Transnationalisation and Institutional Transformations

edited by

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Chapter 1  
**Introduction:**

**Theorizing Transnationalisation and Institutional Transformations**  
Eveline Reisenauer and Thomas Faist

Since the 1990s, transnational perspectives have gained increasing prominence in migration research and social movement studies. Yet it is above all in migration studies that not only issues of cross-border exchange but also problems of membership in states and thus institutional transformations have figured prominently. While migration studies after World War Two concentrated on migration as unidirectional and one-time changes in location, transnational approaches in migration research emphasized dynamics and changes in mobility, and thus new interstitial social realities of migrants. Many transnational studies pointed out that nowadays, due to new communication and travel opportunities, migrants maintain cross-border relations and ties to a higher extent than in earlier times. While the differences with the past may be overdrawn – for example, the masterpiece of empirical migration studies, The Polish Peasant in America (Thomas/Znaniecki, 1927, Vol. 5: 98-127), already addressed issues such as dense and continuous cross-border ties and transnational organisations – transnational approaches have resulted in a decisive change of perspective.

So far, however, most transnational studies have focused on migrant practices and migrant agency but have neglected the transformation of institutions and how these changes interact with the transnational life worlds of migrants (for exceptions, see e.g. Bauböck, 1994 and Levitt/de la Dehesa, 2003; cf. Faist, 2010). A first step has been taken in pointing out that migrants contribute to broadening, enhancing or intensifying transformation processes which are already ongoing (Vertovec, 2004: 972), such as migrant financial and social remittances impacting upon social transformations in regions of origin, or states rethinking and reforming citizenship legislation. Now, we need to take the next step and ask how political, economic, educational and socio-cultural institutions have been challenged and transformed and how migrants and other actors in transnational settings are affected by institutional transformations. For example, in the first part of this scientific compilation the transformation of citizenship is analysed. It is pointed out, to what extend citizenship is challenged by transnational activities of migrants and what are the consequences of transnational citizenship for migrant sending countries. Yet political, economic, educational and socio-cultural institutions do not only provide opportunity structures for individual or collective transnational practices. They are themselves transforming through transnational relations. An
example is, how the movement of family members to another country is affecting and transforming the institution of the family as explored in the chapters of part four.

This introductory chapter proceeds in four steps. First, we substantiate our focus on institutional transformations in carrying out transnational research. This gives an opportunity to avoid methodological nationalism and become aware of multiple scales (local, regional, national, global and so forth). Thus, the contributions to this collection move on various scales of analysis by focusing on institutional transformations in a web of transnational migrant mobility and connectivity. Second, we explore our understanding of institutions in this collection. Institutions are conceptualised as relatively permanent social constructs that influence social behaviour. Third, so far most transformation theories focus on fundamental social transformations, either global trends in Western Europe affecting all regions of the world, such as the rise of capitalism or processes of globalization, or postsocialistic transformation in Eastern Europe. Against this backdrop, this collection addresses the nexus between transnationalisation – the processes of involving sustained and continuous cross-border ties and structures – and institutional transformation in the political, economic, educational and socio-cultural domains. Fourth, this chapter concludes by introducing the contributions to this compilation.

Starting with Institutional Transformations

During the 19th and 20th century methodological nationalism has been the dominant concept in social science. And even in spite of the critique of methodological nationalism (e.g. Martins, 1974; Smith, 1979; Wimmer/Glick Schiller, 2002), sociological research is still influenced by the concept of the (territorial) congruence of society and national state, that is, nationally organised societies. Migration research, in particular, has often been limited by focusing on certain national or ethnic groups only, and confflates societal and state boundaries (cf. Weiß/Berger, 2008: 10). To give an example, Samuel N. Eisenstadt defines immigration as “a process of physical transition from one society to another” (1953: 169) and, as a result, analyses the assimilation of immigrants within their new country. Through such understanding, the nation-state is designed as a container in which migrants settle. It follows that a branch of migration research still deals exclusively with the countries of destination. For example, by analysing the process of acculturation and assimilation of immigrants and the second generation, Richard Alba focuses on the United States as an immigration society (Alba, 2008; Alba/Nee, 2003). As these few examples illustrate, migration research often keeps on with conceptualising migration as unidirectional move from one nation-state-
bounded container to another and is content with capturing integration processes within strictly bounded nation-states.

To move beyond methodological nationalism in migration research it is necessary to develop concepts that encompass the sending or the receiving regions of migrants and the various scales on which social formations can be conceptualized. "Today, global change and the increasing importance of transnational processes require new approaches from the sociology of migration." (Castles, 2003: 24) The challenge for a transnational optic is to capture processes and changes at various levels or scales of society. Towards this end we use the concept of transnational social spaces. "Transnational social spaces consist of combinations of sustained social and symbolic ties, their contents, positions in networks and organizations, and networks of organizations that can be found in multiple states. These spaces denote dynamic processes, not static notions of ties and positions." (Faist, 2000: 199-200) The sociological analysis of transnational social spaces accounts for the empirical evidence, that migration never could be confined to one-time and unidirectional changes from one nation-state to another. Rather, migration processes are often characterised by multiple bi-directional movements and relationships across borders.

If we take a transnational perspective seriously we have to surpass an analytical irritation of social theory’s immanent methodological nationalism by focusing also on methodological challenges and implications for the study of transnational migration. Thus, there is not only a need for new terms but also for new concepts and methodological tools. Referring to Sanjeev Khagram und Peggy Levitt one could say that "the terms 'transnational' or 'transnationalism' or 'transnationality' are partly misnomers, in that the only thing we are interested in are dynamics across or beyond nations, states, or within the (nation-) state system. We also mean something else. By transnational, we propose an optic or gaze that begins with a world without borders, empirically examines the boundaries and borders that emerge at particular historical moments, and explores their relationship to unbounded arenas and processes. It does not take the existence of, or appropriateness of, the spatial unit of analysis for granted. [...] A key component of a transnational approach, however, is to interrogate the territorial breadth and scope of any social phenomenon without prior assumptions." (Khagram/Levitt, 2008: 5)

This compilation contains an attempt to avoid methodological nationalism and cultural essentialism by choosing the starting point of institutional transformations. To start with institutions offers the opportunity for migration research not to focus primarily on the frame of nation-states or ethnic groups, that is fixed territorial and societal units. Rather institutions,
such as citizenship, entrepreneurship, schools or families, are cross-cutting and perforating nation-states and affect migrants as well as non-migrants. By focusing on institutional transformations, the contributions to this collection discuss on which multiple scales (local, regional, national, global and so forth) transformations operate. Furthermore, the complex web of interaction between different levels will be analysed. A crucial aspect, however, is that transnational social spaces are not fixed entities. They can overlap and are not necessarily exclusive. We assume that processes of transnationalisation involve transformations of institutions and institutional transformations effect, in turn, transnationalisation. It is to be pointed out, hot transnationalisation on the one hand and institutional transformations on the other hand interact. Thus, the object of this volume is the nexus between transnationalisation and migration-related institutional transformation.

For example, migration researchers consider the transformation of institutions important in a nation-state context, such as dual citizenship (see chapters 2 and 3) or educational organizations (see chapter 7 and 8). Quite often such transformations are not the result of international migration itself, but of changing conceptions of political community that respond to perceived challenges and opportunities created by migration. The contributions to this collection do not proclaim the end of the nation-state but explore its persistent relevance in a web of various scales of social formations, ranging from small groups to an emerging global or world society. Furthermore, they look how migrants and their often relatively immobile others are affected by and involved in transforming institutions. One institution, which is also subject of contributions in the fourth part of this collection, is the family. This example makes very clear that migration and transnationalisation go along with the transformation of institutions. Transnational family links bring forth two-way flows of financial remittances as well as social security practices. Furthermore, family relations and functions are changing if family members are separated from each other. Examples include "transnational motherhood" (e.g. Hondagneu-Sotelo/Avila, 1997), "transnational childhood" (Suárez-Orozco/Suárez-Orozco, 2001) but also "transnational fatherhood" (Pribilsky, 2004). Another example, linked with the family, is the institution of child and elder care. As Minna Zechner in this collection points out, family responsibilities do not fade away when family members live dispersed in various countries. Rather, transnational caring became a common practice.

**The Concept of Institutions**

In the context of institutional transformation, it is necessary to consider not only migrant practices but also how these draw on and contribute to wider political, social and economic
processes (Vertovec, 2004). By focusing on institutional transformations in different societal domains, this volume aims to go beyond an exclusive focus on migrant practices. For Alejandro Portes (2003: 876) transnationalism "refers primarily to the cross-border activities of private grassroots actors, including immigrants." Accordingly, so far, most transnational research has focused on migrant agency.

In contrast to transnational studies restricting themselves to migrant practices and migrant agency, the subject of the contributions to this collection is the analysis of institutional change in the context of transnationalisation and transnationality relating to migration and migrants. On the one hand, our questions refer to how institutions function, how they are transformed and how institutional transformations affect migrants and other actors in transnational settings. On the other hand, we seek to identify the ways through which migrants shape institutional change. "There is a point to be emphasized in analyzing the impact of migrant transnationalism: while not bringing about substantial societal transformations by themselves, patterns of cross-border exchange and relationship among migrants may contribute significantly to broadening, deepening or intensifying conjoined processes of transformation that are already ongoing" (Vertovec, 2009: 24). However, in analysing the nexus between migrant transnationality and institutional transformation, we ask how 'old' local, national and international institutions acquire 'new' meanings and functions and to what extent additional institutions emerge. Furthermore, deinstitutionalization and the limit of institutional transformation will be addressed. The focus on institutional transformations allows not only for looking at migrant agents but also on impacts of cross-border movements for local and national institutions including non-migrants. By taking a transnational view we are interested in transformations of local, national and international institutions but also in the establishment of institutions on a transnational level. The interaction of transforming institutions on different societal levels will be of particular interest.

Social institutions, in our understanding, denote regular social interactions between individual or collective actors in different social spheres which are guided by reciprocal expectations concerning specific rules based on values and norms. "Institutions are symbolic and behavioral systems containing representational, constitutive and normative rules together with regulatory mechanisms that define a common meaning system and give rise to distinctive actors and action routines" (Scott, 1994: 68). The crucial point is that institutions are relatively permanent social constructs that influence social behaviour.

Moreover, institutions vary according to two dimensions: first, the degree of formalisation, and second, the extent of shared rules which constitute reciprocal expectations. First,
institutions may range from highly formalised structures and processes at one end of the scale to relatively informal ones at the other end. “They consist of both informational constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).” (North, 1990: 97) Second, in some cases institutions are based on widely recognised rules delivered from traditions, conventions or even laws. These rules are usually backed up by several forms of social, political or legal control and corresponding sanctions that ensure conformity to them. In other cases institutions also include broader rules and routines of overall society. It does not matter if there is consensus about the rules in the specific situation or if consensus is only anticipated by those involved.

From a societal perspective, the main function of institutions is the reduction of complexity. Institutions allow for stability, social order and security. They ensure that not every social situation has to be redefined by the actors. From the perspective of actors, institutions regulate behaviour and disburden individuals in certain social situations from extensive reflections, justifications and negotiation processes. Institutions are organizing relatively stable patterns of human activity (Turner, 1997: 6). At the same time, institutions make behaviour expectable for the opponent actor. They structure diverse situations of human coexistence, such as schooling (see chapter 7) or labour markets (see chapters 5 and 6), and thus, create anticipatory reliability for social actors (Göhler, 2004: 210). To sum up, institutions constrain human behaviour and make it expectable. Thus, they structure the political, economic, educational and socio-cultural life of migrants and other actors. However, it is clear that institutions cement relations of power, dominance and coercion by reproducing various forms of capital (Bourdieu, 1992), exclude certain persons and forms of behaviour, and frame perceptions and regulations of conflicts and disguise other issues of contestation and forms of conflictive interests. This, however, does not preclude that there are opportunities for agency to change institutions, albeit to varying degrees. For example, the contribution by Kaveri Harriss and Filippo Osella analyses strategies of parents and students with respect to transformations in educational institutions. And Mika Raunio focuses in his article on institutional entrepreneurs shaping labour markets in the case of the health care sector.

Even if institutions seem to be durable and stable formations, they are flexible and can adapt to various situations. That is also the reason why they are relatively resistant to complete deinstitutionalisation, even if this is possible (Vester, 2009: 108). Because of the flexible character of institutions, it is not only revolutionary situations that bring about institutional change. Institutional transformation may also take place under more standard conditions. Transformation mostly is gradual and thus is visible only after long periods of time (Lepsius,
1997: 63). Following Ronald L. Jepperson, we assume that "institutions can be powerful sources of both stability and change." (1991: 159) Thus, the contributions to this compilation will analyse processes of institutional transformation over time to get aware of the stability as well as the dynamic of several institutions going along with transnational practices. Moreover, institutions often overlap and "thus constitute an order of interconnections among, and embeddedness in, one another." (Turner, 1997: 4) Thus, this collection does not focus only on individual institutions but also on nested institutions at different societal scales and their interaction with their social environment. For example, referring to the Indian case, S. Irudaya Rajan and V. J. Varghese are concerned with interrelations between transformations in the economic and the political domain.

**The Nexus between Transnationalisation and Institutional Transformation**

The contributions to this compilation do not posit a singular theory of social transformation or envision one transformation path for all institutions analysed in this volume. The collection does not claim to develop a theory of social transformation in the context of transnationalisation and migration. Following Wilbert E. Moore there is "no reason to expend a singular theory of change" (Moore, 1963: 24). Rather, the focus of this collection is on institutional aspects of political, economic, educational and socio-cultural transformation processes. Thus, the collection seeks to point out the complexity of institutional transformations in various societal domains. Also, the collection does not assume a direction of institutional transformation a priori. Transformation is neither seen as a continuous process like in development paradigms, nor as a linear process like in evolutionary approaches. The contributions to this collection focus on specific institutional transformations and reconstruct interrelations between institutional transformations. Whether or not transformations of different institutions go in the same direction or diverge is an empirical question and thus, the "ultimate course of each path can only be identified and described post hoc" (Djelic/Quack, 2007: 168).

With respect to the scale on which transformations occur, there are several broad perspectives regarding social transformation. Paradigms taking transformations on the world scale as a starting point include variants of modernisation theories and globalisation approaches. But there are also studies to transformations in specific regions or states. Examples include social transformations in Western societies, such as Western Europe (Crouch, 1999) or the United States (Allen, 1971), but also postsocialistic transformations in Eastern Europe (Elster/Offe/Preuß, 1998). A classic to social transformation is Karl Polanyi’s
"The Great Transformation" (1968). Polanyi's work on European transformations from the 18th to the 20th century includes a historical analysis of broad political and economic macro-processes, which led to the catastrophe of Nazism. It is not so much the particular political-economic focus which is inspiring but the view it offers on broad changes. Social transformation refers to a fundamental shift in the way societal life is organised. This shift goes beyond the continual processes of incremental social change that are always at work, and implies a kind of change in which all existing social patterns are questioned and many are reconfigured.

While Polanyi's work on European transformations is no attempt at grand theory, a branch of globalisation theories grasps globalization as an all-embracing change. But to describe transformations in an interconnected world more precisely, "globalization might be better conceived as a highly differentiated process which finds expression in the key domains of social activities" (Held et al., 2005: 12). Therefore, a transnational perspective can be regarded as an alternative to concepts and theories of globalization which look at the significance of social, economic, political and cultural transformations on a world scale. Transnational approaches thus emphasize the differing effects on various regions of the world and how factors of globalization are shaped by "not only varying economic and political structures, but also specific historical experiences, philosophical and religious values, cultural patterns, and social relationships." (Castles, 2001: 22) Thus, they seek to explore how already existing social patterns react to global forces and transnational challenges.

In this collection we consider the concept of institutional transformations in different domains as an adequate starting point for two reasons. First, from a methodological point of view, we do not presuppose fixed spatial or societal units, such as the national or the global. Instead, by focusing on institutional transformations, we start without prior assumptions about such units but then we empirically examine which boundaries and borders emerge in the course of institutional transformation. Thus, the goal of a transnational methodology is to get aware of various scales and levels of society. Second, this volume provides a contribution to the deeper understanding of parallel and interrelated processes of transnationalisation and institutional transformation. To discern processes of migrant transnationalisation we focus on transformations of distinct institutions in the political, economic, educational and socio-cultural domain. In order to speak of transformation, changes need to be significant in these domains. The contributions to this collection focus on both, transnationalisation as condition of institutional change and influences of institutional change on transnationalisation.
This collection aims to analyze not only established and relatively stable institutions but also the emergent and transformational character of institutions. Thus, we do not take particular institutions for granted but rather stress the process of institutionalization. According to Ronald L. Jepperson, "Institution represents a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or property; Institutionalization denotes the process of such attainment." (1991: 145) In this collection we ask how institutional transformation is occurring. Focusing institutions as socially constituted constructs allows for a better understanding of four aspects of institutional transformation. First, we deal with changes in 'old' institutions. The question arises how existing institutions are transformed by transnational challenges. One example is how transnational migration is affecting territorial borders and hence how nation-states redefine themselves. Second, the emergence of 'new' institutions can be observed. In this collection the construction and establishment of transnational institutions, such as hometown associations, will be of special interest. The relevant question is what drives the increasing spatial reach of such institutions. We will also ask for the agents' role engaged in these processes. Third, we mainly focus on processes of institutionalization yet give also room for processes of deinstitutionalisation. The disappearance of institutions without being replaced by new institutions also needs to be addressed. For example, due to a depopulation of emigration regions, the infrastructure in these regions could be declining. For example, we may observe the gradual disappearance of schools. Fourth, another question concerns the reinforcement of old institutions. This type allows for the fact that not all institutions are transformed, replaced or dissolved in the course of transnationalisation but continue to exist in their traditional form. In this case institutions may not meet the needs of migrants or even pathologize or exclude them.

Institutional Transformations in Four Domains

The nexus between transnationalisation and institutional transformation described above provides the common perspective of all contributions in this scientific compilation. However, the individual chapters offer a range of diverse topics and analyze disparate institutions. Three characteristics stand out. First, this collection brings together researchers from multiple disciplines, including sociology, cultural studies, political science, economics, and education. Second, the collection includes authors from different countries, located in Europe, Asia and Africa. Third, the following parts illustrate the simultaneous processes of transnationalisation and institutionalization in the political, economic, educational and socio-cultural domain, in which the authors deal with central societal institutions. Examples relate
to different institutions, such as citizenship, labour migration, education, family and social security.

In the first part of this compilation transformations of state institutions are discussed. The article by Jürgen Gerdes and Thomas Faist on transnational citizenship considers the prospects, dimensions and the extent of citizenship transformations transcending nation-state borders and boundaries. Their main argument, from a conceptual and analytical viewpoint, is that a reasonable account of citizenship transformation should take into account more systematically and simultaneously different dimensions of change.

Ahmet İçduygu and Deniz Sert focus on dual citizenship as key component of emigration-related policies of migrant sending countries in order to enhance the transnational ties between their emigrant citizens with the homeland. By analysing the dual citizenship regulations of Turkey and Morocco, they emphasize a transformation of migrant sending states’ dual citizenship regimes. While in a first period the politics of citizenship only dealt with national interests, a second period is characterized by transnational influences.

From the perspective of polities Leif Kalev, Mari-Liis Jakobson, and Rein Ruutsoo ask whether the transforming political spaces maintain their coherence effectiveness in governance and democratic citizenship. Even if there are opportunities for transnational political spaces to develop and to enrich political structures, their main finding is that the transnational political spaces are not likely to replace states as the core of polities in foreseeable future.

The contributions to the second part of this volume engage with institutional transformations in the economic domain. As in the article of Ahmet İçduygu and Deniz Sert the focus of the contribution by S. Irudaya Rajan and V.J. Varghese is on the sending country context. Drawing on the Indian-Punjabi experience, they trace on the role of the state in formalizing transnational economic spaces, what they call the Indian national regime of transnationalism. They argue that institutional transformation in terms of alterations in administrative frameworks as a result of the potentiality of transnational resources has resulted in changes at the national, sub-national and local level.

Whereas the previous contribution is concerned with the role of the state in economic processes, the article by Mika Raunio approaches the economic domain from an agency point of view. Based on the example of health care as specific field of employment he analyzes the institutional transformation of transnational labour markets. In this context Mika
Raunio understands transformation as the process, in which institutionalized national patterns of recruitment are becoming more transnationalised. The emphasis of this contribution lies on institutional entrepreneurs who aim to change existing institutional patterns such as recruitment.

Part three deals with transformations of educational institutions. Based on the example of India, Kaveri Harriss and Filippo Osella discuss transformations taking place in educational institutions in relation to transnationalism. They analyse how colonial and post-colonial transformations in education as well as the global production of educational regimes influence educational strategies of parents and students. They point out that history provides complex contexts that are variously reinforced or reworked in unpredictable, unstable ways. Kaveri Harriss and Filippo Osella conclude with comments on the implications of transnational education for social development.

In her article about education Devorah Kalekin-Fishman argues that in a globalizing world, school populations are becoming more diverse. Teachers will be able to facilitate cosmopolitanism in education only if (a) they find ways to deal with the tensions between the goals of the nation-state, and the growing transnational reality in schools; and (b) they discover that the professional repertoire they command for promoting excellence in learning fits in with a program that promotes cosmopolitanism in education.

Part four of the compilation analyses various examples of institutional transformation in the socio-cultural domain. In the first contribution to this part Pauliina Järvinen-Alenius, Pirkko Pitkänen and Anna Virkama point out that social remittances are not only transferred from countries of immigration to migrants’ homelands but also in the opposite direction. Moreover, social remittances are transferred to relatives, friends or colleagues in third countries. To take into account these multi-sited trajectories, the focus of analysis is on the flows of social remittances in transnational social spaces. Drawing on empirical examples concerning family, work and politics, the authors explore how social remittances affect the transformation of existing institutions.

Minna Zechner’s analysis to the care of children and older persons traces the interrelation of care policies and transnational care practices. Care policies on the one hand are supporting social care within the territory of the nation-state. The idea of welfare is to secure the citizens or inhabitants of a nation-state from certain social risks. Social care practices of migrants on the other hand are not restricted to territorial borders. When family members migrate to another country family responsibilities, like care, do not fate away. Rather migrants continue
to perform social care for children and elders back home. Minna Zechner asks how such transnational care practices are supported or hindered by national care policies.

In her contribution Laura Huttunen gives preference to “emplacement” over concepts of “integration” or “belonging” to capture dynamics and nuances of relationships to place. Emplacement is understood as a complex process of interlinking everyday life activities and mundane practices with various local and global structures and policies. Laura Huttunen sees the family as the central institution structuring processes of emplacement. To analyse emplacement within transnational social spaces she looks at both, transnational families and families engaged in transnational practices.

Also the final article by Noureddine Harrami focuses on the institution of the family. Based on ethnographic data about Moroccan migrants in the South-West of France, the contribution deals with the transformation of the family in the context of transnational migration. According to Noureddine Harrami the fundamental function of the familial institution is socialization. On the basis of the examples of religious issues and gender issues concerning young girls' conditions he analyzes cultural transmissions within the family. For example, it is described how rules of honour are changing under the condition of transnational social supervision.

References


Chapter 2

Transnational Transformations of Citizenship

Jürgen Gerdes and Thomas Faist

I. Introduction

Today, we are witnessing increasingly forces and developments transcending the reach and borders of nation states, such as economic and cultural globalization, a growing influence of multilateral policy regimes and international organizations, transnational social movements and migrant transnational practices, which, although in different ways, challenge and change the well established institution of national citizenship. These cross-border realities pose fundamental challenges to traditional citizenship because it is based essentially on the assumption of a congruence of continuous residence in a given territory, a shared collective identity and participation in and subjection to a common jurisdiction. These challenges meanwhile have led to many different, mostly more theoretical, accounts of citizenship beyond the nation state, such as, to name the most prominent terms, postnational, transnational and cosmopolitan citizenship. Empirically, the most visible expression in terms of a corresponding legal status, apart from European citizenship, is the increasing incidence of dual citizenship, which meanwhile is tolerated in some form by more than half of all the states in the world (Faist & Gerdes, 2008). The aim of this chapter is to clarify the prospects, dimensions and the extent of citizenship transformations beyond and transcending the nation state and how these are portrayed by influential theoretical accounts. The scope of the article is, however, confined to some conceptual considerations concerning the different aspects, dimensions and mechanisms of institutional change with regard to citizenship as one of the most important meta-institution\(^1\) in liberal and democratic societies.

The chapter proceeds in five steps. In order to get a solid basis for the question of institutional transformation, we, first, recapitulate the essential features of the concept of citizenship, which is essentially tied to the borders and boundaries of nation-states.

\(^1\) We call citizenship a meta-institution because it is based on a host of other institutions relating to the whole process of representative democracy, effective governance and definitions and enforcement of individual basic rights, such as political parties, parliaments, governments, courts and other administrative bodies.
Citizenship, as it has been developed as membership in liberal democratic nation states, comprises three important dimensions: it builds on democratic self-determination of the people, equal individual rights and obligations, and membership in a political community. Although different understandings of citizenship usually accentuate these dimensions differently – for example, while republican approaches highlight citizens’ activities and responsibilities, liberal accounts emphasize citizens’ rights – one important question is how far these different components can be disaggregated without making the use of the concept itself meaningless. Second, concerning citizenship transformation we begin with the empirical significant case of increasing tolerance of dual citizenship. Even if dual citizenship creates potentially overlapping rights and practices that reflect a simultaneous belonging of migrants to two different nation states, we argue, that the transformational reach of dual citizenship should not be overestimated, because at least some nation-state based functions and justifications are still at work. Third, we elaborate the boundaries of national citizenship and the conditions of access to or maintenance of it and how these have changed in recent years. Changing rules towards toleration of dual citizenship, however, have to be related to other changes of citizenship law rules. While some authors seem to think that the growing tolerance of dual citizenship in itself indicates an increasing permeability of nation-state borders, we argue that this is only one factor which has to be counted against other trends towards more restrictive conditions of citizenship acquisition, especially in European immigration states. Fourth, we inspect some theoretical accounts of citizenship which are announced to transcend the national concept. Most of the concepts of trans- and postnational citizenship focus, however, on only one or two components of citizenship but neglect the other(s) or derive from changes in only one dimension a transformation of citizenship also in its other features. For example, some of these approaches predominantly refer to changes of nation and collective identity but suggest a much more far-reaching change concerning the territorial reach of governance and the transnational origin of individual rights. Our main argument is, derived from an immanent critique of prominent post- and transnational theories, that the dimensions of change should be distinguished much more systematically. On closer inspection, it turns out that what is advocated as citizenship beyond nation-states refers in different ways back to existing nation-states: For instance, an important share of transnational political practices are targeted at national publics, parties and governments; cosmopolitan norms and human rights are often dependent to be implemented in nation-state institutions; and a transformation of collective identity from a particularistic and homogeneous national culture to a multicultural self-understanding does not necessarily imply the erosion of state borders. Therefore, we argue that it is misleading to think of a gradual replacement of national citizenship in favour of trans- or postnational citizenship, at least in a collective dimension. Fifth, we content that efforts to investigate
citizenship transformations are insufficient if they are focussing only on questions of inclusion, access conditions and changing political spaces, as it is the case with regard to some accounts of European citizenship. Rather the question of a changing substance of citizenship in terms of the scope and level of individual rights as usually granted to all persons on an equal basis should be included as well as the issue of possible interdependencies between these two factors. Finally, we conclude that, all in all, the institution of citizenship seems to be today in a somewhat dilemmatic situation. The reach of problems to be regulated by effective political action surpasses the political capacities of nation states, while the democratic resources on the level of nation states are increasingly undermined.

II. The Concept of National Citizenship

In essence, citizenship comprises three important dimensions: it builds on democratic self-determination of the people, equal individual rights and obligations, and membership in a political community. In the first dimension citizenship means above all the principle of unity of both those governing and those being governed, whatever forms the democratic procedures of each state may take in detail. Ideally, citizens endowed with equal political liberty obey the laws in the creation of which they have participated and to whose validity they thus consent (Walzer, 1989). Without democratic procedures guiding citizens’ political self-determination, citizenship would mean little more than members of political communities being subjects of a sovereign. The second dimension of citizenship refers to the constitutions of modern states which enshrine human and fundamental rights of liberty as a legal status. In general, citizens’ rights fall into various realms, for example, civil or negative rights to liberty, political rights to participation such as the right to vote and to associate, and social rights including the right to social benefits in case of sickness, unemployment, old age, and the right to education (Marshall: 1992). The duties corresponding to citizens’ rights are the duty to serve in the armed forces in order to protect state sovereignty against exterior threats, while the duty to pay taxes, to acknowledge the rights and liberties of other citizens, and to accept democratically legitimated decisions of majorities structure the internal sphere. In a third dimension, citizenship rests on an affinity of citizens with certain political communities, the partial identification with and thus loyalty to a self-governing collective, often a nation or a multi-nation (cf. Weber, 1972: 242-244). In modern national states, citizens identify with a self-governing collective which claims to establish a balance between the individual and common interests on the one hand and rights and responsibilities within the political community on the other. Affiliation with a collective expressed as a set of relatively
continuous, social, and symbolic ties of citizens otherwise anonymous to each other, is linked
to the status dimension of citizenship because of reciprocal obligations of members in a
political community. Solidarity and reciprocity are deemed as a requirement for peaceful
coexistence and welfare state redistribution. During processes of nation-building, this logic of
internal inclusion, however, has always been accompanied with forces of social closure and
thus of arbitrary and often violent external exclusion of “others” at the same time. However,
due to the dominance of a legitimation horizon of equality, basic rights and democracy today,
it seems that the only candidate of exclusion remain the non-citizen.

From a sociological perspective, citizenship as well as its transformations can be analysed in
each of these dimensions separately. Accordingly, Isin and Turner (2002: 4) distinguish three
axels of analysis: first, the “extent” of citizenship meaning the rules and practices of inclusion
and exclusion; second, its “content” in terms of rights and obligations accrued to citizens;
and, finally, the “depth” of citizenship referring of the degree of citizens’ identifications with
the political community and the form and thickness of collective identity. In a similar vein,
Joppke (2010) in a recent book analyses citizenship changes in Western immigration
countries in relation to three broad realms: status, rights and identity. Moreover, he rightly
points out, that an adequate analysis of citizenship transformations should also be concerned
with “internal relationships and possible connections between the developments across
these dimensions”, which has rarely been done to date (Joppke 2010: 31). While it is
certainly important to grasp the different dimensions of citizenship transformations and their
interrelations, it is somewhat striking that the political dimension of democratic participation
within a governmental structure, which can be regarded as the essence of citizenship by
distinguishing pure subjects of political rule from citizens partaking in political self-
determination, is missing in these announced research agendas. From a political
perspective, the institution of citizenship is tied essentially to the idea of collective autonomy
and core principles of democratic legitimacy. Citizens view themselves as equal members of
a political community, who by means of democratic procedures and institutions within a self-
governing unit continuously try to regulate the different matters generally conceived as
problems in the different areas of society, to provide for collective goods and, not least, to
secure and enforce the individual rights of its members (Habermas, 1996; 2001). That
certainly does not mean that real political processes proceed necessarily along these ideal
lines, but rather that democratic legitimacy, from the perspective of citizens, serve as a
yardstick to assess the political process regarding its input (democracy) and its output (the
provision of collective goods and ensuring justice).
Because we are concerned with a perspective of citizenship transformation, we depart from citizenship as an institution of the nation state. On the other hand, as it has been argued in the case of European citizenship, “methodological nationalism” should be avoided implying that new developments regarding citizenship should not be assessed according to criteria of traditional national citizenship (Beck & Grande, 2005; Wiener 2007). However, the idea of political self-determination together with individual rights and obligations as well as collective identity can still be seen as key components of citizenship which have to be considered in transformation analysis, irrespective of the fact that they have been aggregated historically and somewhat successfully in territories of nation states, amalgamated with national ideologies of cultural homogeneity and exclusion of others. Concerning access conditions of citizenship, a “transnational perspective”, however, should be concerned not only with processes of “de-ethnization” and “re-ethnization” (cf. Joppke 2010) or the “making and unmaking of ethnic boundaries” (cf. Wimmer 2008), but also with the drawing and re-drawing of borders and boundaries which are not primarily of an ethnic or national kind but rather have geographical, political, economic and social dimensions and which might change the distribution as well as the scope of rights for different groups.

Although we will argue below that the two basic realms of citizenship transformation, conditions of access and content of rights, often overlap and may have mutual consequences, they first should be distinguished and considered separately. We will begin with some considerations on the transformation of the border and boundary dimension in one of its most obvious empirical case, the rise of dual citizenship, and will then later also focus on the dimension of content or substance of citizenship and how that has changed.

III. Increasing Permeability of National Membership Boundaries through Growing Tolerance of Dual Citizenship?

There is an exponential rise of countries with legislation allowing dual citizenship, showing the strongest growth in the last fifteen years (Brøndsted Sejersen, 2008; Faist and Gerdes, 2008). In Western European states the acceptance of dual citizenship has grown even more; meanwhile about two third of these countries tolerate dual citizenship (Howard, 2005). That, certainly, is an important as well as far-reaching transformation of citizenship, because national citizenship until very recently was deemed as essentially exclusive and there were many provisions in national citizenship laws as well as in international conventions aimed at avoiding the incidence of dual citizenship as far as possible. While some authors seem to think that the growing tolerance of dual citizenship indicates an increasing permeability of
nation-state borders in general (cf. Bauböck, 1994, 2003), we argue that this is only one factor which has to be counted against other contradicting aspects and trends which express or stress the national perspective. Especially two of these should be considered in the context of citizenship transformation. First, dual citizenship can have different meanings and functions in different political settings. In order to discover those differences it is helpful to consider also the different justifications as they appear in the corresponding political processes. Second, the increasing tolerance of dual citizenship has been accompanied with citizenship law policies in European immigration states which made the conditions of citizenship acquisition in some other items much more restrictive than before.

Concerning the first issue, it should not be neglected that the states allowing for dual citizenship often justify that due to reasons based on national factors, such as national interests, nation-state-based democracy, equal rights and immigrant integration, although acceptance of dual citizenship from the perspective of the migrants concerned might imply a kind of official and legal recognition of their transnational relations and certainly can have substantial effects in terms of rights and benefits for them. As studies on the political processes of citizenship legislation in immigration states show, most of the arguments of those who were in favour of tolerance of dual citizenship have been raised the issue in the context of efforts to increase the naturalization rates of permanent immigrants (Gerdes and Faist, 2007). That has been justified with reference to the basic legitimation principles of nation-states: individual rights and democracy. Full legal and political inclusion of long-term immigrants by means of citizenship acquisition was viewed as a question of their equal and basic rights that also has a high symbolic value by demonstrating their legitimate membership status for themselves as well as the majority population. The democracy-related argument was that those who are concerned by political decisions should be able, by means of the full franchise, to participate in its development. Also nation-state-based institutions such as constitutions and courts essentially contributed to the acceptance of dual citizenship. For example, the principle of gender equality and its interpretation as superior to the political aim of avoiding dual citizenship was one of the most influential factors in this respect, whereby the transmission of citizenship at birth from both parents in cases of bi-national marriages was legalized. The corresponding situation in emigration countries, however, is somewhat different. Recent policies and citizenship law reforms in emigration states indicate a clearer trend towards an expansion of political communities beyond the nation-state borders and to promote what is called “external citizenship” (Barry, 2006). Many migrant sending states have revised their laws towards acceptance or even embracing dual citizenship and grant to an increasing degree political voting rights by citizens residing abroad. By this means, they obviously try to maintain closer relations to their emigrant
communities abroad because they expect migrants’ contributions concerning economic development in terms of migrant remittances and investments and as political lobby groups advancing the related emigration county’s interests and images in international relations. However, even in this case nation-states are seriously involved insofar as the acceptance of dual citizenship, including its related rights and practices, at least in many cases, did not happen because of the legitimate interests of transnational migrants but rather in the name of national interests (cf. Bosniak 2003; Smith 2003; Faist, 2007).

Regarding the second aspect, several European immigration states have introduced more restrictive requirements of citizenship acquisition, including, for example, more demanding language skills, knowledge of the state’s society and history and constitutional system and more explicit confessions to the public values, more demanding standards of economic self-sufficiency and absence of criminal records, and the adoption of citizenship tests (Joppke 2007; Jacobs & Rea 2007). In cases of so-called integration failures according to these criteria, some countries, as for instance the Netherlands and Germany, introduced legal sanctions in terms of the immigrants’ prospects to gain secure residence permits and to be eligible to naturalization. In general, these trends signify a far-reaching shift concerning the perception of the relation of integration and citizenship acquisition. While many European immigration states in the 1980s and 1990s still regarded naturalization as a precondition or means of immigrant integration, now a conception of citizenship acquisition as a reward for successful efforts of integration on the part of immigrants seems to prevail (Bauböck et. al. 2006, Jurado, 2008).

From this it follows that the question of the permeability of nation-state boundaries and borders cannot be reduced to the issue of dual citizenship, but rather has to include more general developments as well as the different functions of dual citizenship in the context of particular understandings of national citizenship. However, even if the changes connected to increasing tolerance of dual citizenship, because it simply combines national citizenships, do not directly or substantially contribute to transformations towards post- or transnational citizenship there might be other factors, forces and developments in this direction (cf. Bosniak 2003). Therefore, in the next section we will change our focus to theoretical and conceptual accounts of citizenship transformation beyond the borders and boundaries of national citizenship.
IV. Post- and Transnational Citizenships

There are different theories and concepts with titles announcing a transformation transcending the nation state concept. The most prominent are postnational, transnational and cosmopolitan citizenship. Because accounts with the same title partly differ significantly regarding their main thesis, in the following, the arguments of some theories will be discussed independently of their respective title. These concepts mostly contain both descriptive statements about the factual development of political institutions related to aspects of citizenship, on the one hand, and normative assertions how to revise the institution of citizenship in order to cope with challenges that democratic nation-states face with respect to processes of international migration, globalization and transnationalization, on the other hand.

To begin with, in some cases these approaches seem mainly concerned with transformations of collective identity in immigration states as from previously based on rather thick, particularistic and homogeneous cultures to more pluralistic, ethnic-neutral, multicultural and political conceptions of shared identity. For example, Bader discusses under the heading of ‘transnational citizenship’ the issue of a decoupling of ‘ethnos’ and ‘demos’ and the many questions arising in the face of increasing cultural diversity within the boundaries of demarcated nation-states. Bader (1997: 780) proposes a far-reaching “disentanglement of democratic citizenship from ethnic languages, history, and cultures” which is considered necessary in order to live up to substantial individual equality and fair democracy. The problems of cultural justice for national and ethnic minorities and the official recognition of difference in terms of cultural backgrounds, practices and religions, which Bader discusses, are very similar to those that have been raised in the context of multicultural politics of recognition (Taylor, 1993) and under the heading of ‘multicultural citizenship’ (Kymlicka, 1995). According to the general thesis of multicultural citizenship, the established ‘colour-blind’ institutional framework of liberal democratic states which grant individual and formal rights irrespective of the particular characteristics and identities of persons (such as ethnicity and gender) is insufficient to fully accommodate ethnic and national minorities because these institutions as well as the political cultures are biased in favour of the dominant classes or majority’s ethnicity and religion. Because of that, multicultural theorists argue for providing group-differentiated rights as an extension of formal citizenship, such as exemption rights for minority religious practices within official institutions and special representation rights for cultural minorities. Obviously, the kind of transformation that is announced with the use of the word transnational citizenship in this case is related to a changing understanding of (ethnic) nation rather than that of state. While such a transformation of collective identity, including
political consequences such as the introduction of multicultural group-differentiated rights, certainly is an important change, it does not, however, lead automatically to a threat of nation-states’ sovereignty to maintain territorial borders and to define membership boundaries.

The most prominent concept of postnational citizenship also seems predominantly concerned with the nationalist imperatives of nation-states. Y. Soysal’s (1994) account of citizenship transformation starts with the empirical observation that in immigration states there is a dwindling influence of shared nationhood and national belonging on the definition of individual rights and membership boundaries. As she puts it: "Postnational citizenship confers upon every person the right and duty of participation in the authority structures and public life of a polity, regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that community." (Soysal, 1994: 3) It is mainly the fact that immigration states have gradually granted to their immigrants increasing individual rights which previously have been tied to citizenship that has inspired her theory: "Rights that used to belong solely to nationals are now extended to foreign populations, thereby undermining the very basis of national citizenship." (Soysal, 1994: 137) Up to this point, the postnational citizenship approach seems to indicate nothing more than a nation-state-internal revision of collective identity or a reformulation of the terms of legitimate belonging as a basis for access to individual rights. In this sense, the transformation in question might be interpreted as somewhat analogues to a transformation from an ethno-cultural concept of nationhood, which is primarily based on common descent and cultural similarity, toward a republican or civic understanding of political community, where access to membership is essentially derived from residence and the will of the individual persons to join the political community (for this ideal-typically distinction see especially Brubaker, 1992). Such a transformation from ethno-cultural to republican nation, for instance, has happened in Germany during the last ten to fifteen years (Weinbach, 2005; Gerdes, Rieple and Faist, 2007).

However, the postnational model, when it comes to the proposed explanation of this transformation, makes an additional claim which transcends the territorial space of established nation-states, because the sources of this transformation are essentially located outside the nation-states. The postnational approach contents that the development of citizenship rights for non-citizens originate from fundamental changes of the international political order since World War Two, which can best be described as an increasing decoupling of rights and obligations on the one hand and collective identity and national membership on the other. While some postnationalists detect the main aspect in the proliferation of international conventions and treaties relating to universal human rights (e.g.
Jacobsen, 1996), Soysal refers not only to such institutional factors of international law but also to softer forces such as increasing transnational discourses on universal human rights from several collective actors, which significantly form public opinion and delegitimize practices of unequal treatment and marginalisation of categories of persons according to ascriptive criteria. According to Soysal, the emergence of individual rights for immigrants indicates that rights traditionally tied to national citizenship are no longer granted on the basis of territory and on membership within a shared nationhood. To underpin her thesis of a postnational membership based on general human rights, which increasingly led to equal treatment of migrants and nationals within nation states in the postwar era, and to illustrate „a proliferation of transnational arrangements, grounded in human rights discourse, that address the rights and interests of migrants and refugees“ (1994: 149), Soysal especially refers to several conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Council of Europe, The Geneva Convention on the Legal Status of Refugees (1951) and UN conventions regarding international migration and the rights of immigrants. She explicitly rejects the view that these transformations could be interpreted at least partly as a revision or reformulation of national citizenship: “As I see it, the incorporation of guestworkers is no mere expansion of the scope of national citizenship ... Rather, it reveals a profound transformation in the institution of citizenship, both in its institutional logic and in the way it is legitimated. To locate the changes, we need to go beyond the nation state.“ (Soysal, 1994: 139)

Hence, the main postnational thesis seems to be that, first and foremost, international norms and institutions exert pressure on nation states’ sovereignty toward granting individual rights to migrants. Such an interpretation, however, neglects or at least underestimates the values and norms of liberal democratic states, which are anchored in their domestic constitutions and institutions, namely democracy and basic individual rights. In liberal democratic states, some general human rights (such as security of the person, freedom of faith and conscience) are not restricted to citizens and legal residents, but are granted to all human beings, even to tourists. Regarding the improved rights status of permanent residents, which has been denoted as ‘denizenship’ (Hammar, 1990), the postnational membership model with its only reference to international and universal human rights, as it has been objected (cf. Joppke, 1998: 24ff.), cannot fully explain differences of alien policies and laws between immigration countries as well as legal distinctions of resident status of different categories of immigrants. One can go even so far to say that the contention that the rights of denizens are neither tied to territory nor to the societal community of the respective state ignores the real origin of the denizenship status. This is not to deny the influence of international human rights conventions and discourses which certainly also contributed in some way or other to the
improvement of non-citizens’ resident status and the corresponding individual rights. However, human rights are usually formulated in a rather general and abstract way so that they have to be interpreted in relation to concrete situations by parliaments, courts and in the general public. These complex institutional structures of interpretation and balancing different basic rights, the rights of different individual persons, and rights vis-à-vis important collective aims are still primarily available on the national state level. There are many indications, that denizen rights should rather be interpreted as essentially ‘membership-specific-rights’, because they are granted to immigrants to an increasing degree the longer they reside and the more social ties to the societal community they presumptively have developed. Especially in relation to binding definitions and enforcement of non-citizen rights, as it has been showed (e.g. Joppke, 1999; Guiraudon, 1998), administrative and constitutional courts, located at the national level, have played a pivotal role in extending basic rights of migrants against state interests. For instance, courts have often overruled administrative deportation decisions on grounds of long-term residence and in the case of existing family ties. Even in cases, where international organizations and international norms played a certain role, as for example in relation to rules of citizenship acquisition in nationality laws of those states which became independent after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the related justifications emphasized the principle of “genuine link” between certain states and persons, which have to be respected (cf. Orentlicher, 1998). Joseph Carens has argued for a very simple moral principle, which relates to the rights of non-citizens as well as their claims to naturalization: “Living in a society on an ongoing basis makes one a member of that society. The longer one stays, the stronger one’s connections and social attachments. For the same reason, the longer one stays the stronger one’s claim to be treated as a full member.” (Carens, 2005: 33) According to Carens, this principle, by and large, is also guiding existing practices and policies in liberal democracies, even if it is not applied to a desirable extent and in all cases. Likewise Kymlicka (2003: 289) argues that residence-based rights and citizenship acquisition should not be regarded as alternatives: “The rights of aliens are defended as ‘protocitizen’ rights, in recognition of partial integration, and as a step toward fuller national integration.”

Against this background, it would be more plausible that efforts trying to explain the evolution of denizenship take into consideration at least both levels: the national and the transnational level (cf. Sassen, 2000). Postnational theorists, when underpinning their claims regarding citizenship transformations beyond the nation-state more concretely, often refer to the European level. For example, Soysal contends that “[t]he most comprehensive legal enactment of a transnational status for migrants is encoded in European Communities law.” (Soysal, 1994: 147) Thus, the developments toward ‘European Citizenship’ with the growing importance of supranational legal bodies such as the European Court of Justice is deemed to
be effectively limiting the leeway of nation-states. It is supposed that European norms and regulations on the scope of individual rights increasingly also influences matters of immigration and migrants’ rights. That is also argued by Seyla Benhabib, who takes the European Union as the primary example to illustrate the increasing influence of cosmopolitan norms, which in terms of human rights constrain the latitude of nation-states’ democratic sovereignty. This leads, as she argues, to an increasing visibility of the “paradox of democratic legitimacy” within political as well as legal processes and debates. “The paradox is that the republican sovereign should undertake to bind its will by a series of precommitments to a set of formal and substantive norms, usually referred to as ‘human rights.’ The rights and claims of others – be they ‘auxiliaries to the commonwealth,’ as women, slaves, and propertyless males were considered to be, or be they subjugated peoples or foreigners – are then negotiated upon this terrain flanked by human rights on the one hand and sovereignty assertions on the other.” (Benhabib, 2004: 47) According to Benhabib, this fundamental tension between rights and democracy cannot be entirely reconciled, but can be mediated and mitigated through what she calls “democratic iterations”, which are processes of public debate and deliberation in which universalist principles and rights claims are contested, (re-)interpreted and contextualized (Benhabib, 2004: 176ff.). When speaking of cosmopolitan norms, however, it is not entirely clear, first, whether these norms are anchored on an international level or on the nation-state level as well, and, second, whether and to what extent these norms and the related democratic iterations transcend the nation-state level of governance, rights and democracy (cf. Kymlicka, 2006).

