 2). I will give particular attention to life course concepts that relate to longer-term impacts on the distribution of life chances. I then discuss approaches that embed the risk concept in a broader framework of mechanistic approaches to stratification and relational inequality theory (Part 3). Following this discussion, I introduce risk management as an important part of welfare states’ agency that has not yet been given the attention it deserves in life course research (Part 4).

2 Life Course Risks and Adversity

The term ‘risk’ is often used in a rather vague and ambiguous manner or is used to define merely statistical relationships, but it can also help us develop theory in life course research (Mayer 2009: 424). The terms ‘risk’ and ‘adversity’ are often confused and used interchangeably. Schoon and Bynner (2003), for example, note that adversity, or risk, ‘can encompass genetic, biological, psychological, or socioeconomic factors that are associated with increased risk of maladjustment’ (Schoon and Bynner 2003: 22). In contrast, Ferraro et al. (2009: 422) explicitly advocate a conceptual distinction between ‘risk’ and ‘adversity,’ defining ‘risk’ as the probability of a hazard or negative event occurring in the future, stating that “once a risk eventuates in a negative outcome, it becomes a disadvantage [or adversity]” (see also O’Rand 2003: 694). Events and states that may not be perceived as adverse or disadvantageous can increase the risk of later adversity. For example, parental pampering of children is often perceived as comfortable but might at the same time prevent the development of tenacity and necessary adaptive skills. Furthermore, adversity may or may not create risk for future adversity, depending on the availability of coping resources and successful coping strategies.

These considerations explicitly connect risk and adversity to the agency of individuals, networks, organizations, and institutions. Ferraro et al. (2009: 425) specifically mention the role of the individual’s social, economic, and psychological resources and the mobilization of these resources in shaping life trajectories (see also O’Rand 2001; Schoon and Bynner 2003). All of these resources (e.g., significant others, like parents or friends, and organizational supports) may help to prevent risks from turning into adversity. The individual’s agency, likewise, can prevent exposure to risk and disrupt the association between risk exposures and actual adversity.

The same is true for state agency, the state’s purposive actions to shape the lives of its citizens. According to DiPrete (2002: 268) risky life events do not necessarily lead to adverse living conditions because the possible adverse consequences of risky life events may be mitigated by welfare states to a considerable degree. He demonstrates the striking differences between welfare state regimes in shaping risks in terms of the incidence of risky life events and of buffers against their adverse consequences. For example, some welfare states, like the German one, discourage a decision to divorce in order to avoid this risky event, but, if it occurs, they fail to compensate for adversities such divorce’s negative consequences for income. Other welfare states, like the Swedish one, do not try to discourage divorce, but, if it occurs, they buffer effectively against negative financial consequences. Thus, both the person and state need to conceptualized in terms of preventing risks and, should they occur, preventing adversity.

A multidisciplinary life course framework acknowledges that causal factors for life course risks and adversity may be the result of specific developments at several levels over time. The starting point is the fundamental question of how society affects the individuals who live within its boundaries: Whom does the state favor? To identify possible causal nexuses that might create risks over individuals’ life courses, I distinguish, for heuristic purposes, among three levels of development, each with two possible outcomes (see also Diewald et al. 2015):

(a) The development of favorable or unfavorable physiological or mental characteristics,
often, to some degree, as a result of genetic variation;
(b) the manifestation of such embodied characteristics in favorable or detrimental decisions and behaviors;
(c) the transformation of behavior into unequal life chances—risk and exposure—as a result of these characteristics and behaviors.

The definition of risk starts with heterogeneity in the genetic propensity and physiological processes to exhibit certain "embodied" characteristics that play a role for advantage and disadvantage. A definition of risk at the level of individual development has to be aware that general skills may be relevant for a number of outcomes in several life domains and life phases. For example, early self-control appears to be related to many outcomes in later life. And contrary to the conventional view, this understanding of 'risk' should not be limited to the emergence of negative characteristics and behavior (e.g., aggression, anxiety). Risk also involves low or no propensity to exhibit favorable and protective characteristics (Nisbett et al. 2012). Finally, the blocking of detrimental characteristics and behaviors and the activation of favorable ones is conducive to socio-economic attainment.