With regard to contemporary Europe Benhabib (2004: 21) speaks of a “disaggregation of citizenship” by which factual “trends toward postnational solidarity” would be discernible. Also, the European development shows the decoupling of the different components of citizenship: “The unitary model [of citizenship], which combined continuous residency upon a given territory with a shared national identity, the enjoyment of political rights, and subjection to a common administrative jurisdiction, is coming apart. One can have one set of rights but not another: one can have political rights without being a national, as is the case for EU nationals; more commonly, though, one has social rights and benefits, by virtue of being a foreign worker, without either sharing in the same collective identity or having the privileges of political membership.” (Benhabib 2004: 146) Especially, however, with regard to migration and migrants’ rights she makes rather ambivalent, if not contradictory assertions. On the one hand, she reiterates the postnational thesis: “The right to have rights today means the recognition of the universal status of personhood of each and every human being independently of their national citizenship.” (Benhabib, 2004: 68) On the other hand, she stresses the different rights of EU citizens, which are derived from citizenships of EU
member states, and so-called third-state citizens: “While throughout the EU a dissociation of the privileges of political citizenship from nationality can be observed for EU citizens, for third-country nationals, the ties between identities and institutions, between national membership and democratic citizenship rights, are reinforced.” (Benhabib, 2004: 155f.) On the one hand, she complains of the extremely weak rights status of refugees and asylum-seekers in European member states, where they are treated “if they were quasi-criminal elements” (Benhabib, 2004: 163). On the other hand, she is very optimistic regarding the Europeanization of migration policies: “The integration of third-country nationals into the EU’s rights regime is well advanced and, given the growing role of the European Court of Justice and of the European Court of Human Rights, these trends are quite irreversible.” (Benhabib, 2004: 167)

**National citizenship as a part of transnational citizenship**

These critical descriptions already indicate that what is advocated as citizenship beyond nation-states refers, however, in different ways back to existing nation-states. Even Soysal (1996: 24f.) finally admits that “postnational rights remain organized at the national level. The world is still made up of territorially configured political units; implementation and enforcement of global rules and norms lie with national political structures. Simply put, the exercise of universalistic rights is tied to specific states and their institutions. Even though its mode and scope of action are increasingly defined and constrained by the wider global system, the sovereign nation state retains the formally and organizationally legitimate form venerated by the ideologies and conventions of transnational reference groups such as the UN, UNESCO, European Union and the like.” Even if it can be assumed that international norms today have an important influence in domesticating the politics of national interest, we should be aware that national policy makers, because of their interest to be elected again, are forced to meet legitimacy requirements towards their domestic electorates. Therefore, as Boswell (2007: 87) argues, the commitment to human rights at the international level is “likely to be far weaker than at the national level, where there is, after all, a strong pragmatic interest in rights extension as a tool of conflict prevention and enlisting consent. At the international level, states are rarely troubled by the mobilization of societal groups outside of their own state, nor are they under any obligation to secure the consent of nationals of other countries.” (Boswell, 2007: 87)

Also Benhabib’s descriptions of what she calls “democratic iterations” are interestingly referring back to the nation-state level in several ways. First, she criticises communitarian
Walzer as well as liberal (e.g. Rawls) proponents of national citizenship as relying on misleading presuppositions of cultural cohesiveness and homogeneity and pleads for a clear distinction between cultural and political integration (Benhabib, 2004: 115ff.). Because of cultural diversity as a consequence of different competing and coexisting world views and in order to avoid a structural exclusion of immigrants, she is arguing for a shift towards a political instead of a cultural definition of political community: “(...), in liberal democracies conceptions of human and citizens’ rights, constitutional traditions as well as democratic practices of election and representation, are the core normative elements of political integration. It is toward them that citizens as well as foreigners, nationals as well as resident aliens, have to show respect and loyalty, and not toward any specific cultural tradition.” (Benhabib, 2004: 121f.; original emphasis) Obviously, such a transformation toward political integration, though altering the terms of membership and belonging, does not put into question the model of national citizenship. Again, it resembles very much a transformation of nations from ethno-cultural to civic or republican. Second, the political and legal processes concerning the question of public and official headscarf-wearing of Muslim girls and women in France and Germany and alien suffrage in Germany, which she describes as several illustration of “democratic iterations”, happened essentially on the nation-state level as well. According to her account, it was the nation-state based community whose collective identity was simultaneously altered by a reinterpretation of the rights claims of migrants. Moreover, the actors involved, according to her own description, were the constitutional courts and the political elites of these two nation-states. Third, although she states that “the challenge ahead is to develop an international regime which decouples the right to have rights from one’s nationality status” (2004: 68), she nonetheless advocates a “human right to membership” (2004: 134ff.) as a right to citizenship in a nation-state. Such an individual right to naturalization, as she describes it, should consist in a clear and transparent procedure, including a right to appeal, which would preclude arbitrary refusals of naturalization applications and exclusions of foreigners on basis of ascriptive and non-elective criteria such as race, ethnicity, gender, religion, language or sexuality. After all, such an intensive effort of justifying and explaining a right to citizenship as naturalization into existing nation-states makes little sense if citizenship and its corresponding rights, including political participation, are (to be) transferred to other levels anyhow.
However, other accounts of transnational citizenship allude to the experiences and practices of transnational migrants who are political active in two countries. For instance, against Huntington’s claim (Huntington, 2004) that Hispanic migrants in the US would not assimilate and are, to a great extent, oriented towards their home cultures and countries, Michael Peter Smith (2007) argues, drawing on his ethnographic field research, that these migrants are often simultaneously politically active at their place of residence as well as in their countries of origin. Especially, his interviews with Mexican migrants who are leading members of the Federation of Zacatecan Hometown Associations of Southern California (FCZSC) reveal that they have developed, in the course of their transnational orientation and experiences, a sense of interest, loyalty and responsibility vis-à-vis both political contexts, both municipalities, both regions and both states. Because their political contacts as well as their political objectives and projects are oriented in about equal shares toward different political units, Smith, in this sense, speaks of a transformation into “transnational citizens.” (see for a similar accounts: R. Smith 2003; Glick Schiller, 2005). However, the transnational expansion of political interest and involvement of citizens do not imply a transformation of the institution of citizenship, as its meaning does not rely exclusively in active participation (cf. Fox 2005). A related institution underpinning and recognizing transnational political practices can be dual citizenship, but “not all dual nationals are transnationals” and “not all transnationals are dual nationals” (Bosniak 2006: 41). Moreover, transnational migrant political practices and identifications as well as other engagements in transnational advocacy networks do not change the established systems of governance as located in nation state-related and territorially-bounded legislatures, but rather direct their political claims to these governmental units. That is why they are, as Kymlicka (2003: 291) puts it, “predicated on, even parasitic on, the ongoing existence of bounded political communities.”

The terms postnational and transnational citizenship, however, are also used in still another context, namely in relation to premises and statements usually made by concepts of cosmopolitan, global or some versions of European citizenship (e.g. Tambini, 2001). Such accounts usually do not start with a description of changes of the institution of citizenship, but rather accentuate the challenges with regard to effective governance by means of democratic national citizenship in the face of several processes of globalisation. Traditional

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2 Smith also argues against Appadurai (1996), who claims that international migrants to Western immigration states, because of continuing connections to their home countries by means of transnational media, today are unlikely to acquire a sense of loyalty to their countries and places of residence.
national citizenship is deemed to be no longer an appropriate concept, because the scope of political problems such as global market regulation, environmental problems and international terrorism and crime increasingly exceed nation-states capacities of political regulation. Most of these theories, however, exhibit strong normative traits. In a rather general version, global or cosmopolitan citizenship is understood simply as a sort of appeal to individual citizens, to develop, alongside with identifications to their own nation state related polities, a sense of belonging also to humankind, a corresponding sense of responsibility for the world as a whole and some kind of sensibility with the fate of people living elsewhere (cf. Appiah 2007). Such a cosmopolitan morality of citizens beyond their national allegiance is deemed as a precondition for tackling the global problems of poverty and grave social inequalities between different regions and nation states as well as serious human rights violations in countries where citizens do not live. Other more direct political accounts of cosmopolitan citizenship claim that nation state based democracy “has been diminished by economic globalisation which place national societies at the mercy of external social and economic forces which citizens are powerless to control.” (Linklater 2002: 327)

For example, as David Held (1999: 103) argues, because of increasing forces and processes beyond the reach of nation states that determine the nature of citizens’ life chances, “the idea of a political community of fate – of a self-determining collectivity – can no longer meaningfully be located within the boundaries of a single nation state.” Such a view is rebutted by Will Kymlicka (2003: 298) who states that the boundaries of a community of fate is not determined by “the forces people are subjected to, but rather how they respond to those forces, and in particular, what sorts of collectivities they identify with when responding to those forces.” This, however, is a rather weak argument because of especially two reasons. First, today nobody can seriously doubt that in an increasingly interconnected world persons are affected from political decisions, which are made in other than their nation states where they were not represented at all. That is even more problematic in an international system characterized by asymmetrical power relations between nation states. Second, a conception of democratic legitimacy which is limited to the input and quality of the democratic process in terms of the degree of participation and representation of citizens seems insufficient. Instead, the idea of output legitimacy has to be included, which comprises also the capacity of political collectivities to provide for effective political regulations and policies ameliorating the life chances and situations of citizens (cf. Zürn 1998). If effective governance is increasingly diminished, for instance, because multinational companies and international financial markets can no longer be controlled on a nation state level, international institutions are obviously necessary. Therefore, the normative aim put forward by accounts of cosmopolitan citizenship is that especially those international institutions and transnational organizations should be democratized which are increasingly responsible for
important economic, environmental, and security decisions or which are able to influence these matters more effectively (cf. Held, 1999).

**Transformation of What: Individual Rights, Memberships, Communities or of Self-Governing Units?**

This inspections of several approaches of transnational and postnational citizenship suggests the conclusion that different aspects and dimensions of citizenship transformation should be distinguished much more explicitly and conceptually already from the outset. Above all, such transformations of citizenship caused by cross-border ties, transnational relations and global challenges, as the different approaches evaluated above show, should be differentiated according to two dimensions. First, it should be distinguished whether and to what extent a revision of national collective identity is announced or whether and to what degree also a transformation of self-governing units or even an expansion of jurisdictions is deemed to be happened or normatively considered as required. As showed above, some proponents of post- and transnational citizenship obviously think primarily of institutional changes which enhance the integration of migrants in immigration states and which might be connected to the granting of denizenship rights as well as to easier conditions of naturalization. This might be connected to a re-definition of the overall self-understanding of the political community as primarily integrated by means of political values and democratic procedures instead of cultural homogeneity. Such a revision of nationhood and relating changes of membership boundaries, however, need not transcend the territorial borders or alter the scope of governance. Also, institutional transformations toward some form of multicultural citizenship – in terms of, for example, antidiscrimination measures, affirmative action programs, group-differentiated rights for religious minorities, special representation rights for national minorities – do not expand previous jurisdictions. In these cases, the prefixes ‘post’ and ‘trans’ are obviously related to changes of nations but not necessarily to changes of state structures. Other theories also refer to some form of changes and shifts of self-governing units, particularly those which point to developments toward supra-national governance structures as in the European Union. However, often both kinds of transformation are intermingled in some way so that it is difficult to identify the main mechanisms which are referred to. Certainly, there may be a kind of interrelation between both dimensions, as, for example, Habermas (2004) claims that an nation-state internal revision of the basis of solidarity from ethno-cultural particularism to "constitutional patriotism" alleviates the expansion of solidarity patterns beyond national borders which in turn is a precondition for establishing supranational democratic governance structures.
However, by no means there is a necessary correlation between transformations of collective identity, on the one hand, and of governance structures, on the other hand.

Second, changes of citizenship also should be differentiated according to the question whether they either concern predominantly individual persons and their spectrum of rights, what then might affect selected groups only, or to what extend these transformations have consequences for whole political communities and the prevailing understanding and institutionalization of democracy, rights, obligations and commonality. The obvious and appropriate institutional transformation of citizenship on an individual level, which includes the identity dimension as well as the dimensions of rights and political participation, is the acceptance of dual citizenship as the legal recognition of transnational experiences and orientations of transnational citizens. Their dual social, cultural and political ties shape their legitimate interest in participating in the self-governance of both of these different municipalities, regions and states as full citizens, what Bauböck (2007) calls “stakeholder citizenship. If these transnational identifications and participation are backed up by a corresponding spectrum of individual rights in both of the concerned countries through two citizeships, obviously transnational citizenship is synonymous with dual citizenship (cf. Fox, 2005). A corresponding extension of citizenship on the collective level pertaining to all of its three essential dimension – political self-determination, individual rights and duties, and membership –, however, veers toward of what is usually called cosmopolitan or European citizenship.
These two differentiations of change can be summarized in the following schema:

**Figure 1:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspects of Citizenship Transformation</th>
<th>Nation (Collective Identity)</th>
<th>State (Self-Governing Unit, Jurisdiction)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Membership Boundary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Territorial Border</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Dimension</td>
<td>Immigrant Integration</td>
<td>Dual Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naturalization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multicultural Citizenship Rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Dimension</td>
<td>State Neutrality</td>
<td>European Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>De-Ethnization</td>
<td>Cosmopolitan Citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republican/Civic Nationhood</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Collective Self-definition as</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multicultural Society</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Constitutional Patriotism’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multicultural Citizenship</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dual citizenship can be regarded as the most far-reaching factual cross-border expansion of citizenship, implying not only an internal transformation of the definition of membership but also a state- or governance-related change. The change or expansion, however, concerns merely the individual level. European and cosmopolitan citizenships, by contrast, indicate a transformation on a collective level as well and purport an expansion of a self-governing unit and the corresponding political community. In other words, whereas the former can be deemed as an expression of individual autonomy, the latter pertains to collective autonomy. Furthermore, dual citizenship, if the corresponding state regulations allow for it, is a matter of choice of the individual persons concerned. European citizenship, by contrast, is automatically acquired by all persons having citizenship of one of the membership states. Moreover, while dual citizenship combine two bundles of rights relating to two states but do not change the level and scope of the rights tied to national citizenship, European citizenship as a multi-level structure of governance and rights also influence the extent of rights provided for on the national level inasmuch certain areas of regulation are transferred to the European level.
V. Transformations of Individual Rights

As far as the element of individual rights is regarded as a necessary component of the institution of citizenship it is clearly not enough to look at transformation processes relating to changes of boundaries and borders of political self-governing units. Whereas changing conditions of political inclusion and access to full membership in a political unit is certainly an important dimension of citizenship transformation, also changes of individual rights in terms of their scope, level and content as granted to all citizens on an usually equal basis should be included as an another import aspect of citizenship changes. Furthermore, theories on changes of citizenship should be concerned with possible interdependencies of both of these dimensions of transformation and should ask the question, for instance, whether and in what respect an expansion of membership and territory may influence the substance of citizenship regarding changing levels and contents of individual rights, and, the other way round, which consequences redefinitions in content of citizenship rights may have for the conditions of access for newcomers to territories and memberships.

Among the different dimensions of individual rights, social rights are a crucial case, because these rights are politically most precarious and contested. Social rights obviously involve more demanding corresponding duties on the part of fellow citizens than civic and political citizenship rights. While the latter sort of rights only implies rather negative obligations by fellow citizens, such as tolerance and non-interference towards the exercise of these rights, social rights require citizens to make positive contributions through taxes or within social insurance systems in the name of the social rights of others. This seems to presuppose not only a sense of common solidarity, on which basis citizens are ready to accept performances detrimental to their immediate interests, but also a system of effective government able to secure an arrangement of redistributive social policies.

In many approaches of postnational and transnational citizenship, the influence of the European Union plays an important role. However, many of these sometimes rather optimistic accounts concentrate on changes of borders and boundaries but neglect at the same time challenges and shifts at the level of individual rights. For example, Soysal and Benhabib are predominantly concerned with citizenship transformations as a consequence of increased mobility and international migration. They seem to be concerned primarily with nation states as entities of social closure, which are deemed to be increasingly constrained, especially in relation to their capacities to control their borders and to define the conditions of membership access, by EU institutions. However, because they are not concerned with the extensiveness of citizenship rights and its changes, Soysal and Benhabib do not consider
that a restriction of nation-state sovereignty, even if it is conducive to the inclusion of migrants, may have adverse consequences to the political opportunities to uphold established standards of social security and corresponding social citizenship rights and, more generally, to allocate resources by raising taxes in order to be able for providing public goods, at least if there is no other level of effective governance which is able to take over this task. Thus, they tend to disregard that nation-state based citizenship rights has also been the main device for nation-state internal inclusion, at which the provision of welfare and the granting of social rights especially to wage earners played an extraordinarily important role (Marshall, 1950). Benhabib (2004, 147-169), in her description of EU-citizenship, indeed discusses different areas of social rights, such as access to pension schemes, health insurances, unemployment benefits and trade-union rights, under the perspective of an increasing inclusion of EU non-citizens, third-country citizens with permanent residence status and third-country citizens with temporary residence status. However, she does not consider changes with regard to the kinds and levels of social rights and benefits and transformations towards social deregulation and privatization of social risks, which also might be furthered by European integration in its current state.

It is exactly the latter question, which is the starting point of more sceptical views on the prospects of European integration. Some authors even go so far to derive the prospect of increasing “post-national solidarity” (cf. Ferrara 2008) exclusively from EU-regulation concerning the principles of cross-border “portability” and “benefit cumulability” of social entitlements. This, however, neglects, first, that the scope and level of social rights or benefits are still determined on the level of individual member states and, second, that new rules expanding access of social rights to EU citizens can seriously affect the content of social rights toward downsizing. One very concrete example of the correlation of access and content of rights is the established case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ).

Although EU Member States in the past have tried to restrict free movement and access to tax-based social benefits of EU non-citizens to economic activity, the ECJ case law has increasingly destroyed these restrictions. For example, EU member states, by secondary Community law in terms of directives and regulations, attempted to constrain unlimited residence rights of non-economic actors by making these rights conditional on the possession of “sufficient resources” and a sickness insurance, in order to avoid social benefit
tourism of EU free movers and that they become an “unreasonable burden” on the established welfare systems of the member states.\(^3\)

However, as Christian Joppke describes in detail, the ECJ rulings, on grounds of non-discrimination and by blurring the distinction between insurance-based and non-contributory social benefits, follow consistently a line of reasoning that makes EU citizenship a source of access to social rights to all EU citizens, independently of prior economic status categories. It is obvious that this must have consequences for the kind of social policies at the level of EU member states: “Because, in the absence of strong solidarities at European level, the enthusiasm of nation states to provide tax-based social benefits from which the rest of Europe cannot be excluded, and that may even be consumable anywhere in Europe, must cool down.” (Joppke 2010: 166)

More generally, Claus Offe (2003) sees at least two basic dilemmas concerning the supra-nationalization of social rights, one concerning the overall future prospects to transfer competent jurisdiction to the European level and one related to the current state, which still leaves the regulation and overall organization of social security, social services and procedures of wage determination as well as essential parts of overall economic and labour market policies to the individual member states. Concerning the first, a short-term consent of national governments concerning a transfer of competencies to the EU level is very unlikely because of very different welfare state characteristics and development stages in the different EU member states, such as the scope and level of social protection, status rights of collective actors, rates of economic growth and employment performances and, not the least, general institutional structures of welfare states. So far, the scope of EU governance only covers regulation concerning non-discriminatory access to labour markets and jobs and rules relating to health and safety at work. Although a further transfer of competencies in the policy areas of social protection and social services to the EU level would be desirable in order to avoid the erosion of popular support for European integration, the national political elites of the individual member states have little reasons to pass competencies to the EU level in this field because they either would lose economic competition advantages, if they have rather low standards of social regulation and low costs of labour on the national level, or would risk

\(^3\) Directive 2004/58/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.
legitimacy problems towards their nation-state based constituencies, if they hold rather high levels of social security.

The second dilemma, however, is even grave, as it primarily does not concern the remote future prospects of European integration in this policy area, but rather belongs to its mode as it is currently working. According to Offe, the still existing dominance of the often so-called “negative” market integration, as the EU strategy of combating any obstacles to free trade and free exchange of capital, goods, services and labour in the name of avoiding market and competition distortions within the EU, undermines increasingly, the longer it prevails, the nation-states effective means to regulate and constrain politically economic transactions as well as to provide for high standards of social protection. Although the EU member states, according to the principle of “subsidiarity”, maintain the nominal sovereignty in the areas of labour market, employment, market and social policies, they successively lose the actual capacities of “designing and implementing autonomous policies of social protection” because of an “EU-inaugurated EMU [European Monetary Union] and Single Market regime with its effective ban on autonomous policies of setting exchange rates, interest rates, and fiscal debt, as well as controlling capital movements and movements of goods and services across their borders.” (Offe 2003: 457f.) A more direct analogous mechanism is, certainly, the EU strategy of critical observation and abatement of any subsidy policies in EU member states which presumably lead to distortions of competition within the common market (cf. Lamping, 2008). The present situation of EU integration, as distributing the governance competencies in the area of economic, labour market and social policies partly to member states and partly to the EU level, is probably one factor which contributed and still contribute to a general shift in European states concerning the allocation of tasks in the realm of social security from the state to markets, families and even civil society, and, thus, from de-commodification (cf. Esping Anderson 1990) to re-commodification. Also, the partial convergence of labour market and social policies in EU states toward so-called activation policies and workfare programmes, which are justified with changed interpretations of social justice as predominantly meaning equality of opportunities (essentially through labour market participation) and not of outcomes, might have been influenced also by this situation. As Offe worries, it is likely that, under these conditions, the European model of political “embedded” and “social” capitalism transforms itself into a politically unconstrained model of pure market capitalism resembling the Anglo-Saxon type (Offe 2003: 446). Tendencies toward privatization of social risks and the rise of precarious and low paid jobs in several EU member states as well as the increased frequency of official statements by policy makers who view social integration increasingly in terms of or at least dependent from labour market participation might back up such fears.
These remarks, however, are only aimed to illustrate that theories about transformation toward European citizenship, as certainly the most developed case of an institutional arrangement of governance beyond established nation-states, should include the dimension of developments and changes of the substance of citizenship as well. If accounts of European citizenship only focus on the question of who have access to a certain right without considering at the same time the issue of what is the content of the respective right and where it is defined, these will not be able to grasp the more complex dynamics of citizenship transformation. A consideration of both dimensions of citizenship transformation is especially important because it is plausible to assume that both dimensions of citizenship rights probably interact. An example might be, again, the predominance of something like an “activation philosophy”, which can be observed in several European states cutting across different policy areas, especially visible in labour market and social policies, on the one hand, and immigrant integration and naturalization policies, on the other hand. In all of these policy areas considerable political efforts are visible which are aimed at influencing the attitudes and behaviour of persons towards pro-activity and flexibility by means of laws and sanctions in order to enhance what meanwhile is usually called “employability”. Moreover, in both policy areas the corresponding measures, which make certain rights (social rights in the cases of labour market and social policies, residence and naturalization rights in the cases of integration and citizenship law policies) conditional on certain so-called integration performances, are accompanied with public and political discourses, which accentuate duties, responsibilities and obligations of citizens and citizen-applicants vis-à-vis the society and the state. These tendencies across many Western countries, especially in the context of workfare in the realm of social policies, indicate a far-reaching paradigmatic shift to a “contractualization of citizenship” which transforms previously “reciprocal but non equivalent rights and obligation between equal citizens” into market-like voluntary and revocable contracts between individual persons and states that are based on quid pro quo exchange of equivalent resources or performances, leaving and treating “those unable to be a party to an employment contract (...) as nothing less than contractual malfeasants.” (Somers 2009: 69, 72) With respect to social rights, these transformations of citizenship “from status to contract” (Handler 2004) amounts to a complete reversion, when considering Marshall’s (1992: 40) account: “Social rights in their modern form imply an invasion of contract by status.” Moreover, these developments are accompanied with an obvious changing significance and role of civil society and a corresponding increasing emphasis on “active citizenship” as voluntary work in several organizations. One might regard these trends toward conditionality of citizenship even as a partial recurrence of an understanding of citizenship dominating in the 19th century, when many states excluded from voting those persons who did not have
enough income or property to pay taxes. To a certain extent, the new possibilities for emigrants to retain external citizenship in emigration states may be a somewhat corresponding tendency if these are based on the presumption that they make economic or other assumed important contributions to the benefit of these emigration states (cf. Rubio-Marín 2006). These emigrant citizens have, compared to resident citizens, a privileged status, because they stand beyond the territorially related coercive power of the state to enforce collective binding decisions (cf. Fitzgerald 2008). If citizenship means a status conferring a certain set of rights and duties to persons of political community on an equal basis, these developments finally raise the question whether it is still adequate to talk of citizenship transformations and not instead of a system of increasing fragmented privileges for different categories of persons.

VI. Conclusion

The above presented considerations on different forms of citizenship concepts and forms of transformations, such as dual, post- and transnational and cosmopolitan citizenships, are mainly of a conceptual kind. Departing from an evaluation and partly derived from an immanent critique of some prominent existing theories on several variants of transnational citizenship we propose to consider some important differences, aspects and dimensions of change more explicitly and systematically than it is often made. In sum, it is, first, necessary to distinguish transformations of nation and collective identity from changes of self-governing units and jurisdictions and also changes of citizenship on a rather individual level from those on a collective level. Second, it is important to consider not only changed conditions of citizenship inclusion and access to rights but also transformations of the substance of citizenship and the content of rights. Transformations of citizenship in its different variants can hardly be regarded as a gradual replacement of national citizenship by transnational citizenship. In the case of European citizenship one certainly can speak of a gradual expansion of citizenship within a multi-level governance structure. This development, however, as the case of social rights and policies within in European countries indicate, may undermine the substance and extent of rights as they have been established on the nation state level. Today, the concept and institution of citizenship as it has been developed in the past century seems to be in a certain dilemma: On the one hand, the problems which have to be regulated by effective political action seem to be increasingly beyond the reach of nation states; on the other hand, essential resources needed for an input-related democratic process, such as especially a collective identity or a common imagination of a community of cooperation, seem to be still limited to the nation state.
References


Chapter 3

Consequences of Transnational Citizenship for Migrant Sending Countries: A Debate on Dual Citizenship

Ahmet İçduygu and Deniz Sert

Introduction

One important way in which the theoretical deficit and the lack of genuinely comparative studies on the migration-citizenship literature have recently been addressed is through the emergence of studies of emigration and citizenship linkage. Most of the literature on migration-citizenship debates of the last few decades, as observed in the cases of major migrant-receiving countries, has been widely a literature of immigration. In other words, little attention has been paid to “what could be called the politics of emigration” (Brand, 2006; Green and Weil, 2007; Faist, 2007). It is within this context, for instance, that the debate over the dual, or even multiple, citizenship regimes in several emigration countries has been a subject of increasing attention since the mid 1990s (Faist, 2007). In order to see and to evaluate the main consequences of dual citizenship institution for emigration countries, this study aims at exploring the evolution of particular dual citizenship cases within formations of specific migration systems on a country by country basis. While doing so, we take dual citizenship as an institution that transforms from being a consequence of national interests to being a consequence of a transnational space, within policies and practices of emigration countries.

Thus, a comparative analysis of dual citizenship regimes in two well-known migrant-sending countries, namely Morocco and Turkey, will be tied in with an interaction between their transnational contexts and domestic socio-political formations to diagnose the transformation of the classical notion of citizenship from a nationality defined context to its new transnational character. Morocco and Turkey provide us cases where we can examine the ways in which sending countries have perceived the issues of citizenship in the context of emigration flows. These cases are important; historically, because of their long established emigration history attached to the European countries; currently, because of the presence of large emigrant diasporas today; and analytically, because of changes occurred in emigration regimes over time. However, it is important to note that our focus here is particularly on dual citizenship regulation of sending states as a tool of emigration policies, rather than a general discussion on citizenship and its related dilemmas.
As often noted, various elements of uncertainties that modern states face today make it much more difficult for the institution of citizenship to deal with the paradoxes of inclusion and exclusion (Miles and Thranhardt, 1995; Mohanty and Tandon, 2006). Indeed, the presence of expatriated citizens or emigrants to a nation-state poses a question of this kind. As mentioned by Sassen (2002:5), “these signal a de-territorializing of citizenship practices and identities and of discourses about loyalty and allegiance”. Without exercising certain rights and duties, without feeling a full sense of identity, and without carrying out various civic virtues, can these emigrants easily be seen as a part of the societies they are originated from? This is a widely debated, but an unresolved question (İçduygu, 2005). Considering the challenges of international migration in the age of globalization, for instance, some scholars emphasize a fundamental shift from national citizenship, which is a nation-based inclusion, to transnational citizenship, which is a more individual-based universal conception of inclusion (Fox, 2005; Bellamy, Castiglione and Shaw, 2006). However, as a type of transnational citizenship, for instance, dual citizenship has been questioned by other scholars who have contended that individual-based universal conception of inclusion cannot be implemented and enforced without the consent of nation-states (Kalekin-Fishman and Pitkanen, 2007).

Having had the main problematic issues addressed in the debate on “what to do with the (dual) citizenship position of emigrants to the sending countries”, the main points of departure of the arguments of this essay are three-fold: first, and more generally, (dual) citizenship constitutes a dynamic sociological and political ground on which we can analyze the dynamic nature of migrant-sending states’ ongoing attempts to reinforce the boundaries of the national community by insisting upon the economic, political and cultural membership of those living outside the territories of these states; second, and more specifically, there are three defining elements of the analytical operation of citizenship, namely legal status, identity, and civic virtues, and in the age of globalization and in the context of international migration flows we have witnessed the increasing legitimacy crisis of such an operation of citizenship, whose manifestations have been observed in each of these elements as they are de-articulated and re-articulated in various migratory contexts; third, and more importantly, the modern notion of citizenship enables us to see that an empowerment of emigrants cannot be fully achieved without the implementation and dissemination of a more individual-based universal conception of inclusion that is the transnational understanding of citizenship as it might be exemplified by the institution of dual citizenship.
Arguing that the notion of dual citizenship as a type of transnational institution can be conceived as a challenge to the ideal-typical model of conventional understanding of membership status of citizenship which might be characterized as *egalitarian, sacred, nation-based, democratic, unique, and consequential* (Brubaker, 1990:381), this chapter seeks to explore the status of dual citizenship institution in the course of the two migrant sending countries, Morocco and Turkey, attached to the European migratory systems. This is done so by considering: (a) an evaluation of the notion of dual citizenship as an institution of emigration, (b) an overview of the history of international emigration flows in Morocco and in Turkey, (c) an elaboration of the transformation of dual citizenship institution in these two countries over time, through a change from a nation-based conceptualization to a transnational understanding. It is important to note that the usage of migrant-sending or receiving country does not entail a two-dimensional perspective, but used only as analytical categories. On the contrary, the chapter analyzes migration within a framework of transnationalism. Following Fox’ argument (2005), what is meant by *transnational* here is that relatively dual citizenship is the only somewhat “authentic” form of transnational citizenship because of a simultaneous extension of rights, practices, and identities.

The chapter is composed of three sections. While the first section presents a theoretical debate on dual citizenship as a question of emigration, the second provides a descriptive analysis of the country cases of Morocco and Turkey. The final section is composed of the concluding remarks.

**Dual Citizenship: A Question of Emigration**

In an increasingly mobile and interdependent world, the strict policing of the demarcations of national membership seems increasingly futile and counterproductive; dual nationality is simply the recognition of a changing world and can be a means to reconcile memberships in both the countries of residence and of origin (Jones-Corra 2001:1014).

Although we can observe an emergence of increasingly interdisciplinary studies in migration research —for example, Brettell and Hollifield (2000)— its geographical limits focusing largely on the migrant receiving countries of the North and the West is quite bothersome. There is little work on the global South, a lack of sending country perspective on migration, and lack of focus on *emigration-citizenship* linkage. Within this framework, the literature on transnationalism serves as an important asset that link together origin and destination, and
dual citizenship is an important consequence of this transnational space. The increasing occurrence of dual citizenship that preserves a bond between different citizenship elements, e.g., via creating overlapping rights and practices, with a simultaneous belonging of migrants to two different nation states is a significant factual and theoretically persuasive case of transnational citizenship transformation (see Gerdes and Faist, same volume).

Within this transformation of the transnational space, the aspect of state sovereignty as the control of the borders, i.e., exit and entry of nationals and others, is extended to an other aspect of sovereignty, i.e., the implicit contract between sovereign state and citizen, which continues to be active even when the citizen is outside the territorial boundaries of the state (Brand, 2006:7). Frequently, state sovereignty is related with territoriality without much regard to the populations. Walker (1993) puts this issue into context by formulating that while the territorial principle long so crucial to state sovereignty marks a particular type of boundary between whom and what is inside and outside the political community, citizenship is another. In theory, people inside the boundaries of a state are usually its citizens and included in its sovereignty. In real world, however, the separation between the two bases of sovereignty, i.e., territory and citizenship, is becoming very common.

In its common usage, citizenship essentially refers to either a membership status in a particular nation-state recognized in international law (Hammar, 1990:26; Safran, 1995:105; Brubaker, 1990:380) or to a sense of belonging to the national community represented by that nation-state (Mason, 1999; Castles and Davidson, 2000). In fact, these two perceptions of citizenship totally dominate the scholarly literature on citizenship. On the one hand, partly derived from the notion of nation-state and partly derived from the concept of sovereignty is the freedom of each state to decide whether a person is its member, in other words whether someone is a citizen. Hence, formal state membership is called citizenship. On the other hand, it could be argued that every nation-state needs the participation of all its members, so that everybody is meant to belong. As noted by Brubaker (1990:380), debates about citizenship often turn into debates about nationhood: this is what it means and what it ought to mean to belong to a nation-state.

If one defines state as a legal and political organization with the power to require the obedience and loyalty of its citizens, and nation as a community whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, and a national consciousness, then it is possible to formulate citizenship within the range of possible definitions of membership. Citizenship has a formal aspect as a legally acknowledged membership status between the individual and the state. Citizenship also involves a real or an imagined community
membership of a nation. A central theme in debates on the membership notion of citizenship has been the duality of membership, as seen in the concept of citizenship as a membership both of a nation and a state. For instance, Hammar (1990:37) argues that:

Even if citizenship in a legal sense implies membership of the state, it is often viewed to be just as much membership of a nation, especially in states where nation and state largely coincide. As we have already seen, the two forms of membership are often mixed up and it seems to be very hard to clearly distinguish them from each other. As the claim of most nation states is that there is congruence between state and nation, membership in one is taken to mean membership in the other as well.

What is noteworthy about much of the debate around taking citizenship as a membership of a nation is that this model of membership mostly implies a sense of belonging. This sense assumes the presence of a shared national identity, or it requires necessities for fostering a national identity. It is assumed that an individual has a sense of belonging to a nation if and only if he or she identifies with the rest of the people forming the nation. In other words, citizenship seems to be referring to national belonging in the sense of membership of a cultural community. It has been argued that belonging to a shared national identity is required in order for the citizens of a state to avoid alienation from their social and political institutions. The main argument is that the citizens of a state identify with their major institutions and practices if they think that there is a deep reason why they should associate with them— that is a sense of belonging provided by the belief that citizens share a history, ethnicity, mother tongue, religion, culture or conception of the good (Mason, 1999).

Taking citizenship as a formal state membership is seeing its legal status aspect. Considering citizenship as a membership to a nation or belonging to shared identity is emphasizing its identity aspect. The former involves the formal dimension of right and duties and the latter refers to the substantive dimension of participation and identity. It is supposed that these two aspects are necessary conditions in practice for the realization of the liberal understanding of citizenship. Both aspects of citizenship take the nation-state as the normative reference point. However, the way in which one should evaluate the changing dynamic nature of citizenship should go beyond this reference point. It is within this context that the institution of dual citizenship is one of the significant sites at which the continuing interplay of membership status and belonging to shared identity can be elaborated more analytically and critically where we observe a transformation of citizenship as a political agency (see Kalev, Jakobson and Ruutsoo, same volume). It is the dual citizenship that
makes both migrant-sending and migrant receiving states feel challenged by the conventional notion of citizenship and often puzzled by accounts of the membership aspect and belonging aspect of citizenship. Thus, dual citizenship can have different meanings and functions in different political settings with different justifications (see Gerdes and Faist, same volume).

Within this context, what happens to migrant-sending states when they are faced with the phenomenon of naturalization of their citizens is that they lose their comfortable certainties concerning the position of their expatriated citizens. What follows this stage, using Giddens’ terms (1996), is that an “ontological uncertainty—or insecurity” becomes a constitutive element in states’ macro level institutional strategies. International migration creates new challenges for the institution of citizenship, and consequently states question the basis for having their citizens in a national community. As these challenges emerge, states tend to get more involved in emigration policy, i.e., with the lives of their citizens residing abroad where nation-states partake and react on processes of transnational change. Thus, as explained by Bauböck (2003) political transnationalism is not considered here as a result of political activity across territorial borders, but as changes and overlaps in the boundaries of membership in political communities within a necessity of overlapping affiliations of people, i.e., emigrants, to geographically separate polities, i.e., sending and receiving states.

In what follows, there are five explanations on the sending-states involvement (Brand, 2006): The first goes back to macro-historical explanations that see transnationalism as a phenomenon produced by a particular stage of unequal capitalist development between the centre, the global North, and the periphery, the global South, which has caused the push of labour from the poorer states to the wealthier ones in the context of greater possibilities for communication and travel between the origin and destination countries (Basch et. al., 1994). Secondly, there are international politics explanations, which overcome such ahistorical and region-based explanations, and consider the treatment of the expatriates by the host states as a source of sending-state policy toward their communities. Such explanations also focus on ethnic lobbies as a venue, where sending-state can exert influence in certain bilateral relationships. Thirdly, there are the economic explanations which concentrate on the employment effect of emigration where exporting labour can serve as an economic safety valve in a situation of high or potentially high unemployment. These explanations also look at remittances as a reason for involvement in emigration policy. The status of emigrant citizens change from bare recognition and absent citizens, to “national heroes” as the states of emigration seek to encourage emigrants to direct financial resources homeward, in the form of remittances, or direct contributions styled as taxes and investments (Barry, 2006).
Fourth, there are domestic political explanations, which characterize the political systems of many sending states of the global South by varying degrees of authoritarianism where citizen is a subject rather than a participant (Brand, 2006). As explained by Hammar (1989:86), “citizenship has different meanings in the countries of emigration and countries of immigration, in old and new states... in totalitarian and liberal democratic states”. Once sending states engage in a process of political opening or liberalization, there may be a relatively automatic response by the state also to change its behaviour toward expatriates, or the expatriates themselves may take action to force the state to deal with them on changed bases (Brand, 2006:18). According to Barry (2006), this is very much made possible by technological advancement, especially the developments in the areas of transportation and communication that provide emigrants opportunities for remaining actively engaged with their home countries and states the capacity to reach its emigrants. Finally, there are security/stability explanations, which consider expatriate communities as places of refuge for political exiles, thus, requiring an effective surveillance for the security/stability of the state (Brand, 2006:19).

When emigration policy entails citizenship policy, it is obvious that most migrant-sending states today prefer the blood principle of citizenship. Based on national practical interests, these countries wish to keep close contacts with their citizens abroad, and therefore tends to encourage emigrants to retain their citizenship and transfer it to their children. Of course, concerning naturalization policies and practices in migrant-receiving countries, no one can expect the migrant-sending states to have any sympathy for a process in which several hundred thousands of its citizens abroad will definitely be lost. Acknowledging the reality of the permanent presence of its emigrants abroad, and considering the ongoing process of access to citizenship rights in the receiving states, these states today tend to stress the importance of legal regulations which permit the emigrants to qualify for naturalization without giving up their original citizenship. Accordingly, from the viewpoint of the migrant-sending states, dual citizenship is increasingly seen as an important and practical tool for the integration of their emigrants in the receiving societies.

It seems that dual citizenship provides an opportunity for the migrant-sending states to overcome several negative consequences of permanent settlement of their citizens abroad while at the same time offering some practical solutions to the naturalization difficulties experienced by the migrant-receiving states and emigrants themselves. Since the renunciation of native citizenship is often considered to be an enormous psychological and practical barrier to naturalization, it is widely held that acceptance of dual nationality by the receiving and sending states increases the proclivity of immigrants to naturalize (Brubaker,
Although a basic consensus is achieved on the main advantage of dual citizenship, which is to facilitate an easy and quick solution to the anomalousness of emigrants’ status in the migratory process, the inconveniences of dual citizenship have also been emphasized. For instance, it is argued that dual citizenship will create some complicated situation, which cannot be squared with egalitarian democratic norms, such as dual military obligations, dual loyalties, and dual political rights. As pointed out by many proponents of dual citizenship, it is apparent, however, that these inconveniences can be limited by bilateral and international agreements. The content of dual citizenship in itself reveals that the process of acquiring the citizenship of another country without giving up the original citizenship involves consequences for governments of both sending and receiving states as well as for the international migrants. For instance, emphasizing the idea of “everyone should be the citizen of one country and no one should be a citizen of more than one” (Council of Europe, 1991:3), many emigrants living abroad have worried about the application and some consequences of dual citizenship. From this perspective, and closely related to the debates about citizenship in the migrant-sending states are the emigrants’ perceptions and attitudes concerning their own position in the processes of access to citizenship and citizenship rights. Against this background, sometimes emigrants and the governments of their home countries negotiate different forms of citizenship. For example, primarily drawing on the Mexican case, Fitzgerald (2008) argues that the emigrants and the sending states bargain on a form of citizenship, which is based on greater voluntarism, greater emphasis on citizens rights over obligations, and the legitimacy of multiple affiliations. Next section analyzes different periods of this process of negotiation in the context of Morocco and Turkey.

Dual citizenship in the cases of Morocco and Turkey: Some practical and theoretical concerns

After the end of World War II, Western Europe engaged in a massive project of post-war recovery and compensation for its war losses. Consequently, particularly during the 1950s and 1960s, it experienced large scale labour migration from the underdeveloped areas of the world such as the Mediterranean Basin and South Asia, in order to supply the labour shortages in their recovering post-war economies. The migration of labour within, or to, Europe was by no means a new phenomenon: consolidation of capitalism as the dominant economic system in the 19th and early 20th centuries was already accompanied by the migration of peripheral peoples to fill the demand for labour in the newly industrializing countries (Castles and Kosack, 1985; Portes and Bach, 1985). However, migration to
Western Europe after 1945 was different for its two major characteristics: increasing numbers and enlarging geographical scope. Until the mid-1970s about 30 million people entered the labour market in Western Europe, mainly from the Mediterranean basin and its old colonies –from Algeria, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, Yugoslavia, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. This movement, which began in 1945, gained momentum in the fifties, expanded dramatically in the sixties and early seventies, and then ceased in mid-1970s, was one of the greatest population movements in human history, increasing the population of Western Europe by nearly 10 million as a result of net migration (Castles, 1984:1).

While the receiving countries of Western Europe saw the employment of this immigrant labour as temporary and of limited duration, as time passed, many migrants realized the continuing advantages of remaining abroad, and the host countries also found that the need for labour would be a continuing requirement rather than a temporary one (Castles, 1984). With the liberalization of family reunification policies, many immigrants were joined by their partners, eventually becoming permanent residents and/or citizens of their host countries. It was within this context that migrants from Morocco and Turkey entered the labour market in Western Europe, first as temporary workers, and eventually becoming permanent residents and citizens. During this period, naturalization and citizenship issues gained more importance for both the sending and the receiving countries.

Within this background, debates over the politics of dual citizenship in the context of emigration could range in time from the national policies of the second half the 20th century to the transnational content of the late 20th century and early 21st century. We concentrate here on a period of transition from national to a transnational paradigm as experienced by the Moroccan and Turkish states; elaborating the changing perceptions of dual citizenship. As far as the historical background of migratory flows from these two states are concerned, it is possible to distinguish three main periods: first, mostly state-regulated labour emigration from the 1960s to the mid-1970s, which was based on bilateral agreements between states and assumed to be temporary; second, changing face of emigration from the mid-1970s to the 1990s, which was largely characterized with family reunifications and becoming more permanent; and third, the new phase of emigration in the age of globalization, from the 1990s onwards, which is more transnational in character.

Most of the literature on the dual (multiple) citizenship in the last few decades has focused on immigration with little attention given to the notion of dual citizenship as a question of emigration (Brand, 2006; Faist, 2007; Green and Weil, 2007). We propose to take the view
of migrant-sending countries over the politics of citizenship, particularly focusing on the notion of dual citizenship. As far as the migrant-sending countries, such as Morocco and Turkey, are concerned, the institution of dual citizenship studies has raised fundamental questions about nation and diaspora communities from the perspective of these states, focusing on citizenship rights and duties such as voting, military service, property rights, entry and exist procedures as well as reflecting the issues of belonging, identity, and loyalty. Consequently, among others, the following questions emerge: how have the migrant-sending countries sought to maintain with their citizens abroad, and why; and, what are the functions of dual citizenship within this context? At this stage, it is important to reinforce that while there are many similarities between Morocco and Turkey, there are also important differences. On the one hand, Turkey emerges as a relatively liberal democratic state where political aspects of emigration become more important than its economic features. On the other hand, Morocco remains to be a monarchy where economic aspects of emigration prevails its importance.

Still, in both cases we see the transformation of their dual citizenship regimes from being a consequence of national interests to being a consequence of a transnational space. The main point of transformation is that there are two periods of standpoints, politics and policies of the countries of origin towards dual citizenship: In the first phase, these countries see dual citizenship as a tool for keeping the ties of emigrants because that is perceived in their national interests. In this first phase, they are not really concerned about the fate of their emigrants abroad and how they are treated in the destination countries and whether they are incorporated or integrated there. In the second phase, by contrast, countries of origin are not only one-dimensionally concerned with their national interests, but also with their emigrants’ treatment in the destination countries, promoting their interests and rights, and also being in favour of their naturalizations. To this aim, the countries of origin try to attune their own citizenship rules to the respective citizenship regulations of the corresponding destination countries. This transformation is a result of the recognition that keeping ties with emigrants abroad is also beneficial in cases they will not return eventually, given that they still contribute in some way to their development from abroad.

This transformation is going beyond the national interest perspective, which is indicated with our reference to methodological nationalism (see below), but also showing a sort of change of the national interest itself. A higher degree of integration in the receiving states enhances the migrants’ endowment with financial, cultural and social capital, which eventually increases their potential contribution to the development of countries of origin. In return, the countries of origin re-interpret their national interests, which unintentionally has beneficial
consequences for the individual citizens and their rights. Next sub-sections develop how these changes occur in relation to which policies and regulations at what time.

The first phase: Dual citizenship as a consequence of national interests

As Turkish and Moroccan migrants became most sizeable non-EU immigrant populations living in Europe, their states of origin began to be involved in a sequence of bureaucratic efforts to emphasize the boundaries of their national community by insisting upon the economic, political and cultural “nationalness”, that is Moroccanness or Turkishness, of those living outside their territories (Brand, 2006). In the meantime, the receiving states of Europe were also responding to the situation. Although these responses were not in a standardized fashion, there were some familiar elements: To begin with, in view of rising anti-immigrant racism, new bodies were set up within receiving state and NGO institutions in order to defend immigrant human and other rights. Next, an array of grounds have emerged, providing for some degree of political participation for immigrants at least on the municipal level. Also, some immigrant and host-state-initiated organizations have developed to deal with a range of problems in relation to immigration. Immigrants' status in these institutions ranged from arrangements from full enfranchisement to approaching citizenship. These institutional responses of both the receiving and sending countries presented how they tried to tackle the challenge to identity and sovereignty caused by the “insider without” and the “outsider within” (Brand, 2006:56).

Within this period, what determines the early concerns about dual citizenship in Morocco and Turkey was a type of “methodological nationalism” which implies “parallels between nationalist thinking and the conceptualization of migration” (Wimmer and Schiller, 2002: 301). These countries were concerned with “consolidating the homeland” by guarding their citizens abroad and promoting policies they hoped would strengthen the links between their emigrants and homelands. Consequently, the institution of dual citizenship was seen as a functional tool for part of a larger process of keeping ties with the expatriated citizens and of saving the notion of a cultural nation.