In addition to these levels of development, we must still identify possible additional factors "outside the individual" that may mediate or moderate these interrelated developments, namely on the levels of families, social networks, neighborhoods, and wider social contexts such as organizations and national and supranational societies. For example, genetic risk for deviant behavior may be counteracted by effective social control (Shanahan et al. 2008), perhaps by the family or state interventions (e.g., mentoring programs).

There may be a tendency of risks to generate more risks and of advantage to create more advantage over the life course. Trajectories may, however, be altered by the mobilization of individual and social resources and by the activation of individual agency (Ferraro et al. 2009). However, the empirical results on the long-term influence of early-life events on later-life events are mixed and do not support assumptions of continuity as unambiguously as life course researchers might wish (see Mayer 2009: 417–418 for an overview). Obviously, there is also room for reversion to and compensation for early risk and adversity, and it appears that the mechanisms that cause perpetuation or reversion are quite specific depending on different antecedents, outcomes, and times and places. This point is illustrated by research on unemployment and the question of why unemployment leads to future unemployment. Heckman and Borjas (1980) observe that a continuation of unemployment risk may be due to already existing and enduring skill or motivation deficits that repeatedly lead to such adversity. Insofar as it is due to such individual heterogeneity, it is unlikely that adversity will be compensated later on but rather will continue due to the same reasons of skill or motivation deficits, leading repeatedly to unfavorable behaviors. The emergence of these characteristics themselves—the first of the three level risk concept displayed above—then becomes a major task in identifying the 'risk chain' over the life course. The same is true for the transmission of risk across family generations (see chapter "Three Generation Studies: Methodological Challenges and Problems" by Thornberry, this volume). Thus, what appears to be risk and adversity may in fact be endogenous to very early developmental patterns. This is not a statistical point but rather a substantive one: a life course approach to risk and adversity must begin with the developmental emergence of basic behavioral patterns and decision-making resources that the person will then bring to subsequent situations.

Accordingly, risk analysis must also involve taking into account an individual-development perspective in addition to examining events and trajectories alone (see D'ewald and Mayer 2009). However, this chain of risk is also due to how experiences of unemployment alter skills and motivation and how they lead to unfavorable behaviors. These can be considerably mitigated through state agency, avoiding such a downward spiral. Gangl (2004) showed that higher unemployment benefits prolong the duration of
unemployment but, at the same time, allow workers to sustain their search for adequate jobs, which ultimately avoided longer-run scarring effects. Gangi showed that avoiding such scarring effects is a major advantage in Germany in contrast to the US. Thus, policy regimes play a critical role in shaping the individual’s developmental and life course patterns.

To summarize thus far: Risk and adversity are two interrelated but distinct concepts. Whether a risk leads to adversity is dependent on intervening forces at the levels of the individual, significant others, social contexts, and the mitigating role of welfare state policies and institutions. Over the life course, the emergence of risk starts with the development of unfavorable characteristics reflecting early biological differences (e.g., genetic and intrauterine experiences), as precursor of unfavorable decisions and behaviors, which finally may lead to adversity. However, risk is not only the probability that unfavorable characteristics, behaviors, and adversities occur but also the probability that, against the odds, genetic propensities to favourable characteristics do not unfold, that favourable characteristics do not lead to favourable behaviors and, finally, do not lead to advantage.