Turkey

Turkish Citizenship Law (Law No. 403, dated 11 February 1964) is the main piece of legislation on citizenship. Until 1981, this law did not permit dual citizenship arrangement
(İçduygüz, 1996; Kadirbeyoğlu, 2007, 2007a). With the change in the Law, dual citizenship became legal so long as the migrants acquiring another citizenship informed the government; otherwise they could lose their Turkish citizenship. According to the Turkish Citizenship Law (Law No. 403, dated 11 February 1964), there has been ex lege acquisition of citizenship through which children of Turkish mothers or fathers are automatically granted citizenship, whether the child was born in Turkey or not. Consequently, it is always the case that children of Turkish emigrants are easily able to get Turkish citizenship. Furthermore, those children, who had lost their Turkish citizenship because of their parents, can acquire Turkish citizenship by using their right of choice within three years from the day they reach the age of majority. As a result, for the children of migrants who live abroad it has been uncomplicated to take and keep the status of Turkish citizenship.

It appears that in the first two decades of Turkish emigration, as the Turkish state viewed the emigration of its citizens as temporary labour migration, there had been no concern of dual citizenship. Later however, as the temporary migration evolved to permanent settlement, there had been increasing worries about the question of how to keep ties with expatriate citizens. Hence, the Turkish state ended up with both “de facto and de jure tolerance of dual citizenship” for several normative and pragmatic reasons such as the official national self-understanding of Turkish identity, the significant number of citizens abroad, the economic ties those citizens have with Turkey, and the increasing demand from civil society actors for the acceptance of dual citizenship (Kadirbeyoğlu, 2007a). The main rationale behind the government interest towards dual citizenship was related to the nature of national self-understanding that was partly civic-republican and partly ethno-cultural (Akin, 1988). Consequently, expatriate citizens were encouraged not to lose their ties, even if they became citizens of other states.

**Morocco**

In Morocco, citizenship law is based on *jus sanguis*, or descent, where citizenship is automatically acquired by birth from at least one Moroccan parent. This has always been helpful for the children of Moroccan emigrants who live abroad, as it makes possible for them to easily obtain and keep the Moroccan citizenship (Brand, 2006). With the introduction of a new family law in the early 2000s, Moroccan women now are also able to pass on their citizenship to their children (Ennaji, 2010; Krieg, 2010). Similar to Turkey, some groups get the right to acquire Moroccan citizenship, such as children born in Morocco to foreign parents, female spouses of Moroccans, and persons who have rendered “exceptional
services” to Morocco (de Haas, 2009). Moroccan citizenship is practically inalienable. Constitution does not allow original Moroccan identity to be lost except under exceptional circumstances, and then only by a ruling by a committee presided over by the prime minister. Thus, it is almost impossible for emigrants to relinquish citizenship, and it is automatically passed on to the second and even third generations (de Haas, 2009). Considering that permission to renounce Moroccan identity has never been granted since the country’s independence, emigrants obtaining citizenship of their country of settlement has to automatically acquire dual citizenship.

Morocco’s policy of not relinquishing citizenship is considered by some European politicians and governments, especially the Dutch government, as an obstacle to their integration policies. Accordingly, the Dutch government asked Morocco to stop automatically granting citizenship to Moroccan descendants as part of efforts to abolish dual citizenship as a means to further migrants’ integration (de Haas, 2009). The Moroccan authorities refused this request on the grounds that it was an unwanted interference in their internal affairs. Similarly, in 2006, right-wing members of parliament publicly questioned the loyalty of Khadija Arib, a Dutch Labour Party member of parliament who is also one of the two Dutch-Moroccan members of the migration working-group in Morocco, which advises the King by arguing that Arib’s dual position is incompatible because of conflicting loyalties, therefore she had to choose (de Haas, 2009). Correspondingly, in Belgium, Fatiha Saidi who is a member of parliament for the Socialist Party did not want to join the Moroccan migration working-group because she did not want to work for institutions of two different states (de Haas, 2009).

The second phase: Dual citizenship as a consequence of the transnational space

As illustrated above in the cases of Morocco and Turkey, after over several decades of different experiences of emigration and naturalization of emigrants in many countries around the world, the effect of acquisition of citizenship on the position of emigrants and on the origin countries continues to be hotly debated. It is even more intensely debated in the era of transnational migratory settings (Faist, 2007; Pitkanen and Kalekin-Fishman, 2007). At the centre of the debate is the relative importance of the origin countries’ citizenship policies and practices in the likelihood of dual citizenship and if this likelihood is a cause or an effect for the question of an optimum position of emigrants. The cause side of the debate views the positive effect of liberal dual citizenship policies and practices on the likelihood of increasing incorporation into the social, political, and economic spheres of both sending and receiving
countries that would not have occurred otherwise. Implicit in this position is, on the one hand, the assumption that the desire to integrate to the receiving country and thus the demand for acquisition of citizenship can be manipulated by liberalizing the dual citizenship policies and practices. On the other hand, the expectation that the wish to keep close ties between emigrants and sending countries and consequently the demand for transnational citizenship in the form of dual citizenship can be provided by making dual citizenship arrangements possible. The cause side optimistic assessment of the migration and citizenship linkage is exemplified by the relatively relaxed dual citizenship procedures of traditional emigration and immigration countries (İçduygu and Şenay, 2008).

Advocates of the effect side of the debate argue that more rigid dual citizenship policies and practices have produced two conflicting results: first, more clear desire to incorporate to the social, political, and economic spheres of the receiving countries, and then to try to take out the citizenship of these countries; second, increasing reluctance to integrate into the receiving countries, but ironically also being reluctant to return home, and then staying in limbo. In the absence of liberal dual citizenship procedures, emigrants who desire to acquire dual citizenship will be in search of new membership status that carries a transnational character. The effect side of the argument views the desire to live in an environment of transnational relations and thus attempt to incorporate to the various spheres of both sending and receiving countries, as a necessary precondition for the construction of dual citizenship institution. This position indeed determines the demands for dual citizenship policies and practices in many European countries (İçduygu and Şenay, 2008). Undoubtedly however, emigration countries such as Morocco and Turkey have opposite views towards these conservative approaches on dual citizenship.

While these debates are taken place in many migrant-receiving states, the presence of diaspora communities and the ongoing emigratory flows continue to pose both challenges and opportunities for many migrant-sending nation-states and their citizens. Today many nation-states have their expatriates who are the citizens of other countries. Thousands of people have dual or multiple citizenship and live in more than one country. Thousands are disenfranchised because they cannot become citizens in their country of residence. In short, many people have faced with a crisis of their citizenship because of international mobility. The anomalous status of citizens reveals that new approaches to citizenship are needed, which take account of new understanding of citizenship: for instance, as Ong (2006:501) noted, transnational practices enhance the capacity of immigrants to negotiate national spaces and to claim citizenship-like entitlements “as free individuals to confront globalized insecurities by making calculations and investments in their lives”. The crucial question here
is whether the current policies and practices allow for a progressive form of dual citizenship, and what parameters one can think of for this possible form, which is likely to be compatible with the realities of transnational communities. Ultimately, what remains very imperative from these debates is the need for a critical re-thinking about the construction of an institution of dual citizenship which implies a type of transnational citizenship (Faist, 2007).

**Turkey**

As noted earlier, to maintain ties with Turkish migrants abroad, who increasingly opt for permanent residence in their host countries and choose to renounce their Turkish citizenship, the Turkish state amended its Citizenship Law to legalize dual citizenship in 1981 (İçduygu, 1996; İçduygu et. al., 1999). The large number of Turkish citizens living abroad and their economic importance for Turkey can explain why tolerance of dual citizenship has increased in the official rhetoric and practices. Within the context of this change, Turkish citizens who would acquire the citizenship of another country would first apply to the authorities and get permission for withdrawal from Turkish citizenship. After acquiring another country's citizenship, there was still an opportunity to keep Turkish citizenship by returning the required documents to the Turkish authorities within a three-year period after receiving the permission papers. Of course, this dual citizenship application would work only if the receiving nation-states also applied the dual citizenship principles.

However, as some migrant receiving nation-states do not allow dual citizenship, Turkish citizens living in those countries have faced the dilemma of either withdrawing from Turkish citizenship or remaining as aliens in the countries in which they live. This dilemma becomes even more complex as Article 29 of the Citizenship Law indicates that a person who has lost Turkish citizenship would be treated as a foreigner and such person may only benefit from the rights of the foreigners as recognized by Turkish law in matters such as residence, acquiring and transferring real estate, inheritance and labour. Accordingly, many emigrants have been reluctant to give up their Turkish citizenship since they may face the loss of some of their legal rights in Turkey (İçduygu, 1996: 150). Repeatedly hearing the complaints of emigrants on such inconveniences, in 1995 the Turkish state made a change in the law, allowing those who held Turkish citizenship by birth and yet had acquired another country's citizenship, and their inheritors, to benefit from the rights of Turkish citizenship. Based on this legal change, the application of the so-called “pink card” regime protected some of the original citizenship rights of those who held Turkish citizenship by birth but had acquired another country’s citizenship (Çağlar, 2000). This has been an *ad hoc* arrangement, which
legitimates a new membership status implying something more than being a foreigner but being less than a citizen. This has actually been a move from a dual citizenship understanding to a sort of dual nationality principle. As indicated by Faist (2000:271), dual nationality is different from dual citizenship in that rights under the former are more restricted than under the latter in which a person holds the passports of two nation-states and has full rights and duties in both. For instance, holders of the Turkish “pink card” cannot vote or hold political office in Turkey or serve in the Turkish army.

Hammar (1989:81) argues that the debate over dual citizenship involves a debate over the meaning of citizenship. The peculiarities of the meaning attributed to the term citizenship in Turkey and the changing nature of this meaning may be elaborated in the context of emigration-citizenship debate. On the one hand, as often happens in most migrant-sending states, Turkey essentially prefers the blood principle of citizenship. Based on practical national interests, it wishes to keep close contacts with its citizens abroad, and therefore tends to encourage emigrants to retain their citizenship and transfer it to their children. On the other hand, acknowledging the reality of the permanent presence of its emigrants abroad, and considering the ongoing process of access to citizenship rights in the receiving states, it also wishes the emigrants to acquire the citizenship of the receiving nation-states. Thus, the Turkish State initially tended to stress the importance of legal regulations that permit the emigrants to qualify for naturalization without giving up their original citizenship, and dual citizenship was obviously seen as an important and practical tool for the integration process of its emigrants in the receiving societies. However, when the migrant-receiving states did not have the regulation of dual, or multiple citizenship, one-way application of this regulation by the sending-state was not at all practical, and often caused inconveniences for the three main actors of a migration setting, namely the migrants themselves, and the sending and receiving nation-states. Practically, this one-way application appeared to be the acceptance of dual nationality, but the rejection of the notion of dual citizenship (Faist, 2000:272).

Morocco

There is also a growing awareness within the Moroccan state apparatus that emigrants’ social and economic integration into destination countries does not have to undermine their contribution to Morocco’s development (de Haas, 2009; Collyer, 2004). Emigrants’ economic and political integration is considered to be a desirable development, because of the belief that correctly-positioned migrants can play a key role in attracting investment in Morocco and stimulating trade. Besides, the Moroccan state realized that better off and integrated
migrants are also in a better position to send larger sums of remittances to family and friends in Morocco. Accordingly, in 1990, the Ministry of the Moroccan Community Abroad was established to promote social, economic and cultural action aimed at nationals living abroad; to follow the migratory movements of Moroccans; to participate in relations and international negotiations of all types relative to emigration and to the living conditions of Moroccans abroad; and to develop programs to facilitate the reintegration of the emigrants upon their final return (Brand, 2006: 75). At the same time, Morocco began to adopt an increasingly favourable attitude towards naturalization, dual citizenship and voting rights for its migrants abroad, a trend that also continued in 2000s.

Through an in-depth discourse analysis of official documents, Brand (2006: 66) notes that Morocco put together the most serious and multi-faceted consideration of the expatriates to date in its 2000-2004 State Plan. While affirming state sovereignty over the emigrant population by stressing that relations between emigrants and Morocco are very deep, the document emphasizes that the “government is to oversee efforts intended to reinforce Moroccan identity in order to avoid Moroccans’ opting for integration into their host countries” (Brand, 2006: 67). At the same time, it is underlined that the character of Morocco’s relations with the host countries, particularly with the European Union, implicitly depends at least in part upon the nature of relations Morocco has with the emigrants. Therefore, it was important both to defend emigrants’ rights –Ministry of Human Rights was the designated organ to do so– and to preserve the lines of their attachment/belonging to Morocco as well as encouraging their participation in the country’s development. Brand (2006:68) states:

This document is thereby the first to treat [emigrants] as full human beings and fuller citizens, in the sense of the state’s manifesting a serious concern for their welfare and success. The state implicitly seems to have understood that for its call to maintain identity to generate a positive response, it must demonstrate its commitment to provide something akin to the protection or concern for its citizens that underpins the moral authority of the sovereign state.

All these reflect a shift in thinking in which the development contribution of migrants is not forcibly linked to return migration and that transnationally oriented and integrated migrants are perfectly able to engage with their countries of origin without necessarily returning. Thus, there is “a gradual evolution in the state’s perception of the emigrants, from that of a Moroccan abroad as one less unemployed worker at home, to that of a contributor to the national economy, and finally that of a multi-faceted asset with economic, social and cultural ties to the kingdom” (Brand, 2006: 69).
Concluding remarks

This essay began by raising three interrelated questions. The first, i.e., how the migrant-sending countries deal with the citizenship status of their emigrating members, is puzzling given the transnational developments in recent decades when individual emigrants and their families are faced with changes in their legal membership status, identities, and civic virtues. The second question, i.e., to what extent some novel formulation of citizenship institution, such as dual or multiple citizenship might offer innovative responses to the emigratory realities, was inspired by the transnational transformations. The third issue, i.e., how are the dynamics and mechanisms of migrant-sending states' ongoing attempts to reinforce the boundaries of the national community by insisting upon the economic, political and cultural membership of those living outside the territories of these states, remains important as citizenship institution transforms itself from a national context to a transnational one. Explicit in these three questions are a relatively less known but increasingly emerging query about in what ways the institution of citizenship in the migrant-sending countries have experienced change as an outcome of transnational influence.

Citizenship status of international emigrants as it is related to their own home countries is as discussed in the case of Morocco and Turkey here relational and transnational. The construction of dual citizenship institution within this framework involves transnational articulations: emigrants perceive and experience their citizenship through a "dual (or even multiple) settings" that is often linked to de-territorialised transnational identifications. But this de-territorialisation is inclusive of all related transnational spaces, where the related nation-states tend to make a good use of economic, political, cultural and social benefits while they try to divorce themselves from the unintended negative consequences. In the last two decades, most migrant-receiving states were too reluctant in coping effectively with the challenges of the institution of dual citizenship, and tended to be more critical of this institution. Meanwhile, however, dual citizenship became a particularly delicate issue for migrant-sending states in the process of transnational restructuring of their relations with the diaspora communities. In the earlier periods, for these sending states, the institution of dual citizenship was mostly perceived through an understanding of methodological nationalism which encouraged emigrants' to keep their ties strong with their home countries. In the later periods, dual citizenship was determined by a transnational approach, which acknowledged the dynamic exchanges between sending and receiving communities and states. As far as the cases of Morocco and Turkey are concerned, it seems that the institution of dual citizenship emerges as a type of “multi-nationalized” citizenship which is functional for the discourses and practices of transnational spaces where international migrants act and react
as the transnational actors of social, economic, political and cultural spheres both in their home countries and their new settlement countries.

What becomes clear out of the surveys of these two well-known migrant-sending states is that some basic economic, political, and social concerns determine the changing positions of these states' interest to the institution of dual citizenship. These dynamic positions are the decisive transnational outcomes as emerged through the recent differences observed in the cases of Morocco and Turkey: today the rhetoric of dual citizenship is mostly an issue of political and social concern in Turkey, while it is widely a concern of economics in Morocco, due to the priorities of these states related to their emigrants' linkages in the transnational spaces.

References


Chapter 4

Building up a Transnational Polity?

Political Transnationalisation and the Transformation of Statehood

Leif Kalev, Mari-Liis Jakobson, Rein Ruutsoo

Introduction

In this article we seek to develop an analytical approach to political transnationalisation. Transnationalism is a concept mostly developed by social anthropologists and economists resulting in rather limited links to political processes (Bauböck, 2003). At the same time, politics as the field of allocating and legitimating power and individual political agency is clearly relevant for transnationalisation.

There are many perspectives for defining “the political” (see Heywood, 2002: 3-25 for an outline). Here we focus on the capacity of human beings to shape their future using political institutions, determining the political regime and the instruments for governance. This requires a political community of citizens capable to arrange their common affairs. “The diagnosis of social conflicts transforms itself into a list of just as many political challenges only if we attach a further premise to the egalitarian institutions of rational law: the assumption that the unified citizens of a democratic community are able to shape their own social environment and can develop the capacity for action necessary for such intervention to succeed.” (Habermas, 2001: 60).

Contemporary human political life has mainly been organised in the form of state, a central rule within a certain territory vis a vis a certain population. Although a state is the usual example of a polity dominant for several centuries, we can find indications of other types in history and can project other types also in the future (i.a. Albert et al, 2009; Ferguson et al, 2000). Especially in the literature on transnationalisation and globalisation it is often claimed that political unity can also occur without territorial unity and over the boundaries of states. Thus we develop the broader categories of polity and political space to avoid methodological nationalism but to retain the key characteristics of human political organisation. A typical contemporary polity is characterised by statehood in terms of systemic governance complemented by citizenship as citizen political agency in case of democratic governance. There are also other political spaces besides full polities.
Most of the literature on transnationalisation of politics (i.a. Vertovec, 2009; Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003) handles the subject of political transnationalism in a rather particularistic perspective. The transnational strategies and practices of individuals have gained a lot of attention, while the context of political regime (e.g. how to sustain a functioning democracy in the context of transnationalisation) and governance are often left aside (with the exception of migration policies). By addressing the transformation of the political space, we aim to create a framework that treats political transnationalisation in a wider perspective, acknowledging the existence of the impact of both individuals and the institutional structures we often take for granted.

The central problem we address, is: what are the opportunities for the transnational polities to develop? What are the chances that the transnational political space transforms into a coherent polity? Or how would the dominant type of polity – the state – accommodate to the emerging transnational political spaces? Our analysis begins by defining the transnational political space and developing a typology of these spaces. Next we will discuss the main characteristics of a democratic polity and analyse whether and which spaces outlined are in accordance with these criteria and thus assess them as alternatives to the state as a polity. In the third part, we will examine the possibility of states adapting to the transnational circumstance. We will do this by outlining different statehood settings and their opportunities within transnational political spaces.

In conclusion, we analyse the likelihood of different types of transnational political spaces to develop in contemporary statehood settings and identifying the key factors supporting political transnationalisation.

**Transnational political spaces**

The scholarly discussion on transnationalism has in the last decades been developing with accelerating speed, starting with the basic idea of the two-directional cultural and goods exchange created by migrants (cf. i.a. Sutton, Makiesky-Barrow, 1975), of actually having effective personal footage in two or more societies (Chaney, 1979: 209) and circulating rather than migrating (Richardson, 1983: 176). This has lead to regarding embeddedness in cross-border exchange as a normal part of the contemporary social status of people and outlining the possibility of relative stability of transnational social spaces building upon people in or in between various national societies (Glick Schiller et al, 1992).
Related to politics the concept “transnational” gained relevance with the writings of Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane (i.a 2008 [1971]) and other representatives of the constructivist school in international relations. They offer a macro-level insight into the post-methodological nationalism idea – the states not being the sole key actors in world politics. Such an approach is also articulated by Ferguson et al (i.a 2000; Ferguson, Mansbach, 2008; Ferguson, Jones, 2002) – that world politics is conducted in polities – political communities within which there is more interaction than outside, and which feature specific functional institutions. A polity could encompass states, organisations, individuals and their networks that are relevant for its functions. However, a polity is only one ideal typical type of a political space and not all transnational political spaces as theorised in relevant literature comply with that definition. Thus, a more general definition of transnational political spaces is needed.

The concept of transnational spaces is most often associated with the writings of Thomas Faist (i.a. 2000a, 2000b), indicating a border-crossing network of relationships: “transnational social spaces are combinations of ties, positions in networks and organisations and networks of organisations that reach across the borders of multiple states” (Faist, 2000a: 191).

From a systems theoretical perspective transnational spaces are autopoietic subsystems that organise themselves according to the conditions in the environment – i.e. unequal development (as a premise of migration, flow of remittances etc), principal cultural differences (that do not enable thorough integration in the “receiving” society, but rather adaptation to its rules), relative underrepresentation in some political institutions (that could result in remaining extra-institutional and peripheral or in a demand for equal rights) are all “environmental” triggers that design the essence of transnational political spaces.

A transnational political space is also a functional system, where the collective will-formation, decision-making and governance is conducted, rules and norms for other spaces are created depending on the internal power relations and sources of legitimacy. Thus, it is a kind of a meta-space to other transnational social spaces.

As systems theory suggests, the openness of the systems differs. Some systems might be more resistant to transformation (more stably orthodox in Bourdieu’s terms) due to some internal characteristics. For example, although there is a large amount of non-citizens in state A, the modes of gaining citizenship are not reviewed due to a strong mono-ethnic state tradition; or although people from state B residing in state C have transnational attachments, they do not engage nor even feel the need to engage in politics on a transnational level. In
the more flexible systems, heterodoxy prevails and various new political projects might be proposed.

Thus in theoretical terms, a transnational political space may be an ad hoc space that has no sustainable institutions and emerges barely due to a topic that requires political action, but it could also resemble a coherent polity or something inbetween. This is also the case with thematic literature: it constructs the transnational political space of various components, ascribes it different functions and scope. We will attempt to systematise these constructions according to the significance ascribed to the transnational political space.

The weakest type of transnational political space is a tunnel-like formation between two or more coherent polities. Especially migration-centred writings (i.a Guarnizo et al, 2008 [2003]) depict it as “various forms of direct cross border participation in the politics of their country of origin /.../ as well as their indirect participation via the political institutions of the host country” (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; cf. Bauböck, 2003: 701). In other writings, the emphasis is on the role of the transnational civil society institutions. However, these networks are composed of voluntary associations organised around shared interests and cannot stand as a surrogate for the political community per se, which acts as the addressee of claims made by the organisations and groups of civil society. Thus such political transnationalisation is only subsidiary to the nation state level. According to Kymlicka (2003: 291) “the weak transnationalism of advocacy networks is predicated on, even parasitic on, the ongoing existence of bounded political communities”.

A more thorough perception of the transnational political space stems from the multi-level approach which depicts the transnational setting as an additional level of governance. Transnational regime theory (Bennett, 2004; Lipschutz, 2000), understanding of the “rise of legalism” (Schmit, 2004, cf. Djelic, Sahlin-Andersson, 2006) and soft law (Mörth, 2006) see the transnational political space upheld by negotiation networks that produce “norms that promote semivoluntary compliance over force in dealing with common issues.” (Bennett, 2004: 128) As Slaughter (cf 2008) points out, the transnational level fosters cooperation between various governmental or local institutions, agencies etc. It is a network of cooperation, not a sovereign body. Global democrats sketch a multilayered, global democratic order in which no single layer or site is dominant (Pogge, 1992: 58; Young, 2000: 266). As the multilayered scheme also involves significant decentralization to the sub-national level and robust democratic politics is seen truly possible only at the local level, the argument runs that global democracy would, in fact, translate into more, rather than less, „real“ democracy. But no matter how forcefully the principle of subsidiarity is applied, the global democratic
project would still entail the implementation of global principles and standards (e.g. (re)distributive principles, human rights standards) that would rely on coercive enforcement agencies (Benhabib, 2004: 113). Hence, one can’t escape the need to ensure the democratic legitimacy of political institutions above the state level.

The most extensive vision of the transnational political space – the radical one – conceptualises it along the lines of a polity (Bauböck, 2003). It is not only ideally exercised in the multiplicity of „sites“, but there is no systematic arrangement of the levels of governance, either. There are numerous competing and overlapping autonomous power centres acting as habitats in Bauman’s (1992) sense, their influence and persistence depending on the interest of the consumers/“citizens“ to relate themselves to this particular habitat. The radical transnational political space could be viewed as the tunnel and the multi-level space merged: it combines both a vibrant global or transnational civil society and the transnational governance regimes, thus giving it some democratic legitimation. As Price (2003) notes, these institutions enable to fulfil almost all the stages of policy development: agenda setting, developing solutions, building networks and coalitions of allies and implementing the solutions. The system is understood as working if there is adequate information available for citizens who thus can act as rational consumers. Kuper (2004) suggests that this could be organised using (cross-border) formal advocacy and accountability agencies, akin to public ombudsmen, access of information agencies or the public curator’s office would provide citizens “crucial, limited ranges of more independent and accessible information about political actors” while also acting on their behalf as “professional contesters”. In this model states are ought to be replaced and we can speak of a world entirely structured according to the rational offer and demand logic of micro-economic market model.“

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of transnational space</th>
<th>Components</th>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Scope</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunnel-like</td>
<td>Participation in national politics; Advocacy groups and coalitions</td>
<td>Extra link for solving occasionally occurring transnational issues</td>
<td>Modest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-level</td>
<td>Networks of sectoral institutions; Advocacy groups and coalitions</td>
<td>Constant hub for coordinating sectoral policies of different localities</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Advocacy groups and coalitions; Governmental/municipal institutions; Special transnational governance institutions</td>
<td>Full-scale governance of the transnational space</td>
<td>Extensive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Typology of transnational political space constructions. Source: authors
Thus, transnational political space can be conceptualised in several ways, depending on the observer’s focus (determining the components and functions brought into the fore) and ambition but also, whether the locus is on micro-, meso- or macro-level components of the transnational space. Transformation to any of the three types of political transnational spaces requires adjustments of the existing political institutions through both macro, meso and micro level transformations as summarised in the following table. Whereas radical version has very high expectations the others remain more modest and thus more probable. It is worthy of mentioning that radical version can be found in some theoretical writings while empirical research reflects preliminary tunnel-like and partially also multi level conceptualisations of transnational political space.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of transnational space</th>
<th>Expected direction of macro-level transformation</th>
<th>Expected direction of meso-level transformation</th>
<th>Expected direction of micro-level transformation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunnel-like</td>
<td>Accommodation of states (postmodernising) and international governmental organisations</td>
<td>Strengthening of transnational advocacy networks addressing state institutions</td>
<td>Strengthening of transnational citizen political agency based on the usual model of democratic citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-level</td>
<td>Emergence of systematic setting of multi-level governance with various relevant levels including the state institutions</td>
<td>Emergence of advocacy networks and multi-level governance institutions transcending national political spaces</td>
<td>Strengthening of transnational citizen political agency operating at various levels but roughly corresponding to the model of democratic citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>Emergence of dynamic political habitats competing with each other</td>
<td>[Same as macro]</td>
<td>Emergence of transnational agency in line with the model of rational consumerism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Possible transformation of the key elements of transnational spaces. Source: authors

A democratic polity: statehood and citizenship

In many recent centuries, political life has been organised mainly in the form of state. Although it has been challenged by the “methodological nationalism” debate in transnationalisation studies (Glick Schiller, Wimmer, 2002), some characteristics of the state outlined in state theory are more universal, also characteristic to the more abstract concept of polity. Hence, we should be able to identify the key structural requirements for a functioning polity by abstracting the features of the state. In concise form, Mann (1993: 55) has defined the state as “a differentiated body of institutions and staff that embodies centrality, because political interactions are coming from or are aimed at the centre, and that administers a limited territory over which it executes authoritative and binding regulations
supported by physical power." In addition to law and coercion, a state is also communicatively built through a common communicative space including education, standardization, common myths of history, national identity etc. (see Kalev, 2009).

The dynamics between centralising institutions and the people they seek to organise into a coherent political system is the key to the understanding of state-type political organisation but also any other polity. For our purposes it is important to emphasise the heterogeneity of these processes. The state elites and institutions are diverse and contestation within them results in policy-making being in constant flux. Even more heterogeneity is found among the populace. We will follow the understanding that the state institutions generally attempt to create coherence within the territory (Weber, 1978: 54–56; Mann, 1993: 54–63) while the other actors are ambivalent in this respect: they may be supportive, opposing or neutral (see Jessop, 1990: 3-10).

From the many perspectives in analysing statehood (see i.a. Hay et al, 2006; Dryzek, Dunleavy, 2009) our focus is on its capacity to organise systematic governance and establish human democratic political agency. Examining these key features enables us to analyse to which extent different political spaces conform to the requirements of a full polity.

In terms of systematic governance, we can see two main functions of polities – cohesion and effectiveness. First, a polity generates some kind of common binding rationality enabling the member to see each other as partners or adversaries, not enemies (see Habermas, 2001; Mouffe, 2005: 1-8). The conflict of participants should be embedded in a consensus among them on belonging to a polity and on the rules of game. Members of polity should be able to distinguish themselves from the others in a way enabling them to perceive the wins and losses of members as affecting common outcomes. Everyone has to face the possibility of losing in any specific decision – but everyone must have the disposition to see it as losing to those who belong among “Us,” and not some kind of foreign power, “Them” (Baumann, Zintl, 2006: 63).

Second, a polity should have effective mechanisms for both achieving and effecting policy decisions. Fairly achieved and practically implemented policies enable the belief in effective common activity. Statehood as a systematic model of governance entails at least the following key roles of state institutions (Pierre, Peters, 2006: 215-216, adapted):

1. To provide an agreed upon mechanism for establishing priorities, and for making choices among competing priorities. The political process, usually through a legislature of some sort, provides the necessary legitimation and the means for
making decisions that have the force of law.

2. To reconcile the goals and programmes that, even with legislative choices, may be conflicting or at minimum, inconsistent. Although less formalised means have some potential the general means of producing policy co-ordination is through institutions such as cabinets and central agencies.

3. To implement policies, to actually steer economy and society. Implementation has conventionally been considered the province of public bureaucracy and even if it uses non-governmental actors and the instruments of new governance, these tend to function in the shadow of hierarchy and to be backed by the possibility of using state authority.

4. To monitor policy results, generate feedback and accountability to understand the consequences of previous decisions in order to be able to steer effectively. In any society the feedback element is crucial, to provide for on-going correction and change of policy, but for democratic governments the accountability element provides the information basis needed for citizens’ political decisions. Although some private sector watchdogs can be useful, the ultimate responsibility for sufficient and uninterrupted accountability resides with public institutions.

These features of sustainable systemic governance could be understood as universal across various polities. For a democratic polity we need another feature – citizenship establishing individual political agency. Here, the key question is the emancipated status of a person in polity usually understood as the right to participate in defining public preferences and exercising power whereas the contrast to former passive status of subjects is manifest. “The transfer of the sovereignty from the body politic of the king to the body politic of citizens is a major turning point in the history of the western democracy.” (Turner, 1990: 211)

In the context of the transnationalisation debate we can differentiate between two logics of political citizenship: the civil and the democratic. According to the civil logics the emancipation of a citizen is primarily enacted through practice of individual rights and is guaranteed by the rule of law. The democratic logic has the key interest in the ways citizen agency can potentially be performed in practice.

The democratic logic prescribes the state with an obligation to provide an empowering structure for participation and demands some cohesion from the society. Citizen political agency and participation require significant interaction and mutual awareness and hence appear as collective rather than individual. Correspondingly, democratic structures have to be built up in order to guarantee democratic political agency. Political leaders would have to
create political institutions that would provide citizens with opportunities for effective political participation, influence, and control. To take advantage of these opportunities, citizens would need to be about as concerned and informed about the policy decisions of political organizations. This necessitates the engagement of citizens in public debate and discussion of the alternatives, which in turn preconditions political competition by parties and individuals seeking office who would present these alternatives both about internal as well as international governance in a way engaging for the public (Dahl, 1999: 31, abridged).

The radical authors of civil logic (i.a. Kuper, 2004) suggest abandoning the conception of democratic legitimacy implicit in deliberative, participatory and republican conceptions of democracy where laws are legitimate only if citizens can participate in the process of making them. Instead, citizens would exercise control over authorities in a more formal manner giving general feedback on governance. The world could be conceptualised as the dynamic spheres of authority whose foundation is not legitimacy per se, rather a capacity to “evoke compliance” within their respective domains (Rosenau, 2002; Ferguson, Jones, 2002). They would constitute “a locus of mobilization that agglomerates and pursues [citizens’] concerns and yet does not require that citizens act together with high levels of mutual awareness”. In addition, citizen agency could be exercised “voting by feet,” i.e. punishing authorities by abandoning them and joining some other.

The civil logic is in difficulties to meet the key concern of political citizenship, i.e. the effective interconnection of citizen political agency and the exercise of power through institutions. It is hard to see the motivation mechanisms for establishing and maintaining sufficient transparency agents when even in nation state specialised to systemic governance there are serious deficiencies in formulating and implementing policies (see Dunleavy, O’Leary, 1995; Hay et al, 2006; Dryzek, Dunleavy, 2009). Also, why should citizens be more active in civil setting than in polyarchies that are citizen-centred by definition? Changing one’s sphere of authority and place of residence is in practice usually time-consuming and rather than compel authorities people can accept non-agency as a price for decent living (see the literature on denizenship, i.a. Hammar, 1990). The NGOs in global civil society rely upon the support of governments and many of them are not democratic (see Axtmann, 2010).

It cannot be demonstrated that meaningful citizen political agency could be set up on the basis of civil logic. Hence, democratic polities have to be based to democratic logic of political citizenship. Also in this case, citizenship can be globally sensitive or globally oriented (see Parekh, 2003; Axtmann, 2010).
We have identified three key characteristics of a democratic polity: cohesion, effectiveness and democratic citizenship. The transnational political spaces meet these only partially. A tunnel-like space doesn’t have the ambition to replace state and can thus rely on it in all the main characteristics. It can achieve some limited cohesion and effectiveness but this is related to additional personal or group opportunities not aimed at substituting polity. A multi-level space can achieve effectiveness but is in difficulties with cohesion and democratic citizenship as it entails transparency problems. A radical space is in difficulties with all three characteristics of polity.

In sum we can see that in the foreseeable future the transnational political spaces are not likely to replace states as the core of polities. This doesn’t exclude the possibility of the spaces to develop in line with states, enrich and possibly alter the ways polities are functioning. Hence, we should examine the ways statehood is currently transforming to come into terms with transnationalisation and identify the points of possible coeffect.

**Transformation of statehood**

During the last decades, we can see an ongoing debate on the implications of globalisation for the state. We can distinguish between globalisationists, statists and transformationists (Held et al, 1999; Sørensen, 2004, Vertovec, 2009). The globalisationist (or retreat or liberalist) scholars argue that the state is significantly weakening or even fading and being replaced by global or alternative structures. The statist (or sceptic or state-centric or realist) scholars deny this and claim that in broad terms the central role of the state remains broadly in line with the modernity with normal dynamics. Transformationists represent an analytical compromise seeing states proactively transforming as state institutions seek to maintain relevance in changing conditions (Sørensen, 2004; 2006).

Nowadays, there is a rather widespread consensus on the continued relevance of states in transnational politics even among the globalisationist scholars (Held et al, 1999: 9; Beck, 2005; Vertovec, 2009) broadly in line with the transformationist approach. The above discussed cohesion and effectiveness of the polity are seldom denied and dissent on democratic citizenship remains limited. However, the patterns of transformation of state are continuously debated.

Corresponding to the transformationist approach, we understand governance as a complex adaptation and steering of society that may be carried out by different actors in the society in
cooperation with the state institutions in addition to the traditional patterns of modern government (mass democracy and bureaucratic administration). The strategies range from \textit{étatiste} state institutions’ dominance to network-centred governance legitimated by state actors (Peters, Pierre, 2006). However, in all of these the state institutions keep a role of maintaining control and allocating and legitimating authority.

We see state institutions as active shapers of their operation environment, and not simply as reacting to changes or as decidedly negative contra-players to transnationalisation. State institutions seek to find adequate strategies to channel the globalisation and transnationalisation processes to acceptable settings. Diversifying the strategy repertoire they seek to retain a dominant position in society and keep a critical standard of cohesion organised along national borders. These strategies outline the space of opportunities for transnationals and, more broadly, for all citizens and are, thus, important parameters to analyse transnationalism. Of course, citizens need not only to accommodate but can out try alternative strategies.

With regard to the general patterns of transformation we broadly follow Sørensen’s (2004) approach differentiating the modern, weak (postcolonial) and postmodern state. These are ideal types and a state in practice is probably a mixture with some dominant(s). Sørensen discusses the types of state with key interest in the transformation from modern to postmodern statehood. Our approach differs in three main aspects. First, we use the types without expecting the transition from modern to postmodern state to be inevitable and universal. Second, we don’t so much conceptualise these types as only fixed logical options but as dynamic and contingent outcomes of statisation strategies. Third we treat the types as ideal types of consolidated markers of different organisatory logics of governance.

The modern statehood setting is the classical centralised state where the state institutions co-ordinate or steer various aspects of life. As an ahistorical type of state the modernising setting is characterized by the attempts of state institutions to build up solid, centralised and controlled structures, if necessary, resisting the globalising trends. Migration is seen as a phenomenon that might perhaps enhance some spheres of life (e.g. economy, skills) and therefore also state-making. At the same time the modern state is conceptualised as a nation-state which makes transnational migration problematic and unwanted.

The postmodern statehood setting could be described by diffusion and multilateralism – many of the processes that were seen as conducted by the modern state, are now
arranged on supra-state, local or societal arenas. The transnational character of the world is acknowledged as well as the inevitability of migration and the generation of transnational communities. These issues are proactively addressed with a focus on transforming these processes into more manageable forms.

We can distinguish two types of strategies the state institutions following the postmodern model, can undertake: either proactive or comfort-seeking. The institutions that have chosen the proactive strategy can even take advantage of the new situation that potentially meant a setback for the states, becoming the protagonists of transnationalisation and attempting to govern the transnational networks themselves, “colonising” the transnational space. The institutions of comfort-seeking states might prefer giving up several actions, delegating governance to the better equipped, and taking a pragmatic particularistic role: institutions might “specialise” on a very specific function, e.g. accountancy expertise or intermediating the interests of some group or just offering stamps, citizen status and other bonuses of statehood.

In the weak statehood setting, the main ambition of the ineffective public institutions is maintaining at least some grip over society but their success is usually sporadic. Therefore, some governance is performed independent from the state institutions and some aspects are missing altogether. Nation-building processes have usually failed and rather, tribal, local or ethnic communities prevail (Sørensen, 2004). Migration is rather uncontrollable by the state and seen threatening the flailing statehood or just being neglected.

The statehood settings differ in their treatment of citizenship. The modern setting emphasises the ideal type modern citizenship being unitary and unique, sacred, associated both to the political as well as the cultural domain, coinciding with the individual residents of the polity and entailing important political and social privileges for the holders of citizenship (Brubaker, 1989; Schmitter, 2001).

The postmodern setting emphasises the possibilities of multiple citizenship. While a significant part of the discussion has been related to legal rules (see (i.a. Hansen, Weil, 2002; Aleinikoff, Klüsmeier 2002; Martin, Hailbronner, 2003), in the context of transnationalism it is easily conceivable to speak of a sociological conception of actual multiple citizenship exercised in multiple (nation) states. Another approach is represented by the constitutional patriotism of Habermas (1994; 1996; 2001) emphasizing the possibility to build up a multi-level federal setting developing
democratic politics and governance to a new level. The weak statehood is ambivalent in this debate as it is in difficulties to establish any meaningful citizenship in competition with other identities and power centres.

On the basis of citizenship expectations we can derive notable differences among the statehood settings on the basis of their orientation and ability to come into terms with transnationalisation. Postmodern state represents a proactive pattern of governance to embrace transnationalism. Modern state primarily tries to downgrade transnationalism. Weak state strategies are quite irrelevant in the context of very low practical ability to govern. The key parameters of the statehood settings with regard to transnationalism and the respective arena of opportunities for transnationalism is summarised in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RECEIVING STATE</th>
<th>Modern</th>
<th>Postmodern</th>
<th>Weak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modern</td>
<td>Great efforts or letting go (adapting to the receiving or remaining loyal to the sending country). Double affiliation problematic.</td>
<td>Asymmetry that might make the transnational act in concordance with the political aims associated with the sending country, but use the arenas provided by the receiving one.</td>
<td>Hectic environment where the transnational might try acting out the policies of the sending state in control gaps of the receiving state. Yet, the environment difficult to cope with and might therefore disclaim affiliation. Adapting to the new state problematic due to few recognizable and working channels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmodern</td>
<td>Great efforts in adapting to the practices presumed by the modernizing state; yet possible to maintain affiliations that have been significant in the sending society.</td>
<td>Expansive opportunities for transnational practices</td>
<td>Hectic environment that enables to retain previous affiliations, and perhaps also socialize them in the new state. This might be obstructed by the weak state attempting to fill the role of a modern state. Drawn towards the opportunities of the postmodern state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Efforts in order to blend into the modern state; alternatively retaining bonding ties with home community</td>
<td>Enabling environment that maintains important ties in community of origin. May become the arena of promoting community's interest.</td>
<td>Hectic environment that enables functioning in the desired way. Occasionally the state's power demonstrations or assaults from rivaling clans might cause ruptures.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Matrix of opportunities for transnational political spaces created by statehood settings. Source: authors

These variations illustrate the heterogeneity of transnational contexts created by the different statehood settings. Especially in the case of the tunnel-like transnational space the
opportunities for transnationalisation are severely affected by the states on its both ends. We can presume asymmetrical tunnels emerging, e.g. in case of modern and weak statehood. Also in the multi-level transnational political space the differences will be notable although partially mediated by multi-level governance arrangements. The characteristics of anchoring states must be taken into account in comparison to different political spaces.

The discussion above indicates that the operative state institutions can probably retain their relative position regardless of the type of the political space flexibly using various adjustment strategies. Sørensen (2004), summarizing a considerable amount of empirical and theoretical material, remains rather moderate even about the phenomenon we phrased as the frontline of proactive adaptation – the postmodern statehood – and the existence of three types of statehood indicates that many governments oppose more ambitious political transnationalisation.

Although the transnationalisation of the power structure of state institutions is in principle possible it is difficult to show that the state authorities had sufficient motivation for giving up statehood. At least for now, the state institutions are not abandoning the state type operating structures and governance practices, although they potentially adapt these to the changing circumstances. And even in this case, at least some state institutions are likely to retain an effective role in the transnational political space, for example performing a regulating function as a meso-level actor.

Conclusions

In this article we discussed the opportunities for political transnationalisation from the perspective of the basic logics of statehood and citizenship summarised in the form of polity. In the discussion conceptualising the political space and its forms we indicated three main types or levels of transnational political spaces that have different ambition of structuring the political life. The tunnel-like spaces complement and use states. Multi-level models are projected towards the emerging systemic setting of multi-level governance with a still notable presence of the nation state. The radical version conceives transnational political spaces replacing states in a market model.

Transnational political spaces are not likely to replace the state as a full polity characterised by cohesion, effectiveness and democratic citizenship. The tunnel-like spaces don’t have the ambition to substitute states, the multi-level spaces imply the preservation of these features,
and if needed, in a state-like form. The radical spaces as discussed in contemporary literature are unable to offer working alternative polities. On the contrary, the state institutions by large define the opportunities for global civil society and governance and the patterns of statehood significantly influence the chances for transnationals and transnational political spaces.

At the same time there are clear opportunities for transnational political spaces to develop and enrich political structures. To clarify these opportunities we will conclude with analysing the likelihood of different types of transnational political spaces to develop in contemporary statehood settings and identifying the key factors supporting political transnationalisation.

We distinguished three general settings of statehood in the context of state institutions’ responses to globalisation. Postmodern statehood setting tries to positively accommodate to the changes in environment including transnationalisation by applying a more diversified pattern of governance – be it proactively (colonising) or reactively (cloaking). Modern statehood setting is targeted to reflexive straightforward counter-activities to changes by strategies aimed at re-strengthening the features of the modern state. Weak statehood is characterised by inability to systematically accommodate to changes and occasional and inconsistent activities by state institutions.

It is clearly visible that the postmodern statehood setting offers the most room for transnational political spaces and thus gains from them, whereas the weak statehood setting remains ambiguous. In case of the modern statehood setting most of the chances for transnationalisation have to be gained by bypassing state institutions, which regard transnationalisation as in conflict with their aims. However, there are some opportunities in all settings and at large and the statehood setting is not necessarily an obstacle for tunnel like transnational political spaces.

In addition to the postmodern statehood, globally oriented national citizenship and substantial multiple citizenship serve as factors facilitating political transnationalisation. Here ensuring meaningful citizen political agency has become the key qualifying aspect. While the strategies aimed at re-strengthening the unitary model of political citizenship are generally incompatible with transnational political spaces (although some of their tunnel like versions may be tolerated), the transformation towards substantial multiple political citizenship is well compatible with weak and generally compatible with multi-level type of transnational political spaces.
The tunnel-like transnational political space has the opportunities to evolve in all the main statehood settings. The multi-level type of space is primarily dependent on the interest of the state institutions and the success in establishing a systemic multi-level setting of governance; in case it evolved, there would be clear avenues of synergy between transnationalisation and statehood. The radical version is unlikely to gain ground due to the lack of motivation of state institutions. It is conceivable in case of extreme weakness of state institutions such as in failed states. However, as the radical space has the polity deficiencies discussed above, it is unlikely to be sustainable, not to mention democratic.

In conclusion, although political transnationalisation has not been theorised exactly thoroughly, the probability (stemming from the statehood) that the transnational political space would evolve in real life, is considerable. As noted in Table 4, especially the micro- and meso-level expressions characteristic to the tunnel-like and multilevel transnational space are likely to expand. The most fertile statehood setting for political transnationalisation is probably the postmodern statehood, for it is the most flexible and positively minded about it. Weak states are also a suitable ground, although mainly for the emergence of tunnel-like transnational political space, since the multi-level transnational space also preconditions some coherence on the state-level and local level. Although the modern states do not reserve transnationalisation any spot in their state strategy, it might still emerge in the tunnel-like form, primarily due to its citizens’ migratory plans or some extra societal attention.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of transnational space</th>
<th>Compatibility with modern statehood</th>
<th>Compatibility with postmodern statehood</th>
<th>Compatibility with weak statehood</th>
<th>General likelihood to evolve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunnel</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Considerable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-level</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Some</td>
<td>Some</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Only in case of failing state</td>
<td>Dubious</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Transnational political spaces in contemporary statehood settings: compatibility and likelihood to evolve.
Source: authors

We have demonstrated that there is some ground to speak of political transnationalisation and the emergence of transnational political spaces. The internal diversity and various alternative types of these concepts must be recognised to build up an adequate framework for relating their logics to the ones of statehood. Similarly, statehood should not be understood as timelessly fixed and intrinsically rigid but as possibly evolving in a number of main directions of transformation.
This way we can see that these concepts need not to be inevitably opposed and their intrinsic logics be seen as straightforwardly contrasted. Many of the directions of their transformation offer good opportunities to see the connections to political transnationalisation. This enables us to conceptualise transnational political spaces and statehood in a dynamic way and brings out the considerable ground available for empirical research.

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PART TWO
TRANSFORMATION OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
Chapter 5

Broadening Exchanges and Changing Institutions: Multiple Sites of Economic Transnationalism

S. Irudaya Rajan and V.J. Varghese

In the short run, as we can see already, it is likely to be a world of increased incivility and violence. In the long run, free of the constraints of the national form, we may find that cultural freedom and sustainable justice in the world do not presuppose the uniform and general existence of the nation-state. This unsettling possibility could be the most exciting divided of living in modernity at large. (Appadurai, 1997: 23)

Transnationalism is seen as something that runs against the state and driven primarily by the participating people and non-governmental agents, overlooking the role of the state in formalizing transnational spaces. The present paper, drawing from the Indian-Punjabi experience, argues that transnationalism has become a compelling economic imperative manufacturing institutional change at multiple levels with an active involvement of the state. It questions the dominant understanding of transnationalism as beyond and despite the state and as something that is weakening the nation state. The paper looks at institutional transformations in terms of an array of alterations in administrative frameworks at all the national, sub-national and local levels to facilitate diverse forms of economic exchanges and seeks to explore the degree of convergence/divergence between the transnational practices of the ‘people’ and the ‘state’ in an increasingly transnational world. The discourses of belonging being construed at national, sub-national and local levels to reinforce transmigrants’ multiple layers of homeland ties is also examined in an attempt to complicate the notion of voluntarism implicated in transnational exchanges and to fore-figure the considered initiatives from the sending/home institutions/societies.

The concept of transnationalism though said to have made its entry into the intellectual lexicon during the early twentieth century, its acceptability as a paradigm to understand the immigrant state of being with multiple and intersecting belongings came much later after the cold war (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2003: 4). The incredulity towards the paradigm of assimilation has brought transnational affiliations and consciousness into the forefront of migrant belonging with an essential dual orientation or ‘bifocality’ in everyday life (Castles 2002, Vertovic 2007, 2007a). Immigration and transnational being are seen as upsetting
forces to a nation centred notion of boundedness on the one hand (Wimmer and Schiller 2002, Heisler 2001: 229-35) and a challenge to the nation state itself on the other (Soysal 1994, Baubock 1994, Joppke 1998, 1999). Though a distinction has been made between ‘transnationalism from above’ that of states and corporations and ‘transnationalism from below’ that of people (Smith and Eduardo 2006), as a concept and as a field of research, transnationalism privileged the people to people contact across national borders as its focal point, calling researches on multi-sited lives and ethnoscapes (Marcus 1995, Appadurai 1996). As a consequence, the role of the state and political agency in formalizing the largely informal transnational spaces through new institutions and discreet discourses has been largely overlooked. The present exercise by focusing on the working of economic transnationalism at national, state and local levels will discuss the institutional change it brought in the case of sending country and the statist interventions to formalize transnational economic exchanges. The first section will delineate India’s national regime of transnationalism, while the second section delineates the attempts on the part of the state government of Punjab to bag its transnational resources through a powerful invocation of the sub-national identity and ethnic solidarity. The last section discusses how economic transnationalism works at the local level, often sidestepping the national and sub-national structures to reinvent local affiliations of the migrants and transnational citizen through a discourse of ancestral locality. This often undermines and exceeds the attempts to formalize the transnational flows at the national and sub-national levels, but in turn influencing the sub-national and national policies. Such intersecting claims over the transnational resources with the help of discreet layers of attachment also place the federal, state and local structures in competition for transnational resources.

Migration is seen as an integral part of development and as inter-independent variables (Skeldon 1997). As against the ‘brain drain’ presupposition it is increasingly recognized that though certain paths of development can generate migration, migration itself can be a facilitator of profound changes in the economy and society that can be considered to be ‘development’ (Skeldon, 2004). Among the various forms of transnational exchanges, remittances have become a major component of the foreign exchange earnings of a number of countries, resulting in the acceptance of emigration for work as a means of alleviating poverty and ensuring development (Harris, 2005). This has also led to a realization that emigration can be ‘managed’ to promote development (Skeldon, 2008b). It is also seen that as against a permanent loss of its best brains and labour, circular migration would become a means of suitably using the human capital of developing countries for the task of reducing world poverty (Harris, 2005). Unrestricted immigration and settlement has been seen as a greater trouble by the receiving countries too as it accentuates conflicts within native society.
in terms cultural contradictions and resource distribution. Circular migration is thus seen as the best form of migration as it serves the interests of receiving countries apart from supporting development in sending countries through remittances and investments by return migrants, thus eventually reducing migration pressures (Vertovec, 2007; de Haas, 2007). The more optimistic theories of ‘brain circulation’ and ‘brain exchange’, accordingly redefined dependency positively as mutual and accentuating transnational economic exchanges as a developmental and distributive strategy.

The notion of a one-to-one linear relationship between migration and development is however problematic as it presume that development in sending countries will reduce migration. Such conclusions have been plagued by some serious conceptual difficulties as migration and development share a complex, reciprocal and multi-dimensional relationship (de Haas, 2007; Skeldon, 2004). It is yet again presumed, in absolute terms, that migration is caused by lack of development and that poverty and lack of opportunity at home force people to migrate. But this is not often the case. It is found that it is rarely the poorest who move and rarely the poorest countries that participate most in the global migration process (Skeldon, 2008). It is also revealed that development in the areas of origin did not slow down out-migration, instead it often accelerate out-movements. The emigration experiences of Kerala and Punjab, two states with an incredible emigration record in contemporary India, is revealing in this connection. Kerala is seen as a least out-migrating state at least till 1960s. The subsequent flow of people from the state various labour receiving countries in the Middle East, South East Asia and the West has been such that the Malayalees as a group began to be seen as a people with certain intrinsic migratory proclivity. By 1998, 1.36 million people from the state were working in other countries (Zachariah et.al, 2002:17). The number of emigrants from Kerala has increased to 2.16 million in 2008 (Zachariah and Rajan, 2009: 1). The emigration of low/unskilled emigrants from the state is also on the rise- if 92,044 workers were given emigration clearance in 2003, the number has increased to 150,475 in 2007 and to 180,703 in 2008 (MOIA, 2009: 46). Even in the case if Punjab that sends most of its emigrants out of the channel of emigration clearance has registered substantial increase in this regard between the same period- 24,963 in 2003 to 53,942 in 2007 and to 54,469 in 2008 (Ibid). The number of persons seeking authentication of certificates from the NRI Commissioner’s office, Government of Punjab, for migration particularly to countries in the West has also been increasing steadily. These are states with visible rural prosperity due to transnational remittances and investments of various kinds. The total inward remittance to the state of Kerala in 2006-07 was about 20 percent of the state’s NSDP (Zachariah and Rajan, 2007: 11). However, migration continues to remain a major mobility option for many, attracting more people and newer groups, with newer destinations. Such experiences from
different contexts allowed the contemporary views on migration to depart from the earlier premise of the push-pull theories. What was previously seen as a phenomenon driven purely by economic compulsions and opportunities, began to be viewed a vehicle for mobility in a much broader sense.

The ongoing process of globalisation is seen by its advocates as furthering diverse exchanges including labour across national borders and unambiguously positive. The poorest regions of the world, in that sense, would need more globalisation rather than less (Bhagwati, 2004). However, the movement of people across national borders for employment is largely excluded from the ongoing process of globalisation through financial integration (Tapinos and Delaunay, 2000). It is pointed out that in a considerable number of countries, migration management responsibilities have been transferred from their labour to interior or home affairs ministries, taking it away from the domain of employment and work to that of policing and national security (Taran and Geronimi, 2003). Still, the conditions of globalisation through economic integration through transnational flow of capital, goods and technology have accelerated the mobility of labour across national boundaries. Global estimates of people living outside their homeland have more than doubled from 75 in 1975 to 180 million in 2000, in spite of forceful national restrictive regimes. (Taran and Geronimi, 2003). Nonetheless, globalisation and labour mobility are also said to have generated growing inequalities and exclusion not only within nation states but also between nation states. Fragmentation has been identified as an intrinsic part of globalization. Transnationalism is seen as contributing significantly to the ongoing transformations associated with globalization (Vertovic 2007b: 150). As against attempts to configure globalisation through impositions of drastic changes on local communities from above, countervailing attempts are on to configure it from below with a more equitable vision (Castles, 1998; Rosenau, 1997). Transnationalism is also understood as contributing significantly to this, apart from making significant shifts in the nation state model (Vertovic 2007b: 157). The ‘globalization from below’ model and transnationalism of the sending countries/societies finds a convergence at this vantage point. The labour sending countries like India are increasingly considering economic transnationlism as a realistic conduit for attracting transnational resources through its migrants and transnational citizens for its own development, a resource arguably to counter a discriminatory globalization. This resulted in a

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4 Migration is often seen as a reason and result of the wide-ranging changes encapsulated in what is called ‘globalization’.
series of robust statist interventions aimed at institutionalizing transnational ties and structuring what we call national regimes of transnationalism.\(^5\)

**India's national regimes of transnationalism**

India's shift in perception on emigration and Diaspora is said to have come significantly late. The switch over from a notion that see emigration as a depletion of assets and brains to viewing the Indians abroad as a strategic asset of the nation came very recently (Kapur, 2004). India is seen as missed an enormous opportunity by excluding the Diaspora from its post-independent development (Lall, 2001). Though belated the governmental efforts to take migrants and transnational citizens of India on board in a vigorous manner is underwritten by nationalistic considerations. The establishment of a separate ministry for looking after the affairs of the overseas Indians, Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA), in 2004 is considered to be an important step in this direction. The MOIA is mandated to “promote, nurture and sustain a mutually beneficial and symbolic relationship between India and overseas Indians” (MOIA 2007: 6) It is expected to ensure the welfare and protection of the overseas Indians while emigrating, while being in expatriate life and after returning from overseas work. It seeks to ensure and promote beneficial relationship with Indian people abroad, the ‘Global Indian citizen’. This was coincided by a new ‘representational regime’ with categories like ‘Overseas Indian’, Non-Resident Indian’, ‘Person of Indian Origin’, etc. are either created or reinvented as new signifiers as well as administrative categories.

Definitive change in the attitude of the Indian state has a slightly longer history than the MOIA. The Indian cosmopolitanism as represented by the category of ‘British Indian’, which came into being following migrations from India during the colonial time, speak more about the broken promise of ‘imperial citizenship’ (Metcalf 2007, Singha 2006, Edwards 2008: 451). The community that was seen as ‘imperial auxiliaries’ (Tinker 1974), under the cold war cosmopolitanism were looked upon with lack of enthusiasm by the independent Indian state as evidenced from the policy of either ‘return home’ or ‘indigenize’ themselves in their country of residences (Edwards 2008: 452). Nehru was unambiguous in his conviction that

\(^5\) Administrative structures and mechanisms put in place by a nation state according to its own concerns of development to attract transnational resources together constitute national regimes of transnationalism. These regimes not only institutionalize transnational ties within a national framework and reinforce notions of original belonging but also take its migrants and Diaspora on board as carriers of transnational capital. An evaluation of the success of such state interventions is not attempted here.
the primary allegiance of the overseas Indian community is to be to their respective countries of residence. The end of cold war and the introduction of new economic policy in the late 1980s which was open to transnational capital brought a change in the Indian state strategies to its overseas people. The Indian state was strategies from then onwards has been aimed at promoting the emotional and economic ties with its ‘overseas citizen’. The ‘High Level Committee on Indian Diaspora’ (HLCID) appointed by the Indian government in 2000 to survey Indian diaspora and to make recommendation to promote a ‘global Indian family’ and citizenship have made important recommendations reinforcing the state initiatives in this direction further (HLCID 2001, Edwards 2008: 444-45). The NRIs who were seen hitherto as the ‘not-required Indians’ soon got a metamorphosis as the ‘national reserve of India’ in the media representations (Edwards 2008: 454).

The government of India’s perception of Overseas Indians as a “vast reservoir of potential investors, entrepreneurs and corporate leaders whose enterprise can be deployed in India” is defined in a framework of mutually beneficial relationship between India and overseas Indians. India’s radiant economic growth in recent years and its status as a much sought after investment destination in the contemporary world has been consistently projected to attract enterprises of overseas Indian’s into the country. This maneuver at one level underscores India’s credentials as an attractive business location and thereby induce profitable capital investment, but at another level through resorting a nationalist discourse and invoking the original belonging of overseas Indians attempts to “try and make the overseas Indian an active participant in the India growth story” (MOIA, 2008: 43). The duality is mutually sustaining wherein on the one hand overseas Indians were called upon to contribute to the development of their home country and gain from the robust growth of India on the other.

The governmental recognition of NRIs as an ‘important economic constituency with the ability and willingness to invest in the emerging opportunities in their country of origin’, bolstered by a liberalized policy framework for ensuring NRI investments through the automatic and Government route, resulted in creation of new institution for the purpose. This is done within the larger liberalized Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Regime of India with added incentives

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6 The change in attitude is first politically manifested in India’s strong intervention during the crisis in Fiji in the late 1980s (T.P. Sreenivasan, former Indian diplomat, in a conversation). The change was also necessitated by large scale temporary migration of Indian workers to the Gulf region from the 1970s onwards and was reinforced by the liquidity crisis in the early 1990s (Edwards 2008: 453)
for NRIs. The Reserve Bank has granted general permission to NRIs/PIOs for undertaking
direct investment in Indian Companies under the automatic route, purchase of shares under
Portfolio Investment Schemes, investment in companies and proprietorship/partnership
concerns on non-repatriation basis and for remittances of current income. NRIs/PIOs no
more have to seek specific permission for approved activities under these schemes. The
government of India broadly offers five different routes to the NRIs for making investments:
an automatic route with repatriation benefits; investment with the approval of a high
Powered inter-ministerial body with full repatriation benefits; other investment opportunities
with repatriation benefits in the form of domestic mutual funds, investment in bonds issued by
public sector undertakings, purchase of Shares of Public sector enterprises being disinvested
by Government of India, investment in government dated securities or Treasury Bills, investments up to 100 per cent equity without repatriation benefits; and other investment possibilities for NRIs without repatriation benefits like investments in non-convertible
debentures, money market mutual funds, deposits with companies and commercial papers.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) offers various incentives in the form of tax exemptions and
liberal repatriation schemes. Income from the investments made by NRIs/PIOs out of
convertible foreign exchange in their Non Resident External Rupee Account (NRE) and
Foreign Currency Non Resident Account (FCNR) are totally exempted from tax. The income
from NRI investments in securities in mutual funds, bonds and savings certificates; dividend

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7 FDI up to 100 percent is now permitted on the automatic route in all sectors/activities except: (a) activities requiring industrial license under the Industries Development and Regulation Act, (b) proposals where the foreign investor had an existing joint venture/technical collaboration/trademark agreement in the same field of activity, (c) proposal for acquisition of shares in an Indian company in the financial services sector & where SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulation, 1997 is attracted and (d) all proposals falling outside notified sectoral policy/caps or under sectors in which FDI is not permitted. FDI in gambling and betting, lottery business, atomic energy, retail trading and agricultural or plantation activities (other than tea plantations) are prohibited sectors. See, Sector Specific Guidelines for Foreign Direct Investment, in GOI, 2006: 89-97.

8 Automatic route of FDI does not require any prior approval either by Government of India or RBI. The investors are only required to notify the Regional office concerned of RBI within 30 days of receipt of inward remittances and file the required documents with that office within 30 days of issue of shares to foreign investors (HOI: 12-15).

9 http://dipp.nic.in/invindia/invind.htm

10 http://finmin.nic.in/fipbweb/fipb/fipb_index.html


declared by Indian companies and long term capital gains arising from transfer of equity shares in a company and/or equity oriented schemes of mutual funds are also free from taxation. When an NRI/PIO returns to India for permanent residence, the money and the value of assets brought by him/her into India and the value of assets acquired by him out of such money within one year immediately preceding the date of his return and at any time thereafter are totally exempt from wealth tax for a period of seven years after return to India.\(^{13}\) There is considerable exemption to the NRIs and PIOs from the gift tax too. Any sum of money (gift) received by a citizen of India from NRIs/PIOs to any relative or on the occasion of the marriage of the individual or under a will or by way of inheritance or in contemplation of death of the payer are exempted from any form of gift tax.\(^{14}\)

The RBI also liberalized supports NRI investment in India through indirect channels like that of loans.\(^{15}\) Similarly the NRIs are also entitled to get loans from Authorised Dealers (ADs) against the security of shares or immovable property in India for personal or business purposes and for acquiring residential accommodation in India. However, such loans are non-patriable and hence the loan amount cannot be credited to the NRE or FCNR accounts of the NRIs. Authorised Dealers can also loans to NRIs or a resident in India against the security of term deposits in NRE, FCNR and NRO accounts. Under *Foreign Exchange Management Act* (FEMA) regulations a foreign citizen who is resident in India can purchase Immovable Property (IP) in India without any approval from the RBI. He/she is also not required to file any declaration at the time of purchase of such IP.\(^{16}\) NRIs/PIOs can freely rent out their immovable property, without seeking any permission from the RBI. The rental income being a current account transaction is repatriable outside India, subject to the general

\(^{13}\) The wealth tax in India is otherwise too minimal. The Finance Act 1992 has considerably reduced the scope of wealth tax. With effect from 1st April, 1993, wealth tax is being levied only on nonproductive assets like urban land, buildings (except one house property), jewellery, bullion, vehicles, cash over Rs.50,000/- etc. The current rate of wealth-tax is 1% on the aggregate market value of chargeable assets (HOI: 33-35).

\(^{14}\) The term "relative" is defined as: (1) spouse of the individual; (2) brother or sister of the individual; (3) brother or sister of the spouse of the individual; (4) brother or sister of either of the parents of the individual; (5) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the individual; (6) any lineal ascendant or descendant of the spouse of the individual; and (7) spouse of the person referred to in (2) to (6) (HOI: 36-38).

\(^{15}\) See for details HOI 43-45

\(^{16}\) However, investment in agricultural property, plantation and farmhouse is prohibited for all classes of persons resident outside India, be it NRIs/OCIs/ foreign citizens or other foreign entities. Also, the citizens of eight countries, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, China, Iran, Nepal. Or Bhutan (whether resident in India or not) are prohibited from acquiring or transferring any IP in India without prior approval of the RBI.
tax rules of the country. The NRI/PIO is also permitted to remit up to $1,000,000 per year out of the balance in his Non Resident (Ordinary) account/sale proceeds of assets (inclusive of inheritance/settlement). The banks are also permitted to issue International Credit Cards to NRIs/PIOs without prior approval of the Reserve Bank of India. The Reserve Bank of India has taken further steps to simplify financial transactions by NRIs/PIOs, particularly with regard to transfer of interest, partnership assets, gift shares, mutual funds, deposits with Indian firms and companies out of domestic sources, etc.

There was also attempts on the part of the state to systematize and streamline flow of transnational resources for philanthropic and charity works. The government has put a liberal framework in place for the NGOs, in the forms of Societies, Trusts and Non-Profit Companies, to receive contributions from overseas to carry out charity/philanthropic work in India. The major institutional requirement is that all Indian NGOs that receive foreign contributions should get a clearance from the Ministry of Home Affairs in the form of a permanent FCRA registration or prior permission on a case-to-case basis. Any NGO that receive foreign funds under FCRA is required to open and use an exclusive bank account for foreign funds. Moreover, income received by any religious and charitable trust or institutions (an area of significant contribution from the Indian Diaspora) registered with the income tax authorities is not taxable as long as the income is utilized for the set objectives of the organization (HOI 48-51). More recently, the government of India realizing the potential of transnational Diaspora resources through the channel of philanthropy, has established an India Development Foundation (IDF) to promote philanthropy amongst the Indian Diaspora. Apart from promoting philanthropy, IDF is supposed to “align Diaspora philanthropy with the national development goals and to provide a platform to the Diaspora for channelizing their philanthropic initiatives through creditable NGOs and institutions.”

The government of India is also taking concrete measures to strengthen and reinforce the emotional ties that transnational Indian citizens share with their motherland. The category of Persons of Indian Origin was created and a PIO Card scheme was introduced in 1999, much

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17 If IP is purchased through loans, the entire rental income, even if it is more than the prescribed installment, should be adjusted towards repayment of the loan. (RBI Master Circular No. /02/2006-07)
18 RBI Master Circular No. /04/2006-07
19 This is as the requirements of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) of 1976.
20 The proposed national migration policy document (unpublished).
before the formation of MOIA, in an effort to give a formal recognition and bureaucratic authorization to such enduring bonds. The Person of Indian Origin (PIO) is defined quite broadly to accommodate all aspiring foreign citizen (1) who at any time held and an Indian passport, or (2) whose parents or grand parents or great grand parents was born in and permanently resident in Indian or (3) those whose spouse is a citizen of India or a Person of Indian origin as per (1) and (2). A PIO card holder is entitled to visit India without a visa for 15 years; no separate student visa or employment visa is required for taking admission in educational institutions and taking up employment in India; not required to register with the Foreigners Registration Officer if continuous stay does not exceed 180 days and is entitled to get all benefits and facilities available to the NRIs in economic, financial and educational fields. The validity of PIO Card is 15 years and Gratis PIO Card may be issued to an exceptionally eminent person of Indian Origin, who plays an important role in building bridges between India and the country of his/her adoption, if he/she expresses a desire to obtain the PIO Card.\textsuperscript{21} Further, more recently on the recommendation of the HLCID, the Government of India had introduced a scheme of Overseas Citizenship Of India (OCI), by which aspiring/eligible PIOs are given Overseas Citizenship of India. The scheme is operational from December 2, 2005.\textsuperscript{22} OCI has been introduced by statute as a new category of citizenship to facilitate life-long visa, unrestricted travel to India and certain economic, educational and cultural benefits. The scheme has got its limitation and cannot be as full 'dual citizenship' since it does not confer political rights. "A foreign national, who was eligible to become citizen of India on 26.01.1950 or was a citizen of India on or at anytime after 26.01.1950 or belonged to a territory that became part of India after 15.08.1947 and his/her children and grand children" is eligible for Overseas Citizenship of India.\textsuperscript{23} An OCI shall be entitled to have the benefits of multiple entry, multiple-purpose life long visa to visit India, exemption from registration with Police authorities for any length of stay in India and parity with NRIs in financial, economic and educational fields except in the acquisition of agricultural or plantation properties. However, "[p]ersons registered as OCI have not been given any voting rights, election to Lok Sabha / Rajya Sabha /Legislative Assembly / Council, holding Constitutional posts such as President, Vice President, Judge of Supreme Court /

\textsuperscript{21} A citizen of Afghanistan, Bhutan, China, Nepal, Pakistan or Sri Lanka any time are not eligible for PIO Card; See for further details HOI 61-66.

\textsuperscript{22} This was done by amending the Indian Citizens Act of 1955, which disallow citizenship for overseas Indians.

\textsuperscript{23} If the applicant had ever been a citizen of Pakistan and Bangladesh, he/she will not be not eligible for OCI; See for the details of the scheme HOI 55-60.
High Court etc" (HOI 2006). The transnational citizens of India has responded overwhelmingly to the scheme and according to the latest updates around 400,000 OCI documents have been granted by the government of India till December 2008.\(^{24}\) The MOIA has also taken other important measures to reinforce the ties of Overseas Indians with India. Scholarship Programme for Diaspora Children (SPDC), started in 2006-07, with an objective of making "higher education in India accessible to the children of Overseas Indians and publicize India as an education hub"\(^{25}\) with 50% of scholarship reserved for children of the PIOs and the rest for the children of NRIs.\(^{26}\) The Know India Programme (KIP) another initiative of MOIA aims at “associating closely the younger generation of Indian Diaspora with India.”\(^{27}\) Very recently MOIA has launched ‘Tracing the Roots’ Programme which aims at assisting Persons of Indians origin in tracing their roots in India.\(^{28}\) The government had also constituted Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award (PBSA) in 2002 which will conferred on a Non-Resident Indian, Person of Indian origin or an organization or institution established and run by the Non-Resident Indians or Persons of Indian Origin in recognition of their contributions.\(^{29}\)

The institutional changes of these kinds are bolstered by a new discourse of state nationalism that is increasingly open to overseas Indians. Arguably it presupposes a redefinition of nation in such a way to accommodate its transnational citizens. The nation is imagined beyond its territorial confines by the state and systematized and formalized it accordingly with multiple governmental technologies promote formal sense of belonging and extending diverse services to overseas Indians. The statist notion of nation has this undergone re-formalization to take the nation beyond a ‘national space’ to a transnational space’. However, as the preceding discussion indicates the rationality runs behind

\(^{24}\) Out of this 400,000 150,000 have been received and issued in India and the rest from various Indian embassies abroad. http://overseasindian.in/2009/mar/news/20092403-105002.shtml

\(^{25}\) Every year 100 scholarships are given under this scheme. http://moia.gov.in/showinfo1.asp?linkid=520


\(^{27}\) http://moia.gov.in/showinfo1.asp?linkid=546

\(^{28}\) http://moia.gov.in/shared/linkimages/203.doc

\(^{29}\) The maximum number of Awards each year is fifteen. Non-Resident Indians and Persons of Indian Origin shall continue to be considered for Padma Awards and Padma Awardees shall be eligible for Pravasi Bharatiya Samman Award. http://moia.gov.in/showsublink.asp?sublinkid=824
transnationalisation of the nation is primarily national. Nation states are increasingly relying upon 'development' for its self-legitimization, wherein the state centric bio-politics is fundamental to it. Nation state, in search of resources for the same, found its transnational citizens and non-resident citizens a highly potential source to mobilise capital for development. This is done with a nationalistic rhetoric where overseas Indians are called upon to contribute to the development of their home country on the one hand and a given chance to gain from the ongoing development of India. It is the same economic imperatives of the country that enabled the state to provide diverse services to its 'overseas citizens' along side systematic attempts to reinforce their emotional bonds with the home country. However, identities are always intersecting and the 'national' is bound to be coeval with the regional and the local, resulting in claims at the sub-national and local levels for transnational resources on the one hand and affinities/belongings on the other.

Sub-national rhetoric of global punjabi community

The Punjabi Diaspora has a long history, so also the transnationalisation of the Punjabi society (Talbot and Thandi, 2004, Ballard 2003, Helweg 1986, Ballard and Banks 1994, Visram 1986, Thandi 2006, Tatla 1998, Tatla and Dusenbery 2010. The Overseas Punjabi links with their homeland has taken multiple economic manifestations, including conventional remittances, flow of money through transnational service industry like heritage tourism, air-transportation, travel and emigration servicing, telecommunications, trade in cultural goods, entertainment industry, etc. and philanthropic contributions. The Punjabi Diaspora has been seen as a community that retains a meaningful link with their homeland and Diaspora philanthropy is perhaps the most unconventional forms of economic exchange through which the home-linkage has been reinforced in recent years. It is pointed out that though the practice of Punjabi diaspora taking up projects of 'private giving for public good' has got a longer history, the philanthropic remittance has become more significant magnitude, quality and creativity only in the last couple of decades (Roberts, 2005; Thandi, 2006). It is pointed out that there is a positive change in recent times that NRI investments for establishing large memorial gates in the countryside and towns in memory of their ancestors has given way to investing money productively on development projects (Singh, 2008). The diaspora philanthropy seeks its justification in arguments like civic duty, loyalty to village, gratitude payback, sense of identity and so on, but bolstered strongly by the Sikh religious and moral philosophy (Thandi, 2006). It is estimated that the NRIs have contributed altogether a whopping amount of over Rs.1,600 crores during the last five years to the villages in Doaba region of Punjab (Awesthi, 2008). The growing inflow of money into the state
through multiple channels and a larger recognition of the economic potential Punjabi diaspora for the development of their home state, the government of Punjab embarked on an institutional transformation drive to channalise the resources of Overseas Punjabis for the development of the state and to strengthen the Punjabi diasporas affinity with their home state through new institutions and services.

The Punjab government has also taken steps to encourage overseas Punjabis to invest in Punjab, by taking advantage of the ‘emotional and sentimental ties with their motherland’. The major forms of remittance until recently were in the forms of accumulation of household assets or NRI deposits. Overseas Punjabis have invested heavily on agricultural land too, which is often cited as a reason for the exorbitant cost of agricultural land in the state, making purchase of land and cultivating it profitably became an unfeasible option for the real cultivators. However, it was in the New Industrial Policy of 1996, the government of Punjab came out with concrete policies to attract NRI investment in large and medium scale manufacturing units. The policy offered various incentives to the NRIs towards the development of agro-based units, tourism, electronic industry and export oriented industrial ventures (Thandi and Talbot, 2004). For promoting NRI investment concrete steps were taken like setting up of an exclusive Focal Point in Mohali for NRI entrepreneurs, reservation of industrial plots for allotment in all industrial estates in the state, preference for Punjabi NRI entrepreneurs while finalizing industrial proposals and creating of a Special Cell to provide Single Window clearance for investment proposals from Punjabi NRI entrepreneurs were taken, apart from a robust campaign calling Overseas Punjabis to participate the in the development of their home state (Thandi and Talbot, 2004). Other incentives included measures like a 5% concession to the Punjabi NRI investors in land tax. However, irrespective of such initiatives the NRIs continue to be lukewarm in investing in Punjab and low quality of governance, high level of corruption, bureaucratic hurdles and difficulties with business partners in India are often cited as reasons for the same. This has resulted in a situation where some of the incentives like the 5% concession in land tax were withdrawn by the government of Punjab.

The government of Punjab has established a Department of NRI Affairs headed by the NRI Commissioner in 2002 to give special attention to matters related to overseas Punjabis. Prior to this the NRI matters were looked after by an NRI cell in the Central Secretariat of Punjab and attached with the Rural Development and Panchayat Department. The institutional change has resulted in increased governmental interest in the affairs of overseas Punjabis. Realizing the quantum of money being pumped into rural Punjab for philanthropy and village infrastructure by the overseas Punjabis, the Department of NRI Affairs sought to incentivise
and formalize such contributions, by instituting the ‘NRI-GoP Rural Infrastructure Development Fund’. Through the ‘Plan Scheme NRI 2.35’, which allowed 50 percent of matching grants by the GoP for all Village Development programmes initiated by NRIs, the government of Punjab sought to provide an ‘enabling and facilitating platform’ for overseas Punjabi contribution for development of their villages. This was initiated with a view to “ensure full participation of the NRIs and NRI NGOs into the village infrastructure development activities.” A High Level Committee called the Punjab NRI Committee for Development (PUNRICD) is constituted for promoting and implementing the scheme. Since the scheme aims at providing to the ‘overall benefit of the general masses and overall community development of the area’, the government has decided that such projects should not be restricted to hospitals, libraries, drinking water, sewerage disposal, public latrines, street lights, sport stadium, but can include all projects that would be beneficial to the people of all walks of life.

The scheme also ensures ownership of public property by the respective villages and Village Development Committee (VDC) formed in individual villages is not only responsible for the implementation of the project but also for the maintenance of the built infrastructure.

The modalities set by the government of Punjab for the ‘Plan Scheme NRI 2.35’ give control in village development schemes initiated by the NRIs in the villages. All projects coming under the scheme should get an approval from the Higher Power Committee (PUNRICD), which is headed by the Chief Secretary of Punjab. Every project should come through the District NRI Committee for Development (DINRICD) headed by the concerned Deputy Commissioner who with the help of specifically empanelled civil/public health/construction engineers assess the viability of the project and check the detailed estimates of it. On

30 The government of Punjab has published a suggestive list of projects which include projects of water management services covering the entire water circle, various village infrastructure projects, village renewable energy infrastructure, village health care and education infrastructure, establishment of Citizen Service Centres with broadband connectivity for providing government and other services, creating common infrastructure for running special programmes like controlling female foeticide, adult literacy programmes, old age homes, schools for physically and mentally challenged, AIDS Control, Vocational training centres, etc. provision of infrastructure for specialized job oriented training courses like textile and garment manufacturing, agricultural related skills and technical skills of various kinds. (Plan Scheme NRI 2.35 document, Government of Punjab.

31 Principal Secretary Finance, Secretary Planning, Secretary Rural Development, a representative of an NRI/NGOs to be nominated by CNRI, Deputy Commissioner of the concerned District, MD NRI Sabha and Commissioner NRIs (Member Secretary) are the other members of the Committee.
clearance of the project by PUNRICD, the Commissioner of NRI Affairs will transfer the funds (the government share) to the concerned Deputy Commissioner. It is also decided that to ensure full ownership and subsequent responsibility of repair and maintenance of the infrastructure, the implementation of the projects should be carried out by NRI NGOs through the Village Development Committees. A panel of certified engineers, maintained by the concerned Deputy Commissioner, will provide technical assistance to the PUNRICD and DINRICD wherever required. The government share would be 50% of the total estimated cost. As per the set modality, once NRI/NGO/VDC spend 25% of the total cost first out of their share, they can apply for 25% of the government share to be released. NRI/NGO/VDC has to spend the rest of their share in the third stage for getting the remaining share of the government released. The Department of NRI Affairs retains its prerogative to inspect the standard and quality and progress of any ongoing project apart from accounts, as and when the Department feels so. However, launched in 2004 the ‘Plan Scheme NRI 2.35’ did not make any spectacular progress as any other attempts to formalize and ‘governmentalise’ such private initiatives.

Apart from attempts to maximize overseas Punjabi contribution to philanthropy and village development and formalize it through the framework of ‘Plan Scheme NRI 2.35’, the government of Punjab of late has come up with many services specifically aimed at overseas Punjabis to promote and strengthen their bonds with the home state. Apart from setting up the Department of NRI Affairs, which is in charge of matters related to overseas Punjabis, the government has also established NRI police stations, fast track courts for NRI cases and supported NRI Sabha. NRI police stations are opened in six places (Jalandhar, SBS Nargar-Nawanshahr, Hoshiarpur, Kapurthala, Ludhiana and Moga) with its jurisdiction over the concerned districts to address the grievances of the overseas Punjabis, particularly their disputes with relatives and neighbors relating to property issues, etc. Fast track NRI courts have been set up for the speedy settlement of cases pertaining to overseas Punjabis. The NRI Sabha, an NGO of overseas Punjabis with more than fifteen thousand registered members, has been supported by the government of Punjab in redressing their grievances and ensuring their welfare. The Sabha works in close coordination with the government of Punjab and has become a body with significant influence in the Punjabi public sphere.

The attempts of the state government of Punjab fundamentally rely on the sub-national identity and ethnic solidarity of Punjabis across the world. The sentimental and emotional affinity of Punjabis with their motherland and their enthusiasm for its progress is invoked and employed for garnering resources for development and keep them deeply attached to the state. It is also important to note that it was after the separatist Khalistan movement, which
was significantly supported economically and ideologically by the Punjabi diaspora, it became also imperative for the state to discourage diaspora financing for subversive activities and channelise it productively for the developmental needs of the state. This turn reinforces a distinct Punjabi cultural identity beyond the territorial confines of the sub-nation into a global Punjabi identity.

Call of the ancestral village for development

However the most visible form of economic transnationalism in rural Punjab continues of the Overseas Punjabi investment in their respective ancestral villages. Such investments are guided by multiple rationalities, which includes celebration/exhibition of their overseas success in their home locality, a sense of ‘giving something back’ to their ancestral village, preserving memories of their ancestors/parents, a moral obligation to promote religion in its place of birth and sometimes a genuine interest in the welfare of the people of their native village. It is often pointed out that such investments started with contributions to religious places, erecting memorial gates\(^\text{32}\) and spending on spectacular like festivals, sports, etc, but has given way eventually for investments on human development and village amenities through setting up or supporting educational institutions, dispensaries, hospitals, crematoriums, sport stadiums, street lighting, sanitation, clean drinking water projects, etc. Such investments were mostly done initially with individual initiatives and most often without formal frameworks or structures. Such informal investments continue to exist even today particularly in the form of contributions to gurudwaras and religious institutions, local festivals, sports events, etc. of late the overseas Punjabi investments in rural Punjab began to flow through formal channels particularly to charitable institutions and societies, non-profitable organisations, NRI trusts, Village welfare associations and Village Development Councils and NGOs. This has also brought another important change – if the overseas Punjabis under their own self-motivation making investments earlier, now there is significant effort from the native village society to garner resources from NRIs from the village. Apart from welfare associations and development councils in the villages, educational institutions, hospitals, gurudwaras, local organizers of festivals and sports events establishes a sustaining relationship with ‘local NRIs’ and try to harness resources from them for all

\(^{32}\) Such memorial gates erected by the overseas Punjabis in honour of their ancestors or parents are ubiquitous in rural Punjab.
activities that are considered to be for common good of the village. The transformation underlines the reciprocal space of economic transnationalism, where local effort and NRI interest come together.

The experience of village welfare associations’ efforts at village development by making use of transnational resources also allowed NGOs run by NRIs themselves to get into the scene and actively take village development efforts with NRI support forward in a systematic manner. The Village Life Improvement Foundation (VLIF) started in 1999 by an NRI from USA is perhaps the first initiative in this direction. VLIF harness resources from the NRIs in close collaboration with the Village Development Councils of the respective villages undertake development projects in the concerned villages. VLIF working with a motto of “modernizing villages: our villages, our pride” particularly focus on providing amenities like clean drinking water, underground sewerage, water treatment plant, concreting of streets, solar street lights and computer education apart from initiating people empowering schemes and job creation and entrepreneurship in the village. The government of Punjab operationalise its “Plan Scheme NRI 2.35” through such NGOs. VLIF has already completed 6 village development projects already, of which the Kharaudi has been acclaimed as a model and a dozen of other village projects are in the pipeline. Indo-Canadian Village Improvement Trust (ICVIT), headed by a Canadian NRI from Punjab is another important NGO undertaking similar works in villages with the support of overseas Punjabis. Such village development initiative also resulted in intra-diaspora exchanges, wherein overseas Punjabis in different countries come together for the developmental activities of their ‘own’ village. VLIF though was founded by an Punjabi NRI from USA it was spearheaded equally by an NRI from Canada and UK. Similarly through contributions to their village from different national space, innumerable overseas Punjabis develop an intra-diaspora space within a transnational space.

Along side, overseas Punjabis themselves, with the support of some natives, formed Trusts and Charitable societies and funded several institutions in the village for the benefit of their ancestral village. This includes hospitals, dispensaries, schools, collages, training institutes, old age homes, etc. If one takes the example of medical support system, it could be seen that many prominent NRI villages have hospitals and dispensaries with varying quantum of investments and expertise. It is also interesting to note that often the NRI renditions about their developmental initiatives in their respective villages is critical about the failure of the state government in this regard which allowed them to embark on the ‘righteous mission’ of providing better life to people. The main reason for lack of NRI investment in Punjab is explained in terms of a corrupt bureaucracy, extreme politicized governance and lack of supportive structures. It is pointed out that the governmental involvement in the village
development programme through its “Plan Scheme NRI 2.35” too lukewarm, with essentially empty talks.\textsuperscript{33} The transnational initiatives stake its claim on biopolitics, upon the failure of the native government. On the other hand, the flow of resources into villages for development and philanthropy from transnational locations allowed the national government to institute the IDF to promote philanthropy amongst the Indian diaspora and the state government the NRI village development scheme with its 50 percent financial contribution and control.

The institutional transformation in terms of alterations in administrative frameworks as a result of the potentiality of transnational resources has resulted in changes at the national, sub-national and local levels. Though intersecting, these identities are invoked effectively to take the overseas Indians/Punjabis on board as essential categories at each level. This often done, particularly at the national and sub-national levels, in a language of extending diverse services to transnational citizens, allowing them to participate in the ongoing development drive in India and attenuating formalistic notions of citizenship. Nonetheless, the emergence of transnationalism and its economic potential for a ‘sending country’ hardly weaken and incapacitate nation state. Instead economic transnationalism allows the nation state to expand its hand to newer domains. The nation state not only device a careful claim over the transnational resources for its development but also brought many of the economic transactions of its transnational citizen under surveillance and regulation through liberalized banking to NRIs. The offer of overseas citizenship offered a formalistic frame of belonging to the motherland and at the same brought them under a new unbound seriality. The national government is also keen to promote diaspora philanthropy, but more importantly to align it with “the national development goals.” The increasing involvement of the Punjab government in the NRI village development initiatives also at another level points to the expanding domains of involvement by the nation state to formalize transnational exchanges. The state through institutional changes from time to time would find newer relevance for the ‘national’ in an increasingly transnational world. This do not suggest that the state would be able to capture all the migrant processes under a formal regime, as the trasmigrants certainly would have their own ways of negotiating the state strategies and imaginatively making use of the transnational spaces instituted by the state.

References


Chapter 6

Institutional Entrepreneurs Shaping Transnationalizing Labour Markets

Mika Raunio

Mobility of labor challenging the national institutions

The direct\textsuperscript{34} impacts of the economic migration - remittances sent to the country of origin and “illegal” and legal work done in the countries of destinations - are significant at the global level. The amount of remittances was estimated to be about 300 billion USD in 2007 (Vertovec 2009, 8). Obviously, the value of work done by the migrants must be much higher, since some do not send any remittances and those who do, also consume significant part of their incomes in the place of residence. To compare, just about 30 countries in the world had their GDP over 300 billion USD in 2008\textsuperscript{35} and total foreign direct investment outflows of multinational companies (MNCs) were just a bit more than double, 779 billion USD in 2005 (Dunning and Lundan, 2008: 19). So, amount of remittances and especially the work done to by migrant workers, play important role in the global economy. Thus, the mobility of labor is without doubt in the preferences of many economic actors from individuals to MNCs and to sending and receiving nation states. In addition, according to Cohen (2006) especially mobile people, address the challenges for the nation states and their institutions (ibid., 2006: 5).

This puts a lot of pressure to change the existing institutions to better fit with the globally mobile workforce, since well established institutions creating trust and routines also lower the transactions costs in international business, including fees paid by employees and employers in international recruiting services.

Labor market practices are acquiring transnational forms, when employees, employers, recruiters, educators, policy makers and regulators are making border crossing bilateral agreements adjusting regulation and building recruiting practices between the two or more

\textsuperscript{34} Competences, new firms and innovations that migrants bring to more suitable economic environments, transnational business contacts, population growth and so on may be seen as indirect, but still highly significant impacts of the economic migration.

\textsuperscript{35} World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 7 October 2009, Comparing total 240 economies.
countries and providing supportive training programs. Recruiting cause transaction costs for different parties, often these are fees for employees and/or employers. Transnationalisation in labor market have acquired institutional forms for example between the Mexico and the United States in 1950s, between Turkey and Germany in 1960s and also recently especially between the several labor exporting Asian countries and importing countries in the West and in the Middle-East. (Abella, 2004: 201, Martin, 2004: 121; Hugo & Sthal, 2004; Sassen, 1999: 134) Transnationalization in this article refers to emergence of border crossing recruiting patterns between two countries and to supporting socio-economic spaces. Transformation is the process, where formerly institutionalized national patterns of recruitment (with supporting practices and regulations) are becoming more transnational.

In new institutional theory (see DiMaggio & Powell 1991; North 1990) the role of agency - organizations and interest groups who aim to change the existing institutions - is strong. More specifically the change agent is defined as institutional entrepreneur. In this article, institutional entrepreneur refers to agent who aims to change the institutional environment more supportive for their transnational activities. Article proposes that role of institutional entrepreneurs and their stronger involvement to institutionalization process in close interaction with employers and regulative authorities, could be partial answer to avoid known handicaps and problems that now exists in many international recruiting practices. In addition, very different situations of institutional entrepreneurs promoting the transnationalizations of the labor market are discussed to point out, that there are no “one size fits all” solutions for this role. However, the article aims to recognize the key qualities and tasks of the institutional entrepreneur in the context of challenging institutional change i.e. in case of health care sector that already has strong national institutions, since it is not possible to deal with whole variety of different cases here, and one example is sufficient to point out the essence of the issue.

In context of international migration market forces and social networks have been extensively studied (Hugo & Sthal, 2004: 174) and according to Bach (2009) governments and employers play crucial role especially in development of health care migration (ibid. 2009: 230). However, while this article focuses on theoretical and conceptual dimensions of the question, examples are drawn from business services sector organizing the health care professional’s recruiting – labor broker firm and adult education center – to illustrate the argument that role of agency who actually implement the service in the constraints of the regulations and demand should be studied carefully. Quality and ethics of these services play crucial role in formation of cognitive institutions, i.e. routines that create the everyday practices for the labor broking and recruiting.
Institutions and institutional entrepreneurs in transnational labor markets

**Institutions**

As defined in the introductory chapter of this book, the core definition of institutions refers to quality, that they are “organizing relatively stable patterns of human activity” (Turner, 1997: 6). Human agency may cause unpredicted and substantial changes, whereas more stable structural factors, institutions, are often obstacle for the change. Single actions and continuous interaction of agents adapt, transform, upgrade or lock-in structures at the level of both the organization and the environment. (Boschma & Frenken, 2006a, 2006b) In some areas of culture structures are quite durable (religion, political beliefs, etc.), but even these often change over time and many other areas of culture change can be frequent and widespread. (Nelson, 2004: 26-27)

Institutions refer to systems of values that may influence the acceptability of new routines in a certain region or country. Institutions may also form the system of incentives that can guide the search-process to find solutions for socially perceived problems. In different domains different logics are present and for example in economic domain economic rewards are significant while in political domain political rewards are important. Both are steered by the rules and regulations based on shared values or contracts. (Lambooy, 2004)

The recent view to institutions is based on the “new institutionalism” whose main contributors were Douglas North (1992) in the field of economics and DiMaggio and Powell (1973) from sociology. They emphasized the existence of several institutions that consists the institutional environment for the actions. Systems or constellations of several institutions create wider societal structures that enable and constrain, but do not determine actions of agents. New institutionalism also explains the change with recognizing, not just institutions that steer the behavior of individuals according maximized benefits (rational choices) or normative

36 **Lock-in**, refers to deterministic development path of the region when emergence of novelty and dramatic changes are not likely to occur. It is crucial how regional economies can break free from old “negatively-locked-in” paths of development. Martin and Sunley (2006) stress, that evolution of regional economy may turn from phase of positive lock-in to phase of negative lock-in.
institutions (fear of negative feedback), but also cognitive institutions. Cognitive institutions explains, that people follow routines and act as they do, because they do not know what could be the real alternative. Existing routines are taken for granted. Institutionalized routines are well known by the people and they think these routines are “right” way to do things. There are several different institutions in the labor markets in general, but many of institutions are line of business or country specific or related to practices or regulations and some of them are cognitive, like recruiting practices, while others are normative (regulations), etc. Recruiting patterns in health care sector is just one of many.

In addition, new institutionalism emphasis historical continuum, i.e. previous actions may influence the attitudes of the other agents in the new round (tit for tat) and there is always certain level of path dependency restricting the possible choices due to choices done earlier. The problem that path dependency causes for the development is the “lock-in” situation, when historically created institutions and routines steer the actions to the direction, that do not support the development anymore, or may be even harmful, for the well being of the community. Often human agency may have significant impact on the possibilities to break loose from the rather conservative development and path-dependency. (Lambooy, 2004)

In economic history the common assumption has been that economic growth has been possible only after state has been able to offer sufficient infrastructure and institutional environment for the trade and business. This was also assumption in North’s early writings, but he had to reassert his view, since it seemed that also traders own arrangements may create sufficient structures at the early phase of development and small scale business is of course possible without any larger organizations or institutions. (Kallioinen, 1997: 55) However, it is evident, that large scale business and trade substantially benefits from the well functioning institutions creating trust and stability.