3 Risks and Relational Theories of Stratification

Although the circumstances by which risk occurs might indeed be complex and specific for every single risk (divorce, unemployment, serious illness), there continues to be a remarkable gap between such life course risk concepts and theories that could put the risk and adversity generating steps described above into a coherent theoretical framework of stratification. Here, I propose taking mechanistic explanations of relational inequalities for such a framework. Relational inequality theory (Tilly 1998; Avent-Holt and Tomaskovic-Devey 2014) deals with the question of why some people get more respect, resources, and rewards than others. ‘Relational’ means that inequalities are not characteristics situated in people or status positions but are negotiated in relationships between people and status groups. Diewald and Faist (2011) distinguished four major groups of attributes of negotiations that characterize relational inequalities: (1) ascriptive attributes such as distinguishing physiological features, gender, age, nationality, and ethnicity; (2) cultural preferences, ways of life, lifestyles, attitudes, and orientations; (3) competencies, qualifications, and characteristics that are regarded by a society as legitimate mechanisms for the allocation of opportunities or that are at least discussed as such; and (4) the differentiation of activities in the context of social division of labor.

How does the emergence of inequalities out of such heterogeneities fit into the risk and adversity framework developed above? This is illustrated in Fig. 1: The risk pathway outlined in the previous section characterizes processes over the life course shaped by social mechanisms that create inequalities between such related groups—in our case with respect to the emergence of risk and adversity. The most prominent and quite universal social mechanism found in the literature is social closure. Social closure means conscious or unconscious attempts of one group to exclude other groups from access to scarce cultural and material resources, like occupational positions, income, respect, citizenship rights, welfare state benefits, or education. Social closure comprises mechanisms that are often discussed with different labels, like boundary making, stereotyping, stigmatization, or opportunity hoarding (Tilly 1998; Reskin 2003; Diewald and Faist 2011; Tomaskovic-Devey 2014).

The basic idea is that relational group membership (e.g., low and high SES groups) moderates risk pathways, as shown in the figure. For example, Guo and Stearns (2002) compared the levels of realized genetic potential for intellectual development across different social groups. They showed that children from disadvantaged social backgrounds have lower chances to realize their genetic potential than those from a social background with more resources and no ethnic discrimination. In other words, children from disadvantaged backgrounds are excluded from opportunities to develop their genetic endowments.
This example shows in addition that advantage and disadvantage are not only a possible consequence of risk but can themselves become a risk for further developments in a longitudinal perspective.

A similar inequality in risk exposure can be demonstrated for the path from characteristics to decisions and behavior. According to Breen and Goldthorpe (1997) children with the same ability and the same school performance have different chances for higher educational tracks dependent on the social class of their parents. The reason is a 'relative risk aversion' mechanism: Educational decisions are ultimately motivated by the desire to avoid downward class mobility, and this motivation is stronger than the desire to reach upward mobility. For higher class families this means that children have to reach higher educational degrees than it is necessary for lower class families. In other words, the motivation for higher educational degrees is stronger in higher than in lower classes where the costs of pursuing further education outweigh the utility of acquiring more education earlier in the school career. In consequence children from lower class background obtain less education than those from higher class backgrounds with the same ability and school performance.

That is, life-time patterns of risk and adversity are shaped by membership in relational groups. Moreover, we have an important starting point from which state agency can be evoked: equal opportunity at all steps in the development from genetic variation to adversity (see Roemer 1998 for an extensive discussion about how this could be operationalized). If we use a risk framework as outlined above, the question is not simply whether or not one can escape from the class or socio-economic status of origin but whether social closure based on unequal distribution of risk exposure, risk compensation, and risk accumulation contributes to shaping the reproduction of social origin or downward and upward mobility, respectively.

Schoon (2006) has shown that socio-economic adversity in the parental home is a factor that persistently presents significant risks for a variety of outcomes over at least the early life course, with
the term ‘persistent’ referring not only to lifetime but also to historical time, meaning that favorable economic conditions did not diminish social origin inequalities in risk and adversity.

The ubiquitous and astonishingly robust impact of social origin on risk development has to be explained better than has been done in existing research. One possible explanation is that mechanisms considered to be specific are more general than has been assumed. To give an example, Cardona and Diewald (2014) found that parents obviously followed similar considerations not only in school decisions but also in supporting their children’s skill development: children from lower classes are promoted only if they display high skills, both in the case of skill production at home and in pursuing higher educational tracks. Parents’ support for children from higher classes is in both cases significantly less dependent on children’s skills and school performance. In other words, the same mechanism leads repeatedly to similar inequalities.