According to Nelson there is lot of common between North’s definition and sociological definition of institution, but the key difference is that sociological stress the norms and beliefs rationalizing the action in given context, whereas North emphasis is on game theory and on the self-reinforcing nature of institutionalized behavior.” (Nelson, 1995: 80-81)

New institutional views stress also the interaction between the organizations and institutions as they shape each other. More precise definition of agency is institutional entrepreneur which is based on DiMaggio’s (1988) notion institutional entrepreneurship. According the Leca, Battilana and Boxenbaum (2008) institutional entrepreneurship “characterize organized actors with sufficient resources to contribute the genesis of new institutions in which they see
an opportunity to realize interest that they value highly” (ibid., 2008: 4). Institutional entrepreneurship refers to agents or network of agents, who are able to change institutions and who are able to mobilize other agents to support the change. Thus, not all agents who participate the transformation of the institution are institutional entrepreneurs. (Battilana, 2006: 657)

**Recognizing the institution and institutional entrepreneur**

According to Leca and Naccache (2006) agents are not disembedded from existing institutional environment and there is no need for the “crisis” that reveal the dysfunctional institutions, but this is just what new institutionalism was trying to avoid. Instead, institutional entrepreneurship should provide a model of change, where agents can create and change institutions “without disembedding from the social world.” (ibid, 2006: 628)

Institutional entrepreneur should be embedded to institutional environment it is about to change. This refers to rather narrow definition of the institution in empirical cases. In this paper, it is obvious, that implementation of international recruiting is not considered as strategic tasks of the national ministries or health care employers, but the labor broking firms. When education and training consists the significant part of the process, it well fits to international tasks of the adult education organizations also, whose main task is to serve the local employers and to promote regional economic development. These agents are clearly embedded to environment of labor broking practices. Of course, ministries are key agents in institutional change as they create regulations and policies and employers are key agents by creating demand and conditions for the demand, but they are rather creating institutional constraints for the recruiting practices, than institutionalizing the recruiting practices as such.

The other useful distinction should be made between the institutional entrepreneur and traditional “lobbyists”. Different interest groups, government bodies and other political groupings who aim to change existing institutions by impacting on political and economic decision making may be seen as “lobbyists”. The difference is, that they are not creating the actual commercial service or product by themselves that would require new institutional forms. However, in those fields where government bodies or other public agents also implement the service or policy that they promote, they may be seen as institutional entrepreneurs. For example ministry or department of ministry may lobby for certain policy or set of laws that it is aims to implement or city or immigration department of city may lobby immigration strategy for relevant interest groups, and it is also implementing the strategy in
practice. The institutional entrepreneur then differs from lobbyist in a sense, that it also implements the routine that it promotes.

In sum, transnational recruiting patterns are separated, though strongly related with, political guidelines and regulations of public authorities or employers attitudes and demands in the same field. In practice, institutional entrepreneur may really be embedded just one of the institutional environments that it is able to change, other related fields it has to change through networking with allies (embedded) in those fields.

**Evolutionary change without institutional entrepreneur**

Other point to made, is that not all institutionalization processes of transnational recruiting patterns require strong institutional entrepreneurship and intentional efforts. This is case especially when there are not widely spread and profound existing institutions that should be (partly) replaced, but the field is rather “free" or new institutional forms do not require many changes in existing practices. In these cases, change may take place rather “naturally” as the wider environment “evolves”.

For example many economists, sociologists and geographers have seen transnational corporations (TNC) as the main institutional form\(^{37}\) of transnational practices. They have structures, resources, practices and networks that create paths for much of the transnational activities (Vertovec 2009, 8.) John Salt (1992) suggested already at early 1990s that the increasing importance of migration of highly skilled is related to the process of internationalization of large employers and that the particular form of movement is dependent on the evolution of corporate business structures. (Salt, 1992: 484) In practice, these firms have organized their human resource management in transnational form including recruiting, testing and relocation services, etc. The working language is often English and official diplomas are not required from certain country or at all. (Raunio & Forsander, 2009) The transnationalization of the recruiting practices may be seen as “natural" outcome of the organizational form that TNCs have acquired. They have not changed existing institutions as

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\(^{37}\) Institutions are sometimes also referred as form of modern corporation, financial system or educational system, etc. They may be firms like GM or IBM were organizational exemplars of norms given to certain organizational form prevailing at time. (Nelson 1995, 80-81)
much as they have built novel competitive institutional structures at the top of the existing ones.

Other form “natural evolution” may be seen for example in cases of regulative changes (in political domain) and creation of common labor market areas of Nordic countries (including Finland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark) in 1950s and of EU to which Finland joined 1994 and Estonia 2002. Both were significant institutional changes in the political domain and opened up the channels for the mobility especially from Finland to Sweden on 1960s and 1970s and from Estonia to Finland in late 1990s and 2000s when the demand and supply of the workforce and income levels were significantly unbalanced between the countries.

Cultural, ethnic and geographical proximities are high between the Finland and Estonia and Finland and Sweden (especially distance between the capital cities of Finland and Estonia is just 60 kilometers so Tallinn is closer to Helsinki region, than any of the big city-regions of Finland). Importantly many Estonians can speak Finnish, while Swedish is the second official language in Finland, although this does not mean that all Finns speak Swedish even moderately. So these factors do not create high barriers in terms of language, ethnic appearance or cultural habits. In fact, employment rate of Estonians in Finland is same as Finnish and even higher than employment rate or the Finnish return migrants (Myrskylä, 2010: 34), so their integration to labor markets is extremely good. Since Estonian independence from early 1990s hundreds of small, mostly Estonian, labor brokers steered tens of thousands Estonians to Finland, while thousands of Finns went to Estonia. Especially in construction industry transnational recruiting patterns are institutionalized over time and it has been estimated that there are about 15 to 20 000 Estonian construction workers in Finland while there are 15 000 unemployed native Finnish construction workers in Finland. However, these small brokers cannot be seen as institutional entrepreneurs, since they reacted institutional changes in regulative and market environments in culturally and politically favorable environment rather than created the change by themselves. They acted as entrepreneurs, not as institutional entrepreneurs.

Transnational labor markets are existing already many narrowly defined niches of the economy also in Finland, especially in the fields, where change may take place in rather “natural evolutionary” process without strong institutional obstacles and without need for determinant institutional entrepreneurs’ intentional efforts. But in case of health care sector transnationalization is still in early phase. Thus, this process offers good window to analyze the role on institutional entrepreneurs in the creation of institutions.
To conclude, it is important precisely to define, what are the institutions under the study, what is their key structural environment and what is the transnational dimension in this particular case? For example in this case, transnational is seen as alternative and complementing form for national patterns of recruiting. National patterns of recruitment refer to established practices, where employees are sought through local networks of individuals, often through people working in the employer organization or educational institutions where relevant education is given. Also open vacancies are announced mostly regionally or nationally in some cases and when recruiting firms or leased labor is used, the wish of employers may be, to have “native” workers (Raunio, et al. 2009.)

Transnational refers to linkages, that are not international, i.e. constructed by states, but individual agents like firms, people, NGOs, etc and there is certain amount of border crossing reciprocity and constant interaction between the agents. (Faist, 2000; Vertovec, 2009: 3.) Agents may create transnational community or community of practice (Wegner 1997) where linkages between the agents are not direct. Institutionalized transnational recruiting patterns then refers to interactive links between the countries, where non-state agents organize the mobility of the labor with rather stable routines and structures.

Border crossing recruiting patterns between two countries are necessarily not transnational as such, if there is no certain amount of constant interaction between the agents. Further they are not institutionalized, if there is no stability and longevity in these practices. However, border crossing recruiting is likely to create transnational social spaces due to mobile employees and due to labor brokers, who organize the process in two or more countries over longer periods of time. Even in cases, where work done in the new location, would serve just local or national labor markets and recruiting would be mostly one way process, the recruiting patterns and activities may be transnational. Transnational recruiting refers channels that include several mechanisms, modes of operations and social interaction between the two distant places. For example testing, training and recruiting practices may be built transnationally between the two locations. Often, these channels also require negotiations and agreements between the economic and political agents of the two regions and evidently, create transnational social spaces amongst the individuals. Transnational patterns of recruitment may then be institutionalized, although employers maintain their national modes of operations and work as such is done in national labor markets according to national rules and the recruiting is based on the need of the one national labor markets only.
Institutional entrepreneurs transnationalizing health care sector

Health care as specific field of labor markets

According to Bach (2009) there are several distinctive features in migration of health care professionals that require different policy goals and interventions compared to other labor based migrants. Social consequences in sending countries and macro level problems like hindering the achievement of United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals in poverty reduction are evident and severe. While those impacts are important background for the phenomenon, factors related to institutionalization are more relevant for this paper. Health workers mobility is influenced strongly by the regulatory frameworks of individual governments that control the training, recruitment and deployment of health professionals, which makes it much more strongly embedded with national institutions, than for example mobility of ICT professionals. (Ibid 2009, 203-205.) Health care occupations, especially at nurse and doctoral levels, require also good communication abilities and understanding of different local dialects used by the patients, and some understanding of the local health care system.

Also in case of Finland National Supervisory Authority for Welfare and Health (Valvira) grant upon the application the right to practice authorized professions (like medical doctor, nurse, etc.) and to use the occupational (like hospital chemist, assistant nurse, etc.) title of health care professionals. Occupations are then strongly protected against the non-EU applicants, while in case of applicants from EU, their diplomas have to be accepted equally. Although diplomas are equal, employer often requires the ability to use Finnish language in work.

Two illustrative examples are projects aiming to set up long term recruiting and education cooperation with China and Philippines in the field of health care. Importantly, both countries are active labor exporter and they do have transnational institutional structures to support recruiting of labor. These include intentional over education of nurses, existing agreements concerning labor exporting with several countries, national agencies organizing the recruiting, etc. They are also culturally very distant from Finland, so also these institutional factors should be overcome. It should be noticed, that these two projects are rather illustrative examples than actual case studies. Aim is not to study these cases in particular, but illustrate the concept of institutional entrepreneur through them.

The first example is project initiated by the city of Lahti and semi-public (independent public utility of publicly owned education concern) organization of adult education center in Lahti.
Often semi-public adult education centers’ role in general is interesting, since they do not come purely form political or from economic domains, but their role is politically defined to support the economic life of the region and provide services for the employers. Consequently, many of them are very actively involved also to development projects in order to create novel transnational recruiting models with testing, training and coaching services between Finland and selected countries. Projects are important source of funding and tool for service development for these organizations. They are also main providers of work life related training and education for the immigrants.

The aim of the example project is to develop and test the international recruiting model that would ensure the availability of the health care personnel, when regional and national labor markets are not able to provide needed professionals. The aims of the project include: network building with relevant Finnish and Chinese authorities and other actors and also between the China and Finland, developing a recruiting model, ensuring the sufficient skill level of arrivals including the understanding of the Finnish health care systems working principals and adjusting to work within Finnish work environment and developing integration models supporting the work based migration.

Second example is the project or rather goal of Opteam, private recruiting and labor leasing firm. The firm is market leader in Finnish labor markets concerning the international recruiting. Leadership is related to labor leasing in very international and the biggest single European construction site, nuclear plan of Olkiluoto, where Opteam has played significant role in providing skilled labor from Europe to Finland. However, Opteam plans also to import nurses from the Philippines. According to managing director of Opteam, they have invested 250 000 euros to joint operation with university hospital to recruit nurses from Philippines and over two million euros to health care sector’s recruiting projects altogether. Opteam’s goal is to recruit about 20 000 nurses from the Philippines, which would significantly expand their business. (Hankonen 2010)

In fact, in both examples, the motivation for change is to increase business opportunities and it seems that they focus on the building of service concept, that would be clearly transnational, but which would require as little as possible, transnational practices from

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38 Often as part of the European Social Fund’s project, i.e. implementing the supranational organizations political goals.
employers or from policymakers. If the capabilities of service providers are good enough and qualifications, training, language, regulations or relocation do not cause difficulties for the employers or regulative authors (transaction costs are low), they are likely to accept the new transnational practice.\footnote{39}

**Qualities of institutional entrepreneur: Capability to collective action**

According to Battilana (2006) social position and capability to create appropriate alliances are extremely important qualities for institutional entrepreneur. Social position consists from agent's organization and his or her position within the organization, organization's weigh in the given field, social networks and groups that agent belongs and agent's official position in the wider field. (ibid., 2006). In this article agency refers mostly to individual organization, but it should be noticed, that in real life and in theory, there is virtually always certain individual or small group of individuals within the organization(s), who could be seen as actual institutional entrepreneur. However, in this context the key issue is, that there are single agents, who may intentionally change the institutional structures.

Social position and links with higher status individuals refer to both formal authority and social capital. Formal authority refers to those who have a legitimately recognized right to make decisions, like the authority of the state. Social capital refers to informal networks, which may provide access to information and political support. Social capital may offer possibilities to collective action among otherwise unlikely stakeholders. Also connections with different fields are significant. (Battilana et al, 2009: 82-84). In case of adult education center, they had authority of the mayor of the city as a head of the project and already in early stage they co-operated with the Commission for Local Authority Employers who represents the interests of Finland's municipalities and joint municipal authorities on the labor market. Local authorities employ about one fifth of all employed labor force in Finland and especially they employ most people working on health care centers or in hospitals. The invitation to first network meeting for relevant employers and authorities was, to give an example, sent out

\footnote{39 The data is partly acquired from project focused on the “internationalization services of the labor markets” in Helsinki region and included 63 personal interviews with recruiting firms, other service providers and the relevant civil servant. (Raunio, Pihlajamaa & Carroll 2009)}
also by the Commission for Local Authority Employers and the meeting was held in their premises in Helsinki. (Nieminen 2009)

In case of Opteam they also use for example their professional magazine “Optimist” to enhance their social legacy. Magazine includes several interviews with business leaders, well know politicians and immigrants, whose views support the idea of international recruiting, and especially, recruiting of those groups that are in the focus of the Opteam. Also directors of Opteam are placed to same pictures and stories with ministers, top civil servants and top business leaders, which helps to dispel the fears and doubts concerning the bad image of the international recruiting business. In addition, they organize for example free seminars concerning the integration issue, where their services are presented and invited speakers are well known Finnish business leaders and celebrities as well as members of parliament. (Optimist, 2008; Opteam, 2010) These actions are close to traditional “lobbying” of different interest groups, where the views and attitudes of certain decision makers are aimed to change.

Not just social position, but also social skills to implement the cooperation and to evaluate the position of themselves and others in the field are required from the institutional entrepreneur (Battilana et al, 2009: 81). In case of building transnational connections, also specific capability to communicate in, and between, two distant regions are needed. Transnational social skills are well defined by Rosenau & Koehn (2002) as transnational competences that enable agents to “participate effectively in activities that cut across two or more national boundaries” (Rosenau & Koehn, 2002: 110-114).

In case of adult education center, the organization and especially project manager had track record of co-operation with China and Opteam had its branch and training facilities in Philippines. In a sense, these agents were already transnational, or edge of it, since their everyday practices took place in both locations. It should be noticed, that already these qualities, social position and its promotion and transnational social skills, rule out quite many potential agents, who may have interest to shape existing institutions.

In addition, Leca and Naccache (2006) suggest that institutional entrepreneurs should not be seen apart from the existing institutions and institutional disembeddedness is even impossible point of departure. To be successful the right logics in the right context have to be recognized as well as the values and interest of the other actors who may support the change. (Leca and Naccache 2006, 644)
Both example organizations are clearly embedded to institutional environment – border crossing recruiting patterns – that they are about to change. They may be seen as captains of the trade ships in the era before the national institutions that secure the overseas trade: as captains of those ships were selected based on their trustworthiness and capabilities to deliver what they promise in business sense and to keep the transaction costs bearable (Ojala 1997), similarly international recruiting practices should be in trusted hands and out of the reach of the pirates, as long as supporting institutions will replace the personal networks and/or capability and track record based “swift trust”. If these new “captains” will be strongly involved in this process, they will be embedded in emerging institutions.

Further, and maybe even more importantly, capability to build appropriate alternatives to do things should be considered. In case of health care sector, special requirements like ethical aspects and official qualifications of employees are important. New service concepts have to answer to these needs. Human resource director on health care sector had a strong view and long experience how to rule out the low quality alternatives. He had a lot of experience about the low quality offers, that they could not even consider, but all suggestions so far were rejected (Raunio et al 2009).

“We have received and will receive offers and we have discussed and listened what they have to say. So far, it has been quite easy to say, that not now, because their business ideas has often been really at the level of idea. They have proposed co-operation in recruiting and training, but conversation has revealed that they haven’t done their home works. Some have been even surprised that we have for example National Supervisory Authority for Welfare and Health, who is a gatekeeper for registrations (of health care personnel). When basic knowledge is inadequate, it is quite easy to say, that we are not going to develop your business plan. We are ready to discuss, when the home work are done. Door is open for all of them, however, and please do approach us when your concept is ready. There are National Supervisory Authority as a gatekeeper, educational institutions i.e. how the training is organized and ministries and how the process in funded, what is the share of public funding and so on. Professional service provider should have a ready concept and existing networks”

Human resource director, health care sector

The co-operation with market leader firm changed the situation and it was evident that the key trigger to change existing patterns of recruiting from national to transnational was based on the quality of the service concept, in addition to market demand of course. The service
A provider needed the *field specific capabilities* to build feasible alternative to the market with strong ethical and regulative preconditions.

The embeddedness, need of formal authority and social capital refers to institutional entrepreneurs, who have rather solid position in the location where they are about the act, or good social competences to enter this social domain of power. These requirements rule out many organizations and makes it obviously challenging also adult education center and market leader firm in labor leasing, who are obviously very strongly embedded with institutional structures of Finnish and international labor markets.

**Actions of institutional entrepreneur: Divergent change implemented through framing**

The key activities of institutional entrepreneurs based on earlier literature according to Battilana, et. al (2009) are 1) *developing a vision* including sharing the vision of the need for change with followers, 2) *mobilizing allies, people and organizations*, to gain support for and acceptance of new routines and 3) *motivating others to achieve and sustain the vision*. Implementing change that builds on existing institutions is challenging and change that conflicts with existing institutions even more so. Especially latter case needs the mobilization of allies, since those who benefit from the status quo defend existing beliefs and practices in order to maintain their established privileges and social positions. (Battilana, Leca and Boxenbaum, 2009: 78)

**Framing** is the process where novel ideas are introduced for the key agents in the most suitable form and in the context where they are easier to accept. Framing may aim to reveal the failing of the existing routine and expose problems with prevailing institutionalized practices (*diagnostic framing.*) Framing may also concern projects that differ strongly from existing institutions and thus they have to be introduced less radical as they are to reduce fear, incomprehension or apparent irrelevance (*prognostic framing*) or introducing compelling reasons to support the new vision (*motivational framing*). So, institutional entrepreneur have to identify the state and interests of those in target and frame the new mode of operation or routine to appear as congruent with the existing institutions as possible. Also neutral “common good” may be emphasized. To create discourse that resonates with the values and interests of potential allies the “rhetorical strategies” and even specific “institutional vocabularies” including structures of words, expressions, to communicate the vision may be used to change institutions by articulating, manipulating and recombining institutional logics (Fligstein, 1997 according to Battilana et al, 2009: 79-83.)
Example of framing is the discourse of recruiting and labor leasing firms, who use the rhetoric of ethical recruiting and labor shortage, when they communicate with the key allies. Especially labor shortage is used when communicating with key customers and ethical issues and multiculturalism when communicating with ministries and other key public agents. For example editorial of “Optimist”, professional magazine of market leader firm in labor leasing in Finland, states

“Who builds the houses and takes care of elders? Where medical doctors come from in the future? (…) We have a labor shortage, although there is no shortage of people. (…) Ethical principles of Opteam include the practice, where placement fees are not charged from the employees. (…) We hope that as many as possible of them (Philippines nurses who came to Finland through Opteam) stays in Finland. It will happen, if they find their own community here and employer, who boldly dare to take new steps towards multicultural work community and tolerant attitudes”. (Optimist 2008a)

The vocabulary above includes key concepts and discourses of public debate and they are backed up with statistics and other references that increase the reliability of the message, that emphasis the emergence of new community which significantly contributes Finnish society, if bold employers are ready to support it. One crucial question concerns the ethical issues and evidently this arise also in case of Finland. Head of the international affairs of the Finnish Union of Health and Social Care Professionals (Tehy) presents very traditional counter arguments:

“Is it right to build your business on the distress of the people and dysfunctional societies? From individual nurse’s point of view, job in Finland may be considered to be a jackpot in some sense, but real losers are Philippines health care sector, society and the nurse’s family.”

Also issues like corruption and lowering quality of health care in Philippines due to migration of the best professionals are covered. The ethical issues are one of the most important areas where recruiters have to proof the quality of the process for the public sector employers (hospitals and municipalities) and civil servants. (Hankonen 2010.) These questions are well known in the recruiting industry and in case of Opteam especially, which is going to enter to these markets in Finland with determination. So, they also aim to answer the ethical dilemma with convincing arguments. In their magazine the ethical issues are discussed with former health care minister of Philippines, who strongly support the ethical recruiting and gives very similar guidelines for the ethical recruiting as Opteam’s service concept promises to provide.
“At last someone is interested in about ethical recruiting. (...) I think it is high time for the ethical recruiting.” (...) I call my model win-win situation, where receiving country gets nurses and Philippine health care sector benefits as well.”

(Jamie Galvez Tan, former minister of health care in Philippines in Optimist)

It is easy to recognize rhetorical strategies and use of right vocabulary also from these phrases. The former minister of health care, medical doctor, professor and consultant of WHO, UNDP and World Bank, Mr. Galvez from Philippines, is convincing person and also discuss with the same “level” with the ministries and other officials in Finland. In the same context it is mentioned, that Opteam donates medical equipments to Philippines and the possible role of Finland as the forerunner in the ethical recruiting is emphasized, if politicians just understand to grab the opportunity. (Helin 2010) Opteam also established a fund “Time to give back” which announces loans for nurses who wants to move to Finland. With loan money they can support themselves during the training in Philippines and buy flights to Finland. The interest rate for loans is reasonable (5 %). Fund may also give stipends for those who enter to nurse training. (Hankonen 2010) In addition, other means were used to shape the attitudes, or cognitive institutions. For example social media and personal blog writings concerning the life of the foreign employees in Finland are used.

Also adult education organization uses the framing to sell its idea. In addition to already mentioned examples like authority of the mayor (who represent also the important client to recruit health care personnel to Lahti), they present very detailed and convincing documentation of the partners and their current activities in China. According to their report, they contacted through embassy of China’s trade department with China International Intellectech Corporation (CIIC), which is owned by the state of China and one of the biggest firms focused on the international recruiting of Chinese workers and development of the human resources. The turnover of the CIIC is over 1,2 billion dollar, it has recruited and trained Chinese workers to 76 countries and also Finnish telecommunication firm Nokia has used its services. There has been also more than 60 000 expert level recruits as well and from year 2000 CIIC has co-operated with Europe and United States in recruiting of Chinese medical professionals. They have also created a study program and tests according to British standards, which has made it possible for Chinese students to find employment from Great Britain. Also Chinese ministry of Trade supports the co-operation with Finland in this case for the CIIC, which is important in China. (Nieminen 2009)
Also other potential partner, Weihai International Economic & Technical Co-operative LTD (WIETC) is approved by Chinese ministry of trade and it has co-operation with more than 20 countries in international recruiting and more than 37 000 experts from different fields have been recruited through its services. They also co-operate with some Chinese nursing schools and it is one of the ten Chinese organizations, which is certified to train and recruit Chinese nurses to Great Britain according to contract done between the governments of China and Great Britain. (Nieminien 2009)

The strong founding in China as well as Chinese relations with western countries, Finnish telecommunication firm Nokia and health care sector are important part of the framing work, where the credibility of the new alternative is introduced to key gatekeepers convincing way. It provides a picture, where recruiting from China is common practice and not as big change, as one would assume at the first glance. So called diagnostic framing, has been done already earlier, in many public debates and statistics showing that Finnish social and health care sector cannot survive without foreign workers. These figures are presented, in detail, in above mentioned documentation too. It should be noticed, that framing requires a lot of effort, knowledge and existing networks, and when in high quality, it should not be seen in negative terms as selling speech only, but rather as a valuable learning process for the gatekeepers.

**Discussion – entrepreneurs and collective actions**

In addition to examples above, there are several other similar cases that aim to change attitudes and establish routines in order to support the selection of their novel practice. From this point of view in can be claimed, that Finnish labor markets are in the process of transnationalizing, and, in some narrow fields, has already acquired some institutionalized forms. In case of examples used in this article, it may be said, that institutional entrepreneur do not initiate or implement the whole structural change, but they may play important role in formation of certain, more narrowly limited institutions, like transnational recruiting patterns from Finland to Asia. It seems evident that institutional entrepreneur should be able to transmit the change from one field to other in order to make it acceptable in the eyes of the all significant gatekeepers and to initiate the change also in related institutional fields by contacting the agents, who are embedded to these institutional environment. Political field and ethics are strongly present in health care field, which suggests, that profound changes in wider institutional environment or structures are not likely take place due to individual agent’s
effort only, but it is more realistic to try to recognize the group of the institutional entrepreneurs, who promote the same or parallel changes.

In fact, recently in studies of institutional entrepreneurship “heroic views of individuals” are giving a room to actors embedded in social contexts who aim to mobilize other actors to join in divergent change process. Even the concept of collective institutional entrepreneurship is introduced, which suggests that process may involve several actors instead of one, providing the access to varying levels of resources. In case of institutional entrepreneurship change cannot be attributed to any single individual or organization and it may even “result from the accumulation of countless institutional entrepreneurs' uncoordinated divergent actions”. Institutions may change due to “spatially dispersed, heterogeneous activity by actors with various kinds and levels of resources”. (Battilana et al, 2009: 87-89)

Need of powerful allies to conduct the change is evident, but institutional entrepreneur and its allies should be distinguished from collective view or “countless institutional entrepreneurs” who cause the change. This refers also to “natural change” where agents rather response and adopt to changing wider environment, as entrepreneurs always do, but they are not the key agents who initiate the change, which requires significant changes to existing institutional structures. In real life, in wider societal transformations, there are institutions that may change “naturally” while others may require more determinant efforts from institutional entrepreneurs or/and from lobbyist groups.

Thus, in order to provide real institutional changes, institutional entrepreneur has to bring together the different domains and levels in the field, or more precisely, the key agents of these fields and levels (Fig. 1). For example at micro level key agents may be seen as single employers, hospitals or municipalities, in meso level Commission for Local Authority Employers and in macro level different ministries, members of parliament and authors taking care of regulations steering the processes. The level is related to agents’ power to change things, to micro, meso or macro level practices. Significantly, agents who are key allies, have to be able significantly impact on the change that supports the new activity and reshapes institutions, in different levels and maybe in related institutions.
In health care sector in Finland, some (thin) support for transnationalizing recruiting patterns may be seen in political domain’s institutional changes. Finland and China are negotiating about the “minute of mutual understanding” concerning the recruiting of Chinese workers to Finland. Minute aims to guarantee the good conditions for the workers and Chinese officials are also agreed to remove the agencies that take fees from the employees from their lists, according to Head of council of Finnish Ministry of Interior. (Hankonen 2010). Ministry of interior also produced a report concerning the “co-operation models with the third countries in international recruiting”, where “third” referred countries outside of the EU. Report included several recommendations, how the process could be organized according legal and ethical constraints. Thus, change is moving on, not just in recruiting practices promoted by adult education center and recruiting firm, but also in closely related regulative institutions due to government actions.

So it seems, that links with other agents are needed in order to provide institutional changes, that work in different fields of society. It should be noticed, that institutional change in recruiting patterns in one economic sector, may be virtually unrelated to some other economic sectors and their certain sub-fields. For example recruiting patterns of knowledge...
intensive TNCs, small firms in construction industry and public health care sector, especially in case of recruiting nurses and doctors, are creating their own, just occasionally overlapping institutional settings for the transnational recruiting.

Similarly, changes in regulative field’s institutions are not necessarily related to changes in recruiting practices. For example joining to common Nordic labor markets and to EU changed recruiting patterns just in some fields in Finland, when demand on job markets grew. However, not all fields acquired transnational or even international forms of recruiting. In many cases, mobility was based on the individuals decisions to leave and maybe to follow existing social networks. In short, institutional changes in labor markets may take place in different domains and different fields, which may or may not be related. In order to understand the transnationalization of labor markets, this diversity should be well understood in each particular case under the study.

In addition, transnationalization in labor markets does not necessarily mean that workers would move back and forth in interactive manner. The transnationalization may take place in interaction between Finnish and Philippines and Chinese recruiting agents and create transnational spaces between the educational institutions and other related organizations and individuals. However, transnationalization of labor markets may include several separated partial transnationalizations in the labor markets.

Lastly, the high demands for institutional entrepreneur rules out many potential agents willing to shape institutional forms. For example, it may be questioned, are example organizations of this article really transnational entrepreneurs or are they just adapting to changing environment and potential demands? In order to give a solid answer, more profound study would be needed, instead of shallow examples given here. However, it seems that very detailed and sophisticated understanding of the existing institutions, good communication skill and networks are needed. This rules out many groups and is challenge especially for the immigrant groups, without strong attachment to and understanding of the society.

For example in Finland several attempts to support immigrant organizations to create services that public sector could buy, have failed due to immigrant groups lack of specific competences to provide services and lack of understanding how institutions and society work as such. (Raunio, et al. 2009) For example in Helsinki metropolitan region the participation of immigrant associations in the integrative issues of municipalities takes place in rather passive role, mainly through cooperative projects, which are mostly managed by (native) civil servants. Representation of immigrant associations in councils of the cities in the
metropolitan region has been fairly weak and takes place mostly at the planning stages if at all. (Saksela-Bergholm 2010) This is important, since capability to participate and create novel practices will define, who are embedded in emerging institutions and who are not.

Conclusions and the next steps

To conclude, one important question is, how to notice the institutional change when you see one? Over long periods of time, it is quite easy to define the change, but when the aim is to connect the certain individual agent with the institutional change in situ, it is quite fuzzy and uncertain process. It is also difficult to say, what are the actual actions that agent should take, in order to be counted as institutional entrepreneur? How far they should go in their promotion of change? Although these and many more questions need to be answered, the institutional entrepreneur offers promising concept for understanding of institutional transformation of transnational labor markets. Already several points can be made to show the way forward on this pursue.

- Institutional entrepreneur do not provide novel routines that fit with the existing environment and institutions, but aim to change the institutions and environment to fit the novel variations that they promote.
- Institutional entrepreneurs are not necessarily source of change as such, but they intercede or transmit the change from one levels to other and from one domain to other and thus, are source of transformation, which refers to profound and longstanding societal change in all levels and domains of the society, not just temporary changes in some limited fields.
- Qualities of institutional entrepreneur are strong social position, understanding of the field, capability to motivate and create allies, field specific capabilities and transnational competences.
- Activities of institutional entrepreneur start from framing the novel routines to discourse that is understandable and acceptable for the allies and in the existing environment in general and ends with the implementation of the routine in several societal fields and levels, that can be interpreted as the institutionalization.
- To recognize the institutional entrepreneur, robust empirical analysis is required, since their activities and qualities offers just potential to be one.
- In emergence of transnational institutions, the role of weakly integrated migrant groups may work as triggering factor for the change, but is not likely to be strong, in actual implementation process, which defines the form of the institutions, since characteristics of successful institutional entrepreneur includes strong societal
position or possibility to mobilize them, which requires social capital, understanding of the field and its discourses or even vocabulary and motivational factors. These are more likely the qualities of those, who are already embedded to institutional environment.

- Established migrant groups or/and those who have a strong social and transnational competences to recognize and mobilize right allies, may, however, function as institutional entrepreneurs. In economic field this is more likely, since motivating factor is often product or service that can provide profit on the field, but in political and socio-cultural domains rewards are less unclear and recognizable for the new comers and they are more territorially constructed and embedded with existing institutions and thus, motivational factors, rewarding schemes and powerful allies are more difficult to recognize and mobilize without understanding of the local socio-cultural and political domains.

- Learning transnational and social competences may open road to the social capital and understanding of the formal position of the key agents in different field and thus improve the possibilities of the new comer to work as institutional entrepreneur.

- Institutional entrepreneurs may support the creation of more coherent institutional structures where practical and cognitive institutions are implemented carefully between the macro level demand and regulative institutions.

Still, there are several challenges for this approach to develop as coherent theoretical and methodological tool that Battilana et al. (2009) point out. Firstly, embeddedness should defined in more detail, as well as degree of fragmentation and degree of institutionalization. Secondly, also more studies considering actors' with embeddedness in multiple fields are needed, since it may be significant enabling condition for institutional entrepreneurship. The community and individual levels of analysis have received just little interest in research of institutional entrepreneurship, although individuals are embedded in organizations that are embedded not only in organizational fields but also in local geographic communities. The community level analysis of populations, organizations, and markets located in a geographic territory that share, as a result of their common location, elements of local culture, norms, identity, and laws, would be appropriate. Local level has not only remained important as globalization proceeds, but local particularities and specific features have become more visible and salient due to process. “Actors’ simultaneous embeddedness in local geographic communities as well as broader global environments might influence the likelihood that they will act as institutional entrepreneurs and process of divergent change implementation” (Battilana et al 2009, 90.) Approach focusing on individuals and dual embeddedness offers
clearly interesting opportunities also to more profound understanding of the transnationalization of the labor market institutions and the role of agency in this process.

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PART THREE
TRANSFORMATION OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
Chapter 7

Educational ‘Transnationalism’ and the Global Production of Educational Regimes

Kaveri Harriss and Filippo Osella

Introduction

In this chapter we discuss ways in which the education sector is changing as a result of ‘transnationalism’, defined germanely by Aihwa Ong as the “condition of cultural connectedness and mobility across space” (1999: 4). To provide empirical detail we return frequently to the example of India, tracing the kinds of ‘transnational’ processes that are implicated in educational change. The example of India is instructive, as it is one of the largest contributors to flows of highly-skilled migrants and students worldwide (Skeldon 2005). First, we review the existing research on education that has taken place under the rubric of ‘transnationalism’, and then argue to bring other important processes into the frame for analysis. We consider transformations in Indian education that resulted from ‘precursors to modern transnationalism’ (Ong and Nonini 1997) in the colonial and post-colonial period, pulling out their ramifying consequences in the present. We then discuss new developments linked with the globalization of education, and finally, we consider how they impact on the educational aspirations and spatial strategies of parents and students. In so doing, we suggest a need for refinements to the transnationalism approach, turning to literatures on other kinds of social formations to provide us with a vocabulary to expand, but also historicize the spatial and socio-cultural field of global connection.

We begin by reviewing the existing work on education in the context of transnational migration. There are two sides to this literature, as it is organised around studies carried out in the ‘sending’ countries, mostly within a development studies tradition, and in the ‘receiving’ countries within social policy. In both sides of the literature, education is equated with formal schooling, and seen to have an intrinsically positive value: it is the key to economic growth, favourable and competitive positions of companies, regions and nation states; and not least, a substantive freedom and human right (UNDP 1999; Krueger and Mikael 2001). In the contemporary knowledge-based ‘network society’ or ‘information age’ (Castells 1999), advanced levels of education are required to move economies beyond growth based on labour-intensive industrialization towards more capital-intensive activities.
Education and transnational migration

On the impact of transnational migration on education in ‘sending’ countries, we see that debates are focussed on two main issues: remittances and ‘brain drain’, both concerned with the impact of emigration on society and economy. In this field, scholars have broadly expressed pessimism and dismay at the failure of migrants to invest their remittances productively. The latest studies conclude that remittances have a ‘qualified’ effect on increasing educational attainment in migrant-sending households (Kandel and Kao 2001; Hansen and Woodruff 2003; van Hear, Pieke et al. 2004; Acosta, Calderon et al. 2008; Castles and Delgado Wise 2008; van Naerssen, Spaan et al. 2008). However, alongside the qualified ‘direct’ effects of financial remittances we need to consider the ‘indirect’ influence the migrants have on their families, through encouragement, setting an example and showing that investment in education can be “a means to secure overseas migration and enhanced social respect” (Mehta 1990: 157). Furthermore, in the contemporary era of intensely regulated managed/circular migration, highly-skilled migration and education itself have become extremely important as a channel for young people to head overseas. This has had an untold influence on educational priorities in the ‘sending areas’, which is crucial to understand. As Khadria says, “there have been few studies on the impact of skilled migration on career choices and educational choices… there have been a lot of choice distortion and inter-generation or even inter-community conflict over educational choices that have taken place but remained unanalysed if not unnoticed” (2008: 108).

The emigration of highly-educated and skilled workers has generally been seen in a negative light from the perspective of ‘sending’ countries, depleting the nation of its most productive, economically dynamic citizens. Development experts continue to recommend strategies to discourage ‘brain drain’ and promote the retention and return of highly-skilled migrants (Dia 2004; Kupfer, Hofman et al. 2004). Recently, however, these processes have started to appear more complex. Research has questioned whether sending countries are really deprived when highly-skilled workers migrate, given that they often migrate precisely because they are unable to find highly-skilled employment locally in the first place. Moreover, highly-skilled workers tend to migrate internally to metropolitan centres – unwilling and ill-suited to practice their craft in a rural backwater. Many highly-skilled workers are actually produced overseas, as they migrate specifically to pursue education. Opportunities for highly-skilled migration may fuel the expansion of educational facilities in the ‘sending’ countries, too, as in the case of nurse training in the Indian states of Kerala and Punjab (see Skeldon 2005; Walton-Roberts 2011).
Increasingly, debates on brain drain have been recast through the lens of ‘brain circulation’, whereby highly-skilled migrants “do not transfer completely but retain active links with their country of origin by reinvesting, sending remittances and migrating back” (Vincent-Lacrin 2004: 32) – a ‘win-win situation’ in which highly-skilled people have the opportunity to further their careers through migration yet eventually return (Vertovec 2009). This perspective takes account of new forms of polarization cutting across and between countries: the downturn in the destination economies, the return of highly-skilled migrants, emergence of high-tech knowledge economies in the South and outsourcing in the sectors of IT and offshore processing. Highly-skilled circular migrants are hoped to play an important role in shifting high-tech production to, and opening up markets in their countries of origin, particularly in the cases of India and China where foreign direct investment from overseas nationals runs to billions of dollars per year (Newland and Patrick 2004). In India, for example, the downturn in the US IT industry in the early 2000s led to return migration by thousands of IT workers, whilst the emergence of outsourcing and off-shore processing triggered further return migration and eventually became a major driver to the Indian economy (Khadria 2008). However, it is clear that not all countries will be able to adopt strategies of outsourcing to reverse processes of brain drain. Skeldon (2005) suggests that this will be limited to South-East Asia, coastal China, Brazil and Argentina, parts of India, Mexico, South Africa, North Africa, Nigeria and possibly Ghana. Moreover, questions are raised concerning the extent to which the return of even a small fraction of highly-skilled migrants can stimulate the development of high-tech industries. Can highly-skilled workers’ knowledge really be harnessed? How is this affected by the labour relations and practices of professional migrants? What happens if they are tied up in company structures? Does their particular geographic location matter? Can knowledge be transferred equally across different fields? And what about the low grade and lack of creativity of the work that gets outsourced, relative to qualifications (Williams 2005; Upadhya and Vasavi 2008)? The unequal terrain on which ‘brain circulation’ is supposed to take place might lead us back to the idea of ‘brain drain’ – or perhaps “the high status accorded to mobility means that new truths are being normalized” (Sidhu 2007: 217).

We now turn to consider the second part of the literature concerning education and transnational migration, which examines the educational attainment of second-generation youth growing up in the ‘receiving’ countries to which their parents or grandparents migrated. *Migration, Education and Change*, a recent collection edited by Luchtenberg (2004), exemplifies the problematic ways in which this literature has engaged with ‘transnationalism’. Theoretical chapters by Pries and Luchtenberg purport to tackle head-on the challenges to scholarship on education posed by new forms of migration and transnationalism, yet end up...
following a well-trodden path that privileges the education systems of the receiving countries. For example, they introduce typologies of migrant incorporation patterns according to their relationships to their regions of origin and the timeline along which migration takes place, distinguishing between ‘classic immigrants’, ‘return migrants’, ‘diaspora migrants’ and ‘transmigrants’; and then proceed to test for associations between these various modes of ‘integration’ or ‘assimilation’ and the educational attainment of ethnic minority groups in different European countries. This work assesses the impact of transnationalism within a national assimilationist framework. Moreover, when deployed in the ‘receiving’ country, the transnationalism approach tends to reinforce a dubious slippage between the terms ‘migrant’ and ‘ethnic minority’, which we note is strongly racially-coded – playing into a right-wing construction of the children of [non-white] migrants as perennial ‘foreigners’ in the countries in which they are born and grow up (Gilroy 2000; Ware and Back 2002; Hesse and Sayyid 2006).

Debates concerning the relationships between migration and education have therefore been dominated by issues concerning the participation, marginalization and exclusion of ethnic minority children and youth from mainstream schooling. Surveying studies from receiving countries such as the USA, UK, Australia, Germany, France, Greece and Sweden (see Jencks and Phillips 1998; and the case studies in Luchtenberg 2004) we are struck by the overwhelming deprivational tendencies in the literature which largely addresses the assumption that migration and ‘incorporation’ undermine children’s education, “resting on two key terms – racial discrimination and racial disadvantage – which provide the conceptual foundations for almost all current research and policy formulation” (Ballard 1992: 484). The often poor attainment of ethnic minority youth in the education systems of ‘receiving’ countries is indeed alarming, and educationalists have responded with a specialized literature designing and evaluating interventions to redress inequalities, in the context of diverse national policies concerning immigration, citizenship and multiculturalism (cf. Pitkanen, Kalekin-Fishman et al. 2002). Meanwhile, quantitative studies have documented differentiation in the educational trajectories of different ethnic minority groups. For example, Connor et al. (2003) note that over half of 18/19 year old Indian-origin youths in the UK are at university, more than double than their Pakistani- and Bangladeshi-origin counterparts. It is now established that not all ‘culturally different’ children do poorly in mainstream schools, requiring increasingly complex and less deterministic models of the relationships between discrimination and disadvantage, culture and scholastic achievement.

In accounting for the academic achievements of certain high-achieving ‘model minorities’ in the UK and USA, namely Indians and Chinese, commentators have pointed to the
importance of parental success in getting their children to internalize high educational ambitions, making recourse to a highly essentialised concept of culture. This celebration of cultural resources culminates in Modood’s concept of ‘ethnic capital’, supposedly built through the triad of “familial relationships, transmission of aspirations and attitudes and norm reinforcement” (2004: 100). If close ties to ethnic and parent cultures enable educational achievement, transnationalism entails possibilities for educational achievement and mobility (Moldenhower 2005). Whilst the concept of ‘ethnic capital’ grasps the compulsion of parental ambitions and values, it naturalises and deplorably racializes ethnic differences in educational attainment, and normalizes existing stereotypes about patriarchal immigrant culture and neglects to see how children and young people’s educational careers are influenced not only by ethnic background but by social class, the values of peer groups in and out of school, and youth culture outside their own ethnic group, amongst other things. The more astute ethnographies critique the bipolar dichotomy between parents and transnational communities on the one hand, and white society, showing that young people’s use of the dominant trope of being ‘caught between two cultures’ is indeed significantly related to the ways in which they are expected to “allow themselves to be re-made at school, be produced by the disciplinary practices and normative judgements that regulate life at school” (Hall 2002: 122-3; cf. Shankar 2007). The ‘cultural productions’ school of educational ethnography (Willis 1977; cf. Levinson, Foley et al. 1996; Eisenhart 2001) engages with the wide range of cultural influences that saturate the lives of young people, showing how youth culture may articulate with, but equally undermine parental insistence on high educational achievement.

Ethnographic challenges to transnationalism

These studies point to complex ways in which education is changing as a result of ‘transnational’ connections, whether we consider the additional sources of educational financing that are captured through migrant remittances; how educational ambitions are increasingly shaped by the prospect of mobility; the trend towards governance of migration to facilitate circular highly-skilled migration or ‘brain circulation’; or the educational experiences of migrants themselves, and their children, in the places to which they migrate. They also point to multifarious cultural influences influencing educational attainment, and problematize the ‘two cultures’ trope.

The diffuseness of these processes might lead us to endorse a vision of ‘transnational spaces’. As Walton-Roberts (2004; 2005) shows, entire spaces are reconfigured through
transnationalism. Transnational spaces are complex, multi-dimensional and multiply-inhabited, in which not only migrants or people from ethnically-bounded transnational communities are seen to operate, but a multitude of actors with different levels of investment and involvement (Jackson, Crang et al. 2004: 3). In the field of education, however, we encounter a number of problems in adopting such an approach.

First is the problem of newness. The appropriateness of transnationalism as a frame for understanding migrant and diasporic experiences is justified by the defining features of the contemporary era, in which new technologies of travel and communication have permitted people to maintain “more frequent, less expensive and more intimate connections than before” (Levitt 2003: 569). However, massive transcontinental migrations have occurred in past centuries: these are “precursors to modern transnationalism, out of which the latter arose” (Ong and Nonini1997: 18). The recognition that transcontinental processes are not new has provoked much debate among transnationalism scholars, who have strived to identify how long-distance connections in the contemporary era differ from their antecedents. Some scholars have argued for a kind of technological determinism in which transnational migration, if not novel, has at least increased in extent, intensity and speed (e.g. Smith 2003). Others have linked the salience of transnationalism to changes in global flows of capital and trade in the 19th and 20th centuries, recognising that intense economic restructuring has produced a range of cross-border connections (Glick Schiller and Levitt 2006: 9). It is the interdeterminacy with globalization that is supposed to distinguish contemporary transnationalism (Vertovec 2009: 14). Provocatively, however, Tsing suggests that scholars only find global migration new because large numbers of black people have recently turned up in the ‘big white societies’ of Europe and its diaspora, where in the 19th century they were refused (cf. Minsk 1998: 123; Chaudhuri 2005). In the field of education, it is clear that this preoccupation with distinguishing the contemporary transnationalism “erects stereotypes of the past that get in the way of appreciating both the past and the present” (Tsing 2000: 333).

Second is the problem of spatial binarism we find in work on transnationalism, which tends to focus on dyadic relationships “between migrants, the states where they settle, and their homelands” (Glick Schiller and Levitt 2006: 12). Over this spatial binarism are overlaid socio-cultural ‘dual perspectives’ or ‘bifocality’. Aspects of life ‘here’ and ‘there’ are perceived as complementary. Migrants inhabit an inherent ambivalence between the pull of ‘home’, the locus of personal and social identity and religiosity; and ‘abroad’, associated with material bounty and opportunity. Places are therefore imbued with particular value, and transnational space is differentially empowered (Vertovec 2009: 67-8, cf. Rouse 1992; Gardner 1993).
However, the privileging of dyadic relationships between ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ countries obscures other connections in a complex spatial terrain. It also abstracts a wide range of cultural influences into two reified topoi. When deployed in the context of education in the ‘receiving’ countries, we suggest that the transnationalism approach has a racially-coded effect of othering.

Here, we turn to other literatures to provide us with a vocabulary to expand, but also historicize the spatial and socio-cultural field of global connection. In her study of capital and knowledge flows in Indonesian rainforest environmentalism, Tsing critiques the hubris in scholarship of the ‘global era’, with its excited heralding of a future mapped out by universalizing trajectories towards liberalization and transnationalization. She argues that such discourses are performative, in that they naturalise global projects and have “real effects on social life” (2000: 251), yet fail to examine the ways in which global projects are “themselves situated, contradictory, effervescent or culturally circumscribed” (ibid. 339). She then provides a portfolio of methods to study global connection. She urges attention to the process of what she calls ‘channel making’ or ‘friction’. Just as a wheel turns because of its encounter with the surface of the road, so is global connection “charged and enacted in the sticky materiality of practical encounters” (2005: 1). She argues that global connection should always be studied empirically, to tease out “how pre-existing groups link and, through linking, enunciate new identities and interests”, and how “the specific features of the link have ramifying effects” (ibid. 77, 15) – historical precedents that are variously reinforced or reworked in unpredictable ways. As she argues ethnographically, this needs to be explored with an eye to political economy and cultural politics.

This open-ended approach is germane for the purposes of this chapter, in which we explore other salient dimensions of education, including the antecedent educational connections that exist in these ‘transnational spaces’, the “wider political economy of educational provision” (Jeffery, Jeffery et al. 2007: 12) and parents and students’ evaluations of the educational opportunities that inhere in particular spatial strategies.