To summarize: Integrating relational inequality theory in research on risk pathways over the life course makes evident that these risk pathways are not the same for different groups in the society, like women and men and people from different social backgrounds. Relational inequality theory provides a rich and growing body of research on social mechanisms that create risk pathways for different groups. Especially variants of social closure are important to link life course research on risk and adversity to social stratification, social justice considerations, and welfare state intervention.

4 Welfare States’ Risk Management

Existing research in the field of the state and the life course reflects two different streams. Social policy analysis concentrates on specificities of the institutional design or single, specific measures. For the most part, this research centers on incentives and disincentives that are set by policies, and the direct consequences they bear for citizens, such as whether and to what degree the introduction of paternity pay raises parental leave for men. This strand of research often falls short in covering longer life course trajectories, instead concentrating on immediate effects. The other tradition sees the state as an overarching agency that covers the entire life course from birth to death. In this view, the governments of different societies shape different life course patterns, which correspond to different holistic welfare state “regimes” or political economies. This idea assumes that governmental institutions and agency are shaped by an identifiable overall logic that shapes the entire life courses. However, as Mayer (2005: 33), a major proponent of such holistic ideas himself notes, such abstract types are ideal types that may be too reductionist to encompass the more differentiated actual regulations in different subsystems and life domains. The constructs of both the life course and the welfare state are too complex for a uniform correspondence to be likely (Leisinger 2003: 215).

Even more elaborated typologies (Mayer 2005: 33) cannot take into consideration the important and influential differences between nations and policies within such country clusters and the changing policies that do not follow a simple path dependence of established institutions in the face of new paradigms and new risks. The liberal ‘Agenda 2010’ launched by the Social Democrat government in Germany may serve as a prominent example. Although status maintenance is a core principle of conservative welfare state regimes like Germany, the ‘Agenda 2010’ explicitly restricted status maintenance as a guiding principle, for example, in the case of unemployment benefits, which proved to be a major distinction between Germany and the US in Gangl’s study (discussed above) before the ‘Agenda 2010’ came into being. Nevertheless, the idea of overlapping guiding principles should not be hastily abandoned.

In historical perspective, the welfare state can be seen as an answer to emerging risks of the industrial society. In different countries different aspects of these risks were identified as the central theme, and differences in the setting of priorities also led to different institutional designs. Whereas in Germany the industrial
working class was at the center of social political debates, in Great Britain poverty was the central social question, in Sweden it was equality, and in France it was family and fertility. Also the more recent discussion about 'new' risks emerging and challenging the existing welfare state institutions focuses on developments in the labor market and the family system. New risks in the labor market reflect the need for more flexibility in the workforce, resulting in job insecurities and the insufficient inclusion of the workforce in the labor market. New risks in the sphere of private life are disruptive family events that threaten the role of the family as a buffer against market failure (Esping-Andersen 1999). Again, countries differ in what risks are given priority and what 'institutional filters' they choose to use to protect groups against these risks (Hofacker et al. 2010). It is evident that a lot of attention in discussions about the future of the welfare state is devoted to the management of risk.

Leisering (2003) proposed risk management as an important part of welfare states' agency alongside education and old-age pensions. He concedes that this part has been largely neglected by life course researchers (p. 213). According to Leisering’s conceptualization, risk management comprises all measures of social assistance, social insurance, and social services meant to bridge life’s discontinuities and transitions. To do so, agencies of risk management react mainly to risky events in a short-term perspective, as situational programs. Thus, they constitute only a particular part of comprehensive welfare state regimes. They are tied to specific institutions, whereas education and the old-age pension system form another part of governmental policy. Nevertheless, risk management is said to “shape the expectations of the citizens and thus secure the unity of the life course as a whole” (ibid.).

How can ‘risk management’ be fleshed out as a useful concept to capture influences of the welfare state on life course inequalities over and above specifying the single assistances, insurances, and services? As outlined above, cultural foundations of different welfare states set different preferences about which risks are perceived as salient and which are given priority over others. Making reference to Fig. 1, risk management systems can be distinguished in three respects concerning what and whom they address: firstly, whether they focus more on risks or more on adversity; secondly, which type of risk or adversity is addressed; and thirdly, which relational groups are in the foreground when risks are addressed. At all three levels, it is important to note that we should not only look at what is addressed but also what is not addressed—as the negation of the relevance of risks or relational groups (Leisering 2003: 217).

To make the first distinction of whether welfare states prefer to address the emergence of risk or the buffering of adversity, DiPrete (2002) and Mayer (2005) describe risk management as a prevention strategy that in the first case influences decisions and behavior with incentives or disincentives with the aim that risks should be avoided (step 2 in Fig. 1). In the second case, we can speak of an adversity-oriented, mostly insurance-based compensation strategy. We learn from DiPrete’s (2002) comparison among the US, Germany, and Sweden that Germany in general stands out for the first strategy: risky decisions are discouraged by the state and risky behaviors should be avoided. In contrast, Sweden stands out for buffering adversity while not trying to prevent risk. The US is often low on both dimensions. Neither are risky events suppressed, nor are negative consequences effectively buffered. However, as the example of worker displacement shows, these distinctions are not completely valid for any risk. The risk of worker displacement is very similar in all three societies, and only for buffering negative consequences in the form of poverty the expected pattern was found.

From DiPrete’s (2002) comparison of life course risks in different welfare state regimes, another component of risk management which is more on the side of risk orientation than adversity orientation can be borrowed (p. 278): the extent to which the opportunity for rapid recovery from adversity provided by “counter-mobility events” is institutionally facilitated or supported by specific policies such as reemployment after unemployment, upward occupational mobility after downward moves, or remarriage after
family dissolution. The strong links between education, training, and employment as well as the high level of job stability and security in the German welfare state normally provide an exceptionally high level of predictability and continuity over the life course. However, if risk occurs, it may be especially difficult to correct for it and consequently, in such cases, lead to more downward mobility than is seen in less continuity-oriented welfare states.

Such a longitudinal perspective focusing on the duration of risk and possible interruptions of vicious circles is extremely important. As Schoon and Bynner (2003) conclude from existing studies, a high-risk individual is characterized not so much by exposure to a single situational risk factor but rather by a life history characterized by long durations of risk exposure or multiple disadvantages.

The first step in risk development can be seen as a variant of the prevention strategy located earlier in the chain of risks, which focuses on individual development instead of behavioral incentives. Though the development of risky and favorable characteristics has largely been neglected in comparative welfare state research, it can be easily rooted in early work on the emergence of the modern welfare state. Mayer and Müller (1986) in particular have argued that the modern welfare state, while regulating the individual’s decisions, has to address the responsibility of the individual self. A first question relates to the importance of skill development and the avoidance of adverse characteristics for the emergence of risks. Over the last few decades, the discussion about new risks and a redesign of the welfare state has fueled debates about the ever-growing importance of self-responsibility and other cognitive and noncognitive skills for minimizing risk and maximizing personal opportunities (see, e.g., O’Rand 2001). Yet substantiated empirical evidence is still missing, as it is for international comparisons between welfare states with respect firstly to the degree that different skills matter, and secondly, to which policies are used to produce these skills.

The second question is how and how much the government invests in the production of these personal capabilities instead of simply assuming that the person possesses them. In interdisciplinary life course research, the role of individual development in shaping life chances, the possible lifelong impact of early life phases, and the ‘discovery’ of skill production (see Cunha et al. 2010) became driving forces in the production of life course theory and data. However, these developments have not yet found their way into comparative welfare state research and the question of how risks of failure in skill development and chances to block unwanted characteristics are distributed across societies owing to welfare state agency.