**Histories of transnational education**

Characteristically, the transnationalism approach prefigures the degree, intensity and velocity of border-crossing connections to distinguish itself from historical precedents. However, we find it instructive to consider the ‘precursors to modern transnationalism’ (Ong and Nonini 1997) that are being variously transformed in the present context. In particular, colonial rule
was a strong period for the transcontinental circulation of educational ideas and practices. The western education of the colonies was integral to the project creating a self-governing population, inculcating into the colonial subjects a particular set of skills, dispositions and attitudes, serving a modernist administrative and economic imperative (Tikly 2004). Colonial education was a highly differentiated project, unfolding in different and contradictory ways in different parts of the world (Crossley and Watson 2003; Hickling-Hudson, Mathews et al. 2003). In Africa, the French and the British established very divergent education systems, the French offering little support for missionary schools and providing an exclusively secular education in government schools, whilst the British delivered colonial education hand-in-hand with missionaries, arguing that the public interest demanded the inculcation of Christian values (White 1996). In India, on the other hand, British policies were contradictory, at times supporting and then withdrawing from missionary activities, whilst firmly opposing religious education in government schools (Kumar 1991). Given the heterogeneity of colonial education projects, the example of India is considered here, to provide more detailed context to what has emerged as one of the largest markets for education in the world.

In what might be described as an unevenly-empowered but mutual imbrication between colonizer and colonized, the encounter between Britain and India transformed ideas about knowledge and knowledge transmission in both places. In 1813 the British Indian government decided that it would take responsibility for educating its Indian subjects, including the funding of ‘indigenous instruction’ such as that taking place in maktab, madrasa, tol and pyal schools. However, following a debate among colonial officials as to whether the colonial government should patronize ‘Oriental’ knowledges, an ‘Anglicist’ education policy was firmly in place by the mid 1830s. This was bolstered by demands from some sections of Indian society who wanted English education for practical and financial considerations. As the 1823 petition by Raja Ram Mohan Roy to Governor General Lord Amhurst made clear, English was viewed as a means of unlocking western sciences that had contributed to the advancement of European society (Advani 2009). From 1835 the British Indian government became the agency for promoting western knowledge through modern institutions and pedagogic processes. ‘Indigenous’ education was condemned as ‘superstitious’, ‘mythic’, ‘primitive’ and generally ‘untrue’. However, western education was not merely ‘transplanted’ into India but also changed in the process, under the dual demands of economic and cultural imperatives that created a schizophrenic discourse (Chatterjee 1993: 126-8). At the same time, the codifying of ‘indigenous instruction’ through madrasa textbooks or orientalist colleges transformed Hindu and Muslim education (Zaman 1999; Seth 2007). Ideas and practices developed to educate the poor in Britain were trialled and experimented upon in colonial India, and the resulting pedagogies used back in Britain on the
industrial and rural poor (Starrett 1998). Moreover, if we consider the constitution of modern knowledge itself, we see that subjects such as botany, cartography, linguistics and engineering were established through these same asymmetric, but reciprocal processes of interaction and negotiation between colonial officers and colonized Indians (Raj 2007).

If western education was an essential element of colonial governmentality, the leading intellectuals and revolutionaries of national liberation struggles were equally the products of colonial education. In the case of India, most of the members and leaders of the latter 19th century nationalist organizations were educated not only in English schools in India but also in British universities, availing themselves of an earlier form of transcontinental education involving movement within empire rather than between nation states. The English-educated elite held that western education was one of the most important ‘gifts’ bequeathed to them by the British, but they were critical of the standard of education provided in government schools and the ‘denationalizing’ effects that it was having. This led to various attempts to use modern education to reform indigenous knowledges and produce vernacular alternatives. However, “no one seriously proposed what might seem the most obvious answer of all: that national education purvey the tradition or indigenous knowledges of India” (Seth 2007: 167). Rather, western education was appropriated, such that modernity was sought to be made “consistent with the national project” (Chatterjee 1993: 240). At the top end, the embracing of western education culminated in exclusive public schools such as Doon in North India, which were based on the British boarding school model. Such was the rejection of indigenous education that the Doon School was run by English headmasters for whom “previous experience in India was not only not necessary but would be a disqualification… in this way, the School could ensure the service of men untainted by the mores of the society that it hoped to transform” (Srivastava 1998: 40). Notably, it was in such schools that the construction of the ideal modern Indian citizen – rational, secular, metropolitan and nationalist – was elaborated. The dominance of modern education is thus “as much the fruit of nationalist strivings as it is of colonial imposition” (Seth 2007: 182).

In the early post-colonial era, Jawaharlal Nehru’s vision for an independent India articulated a strong modernist take on education’s role in development and nation-building, aspiring for a national education system that would impart scientific rationality, improve India’s ‘human capital’ and enhance the lives of citizens by promoting equality and expanding access to historically excluded sectors of the population. Under a politics of developmental state-ism, believing that government intervention was an important channel for modernization, the education system under Nehru and his Congress successors saw increasing public sector involvement. Despite Nehru’s optimistic ideals, though, state inputs to education have failed
to provide education and literacy for all, and the deeply embedded inequalities that produced an Indian elite in the colonial milieu have continued throughout the period since 1947. This was particularly through the mastery of English-medium education, which changed from colonial language to the language of pan-Indianism, requiring complex political mediations as Hindi was rejected as national language by the South (Advani 2009). “English remains a language of power that it not equally accessible to all”, says Jeffery, “and English-speaking elites remain privileged, both internally and internationally” (2005: 19). Latterly, the claim that there has been an ‘elite revolt’ (Corbridge and Harriss 2000) against the Nehruvian goals of state socialism, egalitarianism and secularism resonates with recent educational reforms in India, which have reinstated the elite’s facility of using private education. The valorization of the kind of international education currently purveyed transnationally, which we explore shortly, and debates about how to appropriate and provide modern education alongside a particular national or community-religious context are therefore all rehearsed in this colonial and post-colonial history.

Also important to understanding contemporary entanglements with global educational provision is historical multipolarity. Alongside, and in contradistinction with European colonial legacies are other transcontinental formations. For example, consider the medieval Muslim world, in which *ulema* (clerics), scholars, students, mystics and traders circulated within the *dar-al-Islam* (domain of Islam) using Arabic and Persian as lingua franca, encountering familiar social codes and moral ideals wherever they moved (Cooke and Lawrence 2005: 4). Or, more recently, the Cold War offers an alternative scenario of distant places mutually imbricated through exchanges of educational ideas, materials, scholars and students. During the 1950s and 60s, bilateral Cultural Agreements between India and the USSR led to countless exchanges of delegations of scientific personnel. The USSR provided assistance in the funding of Indian universities; thousands of Indian students were trained on scholarships in Soviet and Eastern European universities; scientific and technological texts were printed for Indian schools and colleges, and the USSR published low-cost periodicals for distribution in India. Soviet scholars studied Indian languages and translated Indian literary works into Russian, whilst Russian literature was translated into vernacular Indian languages (Roy, Kumera et al. 2007). This historical polycentricity is also played out in contemporary global educational regimes.
Global production of educational regimes

By using the term ‘educational regimes’, we wish to “locate [educational] values in a broad political terrain that encompasses the global, national and local contexts” (Jeffery 2005: 13). Globalization has come to hold a strong influence over educational priorities and implementation within countries. Ongoing politics of liberalization and privatization culminated in the inclusion of education as a tradeable service in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) General Agreement on Trade and Services (GATS) from 1994 onwards. According to GATS, there are four modes in which education can be purveyed transnationally: consumption abroad, e.g. movement of students to study overseas; commercial presence, e.g. overseas branch campuses, franchises, corporate programs; cross-border supply, e.g. distance education, online learning; and movement of people to deliver the service (GATS 1999). Whilst the state was still the main provider of education until the 1980s, privatization is “now so widespread that it cannot be linked easily with any specific class of society” (LaDousa 2007: 139). As Robertson and Dale argue, the globalization of education implies shifts from predominantly state-run national education systems to “a more fragmented, multi-scalar and multi-sectoral distribution” (2008: 3). Robertson and Dale also critique the ‘spatial fetishism’ that inheres in scholarship on globalization and education, and urge us to apprehend the actors or subjects of globalization, locate them in their national boundaries and scrutinize their politics. In the case of education, we see that globalization is driven by a conjunction of specific and nationally-situated interests, namely private educational firms seeking to penetrate new markets, particularly firms based in the USA; and governments, who increasingly require educational institutions to raise their own funds under the directives of supra-national organisations dominated by Northern agendas.

The transnational higher education market has been valued at US$100 billion, of which international students are the most significant and visible part (UNESCO 2002; The Economist 2003). In 2004 there were estimated to be more than 2 million people pursuing education abroad and by 2010 this is predicted to rise to 3.3 million, of whom nearly 60% would originate from China, India, Malaysia, Hong Kong or Singapore (British Council 2004). Evidently, the transnational education system is unevenly empowered, with the Anglo-Saxon countries, the USA, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, enjoying competitive advantage and attracting some 85% of students, linked with the dominance of English in global markets (Larsen et al 2004). Thus, there is an important historical context, “with the consolidation of a globalized economy, the new imperial impetus of education and of English language learning has only been strengthened” (Advani 2009: 12).
Notably, flows of migrant students are also multi-polar. The literature has not paid much notice of the overseas ‘branch campuses’ that are mushrooming in places like the Gulf, India and China, but these reduce the need for student migration and may reconfigure the field of transnational education. Of interest are the growing numbers of schools that have grown out of established ‘parent schools’ from the English private school sector such as Dulwich, Haileybury, Harrow, Repton and Shrewsbury, and that model themselves on their ‘parent school’ to the extent of buildings replicating the original buildings and uniforms copied from the style of those worn by their ‘parent school’ peers. However, not all prestigious English private schools have followed the lead of their peers in such ‘hyper-capitalist experiments’. Indeed, some have actively resisted doing so, concerned at the potential loss of brand name security and/or feeling uncomfortable about the aims of raising money through the overseas satellite (Waters 2006; Bunnell 2008; Waters 2011).

The facility of foreign firms to set up private educational institutions has been subjected to intense public critique, particularly concerning the problem of social inequality. In the field of higher education, there are already western universities in India that have already established offshore branch campuses: Leeds Metropolitan University in Bhopal and the University of the Fraser Valley in Chandigarh are two to our knowledge that have been advertised extensively. The Foreign Educational Institution (Regulation of Entry and Operation) Bill was delayed for four years before being approved for parliament by the cabinet in March 2010, under criticism from the left and the BJP who feared that foreign educators would undermine India’s own educational provision and pushed for investment without giving foreign educators the entitlement to take profits out of India. It remains to be seen whether the dividends to foreign universities – mostly in terms of ensuring a supply of fee-paying Indian overseas students – will suffice to tempt them to invest without guarantees of profit (The Hindu Businessline, 17th March 2010). In a context where Indians are estimated to spend $5.7 billion annually on studying abroad, it is hoped that foreign university branch campuses will save valuable foreign exchange as well as enhance the profile of higher education in India (Times of India, 21st March 2010). The branch campus model may change the nature of educational provision in countries like India. HRD Minister Kapil Sibal said that “a revolution larger than the one in the telecom sector awaits the education sector” (Times of India, 15th March 2010).

South-South flows have received scant attention in the literature on student migration, but the emergence of higher education institutions branded as ‘centres of excellence’ in the South will reduce the need to undergo exclusive overseas migration to obtain a highly-
esteem prestigious education. The global terrain of educational provision is changing. However, "global competition is not a level playing field where each university has an equal opportunity to win" (Marginson and Sawir 2006: 348-9). A revealing comparison of the global capacity and strategy of the Australian National University and Universitas Indonesia shows that universities in developed nations continue to hold most of the cards, having superior public and private resource base, better IT systems and research capacities, and capacity to attract and hold students and staff. Their global character is also one of the key factors in their attractiveness locally. Institutional strategies premised on the idea of the stand-alone institution taking on all-comers in a global marketplace therefore miss the continuing importance of place-bound identities in determining global strength and position, as university capacity is the product of past government strategies of nation building; universities remain central to the policies of governments; and variations in the global position of the nation condition the ‘global potential’ of universities.

In turn, national higher education sectors are transforming in response to the internationalization agenda. In the UK, the main consequence of transnational education is competition for the recruitment of fee-paying international students, to fill the deficits left by reduced government funding in recent decades. Opponents have expressed fears that globalization will lead to a replication of the worst excesses of the North American ‘diploma mills’ or ‘McDonaldized universities’, arguing that trade increases the commoditisation of education, weakens areas in the humanities and social sciences which are felt to have no value in the culture of marketable knowledge, and inculcates privatized, market-like subjectivities in individuals and institutions (see e.g. DeVita and Case 2003). Transnational education is feared to have had major repercussions for the patterns of international recruitment and the experience of international students within higher education: “it is often the universities with the weakest support structures which charge bargain basement fees, attracting academically vulnerable students unable to meet the admission requirements of more prestigious institutions” (Harris 1995: 77). Issues of accountability, quality control and consumer protection in the education export industry have intensified the need for regulation, testing, assessment and international comparison of universities (see Yelland 2000).

International schools have expanded beyond their historical niche catering to the children of elite ex-pat diplomats to the aspiring middle-class families of the post-colonial national elite, who aspire for their children to benefit from the kudos of private English-medium education whilst themselves not globally mobile (Waters 2011). Curricula and pedagogies are also influenced by transnational education, as courses are being reformed with more of an ‘international’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ flavour. In many contexts, the primary aim of curricular reform
has been to promote particular skills for living in the neoliberal global market, such as global awareness, social skills, problem-solving ability and especially, proficiency in IT and foreign languages; IT is expected to enable a shift in pedagogy from costly teacher-dominated learning models to a use of diversified resources and interactive learning beyond the classroom (Law 2004; cf. Freeman 2008; Urciuoli 2008). Leaving aside the abundant critiques that ‘milking the cash cow’ of international students has implied no more than lip-service to the curricular changes that might be envisaged for a truly ‘cosmopolitan education’ (Yelland 2000; DeVita and Case 2003), a more fundamental question in curricular reform concerns the particular source of knowledge that is infused. Some have criticized the legitimacy of labelling what is effectively a western construction of knowledge and knowledge transmission as ‘international’ content. However, our own ethnographic work in Punjab suggests that schools are not trying to transfer international curricula ‘verbatim’ but attempting to achieve nuanced local ‘navigations’, ‘amalgamating’ international education with Indian values (Harriss and Osella 2011). Thus “modern western knowledge is not seen as ‘western’ at all, as a particular mode of knowledge; it is knowledge as such, everywhere and for everyone” (Seth 2007: 182). International education is produced in historical contexts but deployed by such a vast population of actors that they are not particularly ‘western’ (cf. Gupta and Ferguson 1997).

Parents’ and students’ spatial strategies

Historical multipolarity and the polycentricity of global capitalism in the field of education emerge to be very important we turn to consider the value/utility of transnational education from the perspectives of the parents and students who consume it, as it seems that one of the most significant aspects of current changes in the field of education is precisely the ways in which differentially empowered ‘transnational spaces’ are being reconfigured. The existing work on transnational education has emphasised the wide range of factors that are taken into consideration in assessing the value/utility of transnational educational credentials in migrant-sending areas. Parents and students are “not merely engaged in profit making; they are also acquiring a range of symbolic capitals that will facilitate their positioning, economic negotiation, and cultural acceptance in different geographical sites” (Ong 1999: 18-19). In transnational education, parental and family strategies are just as significant as in local education, articulated through the same, well-established relations of class. Middle-class education generally involves more strategy and less contingency, with the pursuit of ‘distinction’ taking precedence over considerations of family and locality (Ball, Bowe et al. 1995).
In the face of growing competition over both educational opportunities and employment, it seems that more and more is being demanded of migrants. In the current knowledge-based ‘information age’, doing well in school is increasingly important as a mobility-providing tool (Suarez-Orozco 2001). ‘Designer emigrants’ are produced in sending areas through the consumption of education. For example, in areas of South Asia with a high incidence and long history of emigration, parental strategies concerning children’s education are increasingly directed towards enhancing chances for international migration, a trend supported by the expansion of private English-medium education. There are varied routes through which the resulting types of ‘educated persons’ develop the subjective propensities, competences and contacts conducive to overseas mobility, which include migration for onward studies; skilled employment; or becoming a desirable match for transnational spouses. Ethnographic studies have shown how grooming through private English-medium schooling is differentiated by the gender, age, birth order, in accordance with the perceived abilities and interests of specific children and young people; and may result in unexpected patterns of preference and allocation within families (Mand 2003; Chopra 2005; Osella and Osella 2008). In aspirant migrant households in Indian Punjab, for example, girls may unconventionally be given more prestigious education than their brothers and thus groomed for transnational marriage, in the hope that once established overseas, they might be able to arrange for the migration of their brothers, thus becoming an ‘agent of marital citizenship’ (Mooney 2006).

In the middle-class families that prefigure in the ethnographies, a child or young person’s stage in his/her schooling frequently dictates the precise timing of family migration, and the concern with education can be seen to completely structure migrants’ household organization, creating novel family forms. The significance of maternal agency and sacrifice in planning for, nurturing and sustaining families scattered for the purposes of transnational education should not be underestimated: arrangements which may variously entrench or challenge the gendered division of household labour; put tensions on, but also enhance marital relationships (Huang and Yeoh 2005). For middle-class Hong Kong and Chinese migrants, the opportunities for economic accumulation remain in East Asia, whilst the opportunities for educational strategizing are in Vancouver or Singapore. The phenomenon of ‘astronaut families’ and ‘parachute’ or ‘satellite kids’ (Zhou 1998; Orellana, Thorne et al. 2001; Thorne, Orellana et al. 2001) have therefore emerged, to permit family migration and citizenship and reduce overseas student fees.
Outside purely economic consideration of how education plays into strategies for the accumulation of capital, parents are attentive also to ‘exposure’, namely the specific values and competences internalized and embodied through living in a particular place. For example, we note that diasporic Indians send their children back to India in order to expose them to Indian culture and traditions, while avoiding what are perceived to be the pitfalls of Western youth culture, in accordance with what Osella and Osella term a ‘folk model of the habitus’ (2008). Similarly, judging the education system to be too westernized and desiring more of an Islamic texture in subject matter and daily life, diasporic Muslim parents send their children to a niche of schools and colleges in Muslim countries that offer to combine Islamic and modern education (Timmerman 2000; Cook 2001). International or ‘cosmopolitan’ education is thus fetishised, but also comes under criticism.

There is a need for more careful attention to the economic, socio-cultural and political contexts within which thinking about the value/utility of transnational education is situated: these are rapidly changing. In Hong Kong, economic restructuring and the expansion of the financial services industry has driven ‘qualifications inflation’. In the context of intense competition over professional jobs, overseas education, particularly from North America, is felt to offer something ‘rarer’ and more valuable than the norm. Overseas-educated graduates are at an advantage in jobs that involve dealing with people such as marketing, insurance, human resources, public relations and law, which points to the value of embodied transnational cultural capital in business and professional spheres; indicating fluency in English as well as less obvious quality of ‘exposure’, incorporating confidence, sociability, cosmopolitanism and possession of valuable social capital (Waters 2005; 2006). However, we cannot assume that transnational education will inevitably be preferred. Preference for overseas education depends on the modes of education available locally, and varies from sector to sector. ‘Exposure’ is not only produced in schools in the west. In India, the powerful middle-class discourse of progress, modernity and India’s dynamism and importance in the new global economy appears to lessen the value/utility of overseas education as India itself has ‘world class institutions’. Studies highlight ambivalence concerning Indian institutions and continued interest in transnational education, but also uneven employment returns to the supposedly prized capitals of international education and studying overseas (Parry 2005; Baas 2006; Nisbett 2006; Baas 2007; Narasimhan 2009; Cross 2010).

Intriguingly, contrary to assumptions concerning the superior value of transnational education the ethnographic studies prompt us to consider that opting for foreign education might in many cases be less prestigious than we assume. For student migrants the intense competition to get into the ‘best’ schools and universities in Hong Kong and India constructs
overseas education as an escape route for those who are unable to secure admission or success in competitive local institutions. Studies suggest that migration for education is frequently triggered by the threat of ‘failure’ in the local education system, indicating the emergence of more differentiated terrain for transnational education (Brooks and Waters 2010). Educational failure threatens middle-class social reproduction and upward mobility; a point that echoes Brown’s criticism of Bourdieu for exaggerating the inevitability of middle-class reproduction, in a context where economic restructuring, unemployment and educational change have “made parents more aware of the uncertainties of success and the consequences of failure” (1995: 33).

Supported by wider government policies (e.g. permitting bank loans for overseas studies), the market for transnational education is now expanding beyond the upper middle-class elite that has long availed it. For example, overseas students from India are now frequently the first in their families to migrate abroad (Baas 2006; 2007). Whilst coming from privileged backgrounds, they may not perceive themselves as such, and indeed many young middle-class Indians appear to undertake overseas education in an attempt to gain permanent residency overseas, seeing themselves not as local ‘haves’ but as global ‘have-nots’ (cf. Hannerz 1992: 228), comparing themselves with to other [western] middle classes whose lifestyles they aspire to, with whom they identify all around the world, and with whom they find it easier to identify than with lower classes in India. Alongside the expansion of access, there is also evidence of fragmentation due to the sheer expense of transnational education and the importance of knowledge, information and contacts in guiding applications for admission and scholarships. Non-elite migrant students who lack personal contacts overseas may be cheated by migration agents working on behalf of cheap, ‘third-rate’ and often informal educational establishments in which they receive a poor standard of education. Student migration is often a period of intense struggle, with students constituting a reserve of underpaid informal workers who are exploited by employers by virtue of racial discrimination, undervaluation of their foreign qualifications and their relative paucity of information about the labour market and contacts; compounded by state policies which only permit students to work limited hours (intended as a safeguard against illegitimate use of student visas as a ruse to ‘economic migration’). As immigration regimes change rapidly, it is inevitably the students who bear the financial, social and legal brunt, their immigration status “indelibly precarious, only ever one risk-of-life away from being withdrawn” (Dembour 2010: 1). There is a gap between the expectations and the reality of transnational education, which is, of course, ultimately a market, and therefore constrained by what one can afford. Importantly, though, we should not always presume that education is a strategy to obtaining eventual residency in the country of education/training; whilst job opportunities in Britain or Australia
may be felt to be better than in India, students and highly-skilled migrants eventually return to India because their earnings can afford a better lifestyle there.

Conclusions

The unfolding project of transnational education has produced new forms of inequality, so we conclude with some comments on the implications of transnational education for social development. Broadly, the exclusivity of transnational education perpetuates and reinscribes social inequalities with reference to knowledge. In the case of India, we have suggested that an ‘elite revolt’ has taken place against national education systems, whereby the elite, who during the colonial era availed themselves of prestigious English-medium education and higher education in western metropolitan cities, were temporarily constrained during the post-independence period by the political imperative for development and nation building, but have now reverted to exclusive transnational education. Transnational education seems to be a spatially-extended version of the well-recognized middle-class tendency to reorganize family roles and capitals to accommodate educational strategies (cf. Ball, Bowe et al. 1995), strengthening the relationship between social and spatial mobility and the reproduction of inequalities. The predominantly middle-class character of student migration therefore begs the question of the impact of transnational education on non-elite groups. The expansion of markets in transnational education has broadened, but also fragmented access to world-class private education. First-time migrants from non-elite backgrounds may be availing themselves of transnational education, but not necessarily from well-regarded institutions. There thus emerges a top tier who receive private education that makes them globally competitive; a middle tier who receive good but not world class education; and a majority who receive local national education (Tikly 2001: 161). The promises of transnational education are therefore not always congruent with the realities.

Finally, we return to the transnationalism approach with which we began this chapter. We take the idea of ‘transnational spaces’ (Jackson, Crang et al. 2004) as our starting point, thinking about how entire spaces are reconfigured in the process of transnational connection. However, we encounter a number of problems with this approach. Through our explorations of transcontinental educational connections in colonial and post-colonial history, the globalization of education, emergence of various forms of trans-nationally provided education, and how these are evaluated by parents and students, we develop three refinements. First, transnationalism cannot be reduced to the present. We have outlined historical processes of interaction, imposition and appropriation of educational models and values which lay down
the tracks for contemporary educational entrepreneurship, and rehearse many of the debates over international or ‘cosmopolitan’ education. History provides complex contexts that are variously reinforced or reworked, in unpredictable ways that cannot be guessed in advance of open-ended ethnographic study.

Second, transnationalism cannot be reduced to dyadic relationships between ‘sending’ and ‘receiving’ countries, as is common in the literature on migrants. When we consider the processes of ‘channel-making’ or ‘friction’ (Tsing 2000; 2005) engaged by the many actors operating at different scales in the global education regimes that we have outlined, the field is expanded to encompass supra-national organizations, national and sub-national governments, private companies as well as families, parents and students. This spatial field is polycentric, with multiple nodes of power, and western dominance cannot be assumed. Whilst the literature implicitly assumes that transnational education is about movement of students from South to North, South-South movement for education has been, remains significant and seems likely to increase. The emergence of ‘centres of excellence’ in the South may obviate the need to migrate abroad to obtain prestigious, exclusive educational credentials. In the contemporary era of globalization, it may be that the model for the future would be the expansion of overseas branch campuses – that is, for the institutions, ideas and practices to move, rather than students themselves. As much as national education appears to be being devalued, there is also evidence of diasporic parents sending their children ‘back home’ to expose them to a niche of schools and colleges combining modern international education with community-religious specific needs. For some, transnational education may be motivated more by failure in competitive, hierarchical local education systems than the pursuit of distinction overseas.

Third, undergirding the social spaces of transnationalism with conceptual oppositions between the complementary values of ‘home’, the locus of personal and social identity and religiosity, and ‘abroad’, associated with material bounty and opportunity, is not helpful. In a global educational regime, parents and students possess “more than a ‘double consciousness’: they face many directions at once” (Ong and Nonini 1997: 12). The approach that would abstract such cultural connectedness into ‘dual perspectives’ or ‘bifocality’ ignores a range of cultural influences, styles and imaginative possibilities.
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Chapter 8

Bringing Teachers Back In:
Dilemmas of Cosmopolitan Education
in the Context of Transnationalism

Devorah Kalekin-Fishman

Dated November 1, 2009, a call for papers for Current Issues in Comparative Education (Vol. 12, Number 1) asks for theoretical and practical submissions related to characteristics that define cosmopolitanism in education. The call cites transnationalism as a necessary component of cosmopolitanism and states further that "[c]osmopolitanism encourages reassessments of cross-border responsibility, illustrating the educational challenges of promoting transnational social justice, global citizenship, and human dignity across familiar social boundaries and divisions. It thus might provide an opportunity for comparative education scholars to reconsider and re-conceptualize the reigning intellectual frameworks, ethical positions, and practical categories of their field and methodologies.'

The editors of CICE seem to assume that schools are indeed dealing with the challenges they name and that many researchers have encountered educational projects framed in terms of cosmopolitanism, have studied these projects and produced reports worthy of publication; and can use their findings to revise approaches to the field of comparative education. In this paper, I argue that although there are papers on education that refer to 'cosmopolitanism' and recognize the prevalence of transnationalism, remarkably few delineate clear criteria for discovering that one or another program is indeed an example of cosmopolitanism in education. Even fewer relate to the realities of schooling into which teachers must integrate cosmopolitanism.

This chapter is divided into six sections. First, I will sketch meanings attributed to transnationalism and cosmopolitanism, and indicate connections between them. Going on to the literature on what is called 'cosmopolitan education', I will point out weaknesses of the vision that is propagated and show that the dilemmas of schooling that teachers face are ignored. The situation in the Israeli state system of education illustrates the viability of the argument. Finally, I suggest an approach to practices which considers teachers' problems and can lead to the shaping of a program for furthering cosmopolitan education. I conclude that although cosmopolitanism is described as a form of consciousness, cosmopolitanism in education is possible only if framed in action.
Transnationalism and Cosmopolitanism

Facets of Transnationalism

In a globalizing world, where the flows of goods and ideas are accompanied by flows of people, transnationalism is a social reality of well-documented importance as an existential position observed among Diasporic groups, minorities, migrants, their kin and neighbors (Castells, 1996; Smith, 2002; Vertovec, 1999; Vertovec and Cohen, 2003: 9).

Investigations of transnationalism as a social reality focus on at least six clusters of salient themes (Vertovec, 1999). Theoretically, transnationalism refers to 'social formations' that 'span borders' (p. 3). Its effects include an awareness of multi-local belonging which leads to a 'transnational imaginary', a type of collective identification that can replace the imaginary of the nation (Vertovec, 1999, pp. 4ff.; also, Anderson, 2006/1983; Anthias, 2002). More widely, transnationalism is deliberately promoted in culture often by religious establishments, through the packaging of cultural elements and their diffusion across borders for transnational consumption (pp. 6-7); in the economy, through the transnational flow of capital via trans-national corporations in the macro- and in the meso-context the flow of capital within the circles of dispersed kinship groups (pp. 7 ff.; also, Robertson and Scholte, 2007; Sassen, 1991); and in the polity where politically engaged Diasporas and social movements position themselves in transnational sites (pp. 9 ff.). Apparently unavoidable is the transnationalism which is signaled by 'the force and form of electronic mediation, between spatial and virtual neighbourhoods' and is evident in the constantly widening disjuncture between territory, subjectivity and collective social movement' which (p. 13).

The intertwining threads of the themes identified as transnationalism (Vertovec, 1999; 2006) ultimately have the effect of shaping transnationality, which Ong (1999, p. 4) defines as 'cultural interconnectedness and mobility across space, a condition that calls attention to the horizontal and vertical economic, social, and cultural practices that span space, the power hierarchies and citizenship regimes in which they are embedded and the ways in which these practices are enabled and regulated by the changing relationship between states and capitalism'. This blueprint lies at the base of arguments for cosmopolitanism in the social
scientists (Hollinger, 1995, p. 86); recognized as a configuration of opportunities for lived experiences, it is grasped as well as a basis for deep revision of method.  

New-Old Cosmopolitanism

Explanations of the 'new cosmopolitanism' do not, however, take transnationalism as their point of departure. First of all, Beck (2009: xii) theorizes 'cosmopolitanism' as a logical step in the evolution of the term 'globalization' in the social sciences. With growing awareness of 'the erosion of clear borders separating markets, states, civilizations, cultures, and the life-worlds of common people, which implies the involuntary confrontation with the alien other all over the globe', Beck (2009: xii) claims that globalization implies a cosmopolitanization of the world, and therefore a 'cosmopolitan turn' is required for re-conceptualizing the social sciences (Beck and Sznaider, 2006: 1) on the one hand, and for revising the moral underpinning of daily experience (Hollinger, 2003), on the other.

Emphasizing the shift required in the social sciences, Beck and Sznaider (2006) exhort researchers to look beyond the national-international distinction that is inherent in theories of modernity (Parsons, Eisenstadt) and post-modernity (Lyotard), of polity (Meyer), and of world systems (whether Wallerstein or Luhmann) (cited in Beck and Sznaider, 2006, p. 16; see also Berman, 1982; Natoli and Hutcheon, 1993). Far from being a set of phenomena happening 'out there', cosmopolitan processes are to be researched as 'globalization from within', the experience of interdependence (Beck and Sznaider, 2006, pp. 9, 12). The point is that research adapted to the cosmopolitan moment will be 'multi-perspectival' taking into consideration the life experiences of the subaltern as well as those of the hegemon, the lives of all groups associated with the post-colonial condition, with full respect for the knowledge and opinions of the natives of all continents. To accomplish this, moreover, the social scientist takes upon herself the duty of re-examining 'the fundamental concepts of "modern society" [such as ] household, family, class, social inequality, democracy, power, state, commerce, public, community, justice, law, history, memory, and politics [which] must be

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released from the fetters of methodological nationalism, re-conceptualized and empirically established within the framework of a new cosmopolitan social and political science' (Beck and Sznaider, 2006: 6, italics in the original). Ultimately they foresee a quasi-revolution in the social sciences for carrying out this revision is a transdisciplinary task which can only be done by finding new combinations of geography, anthropology, ethnology, international relations, international law, political philosophy and political theory as well as sociology and social theory (Beck and Sznaider, 2006: 1).

The 'new cosmopolitanism' builds on a history of debate that goes back at least to ancient Greece where the Sophists challenged the political posture of Plato and Aristotle who did not question dedication to one's city (Athens). For centuries thereafter, the debate continued in Europe as political authorities defended the need for loyalty to one's homeland (village, city or state) against religious authorities of the eternal Church who were interested in spreading their truths without respect for borders. In the eighteenth century, Kant argued for world-wide peace that could be attained by a 'league of nations' which would not have an army so as not to challenge state sovereignty, but would have a legal code to defend human rights. Proposals for free trade promulgated by Adam Smith similarly envisioned international understanding and mutual support. In the nineteenth century, Marx's (1978) account of the mechanisms of capitalism emphasized the inevitable cosmopolitanism of class and the implications of such cosmopolitanism for collaboration across borders. His vision of the 'withering away' of the state in the face of such alliances was, however, isolated from the argument of other pioneering sociologists such as Durkheim and Weber, Comte and Spencer all of whom situated their sociological theories in an acceptance of the world divided into nation-states (among others, cf. Cheah, 1998).

Developments in twentieth century international politics have created new transnational realities on macro, meso, and micro levels; and these are the basis for new conceptualizations of cosmopolitanism. After World War I, practical efforts at setting up mechanisms of international governance through the League of Nations still relied on state sovereignty as a criterion for organization. By contrast, the United Nations (set up after World War II) and its subdivisions have assumed the right to intervene deliberately in the affairs of states. As a regional organization, the European Union has extended its authority over many areas of everyday life across the borders of the twenty-five member states. Although they are likely to be somewhat dependent on states for maximizing profits, transnational corporations are no longer clearly affiliated with one or another state, nor are the banking arrangements for financing industries (Sassen, 1991). Moreover, the steady advance of efficient means of travel, significantly air transportation, as of communication in the form of telephony and
electronic communication, and the advance of 'automobility' are constantly blurring the meanings of borders for individuals. A growing population worldwide enjoys new types of movement and, it has been said, cannot avoid developing a cosmopolitan consciousness (Szerszynski and Urry, 2006, p. 113). Thus the new cosmopolitanism can be understood as a decisive shift in explaining the epistemological changes which constitute the increasingly unavoidable 'globalization from within' (Beck and Sznaider, 2006: 9).

**Comparing Transnationalism and Cosmopolitanism**

From the analytic point of view, both transnationalism and cosmopolitanism are outgrowths of globalization; better, both theoretical approaches are specifications of the effects and the meanings of globalization. Like transnationalism, the 'new' (twenty-first century) cosmopolitanism refers to 'spanned borders' and cultural, financial and political relations across state boundaries. In the large, cosmopolitanism, like transnationalism, has geographical, political, and economic dimensions. But while the concept of transnationalism necessarily remains associated with the overweening importance of nationalism, Beck and Sznaider (2006) read cosmopolitanism as a new social condition which calls for a radical epistemological departure from traditional concerns with the dualistic axes distinguishing 'national from international' and 'we from them' on dimensions of race, culture, religion, or class. Thus, while transnationalism is an existential position to be explored empirically in diverse ways, cosmopolitanism is heralded as not only a socio-cultural condition, but also as a complex scientific and political project with moral implications (see also Vertovec and Cohen, 2003: 9)."41

Emphasizing the moral aspects of cosmopolitanism, many researchers identify it as a realization of the visions of the Enlightenment, seeing in it an ideology or a philosophy of life which has finally been made possible because of the phenomena of globalization. Among its effects, then, the cosmopolitan awareness can be seen as the motor for establishing transnational institutions (Archibugi, 1998) and as impelling the political project of advancing the rights of multiple subjects (Hollinger, 1995). The cosmopolitan turn relates to the very organization of the globe, but also to the fate of individuals because on the personal level,

41 To date the literature on cosmopolitanism has not related to the problems of women in a cosmopolitanizing world and in the framework of this paper, I will not be able to extend my discussion of these issues.
cosmopolitanism is an attitude, a state of mind, and a set of competencies (Hannerz, 1990). The encounter of the moral basis for cosmopolitanism with the reading of cosmopolitanism as a frame of mind and as sets of capacities highlights the inevitable alliance between cosmopolitanism and education.

**Cosmopolitan Education**

Given that cosmopolitanization is an on-going process, there is clearly a need to ensure that people growing up in a globalizing world should be equipped with the competencies that will enable them to take advantage of new political and economic opportunity structures as well as to contribute to fostering a cosmopolitan consciousness. Allied with this is the concern with the ethical values historically associated with cosmopolitanism. Thus, there are rich discussions about cosmopolitan education among philosophers, sociologists, and researchers in the field of education.

**Ethical Aspects of Cosmopolitanism in Education**

Viewing cosmopolitan education as a means to correct the failings of contemporary society, Nussbaum (1997, 2000) argues that through a cosmopolitan orientation liberal education can be reformed and directed towards a heightened appreciation of the nature of justice and of readiness to grant 'material aid' on a broad scale. Papastephanou (2005) insists that a cosmopolitan education can lead to a humanity imbued with a more viable ethic in a world full of global challenges. Responding to those who insist that there are unavoidable competitive elements in human nature, she points out that the de-essentializing trends on which post-modernism and globalism converge underline the fact that human nature is not fixed. The goals of a cosmopolitan education, she admits, are not easily achieved and competitiveness may triumph 'because people often become what they are taught that they are' but not because competitiveness is an inevitable part of human nature (Papastephanou, 2005: 548). Scott (2008, p. 9) interprets the goal as responsibility for a 'shared humanity', and draws on the ideas of Levinas to underscore the perception that 'respect, dignity and freedom [develop] in relation to the disturbing and provocative event of being confronted by another person'. Thus, it is in what she calls 'provocation' that Scott sees 'the promise of education itself.’ To specify some of the content of this promise, Hansen (2007) describes a cosmopolitan education as '(1) an expression of values, (2) a moral compass, and (3) an abiding engine of ideas about teaching, curriculum, [and] learning'. In his view, through a
cosmopolitan education, students acquire respect for the unknown and hence the ability to accept new people and new ideas.

Arguments about whether or not cosmopolitanism is compatible with patriotism are also tackled if not resolved, by philosophers concerned with education (see Appiah, 1998). On the basis of the description of cosmopolitan education as an education for democratic values (Held, 1995), Ben-Porath (2007) insists that there is no contradiction between a cosmopolitan education and national patriotism. Taking being-at-war as the exemplar, she reasons that when a state is engaged in warfare, members of the nation must collaborate and care for one another. Schools should convey this understanding; not as jingoism, but as the kind of achievement for which a democratic cosmopolitan education strives. Similarly, Osler and Starkey (2003, pp. 243, 252) argue that to fulfill goals of cosmopolitan citizenship, education 'needs to address peace, human rights, democracy and development'. This requires a broadening of sympathies, but the recognition of common humanity does not mean asking people to 'reject their national citizenship or to accord it a lower status' [sic!].

There are, however, other voices. Gunesch (2004: 268), on the other hand, asserts that the core of education for cosmopolitanism should be derived from a clear image of the type of individual that is to be educated, and the state cannot be given special favor. Leaving the position of the state open, he proposes a model in which the goal is for students to acquire 'world citizenship in terms of individual engagement with cultural diversity'.

**Strategies for Cosmopolitanism in Education**

While the literature mentioned above relates to education mostly on the level of ideas and aspirations, there are writings that purportedly deal with educational strategies. In a paper presented at the 102nd annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Casey (2007) describes 'The Cosmopolitan University' as 'The Medium toward Global Citizenship and Justice'. Explicitly embracing a cosmopolitan goal, the paper points out that American universities must be encouraged to foster international solidarity (the core of cosmopolitanism) by smoothing the way for foreign students to integrate into courses of study and by setting up branches in foreign countries where the meeting of intellectuals of different origins will contribute to mutual understanding and collaboration. Ironically, then, Casey makes a declaration in favor of cosmopolitanism by showing how to promote the cultural imperialism of the US.
Other papers on cosmopolitanism in education relate to the individual student. Torres (2007, p. 156) cites Freire's ideas that students have to be educated in the democratic process via 'normative grounding, ethical behavior, knowledge of the democratic process, and technical performance', as well as being guided to understand themselves better. To these ends, he notes that it is important to 'redeem' Freire's concept of 'conscientização' as self-reflection oriented to one's history and traditions. Here, too, the idea is somehow to attain a cosmopolitan viewpoint through a close examination of national traits. A somewhat more specific guide to finding connections between learning and cosmopolitanism is proposed by Emdin (2008). Impressed with the difference in attention and energy that students demonstrate when they listen to the performance of a favorite song and the apathy and indifference they show when listening to a chemistry lesson, Emdin (2008: 773-4) suggests '3 C's' for harnessing youthful energy to the study of science in school: cosmopolitanism, co-generative dialogue and co-teaching. While, however, he is able to provide instructions for 'doing' co-generative dialogue and co-teaching, in regard to cosmopolitanism he is satisfied with encouraging teachers to subscribe 'to a cosmopolitan outlook' in class. This, he claims will make taking part in what is going on attractive to all the students.

In a very detailed article, Fernando Reimers (2006) talks to the goals of 'Schools in an Age of Globalization'. Although he does not discuss cosmopolitanism explicitly, his concern with cultural differences and 'human rights in a framework of global values that includes compassion and caring, concern for others, respect and reciprocity' (Reimers, 2006, p. 276) echoes the qualities attributed to 'education for cosmopolitanism' as worldwide citizenship. In his view, citizenship education converges with human rights education and both are molded by common values. This, of course, leads to an examination of the curriculum, and here Reimers touches on the importance of learning facts that broaden one's cosmopolitan understandings. To his mind, the content of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is material that is highly pertinent to developing a global perspective. Quoting Dewey to the effect that 'how we teach is what we teach', he does, however, highlight the importance of school practices outside the classroom as well as inside it, for shaping citizens with a shared democratic consciousness.

The literature is extensive and I have been able to cite only a few examples in order to show the types of discussions underway. All praise education based on mutuality, a core concern of cosmopolitanism, and recommend that students learn to respect others of diverse types; that they learn democratic values; and that they learn what it means to be citizens of the world. Researchers imply that if requisite norms and values 'are taught', and if textbooks describe and explain them, then students will learn the messages and 'have' the values.
Most of the writing on cosmopolitanism in education overlooks the role of the teacher and evades the complexities of what learning entails. The assumption is that what adults understand as cosmopolitanism can be transferred to children as a kind of multi-faceted knowledge.

All told, the proposals show an ignorance of the fact that education is an important part of governance and not a site where a decision to further cosmopolitan education can be imposed as a technical curriculum directive. Any search for a way to develop cosmopolitanism in education must consider that enabling such an education requires a sophisticated and flexible interpretation of what goes on in schools. To this end, advocates must examine the teaching-learning process, the political foundation of education, and the dilemmas that face teachers in schools. Analysis must include an understanding of how teachers are prepared for their profession and the kinds of obstacles to cosmopolitanism the professional education may raise in teachers’ consciousness. Only on such broad grounds will it be possible to propose a program of action that is likely to be effective in developing cosmopolitanism.

Yet, the literature that supports cosmopolitan education barely mentions professional issues or teaching practices. Dilemmas that face teachers in their work as teachers – dilemmas that may make it nigh impossible for them to ‘decide’ to engage in doing cosmopolitan education are shaped by the conceptualized spaces of teaching as well as by teachers’ own socialization / education. In order to show how this is likely to work, I will first relate to critical analyses of education and illustrate my interpretation by examples from the state education system in Israel (Kalekin-Fishman, 2004).

Obstacles to Effecting Cosmopolitanism in Education

The Teaching-Learning Complex

Learning is a complex process and it is not a linear outcome of ‘teaching’. In psychological studies of learning, researchers examine students' cognitive skills such as knowledge (memory of specifics), understanding, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation (Bloom, 1956). It has been shown that in order to gain a command of ranges of skills, learners also have to acquire meta-cognitive skills such as ‘planning, organising, monitoring, and doing self-assessments of one’s competencies’ (Hartley, 2007: 46). The constructivist turn in education, moreover, has riveted attention to how learning is related to students'
assessments of what is required in any learning context. Examining outcomes of lecture-based learning versus student—activating lessons, for example, Struyven et al. (2006) found that when students are activated they engage in 'deep' learning, and are likely to make concerted efforts to plumb the meanings of the texts and the ideas presented to them. By contrast, lectures encourage 'surface' learning; students do not exert themselves beyond acquiring the obvious details that are laid before them in the classroom situation. They may even take a 'strategic' approach, not centered on what is to be learned but on how the lecturer is likely to assess learning. Beyond the cognitive skills and the degrees of activation, elements of affect such as motivation, intention, student history of failure or success, among others, undoubtedly also have effects on current learning (Struyven et al., 2006, p. 14). Still another aspect of how learning gets done is the factor of grouping. It has been found that learning in groups is more effective than learning by oneself, and many studies show that sharing learning experiences affects learning outcomes positively (Lazonder, 2005; Stanton et al., 2004).

Some learning escapes classification among the categories noted above. Because it is clear that students do not learn exclusively from what is presented as 'the material of the lesson', it has proved fruitful to study distinctions between learning in formal frameworks and learning in informal frameworks. There is purchase in examining relative salience of what is learned: core knowledge and peripheral knowledge; explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge; what students have learnt about practices and to what degree students have learnt to be (i.e., to perform as) participants in a community of practice. Moreover, at the source, it has been shown that people endowed with different types of intelligence and different sensibilities (cf. Eisner, 1994; Gardner, 2006; Sternberg and Grigorenko, 2002) learn in different ways and acquire different kinds of knowledge.

In the descriptions of learning and its theorizations as culled from the literature, teachers have a crucial role. Even passing mention of the types of learning that may be required in different subjects and for different purposes demonstrates how varied the types of functioning required of a teacher. The complexities of learning and hence, the complexity of deciding what types of learning are possible and how those types of learning can be fostered in teaching-learning events are the challenges that teachers face daily in their work. Given choices of texts and tasks, the teacher is responsible for helping students develop appropriate cognitive skills. Beyond these, in arranging the classroom, choosing materials, designing the lesson, distributing tasks, positioning students, monitoring events, overseeing long-term learning processes, the teacher creates a climate which may or may not facilitate learning because of the wide variety of learning styles that different students adopt.
Teachers can control what knowledge they intend to convey formally but have no way of controlling the informal learning conveyed by modes of speech, by the appearance of the classroom, by contacts with peers 'in the meantime,' and by the performance of equipment. Teachers find ways to convey explicit knowledge, but the tacit knowledge about what can be done with it has to be acquired through acting on the basis of that knowledge. In connection with the learning that is considered necessary, the general orientations of students to the classroom situation may be decisive in whether the teacher will be involved in a supply – push or in a demand- pull mode of teaching, i.e., a proactive or reactive approach to what they consider learning (Brown, 2006).

More subtle problems are part of the minimal structure of the teaching-learning situation. Over time, teachers have to face the limitations of the space of the school and the space of the classroom. In schools, teachers are enclosed in a relatively rigid space with clusters of student life trajectories (Massey, 2005). Constrained to experience students' temporal evolution together with their own, this is a constant source of tension that cannot be avoided.

**Political Problems that Attend Teaching**

In a newspaper article published in the 1860s, Marx condemned a German law that was to require children to go to school. His fear was that compulsory schooling would be a way of regulating social and political life, of homogenizing personalities, and of preserving the political and the economic status quo. One hundred and fifty years later, education – at least primary education for all -- is presented as a basic need, an unquestioned good, and is no longer styled a privilege. The progress of states toward ensuring a decent standard of living for their populations and toward developing reasonably comfortable life conditions is measured at least in part by the availability of schooling. Throughout the world, education is an uncontested value, imbued everywhere with clusters of unchallenged norms that underlie networks of statuses, role relations and legitimate ways of knowing. Schools everywhere have been shown to children's ways of thinking and their ways of understanding the environment (Scribner and Cole, 1981). Accomplishments of schooling are offered as sets of unalloyed good, even though the smooth statement hides some uncomfortable facts that confirm, if obliquely, some of Marx's fears.