The discussion about the role of early individual development leads us immediately to the third question: whom a specific risk management favors or disadvantages, thus producing relational inequalities. If the role of general skills for attainment is growing, then the question of whether these competences are produced in the systems of education and training or left to the initiative and ability of the parental family is of paramount interest for the intergenerational transmission of advantage and disadvantage (see chapter “Three Generation Studies: Methodological Challenges and Problems” by Thornberry, this volume). The growing significance of such competencies, which is not taken up by a corresponding governmental agency to produce them within the formal systems of education and training, may help to explain why the direct link between social origin and destination is so persistent even if the transmission pathway over education is controlled for (Jackson et al. 2005). In other words, welfare states that focus on equalizing educational opportunities alone may fail to reach their goal of an open society. The failure of governments to focus on general skills is predominantly a risk for the lower classes and the unemployed who do dispose these resources much less than higher social classes. In other words it is a mechanism of social closure in keeping considerable parts of the population away from the possibility of acquiring characteristics relevant for achievement, and this is due to circumstances for which the disadvantaged cannot be held responsible.
Relational inequalities are not only created with respect to skill development but also when the welfare state shapes decisions and behaviors. This becomes especially visible in the field of work-life interference and the division of labor between the sexes. The welfare state agency is formulated to be gender-neutral but in fact ignores the existing gender differences in the division of labor. Thus, even policies designed to support mothers’ employment prospects may in fact undermine them. Instruments of work-family reconciliation may even aggravate employer discrimination against women insofar as they erode their attractiveness as employees and restrict women’s career mobility (Mandel and Semyonov 2005).

A more complicated pattern arises if sex and class are jointly taken into consideration. It becomes clear that, in addition, the influence of different family and labor market policies on women’s employment is markedly dependent on their class position (Mandel and Shaley 2009); whereas maternity leave policies and childcare facilities shelter lower-class women from employment risks, the same policies are rather a handicap for women who compete with men for higher-class jobs, because they are perceived as risky and vulnerable instead of powerful. In addition, extended maternity leaves and related policies are not as important because these women are, especially in liberal market societies, able to purchase necessary services in a low-wage labor market.

Finally, at the most basic level, risk management systems start with the question of who should have access to (full) citizenship at all in the context of international migration. With the increasing share of different groups of migrants within the population, the legal status that should be granted to them and the degree to which welfare benefit entitlements compared to natives differs and the maintenance of such is discussed even in universalistic welfare state regimes.

Disruptive employment and family events bear the risk of not only socioeconomic adversity but also social and emotional stress (see, e.g., Kalil and Wighman 2011). There is, however, no comparative research to show how different risk management systems address possible social and emotional consequences even though they might impinge severely on the development of children in the household, which later on might influence their mobility chances.

5 Summary and Outlook

Taking together the evidence presented here about differences in welfare states’ risk management calls into question whether it is appropriate to limit this concept to a distinctive part of welfare institutions that target adversity rather than risk. In contrast, I advocate a broader view on all policies that influence the life course for better or worse. Examples were presented to demonstrate that different welfare state regimes and policies can be differentiated along three lines: (1) whether they focus more on avoiding risk or on buffering adversity; (2) which specific risks or adversities are focused on; and (3) which relational groups are addressed and then favored or disadvantaged with respect to risk. Differences between risk management systems based on these three lines of distinction form patterns that are greater than the impact of single policies. At the same time, they are more comprehensive than those suggested by DiPrete (2002) insofar as they include a usually neglected part of risk emergence, namely skill production, which is increas ngly advocated as an efficient risk avoidance strategy.

This plea is backed by advances in life course research stressing the pivotal role of cognitive and noncognitive skills for the understanding of risk chains, their emergence early in the life course, and their conceptual significance for understanding the emergence of new individualized risks and corresponding ideas for a redesign of the welfare state agenda. Though there are several new studies that look at skill development in an internationally comparative perspective, the integration into a more comprehensive risk management framework is missing. Thus, a fuller account of life course concepts and general theory of stratifications seems more fruitful than the view on institutional differentiation for studying welfare states’ risk management.
References