In practice, the organization of state education is a site of struggle in a double sense. From outside the state territory, there are assaults on sovereignty by supra-state institutions;
internally, groups with diverse interests struggle to impose an institutionalization of their agendas in schools. With the growing number of regional, international, and global organizations, all with social and cultural agendas, state systems of education are called upon to defend and sustain a shared national imaginary, legitimating the state as a national state. Through education conceptions of the state as a unique national territory are reproduced and disseminated. Defined as the consensus, state sovereignty is asserted in the language of instruction, the disciplines that make up the curriculum and the modes of organization. The consensus is institutionalized in time allocations, bureaucratic structures and hierarchies. It is also expressed in terms of a historical narrative that intertwines the history of the 'nation' with the history of national education. Within the state, moreover, the 'consensus' embodied in a particular configuration of schooling is the outcome of on-going intra-national struggle. There are clashes about how to allocate students to different types of organizations, and criteria for shaping careers in schools for students and for those in charge of carrying out the tasks defined as education. There are struggles over focal elements of curriculum content. Agitation for different kinds of education, overt in democracies and covert in autocratic states, is an integral part of political campaigns. The outcomes are never fixed once and for all. Moreover, following Foucault (1980), it is possible to see that how schools are run is minimally an expression of governmentality --- among the practices and rationalities of rule that perhaps do not originate in the state, but are nonetheless an expression of the way governance is conceived in a given collective even if this is not the overt intention.

Although I surmise that these foundations of state schooling are quite general, I will here quote examples from the state system of education in Israel which I believe can provide a trenchant illustration.

**State Education as an Obstacle to Cosmopolitanism in Education: The Case of Israeli Education**

**Education and the Founding of the State**

When Israel was founded in 1948, all the pre-state systems of education were maintained apart from the government schools of the mandatory/colonial power, the UK. For the schools in which Hebrew was the language of instruction there were four distinct systems, each the arm of a political party. They were: the centrist General Zionist system, the left-wing Socialist Workers' system, the Religious Zionist system, and the right-wing system of ultra-orthodox
anti-Zionist schools. Education for speakers of Arabic was sparse and generally conducted under the aegis of religious bodies.

The early years of the state were years of mass Jewish immigration which more than doubled the number of children eligible for schooling and in attempts to maximize funds that they could claim from the state, the systems engaged in zealous, even fanatical competition. Passed in 1953, the Law for Compulsory Education ostensibly instituted a system of state education to counter the fragmentation and calm the conflicts. The law asserted that the state would replace the political parties, and would take responsibility for compulsory free primary education (kindergarten to 8th grade) for all the children in the country. However, to resolve disputes which, it was feared, might undermine the very existence of the new state, the law defined 'state education' ab initio as a bifurcated system with separate apparatuses for the religious state sub-system (Hebrew-speaking) and the secular state sub-system (the latter divided again for speakers of Hebrew and Arabic). Further, the law recognized ultra-orthodox Jewish schools as private schools supported by the state although no government supervision was imposed. To form the state secular system, the Socialist Workers' system was assimilated to the General Zionist system and in effect eliminated from the educational map. But the goals of each of the Jewish parties were enunciated as an integral part of the educational project. Those mentioned included the goal of learning the scriptures (a principle of the religious Zionists), the goal of fostering a scientific orientation and of developing craftsmanship (General Zionists), and the goal of training for agricultural expertise (Socialist Workers even though their curriculum and mode of organization were not represented in the new system). Overtly, interests of all the parties were preserved even though the parties as such no longer had complete control of either the curricula or the staffing. The legislation ignored the obvious: it was patently impossible to build programs to achieve all the contradictory objectives. At the same time, however, the state asserted its right to control education by underlining the over-arching goal of education as to develop a Zionist consciousness (Lamm, 1973).

This assertion was, of course, anathema to the large minority of Arab citizens in Israel. True, a significant achievement of the 1953 law was the institution of compulsory state education for children whose mother tongue is Arabic. Less than ten percent of the male children had had any formal schooling until then. In the narrative of the system, however, goals that

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42 The party had a majority in the government and so could be cajoled into accepting the decision.
related to Arabic as a mother tongue or to Arabic culture, or to Muslim, Druse and Christian religious values were formulated for the first time over forty years later, in the mid-1990s. Only then, with the pressure of the Arab Committee for Education (a voluntary organization set up by heads of Arab local councils in Israel) together with Arab Members of Parliament and activist members of the Jewish lay public, did the Ministry of Education revise the formulation of the goals of education to include full recognition of the cultural rights of the Arab minority, 'loosening' but not removing the demand for identification with the Zionist project (see Kalekin-Fishman, 2004).

The Student Career

In the Israeli state school system, the reality of schooling is presented to students as inevitable. Students are inducted into a framework in which the curriculum is fixed, their positioning in classes is organized without their participation in the decision-making process, and their daily agendas are arranged for months in advance. As the 'subalterns' of the school, students tend to take the most rational course, namely, to evade restrictions insofar as possible. Restrictions include rules that govern comportment, on the one hand, and the irksome mental load of 'learning', on the other.

The state system of education fosters a carefully graduated awareness of what constitutes knowledge throughout the student's career. A student's first experience of schooling is her encounter with a teacher who is overwhelming. In primary school one teacher is responsible for each class with only occasional entrance, interference, if you will, of teachers for sports or music. From the consistent presence of the class teacher, children learn what patterns of behavior are acceptable in public often by contrast with the patterns of behavior practiced in the home. From the way teachers' hours are distributed in the time-table children are also taught that fields of knowledge are organized in a hierarchy; some studies are important and some are of negligible importance. The 'extra' teachers are presenting less important areas of knowledge and with luck, are providing peeks at what is meant in schools by 'fun' – something that may or may not be congruent with children's intuition of what is enjoyable. The picture is nuanced somewhat in secondary schools. There is differentiation in the subject matter and recognition that additional teaching staff may be experts in important if relatively esoteric disciplinary areas. Meetings with certain teachers convey an acquaintance with more valued divisions of knowledge (teachers of physics or chemistry) and with divisions disadvantaged by social selection (fine arts, poetry).
The generality of practices is wrapped in a world view which is conveyed as the 'way things are'. Schools attempt to preserve the normative patterns of behavior, although, as noted, these are often contested. At the same time, signs of what constitutes the national character are a constant presence. Marking the annual cycle by means of religious holidays adapted (in the state secular system) to national symbolization is a powerful mode of education. The institutionalization of time during the school year illustrates this. School rituals, which mark the highlights of the school year, are among the fixed elements of the universe. Through the rituals, the school calendar expresses the distinction between the sacred and the profane, part of the 'way we live'. The times are, of course, connected to designated places within the state territory – Memorial Day to the military cemeteries; agricultural feasts integrated in the Jewish religion are connected with the plants and odors of the fields, national holidays are exhaustively celebrated at fixed times and in varieties of places that endear the territory and emphasize the association of the state with nationhood. Each highlighted date is also associated with appropriate songs and sounds (Kalekin-Fishman, 2010).

The ideology which legitimizes the existence of the state, and makes its mark on the consciousness of each student is established as a set of understandings that cannot be countermanded; they are the basis of pertinent knowledge as well as the indicators of national morality. Teachers who convey what is known as knowledge, and sanction the patterns of the profane, also conduct the sacred activities; willy-nilly they have an important role in establishing the incontrovertible truth of the existence of a nation (Kalekin-Fishman, 2004).

The directedness of the nationalistic agenda in Israel has to be understood in light of the fact that the existence of Israel as a nation-state could not be taken for granted when it was recognized as a sovereign member of the UN on November 29, 1947. In the territory allocated to the state then there was a population of about 600,000 Jews. The leaders reasoned that to make the state a viable entity they would have to attract a large number of immigrants. Although the success of this project was not a foregone conclusion, resources have steadily been invested in order to maintain a steady stream of Jewish immigrants. In Israel today, there is a population of more than seven million people, about 76% of whom are

43 In 1948, survivors of the Holocaust and persons displaced after WWII were, of course, eager at long last to find a country that would take them in. But for those Jews, who viewed Judaism as a religion, the idea of migrating to a Jewish state was not necessarily appealing.
Jews from over one hundred different countries. But in terms of assuring a shared national imaginary, this success raises problems. Even though 90% of the students in the schools today were born in Israel, the countries of origin of their parents and grandparents are diverse. Because of the policy that the state adopted in order to ensure its viability, schools are inevitably locales of trans-national consciousness, loyalties, and practices. Students bring into the schools the memories that are rehearsed in the homes, the practices that were brought from each particular Diaspora, and often the networks of connections with other countries that are fostered in the family.

The effects of transnationality are not necessarily benign. Educators have to contend with a rising tide of violence in schools among peers and on the part of parents (Arieli, 1995; Elbaz-Luwisch, 2005). Among the bones of contention are crude attempts to lean on teachers for marks that signal success, and to evade investing in learning by 'achieving' classification as a person with innate learning difficulties (see Wilf and Wilf, 2008). Yet the job of teachers and the expectation of inspectors, parents and the students themselves is that learning does get done in schools. The best strategy is considered sticking to the plan embedded in the structures of the educational system. How are teachers prepared for this task?

**Educating Teachers**

Further obstacles to cosmopolitanism in education arise from the framework for professional education that prepares candidates for teaching. In Israel, the formation of the teacher is the responsibility of specialist professional schools or of professionally-oriented departments at the university. In their professional education, teachers acquire discipline-grounded pointers about how to get along with students in schools, along with repertoires of skills for imparting 'pieces of knowledge' of different kinds. The teacher is led to see herself as an autonomous professional but she is taught how to limit her interventions to what is interpreted as needed by students – and what is needed to preserve community / state solidarity. In the professional preparation, the emphasis is on how to do teaching. Since teaching is purported

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44 By September 2009, the total population of Israel was 7,515,400 [75.5% Jews, 20.3% Arabs; 4.2% ‘others’ – non-Jewish family members of Jewish immigrants, non-Arab Christians or Muslims, and people whose religious affiliation is not listed in the Ministry of the Interior]. Among the entire population, 70% were born in Israel. In the schools, as noted, the number of native-born is higher.
to be a way of channeling knowledge and consensual values, i.e., the values that are taken for granted in textbooks and acted out in the organization of schools; knowledge is assumed to be unambiguous and students in classes are assumed to be associated with universally agreed upon types.

Internalization of the framework for the nationalizing program of the state is facilitated by reference to easily assimilated slogans abstracted from canonical texts such as the Bible, from the orthodox Jewish Prayerbook, or from the Israeli Declaration of Independence. Slogans such as 'all Jews are responsible for one another,' one is obliged to 'bend one's will to the will of God,' the obvious need for 'the ingathering of the exiles,' are among the self-evident values that teachers are expected to internalize and disseminate. Defined as central values of the state, the slogans also serve to legitimate the state's practices of assigning rights and duties, recognizing or not recognizing claims made by residents or citizens. What is conveyed both formally and informally is the assumption that what exists as schooling is exactly what ought to be. The hierarchy that is embedded in government ministries, including, of course, the Ministry of Education is replicated in each school from the headmaster 'down' and adapted to taken for granted hierarchies in parents' organization, but also in classrooms. Thus, the relations of hierarchy are taught – and learned – as the structure of a framework without which it would be impossible to conduct a learning environment. Student teachers practice skills as they acquire them in schools. Teachers are the products of the school system that awaits their professional services and they have been socialized to the current hegemonic narrative of the nation-state. Preparation for the vocation of teaching underlines the explicit message of the system. Forms of teacher education and the conditions of teachers' employment are coordinated with how schooling is framed and with how 'normal' teachers act.

But there is a catch. Teachers who have gone through the system as students are indeed prepared for the ideological context of teacher education as well. But concomitantly with their preparation for teaching, or before they enter upon professional training, they are exposed to study in the university. Speaking in terms of the educational organization, the university is the place where the student must come face to face with knowledge as it is practiced in the real world. To some extent, one can say that the mere requirement to access reading materials which were prepared in different countries with different axiomatic truths is enough to tear apart the veils which are so carefully woven throughout primary and secondary schooling. Here students are exposed to the kinds of differences of opinion that characterize the academic and the scientific world. They are introduced to the uncertainties, the doubts, the questions, and the arguments that can never have a permanent resolution because they are
at the heart of inquiry (Weber, 1964). The exposure to academe opens a window to skepticism and perplexity. The national worldview is implicitly but, even then, not explicitly put in question.

Yet, in the face of the implacable structures of schooling, the ideal stance for teachers that is promoted is that of 'neutrality'. In their professional education it is impressed on teachers that in order to safeguard the well-being of students, schools have to radiate neutrality in regard to political struggles within the state. Knowing that politics must not be allowed in to the school, they are encouraged, to introduce changes that may be needed from a pedagogical point of view. In the large, however, teachers' task is to demonstrate neutrality and support the status quo. The neutrality extends to the approach to knowledge. Subject matter as it appears in the curriculum is absorbed by teachers as the neutral, unambiguous core of whatever discipline they may be teaching. They know that the curriculum has been planned to cover as much of the world of knowledge as possible. The mission is defined as conveying knowledge assumed to enjoy the stamp of approval of the scientific communities. Having undergone vocational preparation, teachers are presumed to be able to set aside the doubts and the confusion that the university, in promoting scientific endeavors, must have provoked.

The upshot of their professional education is that teachers are supposed to emerge as agents [not in the philosophical sense of autonomous actors, but in the insurance sense — representatives of organizational goals]. They are, moreover, in the conceptualizations (metaknowledge) they hold, in their repertoires of patterns of behavior and in their intentions (habitus), the representatives of the state ideology, the message (albeit evolving) that the state fosters as the 'good life', for its perpetuation as organization and institution.

Is the Structuring of Education in Israel Unique?

Although the particularities of the Israeli condition are not necessarily generalizable, research discloses that the challenge presented in the Israeli classroom is not necessarily unique. The literature of the last twenty years makes it clear that transnational communities have formed throughout Europe and Asia (Castles, 1998; Kastoryano, 1998). Mobilities of experts, students, industrial workers, domestic workers – even when originally intended to be temporary have given rise to groups with families settled into the receiving country (Raijman, 2008/2009). Ties with communities that span borders are reinforced by the media and the sheer awareness of 'people movement' – the possibilities of relatively cheap tourism, the possibility of finding work across borders. In accordance with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the children of temporary residents of all types are admitted into the school system. Immigrant children are equipped with the slogans, the times, the spaces, the practices of 'there' while attempting to fathom the meanings of the slogans, the times, the spaces and the practices that are taken for granted 'here'. Children bring their own and their parents' life trajectories into the classroom; these include transnational affiliations, loyalties, communal identifications, rhythms of everyday living. Thus, students of all ages bring into the schooling situation sets of tools for thinking and sets of practices that diverge from what teachers know to be the norm. In the classroom spaces, teachers find they have to deal with what is likely to be a confusing array of trajectories meaning 'time so far' and pointing ahead in different ways. In practice, professional education grooms teachers to stem the tide. Appointed as agents to limit developments of certain aspects of the trajectories, teachers are challenged daily to adapt their materials and their behaviors to steadily diversifying groups of students. The fact that with growing tides of transnationals the state is changing, as the governance of the world is changing, is not a realistic argument against the hold of internalized ideology.

**Can Cosmopolitanism Be Integrated into Education?**

In the framework of a state education which is oriented to underlining state sovereignty, cosmopolitanism cannot easily be absorbed into educational programs. There are, however, pressures which challenge the exclusivity of a nationalist orientation, if only because internal and external pressures impact the consciousness of teachers and students alike. With diverse types of population movements across the globe, transnationality is appearing in schools in ever more impressive proportions. Secondly, there is 'internationalist' pressure from supra-state forms of governance. No state is immune to the influences of decisions taken in the various sub-groups of the United Nations, of the consultations and conventions of regional groups such as the European Union, or of the international non-governmental

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45 As part of a recent reform in Israel, teachers are obliged to spend more time in schools, to attend to individual needs of students. As 'autonomous professionals', they are instructed to compile a 'vision' for the functioning of their school, and they do this with a view to adopting the consensual values, the official ideology, to what they see as the essence of schooling. Experience shows that the presence of students with different backgrounds in class is taken to be a problem that has to be overcome by pressure for homogeneity (Ministry official: personal communication).
organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Médecins Sans Frontières (Ku, 2002: 542; cf. among others, www.sociology.emory.edu/globalization/ingo.html).

In a word, transnationality appears in classrooms not as an ideal but as an inevitable reality. There is a possibility of integrating cosmopolitan projects into education, however, only if it is possible to find elements of what is taught as professionalism that can be coordinated with cosmopolitan principles and practices. A practical orientation is called for in order to encompass the dense differences within classrooms as well as in order to grasp the unfolding meanings of globalization. To ensure such an orientation in the schools, it is important to find 'hooks' onto which a program of cosmopolitanism can be hung without threatening the educational establishment. These hooks can be found in the images of the psychology of good teaching and in the basic idea of community that infuses every nationalizing project. Community can, moreover, be an immediate experience for students. Like all good pedagogy community has to be conveyed not by preaching but by doing; by leading to action that builds on the knowledge and the skills that teachers have acquired at the university and in their professional education. A key structure that is of immediate use can be found in Israeli schools. As a rule, children are assigned to classes which study together throughout the six years of primary school. Integrating the concept of the class as a community into teaching can serve as a basis for collective activity, thus fostering experiences that further cosmopolitanism in education.

**Building a Program for Cosmopolitan Education**

To recapitulate, a practical program for cosmopolitan education can only be formulated if teachers and their dilemmas are taken into consideration. Implementation will, furthermore, be possible only if elements in teachers' professional education are taken as the basis for furthering cosmopolitanism as a realistic educational goal. An important conceptual link is to legitimate a vision of participatory citizenship in civil society as integral to the educational mission (cf. Etzioni, 1993; Lister, 1997; Walzer, 1990).

Because of the varied learning styles that are recognized in educational psychology, teachers are encouraged throughout their professional education to find varieties of ways to attract students to learning. This basic tenet has manifold implications for constructivist approaches to the teaching-learning situation, among them the conviction that in order to achieve maximal learning, students have to be involved and insofar as possible, active (Brown and Adler, 2008). Moreover, doing things in groups has been shown, as noted, to be
a most effective learning tool. Teachers are taught that developing collaboration in groups 
(Lazonder, 2005; Stanton et al., 2004) and fostering solidarity in the classroom is useful for 
learning (Papastephanou, 2005). Standards of good teaching, then, are identified in terms of 
the teacher's skills in enabling students' activities.

Developing social skills via projects is also pre-defined as an integral part of running a class, 
a school. Students in classes are groups that have the potential for forming and belonging to 
civil society and the idea that they are actually shaping a civil society through their own 
participation can be realized. Some of the definitions of civil society deal with specific political 
regimes; some belabor distinctions between civil society and the state. While definitions of 
civil society are varied (Ku, 2002; see Bernhard and Karakoc, 2007 for a useful survey), civil 
society in all its permutations is strongly associated with community and community values. 
Seeing schooling as a service to civil society along with the incontrovertible goals of 
acquiring knowledge and skills for getting through the student career with aplomb, will enable 
teachers to guide students in the very acts of creating a community. This value can arouse 
no opposition whether the 'community' is that of a state or a village. Any program that guides 
students toward becoming part of the community and toward being active members of a 
community can fit in with the goals of teaching in general and can further a program of 
cosmopolitan education. This view of what cosmopolitanism in education entails can make it 
possible to recruit teachers to initiate concrete steps to further 'globalization from within.'

As the basis for an educational project, the framework for researching 'Global Civil Society' 
developed at Johns Hopkins University (Salamon, Sokolowski and List, 2003) provides a 
scaffolding that can be used by teachers. Their definition of civil society which has served 
researchers in forty different countries is: 'a broad array of organizations that are essentially 
private, i.e., outside the institutional structures of government; that are not primarily 
commercial and do not exist primarily to distribute profits to their directors or "owners"; that are self-governing; and that people are free to join or support voluntarily' (Salamon and 
Sokolowski, 2003). It is from their list of the types of organizations that are likely to be found in 
civil society around the globe that we can find ideas for concrete projects furthering 
cosmopolitanism in education. According to them, in civil society there are, along with other 
types, organizations that deal with:

- Culture and recreation
- Education and research
- Health
- Social services
- Environment
Each of these types of initiatives refers to a wide array of attempts to deal with problems that are relevant to life in schools. The kinds of problem-solving that can be undertaken in schools is analogous to the kinds of problem-solving that citizens in neighborhoods, villages, cities, and regions are likely to be called upon to do.

Groups of children can be sensitized to community issues throughout all the years of schooling. An interesting outcome of such awareness will be that students will be learning to cope with the very social issues, terms for which Beck and Sznaider consider to be in need of revision in the social sciences. They will be discovering the practical and dynamic meanings of key terms which, according to theory, require re-clarification.46

Speaking practically, the point of departure for introducing cosmopolitanism in education will be problems that trouble the class as a community. In defining the problems that can be solved, students will consider what kinds of activities the class can undertake, what kinds of activities can contribute to a solution of the problem, and so on. In the early years of schooling, of course, the students will deal with issues that arise in their immediate milieu. As they mature, they will develop sensitivity to issues of wider scope. In guiding the groups, teachers will find it necessary to foster significant intellectual capacities: observation, definition, clarification, translation into action, implementation, drawing conclusions about what has been accomplished and what remains to be done. The original definition of the class-as-community, as an acting collective will expand to encompass community as a broader social construct. Students will be observing different types of community actions while reflecting on themselves and their place in relation to each of them. It will be important to call their attention to the environmental, economic, and even the political context. And, in order to reach decisions on action in the community (however community is defined in any

46 As noted above, these include: household, family, class, social inequality, democracy, power, state, commerce, public, community, justice, law, history, memory, and politics.
given year of study), they will have to adopt modes of abstraction. The power of emphasizing these keys to cognition lies in their professional acceptability, their indication of what kinds of learning can be attractive to different students – a task that every teacher can legitimately undertake. According to Dillon (2008, p. 258), these pedagogical indicators lead to breaks with disciplinary norms, and thus broaden perceptions about the nature of knowledge.47

Despite the relative single-mindedness of teacher education, the broad infrastructure of teaching allows teachers to find their way to further such a project. Working in the classroom as a community or as sub-groups, settling on problems that concern the community as it is understood by students at different stages of their development, and using varied keys to cognition as pedagogical indicators lays the groundwork for the kind of openness that can lead to a solution to some aspects of teachers' dilemmas. Certainly this kind of performance can guide students to kinds of awareness that advance the moral aspects of citizenship and further a mindset that accords with the cosmopolitanization of the world.

**Concluding Remarks**

Cross-border relationships are apparently inevitable in a globalizing world. They include elements of feeling such as multi-local belonging, a 'trans-national imaginary', connections with 'neighbors' who are physically at a distance, as well as transfers of cultural elements. Such relationships also include concrete contacts through the flow of capital and coordinated political engagement. Such interconnectedness encompassing 'horizontal and vertical economic, social, and cultural practices that span space' (Ong, 1999, p. 4) evolves into transnationality with implications that go beyond the limitations of nationhood. It is key to the transition from narrow conceptions of nationalism to a perception of the nation as part of the globe; and hence, of the need for promoting 'globalization from within', a cosmopolitan consciousness. In a word, there is a need to recognize the place of moral practice as a mode of dealing with the changes that people are undergoing.

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47 Note that the cosmopolitan project as conceived by Beck (Beck and Sznайдер, 2006) is understood to require a radical change in definitions of knowledge with new combinations across disciplines.
Indeed, the new cosmopolitanism is defined as a project which embraces ethical principles as well as a social theory and changes in the epistemological basis of methodology; this is a project of which education is an integral component. Aspirations, however, are inadequate to bring about the kind of practice that is implied. Above all, cosmopolitanism can be brought into education by taking into account the practicalities of schooling and the dilemmas facing teachers. These include the complexities of the teaching-learning nexus, the significance of educational projects for governmentality, and the expectations of teachers' professionalism.

State schooling is an apparatus for imparting knowledge in ways that are appropriate to the national imaginary. In the systems, the structuring of both children's education and teachers' professionalism is guided by regulations designed to ensure the maintenance of whatever compromise among conflicting interests is currently accepted as the mode of education that best serves collective as well as individual needs. Yet, classroom populations are not all attuned to the consensual mode. Groups put together for the purpose of learning are increasingly transnational, made up of students whose backgrounds are highly diverse. And the diversity is often the root of the most basic of teachers' problems: pedagogical dilemmas about how to induce effective learning.

For teachers, adopting a program of cosmopolitan education may be a way of solving the problems they confront in facing a class where transnationalism is 'rampant'. This can be accomplished by thinking through the idea that even in the schools, students and teachers are part of a civil society, namely a society that is maintained by active voluntary participation of its members. It has been proposed here that it is possible to activate children as a civil community of participating citizens who are guided to turn their attention successively to problems that they as a group can help to unravel. Working through the steps of activation as participants in a social nexus, students have opportunities to act in civil society as cosmopolitans, acquiring the competencies that support an interactive transnational reality while becoming imbued with a global ethic. From the literature on the teaching-learning nexus, we can see that in this type of undertaking teachers are enabled to use the very professional resources which are known to advance in-depth learning.

Time is embedded in school spaces – and it is clearly impossible for schools to be disembedded from history. The inexorable advance of globalization is a wave which can be ridden with the help of tools that were invented for tangential purposes. The milieu in which teachers are called upon to exercise their profession is rife with contradictions. Thus, it is possible for teachers to apply their professionalism so as to further both consensual national
goals and as the means toward furthering a program of cosmopolitanism in and through education.

References


PART FOUR

TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
Chapter 9

Transformative Impact of Social Remittances in Transnational Settings

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There is much research literature focusing on the quantity and impact of migrants’ cash transfers to their families and communities back home. Among other issues, researchers have focused on the circumstances under which financial remittances can be channeled into productive investments in sending societies. Some of the researchers have also underlined that financial and material remittances have profound social impacts in migrants’ homelands, communities and households. Peggy Levitt, in particular, has highlighted that migration-related changes do not result from monetary transfers only, but social catalysts are also at work. Parallel with financial remittances Levitt has termed those factors as social remittances (1998; 2001:54). She has initially defined social remittances as “the ideas, behaviours, identities, and social capital that flow from receiving- to sending-country communities” (Levitt, 1998: 926). Later on Levitt (2008: 6) has acknowledged that migrants can also bring new ideas and practices to the receiving countries, but still the previous research has mainly concentrated on exploring how migrants’ social transfers, named as social remittances, modify the lives of those who “remain behind” (see Córdova & Hiskey, 2008; Gakunzi, 2006; Jiménez, 2008; Moran-Taylor, 2008; Parella & Cavalcanti, 2006; Taylor et al., 2006).

In this chapter, we hypothesize that new concepts and practices are not transferred just between host countries and countries of origin, but rather they are flowing in transnational spaces which encompass both migrants and non-migrants and are characterised by an intensified movement of diverse transfers across national borders. Further, the present research on social remittances has not explored how border-crossing transfer of new conceptions is linked to institutional transformations in transnational settings, including the host societies where migrants’ transformative impact is often reduced to “increased multiculturalism”. By looking at ongoing transmission processes and by identifying different

48 Although the term was introduced by Levitt, she is not the first one who has discovered that migrants convey new ideas, values and practices to their previous homelands. Already in the 1950s and the 1960s, researchers claimed that return migrants could transmit, for example, skills, knowledge and normative ideas from the receiving countries to their countries of origin (de Haas, 2007: 3).
types of transnational transfers suggested in the previous research we will outline a picture of emerging transnational institutions and figure whether – and to what extent – transfer of social remittances in transnational settings may transform existing institutions. For this purpose, we draw empirical examples, in particular, concerning family, work and politics from research concerning both migrants and non-migrants in different fields.

The Flow of ideas and practices in transnational social spaces

Studies on migrant transnationalism have often stressed the bipolar transnational ties between the migrants’ countries of origin and new countries of settlement. For our purposes, the concept of ‘transnational social space’ seems to provide a useful approach to explore the transnational transmission processes of social remittances. As explained by Faist (2000: 309), transnational social spaces are composed of “relatively permanent flows of people, goods, ideas, symbols, and services across international borders that tie stayers and movers and corresponding networks and non-state organisations”. One of the essential features of transnational social spaces is the cross-border transfer of conceptions and practices. Examples of transnational social spaces include, for example, communities of scientists, transnational families, trans-state religious organisations, and ethnic communities (Faist 2007: 4). Such spaces can include individuals – both migrants and non-migrants – living in several nation states. Furthermore, transnational social spaces can differ significantly in the sphere and scope of their activities.

The transmission of social remittances has mainly been described as a one-way process where migrants adopt new ideas and models of behaviour in the immigration country and convey them back home to non-migrants living in the country of origin. In the case of financial remittances, these are predominantly one-way flows from host societies to migrants’ home countries. Subsequently, social remittances are typically examined from the same perspective. Besides, the fieldwork on social remittances has mainly been conducted in the migrants’ countries of origin and empirical evidence of their impact in the countries of destination is thus limited. Both in the case of financial and social remittances, migrants are

49 In her most recent article with Lamba-Nieves, “Social Remittances Revisited” (under review; published on-line 2009) Levitt argues that social remittances circulate between receiving countries and the migrants’ homelands. Yet, the emphasis is still on the transfers from migrants to non-migrants back home.
seen as the key agents of transmission. However, the transmission processes of these two types of remittances are not quite similar. While money is usually sent detached from individuals, the ideas and practices are embedded in individuals. Coe and Bunnell (2003: 438) have noticed - concerning knowledge transfers in general – how embodied know-how is shared and transferred through social networks by processes of social interaction. Therefore, regarding social remittances, social interaction is a prerequisite for such transfers to take place. Furthermore, transnational networks play a key role in the transmission processes.

Thus, in this article, we understand social remittances as conceptions and practices transferred through interaction between individuals or within transnational networks, communities or organisations in transnational social spaces. Our conception is that the binary constellation of ‘receiving country’ and ‘sending country’ in explaining border-crossing transmission of social remittances is problematic and should be supplemented by a transnational approach, taking into account the role of mediating factors such as individual migrants, transnational networks and improved communication technology. It is true that not all migrants have transnational orientation, and that migrants’ transnational activities can differ significantly depending, for example, on their migration background, political status, life-cycle stage and resources. Still, an increasing number of people is constantly moving between two or more countries, or is living in several countries, and even continents, during their lives. Furthermore, migrants’ transnational contacts and networks are not limited only to their countries of origin. For example, members of transnational families can reside in various countries. In addition, migrants’ friends, colleagues or fellow students can live or have “roots” in different nation-states.

Levitt (1999; 2001) has explained the ways how social remittances have been transmitted to sending communities. Migrants communicate with their relatives or friends living in their country of origin, for example, by phone, e-mails, or videos, and simultaneously convey new beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours. They also pass on new ideas and practices during their visits to the countries of origin, and social remittances can be exchanged when non-migrants visit their relatives or friends in the country of immigration. Migrant associations, organisations, informally-organised groups and social networks have also been identified as possible transmission channels. (Gakunzi, 2006; Levitt 2001; 2009.) The ideas presented by Levitt are of interest but there is a need for critical amendments, particularly as systems of practice, normative structures, identities and social capital are seen as the main types of social transfers (Levitt, 2001; 2009). For instance, concerning gender identities, there can be many different identities depending on ethnicity, age, social class, sexual orientation, and so on. Hence, stating that migrants adopt and transfer gender identities of receiving societies
would be difficult to prove empirically, since it would require a deep analysis of ideas and beliefs behind certain type of gendered practices and a reliable way to prove that migrant has really internalised these ideas. Therefore, we find it more accurate to argue that migrants observe and adapt from their visible and observable fragments, such as clothing, consuming, and spare time activities, ideas regarding gender roles and positions.

It has been suggested that there are several factors that can hinder or support the adoption and transmission of social remittances (see Levitt 2001: 65-69). For example, the level of differences in value structures between the host and home countries can have an impact on how easily new norms will be adopted. In addition, the extent and amount of social remittances conveyed simultaneously influences their impact. Furthermore, both “senders” and “receivers” of social remittances expand, select and modify ideas and practices which they adopt (Levitt, 2001: 56-59; Suksomboon, 2008: 478). When people living abroad have contacts with colleagues, neighbors and classmates in their new home country, they observe behaviors that differ from what they are used to. Yet the immediate social contacts of migrants are not necessarily restricted just to natives/members of cultural majority in the receiving country: they can come to contact even more often with other immigrant or ethnic minority groups, and adopt their practices. Therefore, it can be said that migrants rather represent and transmit fragments of hybrid identities in transnational settings.

According to Levitt (2001: 66, 131) migrants can take advantage of their powerful economic position (due to financial transfers) in order to influence decision-making of non-migrants in the societies of origin. This conception is rather questionable. Although people working abroad may have a higher economical status compared to those who have been “left behind”, it does not automatically mean that they are admired and imitated in the sending communities. Rather, the migrants’ status may be ambivalent and their perceived success can be seen as 'corrupted success' by those who stayed (Lacroix, 2004: 90). The different ways of living that the migrants display through their behaviour, clothing and consumption can attract some but put off some others. This is the case, in particular, what comes to deeper value and norm structures. Furthermore, Flores (2005: 21-23) has underlined how one should not ignore the role of national and international power structures in transmission processes: the remittances conveyed by elite sectors of Diaspora usually reinforce traditional hierarchies while the remittances of the poor and working-class sectors can challenge or upset existing power relations.

Research on social remittances has so far overlooked the impact of improved communication technology to the cross-border transfer of ideas and practices. Many migrants are nowadays
taking advantage of various technological innovations to share experiences and views with their relatives and friends. Internet is an increasingly important arena in transmitting images ‘from here and there’. Virtual social platforms, such as Facebook, offer a public forum to distribute visual material, and, in You Tube, all kinds of video clips are available for circulation within one click, but still the selection and distribution is always done by individuals. It is worth noticing that, in transnational contexts, even innocent looking posting of a video may have political impact since the virtual rights are perceived differently in the contexts of different nation-states. For instance, You Tube is forbidden in many authoritarian states. This implies that migrants living in countries where such restrictions do not exist have an access to video material that their friends and relatives back home cannot see, but they can share this information with them. In this way, migrants become gatekeepers to transnational ‘mediascape’ (Appadurai, 1999).

There is evidence that many migrants prefer online communication for staying in touch with their friends and relatives who are in geographically distant places. For example, among those Estonian and Moroccan migrants we have examined50, Internet (e-mails, chats, Messenger, Skype-calls, Facebook, YouTube, and so on) is the most popular means for transnational communication. The use of Internet has made keeping frequent contacts with friends and relatives cheaper, easier and faster than before. Using information technology has become a normal part of many migrants’ and non-migrants’ everyday life. As Miller and Slater (2000) have shown, computer-mediated relationships of migrants are no longer separate from their other social relationships. Furthermore, internet groups can bring together both migrants and non-migrants from different countries and allow members of such groups to cross geographic and national borders easily. Brinkerhoff (2009) has, for example, looked at how members of virtual diaspora groups –living in different nation states- have been sharing experiences, discussing and negotiating political views, and, eventually, fostering also their social capital through online interaction. Consequently, new communication technologies provide inexpensive and fast channels to maintain daily contact to persons living around the globe and, consequently, transmit social remittances more rapidly and more extensively than before.

50 Within the TRANS-NET-project (see the Introduction of this book) 2008-2011, both in Finland and in France, 80 semi-structured interviews of migrants were carried out as well as 20 life-course interviews of the selected persons mainly from the same groups.
Searching for the transformative character of social remittances

To find representative cases of transformation processes we draw empirical examples from previous research on the field. Empirical evidence suggests that there are, in particular, three spheres of life where social remittances play an important role: family, work and politics. In this chapter, we focus on these three cases and ask how – and to what extent – the circulation of ideas and practices in transnational social spaces can transform the institutions concerned. As research focusing on social remittances has mainly examined them as one-way flows and has looked at their impact mostly in the countries of origin, we also refer to studies which are not explicitly focusing on social remittances but the authors are discussing transnational transfer of ideas and/or practices on a more general level.

Case 1: Family order

In the previous research, there is evidence that transnational migration and new conceptions conveyed by migrants can – at least in some ways – transform the existing family order. Frank and Wildsmith (2005) have noticed that, in Mexico, persons residing in communities with medium level of migration experience have a greater risk of union dissolution as compared to residents of communities with low levels of migration. It was concluded that the norms regarding divorce and marital unions could have been transferred to Mexican communities through return migration and migrants residing in the United States. Nevertheless, there are limits regarding the adoption of new ideas once migration has become a standard feature in a community. (Frank and Wildsmith, 2005) Concerning family planning, it has been noted that transnational and other kinds of social networks can transmit information about the positive effects of fertility control as well as methods available, and consequently enhance the use of modern contraceptives (Lindstrom and Muñoz-Franco, 2005). More effective family-planning methods can eventually change both family sizes as well as the lives of men and women. The ability to control births can also have an effect on social structures of the societies. This implies that ideas and behaviours brought by both migrants living abroad and returnees may gradually transform family orders.

Most evidently, transnational migration has challenged existing conceptions on marital unions in migrants' home communities. In Thailand, cross-cultural marriages between Thai women and foreign men have changed marriage choices: marrying a foreign partner is now perceived as an opportunity for upward mobility as well as financially beneficial. Furthermore,
migrant women are also themselves reinforcing views of international marriage migration as a success story, making it a desired option for girls. (Suksomboon, 2008) In Morocco, the number of previously inhibited marriages between Muslim women and foreign non-Muslim men has increased, and such unions have become socially more tolerated in recent years (Harrami and Mahdi, 2008). One reason why the “mixed” marriages have become socially acceptable in migrants’ home communities is that marriage has been seen as a migration strategy and economically beneficial for family members.

It has been pointed out how both male and female migrants have adopted new behaviours and conceptions regarding family order, such as more equal division of household chores, ideas how to hinder domestic violence as well as new approaches in family management: giving special attention to children and consulting more their partners. (Levitt, 2001; Moran-Taylor, 2008; Taylor et al., 2006; Tiemoko, 2003) Furthermore, they have been conveying new ideas also to the non-migrants in the communities of origin which have influenced, in particular, women’s attitudes. (Levitt, 2001; Moran-Taylor, 2008; Taylor et al., 2006) However, it has been noticed how the changes in male returnees’ behaviour and views have often been temporary: men have reverted to previous patriarchal ways. (Taylor et al., 2006: 56) In addition, female migrants’ emancipated behaviour is not always welcomed by the communities of origin (Moran-Taylor, 2008: 116). Consequently, migration-related changes to gender order within families, influenced by social remittances, can be gradual or even ambivalent due to the social structures which resist transformations.

Regarding the impacts of social remittances to the receiving countries’ family orders, Suksomboon (2008) points out how the ideas and practices concerning family are also transmitted from the home country to the host country. For example, as Thai-Dutch couples have different understanding of the family unit as well as of the responsibilities of adult children towards their parents, this requires management and renegotiation between migrant women and their spouses. Suksomboon (2008:461) argues that “these social remittances expose non-migrants to global cultural diffusion and cause to a degree a transformation of their social values and their life styles” Although cross-cultural marriages are becoming more common within host societies, one cannot yet show that family institutions in the host countries have been rapidly changing due to the new practices.

Although there is evidence that migrants have transmitted new ideas and practices concerning family orders which have affected non-migrants’ and communities’ behaviour and views particularly in migrants’ countries of origin, one can also notice that permanent changes in norm systems are often slow. The changes can be uneven and gradual
depending on the social structures and ideologies in the countries concerned.\textsuperscript{51} Therefore, one cannot yet claim that family institutions have been profoundly transformed due to the transnational flows of ideas and practices. However, migrants can have a special position - because of their transnational orientation and cross-cultural know-how - to promote new ideas on family order as well as to introduce different kinds of marital practices.

\textbf{Case 2: Work conditions}

Transnational migrants may also transfer new ideas, knowledge and practices through their work. An increasing number of people exercise their occupation in two or more countries. Not just low-income workers migrate to rich countries, but also highly skilled professionals are increasingly going international, due to higher income and life opportunities elsewhere, or because of lack of opportunity at home. These movements are occurring between high-, middle- and low-income countries, “developed” and “developing” worlds, but also among highly-industrialised and "developing" countries, with different but linked impacts and challenges in each case. Yet previous research on social remittances has not scrutinised transfer of conceptions or practices in transnational occupational contexts.\textsuperscript{52} The majority of migrants studied in relation to social remittances have been working in manual/manufacturing work in the destination countries. In these cases, their interaction with the host population is probably limited, in particular, in work contexts. However, there are also a number of highly skilled migrants who are actively participating in different kinds of transnational professional networks and activities.

In our study (2011) focusing on the Finnish/Estonian transnational social space, new ideas and practices were often shared at occupational contexts. Migrants had conveyed manual/professional skills, ways of organising work, knowledge about project work, organisational know-how and ideas on promoting gender equality at the workplace and in recruitment processes in transnational settings. They had also adopted new professional

\textsuperscript{51} See also Harrami (in this volume) focusing on how transnational migration affects cultural transmission within migrant families.

\textsuperscript{52} The studies to which we are referring in this chapter have not mentioned ‘social remittances’ as such (except Gakunzi, 2006) although most of them are discussing international/transnational transfer of ideas, knowledge and/or competences.
skills and practices from different countries where they had been working. The respondents reported that the members of different kinds of transnational occupational communities/networks had shared new ideas and practices, and they had mutually profited from these exchanges. It should still be taken into account that several factors can hinder conveying new knowledge and practices in work environments. For instance, host country nationals may not value or accept the immigrants' competences. Forsander (2002) who has examined the role of social capital and cultural competences of immigrants for their incorporation to the labour market in Finland, has noticed that, due to different forms of discrimination, immigrant workers lose possibilities for transferring their knowledge, ideas and skills obtained in the country of origin. Rather than transmission of professional skills the concept of “brain death” was used by Gakunzi’s (2006) African informants to summarise their situation in Europe: highly skilled immigrants had ended up in low skilled occupations in the immigration country and, therefore, progressively came to lose their professional skills acquired in the source country.

Despite discrimination and prejudices, in work environments, there are also arenas where migrants and non-migrants meet and are able to exchange their views, beliefs and practices. The adoption and implementation of diversity management practices represents an example how companies and their HRM practices have changed as a consequence of transnational mobility of labour. Many managers have started to value the diversity and the various skills of both recent and old ethnic minorities. The most successful examples have also shown that adopting a new diversity plan is not enough but more long-term institutional changes will be needed, including reforms in HRM strategies. (Marquis, 2007: 1-6; Wrench, 2007: 3-7) In the 2000’s, diversity management practices have become a relatively common business practices, particularly in large Western companies. An important factor which has influenced the policy changes includes the development of heterogeneous workforce due to the increasing transnational mobility of labour as well as the increasing internationalisation of business. In transnational occupational spaces, significant culturally based differences can exist in the relationships between managers and employees, and also among majority and minority employees. This means that ignoring diversity is no longer an option. It is evident that a human resource strategy wherein the mainstream staff are seeing as a norm fails to provide the representatives of minority cultures with equal opportunity and, thus, to prevent their exclusion. In a culturally diverse environment it is not enough that all people are to be treated the same, rather the management of diversity needs to become a main issue of concern.
It has been shown how a part of professional expatriates maintain extensive and frequent contacts with colleagues and institutions in their former home countries (Mahroum et al., 2006; Saxenian, 2006). Such transnational ties have been transforming to ‘diaspora knowledge networks’ which provide arenas where “brain drain” can be converted to “brain circulation” through the transnational transfer of skills and knowledge. Although it has been claimed that such networks may not be stable and their impact has not been measured in detail (Lowell and Gerova, 2004), there is evidence that the number and activities of diaspora knowledge networks has been increasing in recent years (Kuznetsov, 2006; Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006). Although globally their number is still limited, their diverse activities, such as exchange of scientific, technical and administrative information, “scientific diplomacy”, joint projects, enterprise creation, training and *ad hoc* consultations can support the scientific, technological and economic development of migrants’ former home country in different ways. Furthermore, there also exist networks which unite professionals originating from the same region or continent, not only from one nation state. (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006: 7-8, 16) In such networks, scientists can exchange and circulate information not only between the host and home country but also within and across several countries. Furthermore, it is not always necessary that migrants physically move in order to transfer ideas across national borders. Through virtual networks highly skilled expatriates can transfer information and know-how without moving themselves.

Coe and Bunnell (2003) have identified transnational innovation networks among which one domain include networks composed of “knowledgeable” international migrants, bridging associations and transnational enterprises. Concerning innovation processes, they underline the importance of ‘mobile knowledgeable subjects’ who are “plugged into networks facilitating the ‘external’ renewal and reworking of practices that define innovation” (Coe and Bunnell, 2003: 452). In other words, transnational, highly skilled migrants can play a key role in transferring and sharing new practices which can promote innovation. Transnational scientific networks, for example, can be a space for the transmission and adoption of new ideas. Furthermore, such networks – which include both migrants and non-migrants- can develop into “transnational technical communities characterized by mutually beneficial connections and the *circulation* of people, capital, technologies and ideas” (Coe and Bunnell, 2003: 438). An example of such communities could be the transnational technical and business communities created by the ‘new Argonauts’ –mobile migrant entrepreneurs from Silicon Valley.

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53 Emphasis in the original text.
Valley- in cooperation with local partners from their homelands, including China, Taiwan, Israel and India (Saxenian, 2006).

Transnational technical/scientific communities and networks are examples of new forms of transnational social spaces which have been rapidly expanding. The development of information technology has facilitated the transnational activities of such communities and networks. Mutually beneficial circulation of know-how and knowledge is the core idea of such spaces. Transnationally-oriented migrants which possess transnational competence (see Koehn, 2006) and belong to diverse, heterogeneous networks can ideally link scientific/technical communities in different countries. Through exchange of ideas and practices, members of such communities are taking advantage of the social capital embedded in their networks, developing bridging social capital and enhancing their human capital.

Case 3: Political sphere

In the increasingly interconnected world, one question of actual importance is the flow of political conceptions in transnational settings. Cross-border migrants and migrant organisations have been represented both as potential advocates of democracy as well potential supporters of terrorism. For instance, international organisations have been portraying emigrant organisations and migrant communities as possible promoters of democracy, human rights and good governance (Faist, 2007: 2, 6). Yet some authorities and politicians have also expressed fear how migrant organisations can through their transnational activities agitate for violence and disorder.

It has been suggested that increasing democratisation of states as such has enhanced migrants’ opportunities for transnational political engagement. Koslowski (2005a: 5) underlines that “democratisation in host countries provides more conducive environments for emigrant political activity while democratisation of home countries increases the chance that emigrants are able to influence their homelands’ politics”. Yet the links between migrant political activities and democratisation processes can be very complex. When examining the

54 See the definitions of social capital by Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1990) and Putnam (1993), and Faist 2000 (on the role of social capital in migration movements).
case studies on the Dominican Republic and El Salvador, one can notice migrant organisations were part of political opposition movements opposing the authoritarian regimes and taking part in the political processes which led to democratisation. Although migrants have been enforcing democratic decision-making in these countries, their contribution to the deepening of participatory democracy has been limited. (Itzigsohn and Villacrés, 2008.) Therefore, migrants can have in transition periods special interest to support democratisation processes but when the political regime has been reformed their political activities may diminish or they may opt for maintaining the privileges of certain groups.

There are also indications that migrants can enhance tolerant attitudes and political participation of non-migrants in the countries of origin to a certain extent. For example, in Mexico, people living in communities with high migrant population were more eager to take part in political activities. Non-migrants who had transnational contacts, were more likely to work for political parties, to attend political rallies, to vote, and also to tolerate their opponents, including their political rights. (Jiménez, 2008) Similarly, a study concerning six Latin American countries by Córdova and Hiskey (2008) showed how individuals with strong connections to migrant networks expressed higher levels of political tolerance if compared to those with limited or no connections to migrants. In addition, those having more exposure to transnational networks were also more active in community-related activities. However, it is also possible that authoritarian regimes interpret the attempts of exile organisations to promote the development of democracy at the home country as “outside interference” and use it as an excuse to repress opposition forces, as happened in China (Freedman, 2005: 145).

Internet has become an important medium for migrants’ political advocacy. Again, online migrant groups can both promote secessionist movements and civil war as well as search for peaceful solutions for the internal conflicts in their countries of origin. There is evidence that cyberorganisations of migrants can prevent conflicts by providing platforms for discussions on homeland, negotiating hybrid identities inclusive of liberal values, showing alternative paths to address conflictive topics, and discouraging calls for violence. Moreover, interaction within the communities can also foster bonding and bridging social capital of their members. (Brinkerhoff, 2009: 146-147; 201) Bonding social capital allows them to unite and share experiences with those with similar backgrounds while bridging social capital assists them in crossing national and ethnic boundaries by linking migrant groups in various host countries.

When discussing the transfer of political ideas and practices in transnational settings, one should take into account that political ideas and practices are not just transmitted from host
society to home country but instead flowing in transnational social spaces, and that migrants can already possess ideas, for example, on advancing democracy and human rights when they emigrate. In case of exiles, which have fled authoritarian regimes, emigration has often opened opportunities to promote their political ideas, and simultaneously influence political change in the country of origin. In these cases, migrants can “send back” conceptions already arisen in the home country, as well as elaborate these ideas based on their experiences in the host country.

Political activities of migrants can be supported by the political opportunity structures provided by the host countries. Political mobilisation of migrant groups, including the transfer of political ideas and practices, can have implications not only for the country of origin but also for the host country. For example, in case of Kurdish diaspora, Kurds have been able to express their ethnic identity and mobilise political activities more effectively outside their homelands. In case of Germany, the civil rights provided ground for developing community ties of Kurds, for aggregation of resources and for organising various protest activities. The political activities of Kurds eventually affected also the domestic politics of Germany. (Lyon and Ucarer, 2005: 77.)

Koslowski (2005b: 1) suggests that “increasing international migration, the information revolution and democratisation have propelled a globalisation of the domestic politics of many states that is similar to the globalization of national economies”. From our view, migrants’ political activities - which include the flows of ideas and practices over national borders – have, in some cases, extended the realm of domestic politics from national to transnational level. However, one has to note that not all emigrant groups are politically active or influential. Some powerful migrant communities have been transforming domestic politics in the way that it also includes a transnational dimension. The political freedoms have advanced the possibilities of the migrants to express their views and promote their agenda both in the new country of settlement and in the country of origin.

55 See also Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2009) on how migrants' experiences prior emigration can influence both their activities in the host societies and what they remit back to their countries of origin.
Conclusion

In previous research, there has been some discussion to what extent migration and migrant transnationalism can transform societies in general. Portes (2008: 19-24) has argued that transformational potential of migration is limited in host societies. He provides examples of some 20th century migratory movements to the United States concluding that immigration has not changed the fundamental pillars of the American society, such as normative complex, legal system or power structures. According to Vertovec (2009: 23-24), migrant transnationalism and its social effects may not bring substantial societal transformations alone but can contribute to broadening or intensifying on-going transformation processes. Consequently, he suggests that migrants’ transnational practices – at both individual and collective level – can in the cumulative way alter value systems and social practices of people across regions. Likewise, Stephen Castles has mainly focused on social transformation in the context of increasing transnational connectedness. He has highlighted that there is a need to study social transformation processes caused by cross-border flows and transnational networks in a wider global context (e.g. Castles, 2001; 2007).

The focus of this article lies in institutional transformations caused by transnational flows and networks. We sought to figure whether the transnational transfer of social remittances can transform existing institutions. On the basis of the empirical evidence presented it can be concluded that social remittances may change conventional thinking in the spheres of family, religion and politics as well as transform competence requirements, qualifications and professional identity maintenance. It was noted that although the flow of new ideas and practices may affect both migrants’ and non-migrants’ and their communities’ actual behaviours, the changes are particularly slow in the sphere of attitudinal and normative structures. If compared to the influence of global media flows, the power of social remittances lies in the personalised nature of transmission: one of the key features of social remittance transmission is that these are often communicated between persons who know each other well, or are united by mutual social ties (Levitt, 2001: 64). Furthermore, migrants can pass information and practices which are seldom conveyed in media, such as transnational know-how and occupational expertise. Such information can be particularly useful for those planning to migrate and for those who are engaging in transnational

56 If Portes had looked the issue few centuries earlier, he might have noticed that earlier migration movements did, indeed, profoundly alter the society in the North America.
business or working in transnational contexts. Transnational migrants have a special position to attain multiple human capital as they live in several nation-states and have become familiar with life styles, modes of behaviour and political systems of these countries. Through novel perspectives, they can compare social and cultural differences and similarities in different societies and share their ideas with those who have not moved. Transnational networks, communities, and organisations provide arenas for negotiating and adopting new conceptions and practices.

Although it is difficult to identify clear institutional changes caused by transnational transmission of social remittances, the emergence of transnational occupational spaces and new forms of HRM strategies may provide present-day examples of institutional transformations. Still, the most evident examples of institutional transformations can be found in virtual environments. Transnational virtual communities represent examples of emerging transnational communities which unite people with different or similar cultural, ethnic and/or linguistic backgrounds. In these communities, people can transcend national borders without moving themselves. On-line communities provide opportunities both for fostering ethnic community ties and for creating multicultural, transstate communities sharing same passions.

There are also other types of transnational “communities of practice” (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998) where people share same interests and engage in common practice. In such communities, people can exchange ideas, conceptions and practices as well as foster their social capital across cultural, linguistic and/or national boundaries. Different kinds of transnational social spaces can, therefore, be examined as communities of learning where participants engage in a process of collective, informal learning: sharing, exchanging and adopting new ideas and practices. Many interesting questions are arising here. It can be asked in what kind of transnational communities and social spaces ideas, information, and practices are transmitted and exchanged smoothly? In addition, one could ask, which aspects may hinder interaction processes in transnational settings? In general, exploring social remittances can assist both in attaining deeper understanding of the nature, function and development of different kinds of transnational social spaces as well as understanding socio-cultural transformations linked to migration.
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Chapter 10

Transnational Care and National Social Policies

Minna Zechner

Transnational care

Family responsibilities, like care, do not fade away when family members live dispersed in various countries (Alicea, 1997; Bryceson & Vuorela, 2002; Zechner, 2008). Instead new ways to provide emotional, practical and economic care and guidance emerge in these transnational families (see Huttunen in this book). One of these new ways is transnational care, which refers to caring activities that are performed across the borders of nation-states (Baldassar et al. 2007: 3; Zechner, 2008: 33). Care and more specifically social care is here understood as activities and relations involved in meeting the physical and emotional needs of children and elders who are not able to do it themselves (Daly & Lewis, 2000: 285). Care is a gendered activity, performed to great extend by women. Care is also often a pivotal issue in migration. For example the moves and migrations and especially their timing amongst migrant groups from Bangladesh to United Kingdom is very much influenced by care. More specifically the decisive factor is when female labour is needed for care reasons. Husbands leave wives behind so that they care for children and parents-in-law. In addition wives are called for to join the husbands in United Kingdom when the husbands become frail and ill (Gardner, 2002: 122, 124).

Child and elder care are both individual and societal activities. It means that giving care produces welfare both at an individual as well as at a societal level. Care activities are framed, defined, controlled and supported by various kinds of social policies. The care of family members is generally understood as a family responsibility, but processes such as ageing of the population, low birth rates and the rising numbers of women in the labour market have paved the way for social care to be collectivised to some extend. Still, averaging across the fifteen EU countries and Norway, informal care of older people in 2000 was five times more prevalent than formal care which comes through services of various kinds (Daly and Rake, 2003: 54). In some countries such as mainland China, Israel, Spain, Taiwan and over half of the US states there is a legislation defining the role of family members in providing care for elders (Izuhara, 2010a: 155).
Since social care has become a societal issue, a vast number of policy responses have been designed to provide and support care activities especially in developed welfare states. Despite the increasing impact of transnational organisations, such as European Union (EU) or Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), on national social policies, care policies have generally stayed predominantly national even though there is certain degree of convergence in welfare policies either offering cash benefits or services (Starke & Obinger, 2009: 123; see also Kalev et al. in this book). Also during the past decades states have increasingly pursued a social investment approach in social policies hence linking employment and social provision more closely together than before (Lewis, 2006: 2).

Care policies are under change but their national character has remained even though transnational caring has become a common practise. In this chapter I aim to tackle following questions by looking at different types of mainly European care policies through the lens of transnational child and elder care activities. The questions include: What happens when the transnational care activities meet the care policies that are mainly national? What kinds of care policy responses support transnational care and which ones may even hinder such activities? And finally, are there differences in child and elder care policies in this relation?

Policies are scrutinized mainly from the migrant’s point of view, where a migrant is giving care across transnational social space. Migrants and their close ones are seen as actors who may make use of various national care policies in an innovative way. Even though care policies are designed to support care provision within the nation-state, they may additionally include elements that can be of assistance when giving care also transnationally at the same time. This means that when migrants or their close ones living in a developed welfare state are targets to child or elder care policies, they may at the same time make use of these policies while giving or receiving care across nation-state borders. Transnational caring is an activity which has been documented in various studies and my data consists of these studies.

This chapter is in a way testing different types of care policies in relation to transnational care. I will demonstrate how transnational care stretches the boundaries of national welfare policies and that individuals sometimes use the care policies in ways that are different from what the policies are originally designed for. As a result national policies may be changed. What has to be kept in mind is that migrants in developed welfare states do not form a homogenous group. Instead they vary from refugees and asylum seekers to high rank expatriate workers and other professionals. Based on their different statues officially defined
as illegal and legal immigrants with varying types of residence and working permits, some of them have full access to publicly provided social welfare whereas others have very limited or no access at all. In addition there is always a need to pay attention to the possible barriers for international move such as requirements for visas, passports as well as political instabilities, wars and natural disasters. Some families are also dispersed to more than two locations but for simplicity I am referring to two localities: migrant’s country of residence and the country of departure only. Finally, care of children and older people has traditionally and predominantly been a female activity, thus care policies shape especially the transnational activities of women. Next I shall put forward some issues related to social care policies and their changes in recent years.

Care policies

Before going to national care policies, it must be reminded that since the majority of European welfare states are members of the European Union, the role of EU must somehow be taken into account. European Union has some degree of power to shape national policy responses. Free movement of labour, capital, goods and services amongst the member states, is one of the main motives for the European Union. The right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States is also granted to their family members, irrespective of nationality (Directive 2004/38/EC). These issues have an essential impact on transnational care activities.

Regarding child care, member states committed 2002 in Barcelona meeting to step up provision of child care so that by 2010 it would be available to 90 per cent of children between three and six years of age and 33 per cent of children under three years of age (Commission, 2006: 10). This goal has not in many countries been achieved but already a creation of such an explicit goal gives states a strong incentive to shape their child care policies towards offering services.

The impact of EU on elder care policies is less direct than on child care policies. Anyhow at least two main EU impact areas are worth mentioning. Firstly there has been a gradual move towards applying internal market and competition law in the field of social protection (Saari & Kvist, 2007: 2). Hence EU sets guidelines on how public entities are supposed to do their procurement and set out tenders for certain services that are open for outsourcing. Secondly a common European Union policy on legal and illegal immigration is under way (Council of the European Union, 2008). This means that the international movement of essential actors...
in care, namely family members and care workers is to become standardized across the European Union member states. Generally within EU there is a freedom of movement and residence. For retired people freedom of residence is applicable when they have pension, health insurance and sufficient resources to prevent them from becoming dependent on the host country (King et al. 2000: 175). Freedom of movement is also determined by the definition of family members, which usually refers to spouses and minor children (Kofman, 2004). In Spain and Denmark instead older generations may be included in family reunification measures if they are dependent, in Germany for humanitarian reasons and in Netherlands if they are in serious difficulties (Kofman 2008: 75).

Social care encompasses various stages as well as spheres of life. For example matters like housing, public transport and barriers in the nearby environment essentially shape the possibilities of people to give and receive care and to live an active and fulfilling life. From that point of view majority of social policies have a role in shaping people's activities in social care. However in this chapter only policies that are directly aimed at shaping child or elder care are considered. Also it is assumed that children are generally healthy, not with disabilities or long-term illnesses.

Social policies supporting care activities basically meet three needs, the ones of time, services and finances (Daly, 2002: 255). Meeting these needs can be translated to four different types of policy responses:

1. monetary and in-kind social security and taxation benefits,
2. employment-related provisions,
3. services and
4. incentives towards employment creation (ibid. 255).

Monetary and in-kind social security and taxation benefits take often the form of cash for care where people are given money for not using services and/or for doing the care work themselves usually at home. Benefits may be paid for the carer of for the person in need of care (if an adult) and the amount and type of control related to the use of a benefit vary substantially. Reimbursement may also be other than cash, for example assisting devices, diapers or house renovations. Monetary benefits related to taxation are often given to families with young children in a form of a family taxation. Lower levels of income tax are paid if the taxpayer has so called dependent family members.

Employment-related provisions are only available for those who are active in the formal labour market. A common version of such a provision is care leave, which allows parents and
those giving care to an elderly person to take time from employment for caring. Other forms of provision may be career breaks, flexible working times and reduction of working hours. Each of these policy responses frees individuals temporarily from employment responsibilities in order to give care.

Services are generally divided into institutional or community-based ones. Institutional care services offer to elders 24-hour care when care needs are extensive. For children institutional services in the form of day care are usually offered for the time their parents are busy with work or study. Community-based services are mainly supporting elders with everyday activities such as eating and bathing and giving them a space for socialising. For children community-based services are at times to be consumed with parents or other adult who has the main responsibility for the child during the service use. An example of such a service is a meeting point for parents with young children or an afternoon club for primary school children.

Incentives towards employment creation include policies such as tax rebates for buying services from the market. Also vouchers that may be used for buying market-based services can be understood as and incentive towards employment creation. Mainly these incentives aim to encourage people to consume services at home and to buy them directly from the market. This way service sector employment is also boosted. Policies predominantly aim to assist caregiving within the national borders, not for somebody residing abroad. This is taken as given here since the transferability of welfare benefits is generally very limited, especially related to social care.

Policies on care have during recent years been under change. Public responsibility of child care has been increasing in European countries (Anttonen & Sointu, 2006: 118). Parental leave schemes have spread across countries even though entitlements still vary significantly. United States and Australia are one of the few welfare states that do not have any form of paid parental leave (Himmelweit, 2008: 257). Nordic countries have transferred many child care tasks to social services. Most Continental European and English-speaking countries instead support family income through transfer payments or tax benefits (Starke & Obinger, 2009: 133). Child care is increasingly understood as a shared responsibility where women, men and the state are involved, even though the main responsibility is still held by parents (Anttonen & Sointu, 2006: 119).

Public responsibility on care for older persons has also been increasing in European countries (Anttonen & Sointu, 2006: 121). Policies aim to recognise and sustain familial care
by combining the transfer of money to families with the provision of services. At the same time new social care markets have been started up, based on the distinction among financing, purchasing and management of services. Social care markets include competitive procedures and market mechanisms and aims to empower the users allowing them freedom of choice through more purchasing power (Pavolini & Ranzi, 2008: 18).

Welfare states have put different emphasis on children and elders. Looking at the direct public expenditure it is possible to divide welfare states into ones that are either oriented towards youth or towards elderly. In this terms consistently elderly-oriented countries are Austria, Greece, Italy, Japan, Spain and United States. The most youth-oriented welfare states are the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries and the English-speaking countries other than United States (Lynch, 2006: 16). Social expenditure does not of course reveal it all since intergenerational transfers, spending in the market and other groups of people benefiting from policies not targeted to them takes place as this chapter will point out.

Now having described the variation of social care related policy responses as well as some broad policy changes, I shall evaluate them by paying attention to how care policies support or hinder transnational caring activities within and from developed welfare states to other countries. I start by looking at care services, then move on to incentives towards employment creation after which employment-related provision and finally monetary benefits are considered.

**Care services**

The underlying idea of welfare policies is to secure the citizens or inhabitants of a nation-state territory from certain social risks. It has been claimed that the construction of the national welfare has been an integral part of nation-building as well. Social policies, including care policies have indeed explicit and implicit goals such as socialising people into desired patterns of action as well as sorting out and regulating so called problem populations (Clarke, 2004: 1).

The main function of publicly provided or organised care services is to either support or replace informal care given by the close ones, mainly family members. In transnational families those who give and those who receive care are living in a territory of another nation-state. Since public care services are mainly offered within the territory of a given welfare state, they do not give much support for transnational caring activities, unless those in need
of care migrate. In such case it ceases being transnational care. In many countries it is very difficult for older persons with care needs to enter the country where for example members of younger generations reside. For example entry to Britain to join families is feasible only if the potential entrée can demonstrate that the stay would not entail recourse to public funds (Mand, 2008: 189).

However, there are some exceptional cases where a welfare state has taken measures to produce or support the local production of care services in another nation state. Certain Norwegian municipalities have set up nursing and care institutions in Spain providing elder care. These institutions serve mainly Norwegian pensioners who have migrated to Spain as retired migrants either on permanent or seasonal basis (Migration and health, 2009: 81). The problem with these institutions is that they only provide for those who originate from Norwegian municipalities that have contributed to the provision of these services. A group of Norwegians have started to lobby and campaign for a coherent and fair treatment of Norwegians living in Spain and in need of care (ibid. 86).

Similar trends are visible in schooling, for example German state has a long history of supporting German schools (Deutsche Auslandsschulen) all over the globe. Schooling is in this article understood as education and not as care therefore it is not discussed further. I just wish to make a point that public bodies providing services for own nationals and other target groups abroad is not that uncommon.

Public services are anyhow predominantly offered within the territory of a given welfare state. If a child or elderly person in need of care resides in a country where care services are not available, they offer very little support to those who give or organise care across the transnational social space. Transnational social spaces refer to “...a densified and institutionalized framework of social practices, symbol systems and artefacts that span pluri-locally over different national societies” (Herrera Lima, 2001: 77). On the other hand, when children or elders in need of care reside in a country where services are available, family members and close ones from abroad may find these services useful when making an effort towards transnational caring. For example Albanian migrants in Greece, United Kingdom and Italy are involved in transnational care of older family members since it is the duty of the son to look after the parents. In addition the Albanian welfare system is weak; pensions are not high enough to secure livelihood and social services are a rare phenomenon, especially in the countryside (King & Vullnetari, 2009: 29, 31).
New Zealand and Australia are societies that are structured by large-scale migration flows both into and out of the country. The adult children of many middle-aged and third age parents live and work overseas and, consequently, many people in these countries end up lacking close family support in their old age. In this situation social service staff may have to communicate with relatives outside national borders in order to keep them informed and involved (Baldassar et al. 2007: 180; Lunt, 2009: 240). A study from Australia on transnational elder care shows that the most successful encounters between migrants and professionals where the older person in need of care resides seem to be when the migrant has training in medicine or nursing. Availability and lack of care services may also influence the frequency and length of visits to the country where older person in need of care resides (Baldassar et al. 2007: 180–181). At times older generations choose to return to the country of departure at the time of retirement. When returned parents start to need care, this may evoke the unwilling or willing return of younger generations in order to support and give care as has happened with some Pakistani families living in United Kingdom (Harris & Shaw, 2006: 269–270).

Public services offer little help in transnational caring, depending on the direction of caring: between the developed countries or between less and more developed countries (in terms of welfare state and social services). Transnational caring from a state that offers a wide variety of social services into a country where care policies and services are scarcely available, demonstrates the differences between countries in a very concrete and often negative way (Zechner, 2008). Since the direction of international migrants is often from less developed countries towards the more developed ones, this kind of a setting is not unusual. Migrant families who are aware that there are only few services available for those in need of care in the country of departure, provide economical and practical support across national borders as to compensate the lack of services (Baldassar et al. 2007; Zechner, 2007; 2008). The strength of filial piety has a role to play here as well and for example Chinese and Indian migrants living in United States at times choose to bring their older parents to live at least part of the year in US (see Lamb, 2002; Lan, 2002).

A comprehensive service provision in the migrant’s country of residence may be of importance as well in transnational caring. When the care of children and elders residing in the same country with the migrant is arranged in a satisfactory way, the migrant is able to put more effort in transnational caregiving. Also individuals may gain insights from both countries regarding care provision and arrangements. For example in Finland and Norway children are all equally entitled to daycare services whether the parents are active on the labour market or not (Rantalaiho, 2010: page). This means that migrants outside the labour market can place
their children in public day care and dedicate their time for transnational care, if they wish. A study of Ukrainian immigrants in Germany on the other hand demonstrates how the German day care system, which often does not accept children younger than three years of age, may limit transnational caring possibilities of the parents. Working immigrant mothers have very few possibilities in finding day care solutions for children under the age of three years (Amelina, 2009: 20, 25). Having a well-functioning child care and schooling provision in the country of residence lessens the need for child-shifting. Child-shifting is a practice of shifting the responsibilities of childrearing between parents and other relatives, close friends, or neighbours. The shift may be permanent or temporary and it may last from few days to several years. With Caribbean families it usually occurs when parents are unable to take care of their children (Russell-Brown et al. 1996). Children are left for example to grandmother when the mother migrates (Toro-Morn, 1995). Affordable and available day care services and schooling lessen the need for international moves motivated by child care (see Zontini, 2006).

If parents are not content with the quality of the services or with the fact that children become socialized to the local mainstream culture, they may want to send their children abroad to be cared for or for schooling (see Toro-Morn, 1995; Orellana et al. 2001). Indian migrants in Australia also send children to India for extended holidays in order to learn about their ancestral culture (Voigt-Graf, 2005: 380). At times children are specifically sent abroad after high standard school services (see Harriss and Osella in this book). For example a number of Korean and Chinese parents have been sending their children to United States to attain local schools for the purpose of gaining later entrance to an American university. Children may reside either with a paid caretaker, in boarding homes or with locally residing relatives and friends (Zhou, 1998, Orellana et al. 2001). These children are often referred as parachute kids. Also Bangladeshi children are at times joined with their families and relatives residing in United Kingdom at early age so that they, especially boys, can benefit from the educational system. If biological mother of these children are unwilling or unable to move to Britain, children may be brought by co-wives of their mothers or other female relatives (Gardner, 2002: 126). As a reversed practise, certain group of Indian migrants in Australia have a habit of sending their children to be raised by the grandparents in South India (Voigt-Graf, 2005: 373).

Also older people may migrate after care services, so far mainly medical services are sought after in foreign countries. This activity evokes mainly temporary international mobility in the form of medical tourism, which typically refers to patients travelling abroad for surgical operations. Popular destinations for medical tourism include countries like Thailand,
Singapore, India and South Africa. The direction of movement in care migration and medical tourism is from more to less affluent countries (Connell, 2006; Kröger & Zechner, 2009). These examples that go beyond public policies show that child and elder care services, public or market-based, are influential in international moves and in transnational activities.

**Employment creation**

The rationale behind incentives towards care employment creation is that when individuals employ somebody to do care work or buy care services from the market, the demand for public services diminishes. In addition any state is eager to increase the number of people in employment. It may also be so that supporting employment creation is cheaper for the public purse than offering public care services which often are heavily subsidised by the public monies or they are free of charge. For example in 2007 in public Finnish elder care customer fees covered about 16 per cent of nursing home expenses and 14 per cent of the home care expenses (Sjöholm, 2009).

One obvious reason for employment creation is that labour market activity brings tax revenues usually only if the work is performed within the national borders. The policy means to create employment in the care work sector are mainly cash benefits, tax deductions and vouchers. Tax deductions often allow lower social charges for employing somebody to do the work. Vouchers on the other hand cover either completely or partially the costs of buying services. Also cash benefits may be used to cover the costs of employing somebody but I will cover the issue of cash benefits later under the heading of monetary benefits.

In France subsidised childminders, allowances and tax deductions are widely used tools of family policies. An allowance is paid to families with children under six years of age and who are cared for at the home of a registered childminder. Another allowance is paid to families employing nannies to look after their children in the family home. In addition, parents may deduct half of the costs incurred from their income tax and as a result up to 70 per cent of the total cost of child care may be covered with these benefits and deductions. Families, who employ someone to look after their children after school or on Wednesdays when there is no school, may claim tax deductions with a pre-financed voucher to simplify formalities when employing home help services (Pailhé et al. 2008: 153–154).

Since taxation is predominantly national, vouchers usable in the domestic markets and support employing a childminder or a nanny is mainly for hiring them in the country of
residence, policy responses that aim at employment creation in the care work sector give little help in transnational caregiving. They may be useful in arranging care in the country of residence and hence give space for transnational care activities indirectly.

Time for care

The main forms of employment-related provision for care consist of leaves and adjusted working hours. Choosing part-time work for care reasons (done mainly by women) can be considered as an individual choice, even if restrained by policy responses such as unavailability of full-time day care for children. Still, for example in Sweden and Norway parents have the possibility to take part-time parental leaves. In Austria parents may after fulfilling certain requirements, work part-time and have flexible working hours until the child turns seven (Kreimer, 2006: 144). Care policies thus may have a profound effect on the working time of the parents. In Sweden parents may use parental leaves until the child turns eight whereas in Norway leaves are to be used by the time the child turns three (Rantalaiho, 2010: page).

The majority of European countries offer care leaves for parents with young children (Bettio & Plantega, 2004: 91). European Union has been driving this development from early on and in 1996 a directive on parental leave gained legal force (Hall, 1998). The incentive for elder care leaves has been much less vigorous and generally only short term breaks from employment are offered for elder care purposes. Sweden with 60 days and Denmark with three months offer longest periods of leaves at times of an adult relative facing a severe illness (Bettio & Plantega, 2004: 96). In United Kingdom as well as in Finland there is no specific provision for leave for carers of adults, only unpaid leave for temporary emergencies (Himmelweit, 2008: 357; Zechner, 2010: page). It means that contrary to child care, time for long-term elder care is not generally being offered for employed individuals.

Time for care would be a valuable asset in transnational care since in many cases the distances between the carers and those in need of care are long. Anyhow this is not always the case since many persistent patterns of international migration take place between neighbouring countries such as from Mexico to USA and from Poland to Germany.

Notwithstanding the lengths of distances, time is an essential resource in care since giving care means doing something for somebody who can not do it for him of herself. Especially personal care, such as helping with dressing up, bathing, eating, moving and personal
hygiene is not possible from a distance. Personal care thus demands that people are in a same place at the same time. Other types of care and assistance are possible from afield. For example sending money or goods, giving emotional support, organising services or other kind of help is possible from afar. There is still one kind of care-related activity that may not be done from a distance, but does do not require that the care receiver and the care giver are present at the same time. For example cleaning, shopping, cooking and going to the bank or library are these kinds of activities. Here child and elder care differ greatly since young children usually require constant attendance while elders often are able to stay alone for longer periods of time, depending on the care needs they have. On the other hand young children are many times easier to take along when running errands than older people who may have difficulties with their mobility.

All of the above mentioned activities that can be part of care require time. Care leaves, especially if they come with an allowance, allow people to use time for organising and giving care transnationally. If leaves come with monetary benefits, they can also help to cover the costs of care. The money can be used for buying services, either from the formal or undeclared market. Also friends, neighbours and relatives can be reimbursed for their care activities. Person using the leave can use the benefit to visit the care receivers abroad, providing that travel is not prohibited due to passport or visa requirements or due to political or other instabilities of the countries. Depending on the citizenship of the traveller, people have different possibilities to enter countries. Generally citizens of Western countries have better access to majority of countries than citizens from countries in Africa, Asia or Middle-East. In addition return to the country of residence may be a risk for refugees and especially for immigrants without required permits (Baldassar et al. 2007: 181–183).

Full-time care leaves give more flexibility for transnational caregivers than shortened working hours or part-time work. Shorter hours may also be used for similar purposes, for making extended weekend visits if the distance between the care receiver and the care giver are not too long. Nordic countries offer longer periods of child care leaves and higher levels of compensation than most of the other European welfare states (Himmelweit, 2008) giving implicitly stronger support to transnational caring as well.

Like many other benefits, care leaves may not be very easily transferred to abroad. When the right for leave has been gained, restrictions for travelling abroad are not very common. For example Norwegian mothers who are on maternity or on parental leave and who have parents or parent-in-laws residing in the Sun Belt of Southern Europe have spent longer periods of time with the grandparents abroad. The arrangement is temporary and may be of
mutual benefit so that mothers receive help with child care and grandparents are assisted by the mother of children.

Monetary benefits

Cash benefits have become increasingly common in Europe as a policy response especially in elder care. For example Austria, Germany, England and the Netherlands have introduced direct payments and/or individual budgets. These are to some extent replacing directly provided public services for children and older people needing care. Money is a flexible benefit since it can be used in a variety of ways. The negative effect is that it also contributes to feminisation of care work as well as creation of low paid care work occupations often at the undeclared labour market. In addition care work tends to become less professionalized.

Many cash benefits include restrictions on the use of it. For example there are differences between these schemes in relation to whether or not they allow the payment of migrant care workers and co-resident relatives (Ungerson, 2004:190). Cash benefits to child care are paid to parents, but for elder care they may be paid either to the person in need of care or to the one who is giving care. Child benefits are not specifically paid for care purposes, but they are an example of a universal and non means-tested monetary benefit paid in many European countries such as Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Netherlands and United Kingdom (Björnberg, 2006: 93–94). Cash benefits for child care are paid for example in Finland and in Norway. In both countries the main requirement besides being covered by the social insurance system and having a child under three is the non-use of public day care facilities. The benefit is accompanied with an optional leave and the money may be used freely (Rantalaiho, 2010: page). The Norwegian cash benefit for child care may be exported. The requirement is that one of the parents lives and works in Norway, pays taxes and social insurance fees. The other parent and the child under three may be living outside Norway but within the European Economic Area. The child ought not to be in a publicly provided child care facility and be under three. The number of beneficiaries is small, but increasing. In 2008 there were 700 beneficiaries of this exported benefit outside Norway. Majority of them reside in the new European Union countries, mainly in Poland (Bjørnstad & Ellingsen, 2008: 24–26).

This is one of the very rare benefits that explicitly support transnational care of immigrant family members. The residence and employment of an immigrant in a developed welfare state gives eligibility to a benefit that may be used for child care in the country of departure. In Finland the cash benefit for child home care is understood as a reward for not using
publicly organised day care services to which parents with children under school age have a
subjective right. Still, the European Court of Justice has decided in 2002 that Finland is
obliged under certain conditions to pay the benefit for family members abroad (Ministry for
Health and Social Services, 2002). For example when a Finnish company sends employees
abroad or when an employee comes to Finland to work from another EU or EEA country.
The court case demonstrates that at times transnational families shape care policies and
their application through official means.

In United Kingdom a Working Tax Credit may provide up to 80 per cent of childcare costs to
low- and middle-income lone parents in employment and dual-earner couples (Himmelweit,
2008, 362). It is possible to apply Working Tax Credit also when the child lives outside UK.
The prerequisite is that the parents come from a country in the European Economic Area
(EEA) and are working, or are actively looking for work, in the United Kingdom (HM Revenue
and Customs).

For elder care purposes Italian care allowances are paid to the elderly in need of care
according to the invalidity of the person. In Austria the level of benefit is tied to the number of
hours for which help is needed (Kreimer, 2006: 147). It is not very likely that a person with
high level of invalidity can give care transnationally or use the money for arranging
transnational care. To receive the benefit the level of invalidity must be high but there is no
benefit can of course give economic support to caregiving children residing abroad. In
Austria, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom and USA cash allowances for people with
disabilities to spend on employing carers directly come with little regulation (Glendinning,
2006: 131; Himmelweit, 2008: 363). They tend to boost grey economy mainly consisting of
immigrant care workers. For example in United Kingdom there is minimal regulation on the
employment of personal carers (Himmelweit, 2008: 363). In Holland instead the personal
budget holders have to make formal contracts with their employees and adhere to
regulations concerning wage levels, social security charges and taxation (Glendinning, 2006:
131). A common problem with these cash benefits is that their levels tend to be fairly low. If
paid to the person in need of care, the levels are not equivalent to the costs of institutional
care or home care services. When the benefits are paid to the carers, they often fail to
secure adequate standard of living and they do not compensate the effort that caregivers put
to care work (Glendinning, 2006:133–134).

The direction of intergenerational transfers is usually from older generations to younger
generations. It seems that when older parents live in different country, at least in France, the
flow is almost as common the other way around: migrant children paying remittances to their parents, especially if parents live in a developing country. The reason to send remittances to parents is generally parents’ lack of economic resources (Attias-Donfut & Wolff, 2008: 267). For example in Cape Verde, older women whose children have migrated abroad and who do not have an income, take it for granted that their children send them money (Åkesson, 2007: 102). It is thus possible that Cape Verdean women with young children in developed welfare state may use cash benefits that are destined for child care, also for supporting their parents in the country of departure.

Money can be used for travelling as well as for buying services and assistance. Often monetary benefits are received only after a strict needs or means testing. Also the use of these benefits may be restricted or controlled in various ways. Finnish carer’s allowance for example requires a written contract between the carer and the municipality paying the benefit. Care performed by the carer is described in the contract in detail. In contrast, the Finnish as well as the Norwegian child care allowance is free to be used as the beneficiary wishes (Zechner, 2010; Rantalaiho, 2010). In addition recipients are entitled to a leave that may be extended until the child turns three. Together the fairly long period of leave and the cash that may be used freely give parents of young children resources that are possible to be used for transnational caregiving even though this is not necessarily the original aim of the benefit.

In developed welfare states old age pension systems have secured the economic situation of elders and they have changed the circulation of private economic support from parents to children (Attias-Donfut & Wolff, 2008: 282). The direction of private transfers flows in the opposite direction of public transfers of the welfare states (Kohli, 1999). In Sweden on the other hand, immigrants from Africa, Asia and Latin America give more often economic support to members of older generations than Swedish-born residents in Sweden (Björnberg & Ekbrand, 2008: 254).

In Germany, the middle generation of migrants give their parents more often economical support than non-migrants of the same generation. Non-migrants in the same position give much more practical help than economical help to their parents. The reason for migrants giving so much economical support is distance. When elders live in another country, migrants are not able to give much practical help. Money substitutes practical help and it may be also given to siblings living near the elders and actually caring for the parents. Also migrants in Germany are mostly from less well-off countries and parents living in these countries need remittances (Baykara-Krumme, 2008: 298–299). Some Indian parents whose
adult children are residing in US feel that they have invested in their children and by moving to or close to them from India, the elders are able to reap the rewards of their investment. Children also are given a possibility to reciprocate towards their parents (Lamb, 2002: 307).

Conclusions

Care policies offer people time, services and money for child and elder care. Care policies are national but a vast body of research has documented that people use the benefits policies allow also for transnational caring activities. This does not necessarily mean that they are being used for purposes not intended. Instead getting support with care activities in the migrant’s country of residence may also be helpful in giving care transnationally to close ones in the country of departure. Similarly comprehensive care policies in the country of departure also support care given transnationally.

On the whole, monetary benefits seem most useful in transnational care. Cash may be used for visiting the care recipients, paying for the travels of those in need of care, buying services or help and other care-related goods such as assisting devices. Time in addition to money is a valuable asset in care, since care work is very time consuming. In transnational care time is not only needed for actual care work, but also for travels covering the distance between the carer and the care receiver.

Caring across national borders may face obstacles due to travel restrictions. Visa and resident permit requirements are the most common ones. In addition political instability and natural disasters may make transnational caring more complex. Transnational caring includes short or temporary visits but not permanently intended relocations. Being a beneficiary to social insurance benefits such as unemployment or sickness benefits may also restrict the possibilities to international travel (Baldassar et al. 2007: 187; Zechner, 2008: 39). These kinds of benefits are generally not easily transferable, even within the EU.

People who have stayed behind often interpret the support that migrants give or fail to give as a sign of whether they care or not about those who have stayed behind (Åkesson, 2007: 107). Many of those who do not migrate, especially in the least developed countries, are dependent on the people, money, know-how and other resources that are far away from them (Åkesson, 2007: 93). The relations between migrants and those who have stayed in the country of departure are often asymmetric. Although social change has been detected for example amongst Chinese migrants in Tokyo who have older relatives in Shanghai. Older
parents have become more independent in terms of residency and retirement resources and
generations are growing away from the previously intensive and exclusive self-help
approaches (Izuhara, 2010b: 92, see also Huttunen in this book). Still, from the point of view
of those who have stayed in the country of origin, the initiative for caring activities lies often in
the hands of the migrants. When they can call, visit, send money and organise help (Åkeson,
2007: 111). Migrants on the other hand may feel that they have been forced to
transnationalism. They have to keep contact and maintain relations to the members of kin the

Transnational caring activities of individuals have so far shaped national care policies only
minimally. A distinct example is the establishment of Norwegian nursing homes in the
Spanish coastal region. Since the scope of transnational caring will be likely to increase in
the future, it is likely that new pressure groups that aim to change care policies so that they
support transnational caring as well will emerge. The European Union court case concerning
the payment of Finnish cash benefit for child home care shows that transnational actors
actively shape the national policies that seldom take transnational practices into account.
Also Norwegian elders in the Spanish coastal area have actively been working to shape the
policies to better fit with transnational patterns of life.

In certain countries there are fairly generous cash benefits for care with minimal or no
regulation of how the recipients use them. These kinds of benefits allow most room for
transnational caring since the money is freely usable. The Finnish and Norwegian cash
benefits for child care where parents are entitled to a leave are prime examples of care
benefits that give support for transnational caring allowing time and cash for parents to be
used for arranging care transnationally either for children or elders living elsewhere. These
benefits are also to some extend transferable within EU countries at least.

Austrian and Italian cash benefits for older persons with disabilities may also be used for
transnational caring. Although the beneficiaries themselves are not very likely to be able to
do such activity. Therefore they support transnational care only if the money is circulated to
those with abilities to give and arrange transnational care, such as migrated adult children of
beneficiaries. The increasing emphasis on choice that has been given on care policy
changes, when driven by means of cash benefits, is a trend that gives space for
transnational caring activities. It has been estimated that since 1990’s in both child and elder
care cash benefits have been increasingly used in care policies (Yeandle & Ungerson, 2007:
2). If this continues to be the trend in the future as well, it means more possibilities for those
involved in transnational care, even though the levels of benefits are not likely to increase. It
is possible that since majority of cash benefits are not intended for transnational caring, there will be more monitoring on how they are used in order to prevent them being used for transnational caring. Also from the welfare state point of view the proliferation of cash benefits is not positive since it may hamper the development of care services. Cash benefits also tend to pull women from the labour market, or to create a pool of low-paid female care workers in working precarious circumstances. Since a majority of the beneficiaries of cash benefits are women the responsibility of ensuring appropriate care arrangements rest proportionally on women as elders in need of care, as daughters of these elders and as mothers in the case of children.

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on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely
within the territory of the Member States.


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Chapter 11

Emplacement through Family Life:
Transformations of Intimate Relations
Laura Huttunen

Introduction

Each transnational social field or formation has its own particular history of emergence. There are those which grow from refugee exoduses, others that grow from labour migration or business enterprises (Cohen 1997; Van Hear 1998). Each history includes its own particular dynamics of interrelated institutions and their interactions; e.g. those who move as refugees encounter a different set of institutions than those who migrate as skilled professionals. In order to understand changing patterns of social life in transnational fields, we should look at the dynamic interplay between relevant institutional forms in each particular transnational context. There is one institution, however, that touches all migrants, irrespective of their reasons for migrating: practically everybody is connected, in one way or another, to the institution of family.57

In this article I consider the ways in which transnational migrants seek to emplace their lives, and how various institutions shape the process of emplacement. My focus is on family as an institution for shaping every-day life emplacement (see also Vertovec 2009: 61-64; Rubel & Rosman 2009). There are other relationships, such as collegial and neighbourhood relations as well as friendship relations that may be important for processes of emplacement, but those relations are not institutionalised to the extent that families are; neither are they recognised by state institutions (or others) in similar ways. As Faist and Reisenauer point out in the introduction, institutions “denote regular social interactions between individual or collective actors” and are “are guided by reciprocal expectations concerning specific rules based on values and norms” (xx), moreover they are “relatively permanent social constructs that influence social behaviour” (xx); in this sense family is clearly the most institutionalized form of social relations on the every-day life level.

57 Those without any actual family members –such as orphaned children - are defined, in many contexts, through this very lack of family connections, which foregrounds the social and cultural significance of the family institution.
Family life is embedded in social and political structures shaped by other institutions such as states and international migration management. Within the scope of this article I will refer only briefly to the frames provided by such institutions, and the ways in which they interact with the institution of family.

To make the discussion of families more concrete, I will give empirical examples of my own ethnographic research among Bosnians living between Finland and Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia). Unlike in neighbouring Sweden, there were no labour migrants from former Yugoslavia in Finland; practically all Bosnians in Finland came there as refugees during or soon after the war in Bosnia between 1992 and 1995. Most of them are of Bosnian Muslim/ Bosniak background, or with mixed background. They constitute a rather small community in Finland, about 2900 people, dispersed to different localities in Finland. As the community was formed as a consequence of forceful expulsion from their country of origin, ideas of return there have been rather strong among the community members. But recovery from the devastation of the war, both politically and economically, has been rather slow, and consequently many refugees have decided to stay in their new countries of settlement while recreating connections with the post-war Bosnian society.

This is, of course, only one particular case, and I do not mean it as a case representative of all families within transnational fields. In order to enrich the discussion, I will refer to other cases found in research literature. My point is to argue, through these examples, that families are flexible institutions that both shape processes of emplacement, and are simultaneously shaped by them. Each example needs to be understood in its specific social and historical context.

I will first briefly discuss my choice of conceptual framework, especially my understanding of ‘integration’ and ‘emplacement’ in relation to transnational movement. Then I will discuss ‘family’ as a concept in relation to such movement. After that I will look more closely at various aspects of family life and family transformations through empirical examples. I will

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58 Between 2001 and 2006, I have conducted periodic ethnographic research among Bosnian diaspora, especially on transnational relations between Finland and Bosnia-Herzegovina. My actual fieldsites are located both in Finland and in Bosnia. For more information, see Huttunen 2005; 2007; 2009a & b; 2010.
close the article by discussing some implications of my arguments for current debates about multiculturalism.

**Conceptual frames: From integration to emplacement**

Migration, for whatever reason, necessarily complicates migrants’ relationship to space and place. Michel de Certeau suggests that the best way to understand space is to think it through spatialized practices; relevant space is practiced space (de Certeau 1986). The lived or practiced space for migrants is created through practical engagements that may straddle long geographic distances. In most cases these are between two localities (cf. Guarnizo & Smith 1998), but they also may encompass more complex webs of localities. Such practical engagements to various places are often mediated through family structures.

Both policy makers and researchers within various disciplines have tried to capture the social processes related to migration flows through different conceptual frameworks. Transborder migrants’ relationship to countries of origin and new countries of settlement figure importantly in these formulations. ‘Integration’ is a concept widely used both by researchers (e.g. Delle Donne 1995; Carmon 1996; Valtonen 1998) and policy makers. It is often understood as a structural relationship between immigrant individual and the larger host society. An integrated individual becomes incorporated into the new society, ideally as an equal member (see e.g Vasta, 2007: 717-719).

‘Integration’ is mostly used in describing migrants’ relationship to the new country of settlement, and as such points to several important issues. Equality and inequality, entry into the labour market and education, racism and discrimination, processes of incorporation as well as migrants’ own resources for relating to new environments are often addressed within the frame of integration. There is also a substantial body of literature addressing problems of integration as well as the processes of migrant inclusion and exclusion (e.g. Stolcke 1995; Vasta 2007; Pardo 2009; Wise & Velayutham 2009)

From the transnational point of view, however, some questions arise: where is one integrated to? Are there inherent tensions between ‘integration’ to new host societies and sustained relationships to countries of origin and/or larger diasporas (cf. Vertovec, 2009: 77-84). When using ‘transnational optic’ (Faist & Reisenauer, this volume) one may argue that ‘integration’ as a concept often produces rather localized understanding of important relationships. The focus is on relationships within the new country of settlement, while other relations and
practices, those that cut across nation state borders and connect with the country of origin (and other places) are often left out. Many empirical studies suggest that some form of integration to the new countries of settlement and sustained transnational relations do not exclude each other; these should rather be seen as intertwined mutual processes (e.g. Levitt 2003; Smith 2006; Vertovec 2009)

‘Belonging’, another rather popular concept in migration literature, emphasises migrants own point of view, and refers to the ways in which migrants identify with places and social milieus. It is often framed as ‘a sense of belonging’ (e.g. Vuorela 2009). Such a formulation directs our attention to the multiple ways in which belonging is socially negotiated, and not understood just as a ‘feeling’. We may also have a sense of belonging to several places simultaneously, which is helpful when studying life within transnational fields.

‘Emplacement’ resembles belonging as a concept in many ways. Feld & Basso define emplacement as “the way in which people encounter places, and invest them with meaning” (ref. Jansen & Löfving, 2009: 12). But, as Jansen and Löfving point out, emplacement should not be understood simply as the capacity of the individual. I understand emplacement, together with Jansen & Löfving (2009) as “the point where subjects’ capacities to put themselves and others into place articulate with the power relations that unequally distribute this capacity” (p. 13). Emplacement as a concept allows us to look at migrants’ relations to several places within transnational social fields simultaneously. Jansen and Löfving’s formulation also points to the importance of looking at power relations that organize processes of emplacement; emplacement is understood here as a process where migrants’ own agency intertwines with structuring elements and organizing power relations, i.e. institutional formations. If ‘integration’ is understood as a policy concept promoting certain forms of relating with the new country of settlement, ‘emplacement’ as a concept enables us to analyze, without normative expectations, the processes of making (and remaking) social space in both the country of origin and the new country of settlement, through various institutional formations.

In this article I take the concept of ‘emplacement’ as the most fruitful one to capture dynamics and nuances of relationships to place on the everyday life level. It is important to recognize the interdependence of emplacement to various locations within the transnational space: one’s relationship to a new place of residence is necessarily interdependent with the relationship to the place of origin. There is a dialectical tension between these two: difficulties to forge a meaningful social position in the country of settlement may produce stronger
orientation towards the country of origin, while unfavourable developments in the country of origin may encourage stronger engagement in the country of settlement.

Moreover, emplacement should be understood as a dynamic process: migrants’ relationships to places change over time, in response changing social, political and cultural contexts in all locations that are significant in their personal lives. In the following I will look at the ways in which families figure in processes of emplacement.

**Families in transnational social fields**

Deborah Bryceson and Ulla Vuorela (2002: 3) define ‘transnational families’ as “families that live some or most of the time separated from each other, yet hold together and create something that can be seen as a feeling of collective welfare and unity, namely ‘familyhood’, even across national borders.” In this understanding, families become transnational through spatial separation. This very separation may be understood in some cases as a strategy for emplacement in new environments and for pooling family resources, while in other cases the separation is a result of coercive politics and inadequate living conditions in original locality. Often it is the combination of these all.

Family as such is a culturally defined and polymorphous concept. Some forms of family life, such as same-sex couples, are not necessarily recognized by the state authorities, and in such cases even more creative practices of family life emerge. The boundary between family and larger kin group is flexible and negotiated in changing contexts. If ‘family’ is understood as the nuclear family, there are also migrant families that are not transnational in Bryceson and Vuorela’s sense: they migrate together and continue to live as a unit in one locality. But they do engage in cross-border social networks that shape their processes of emplacement to a significant extent. Both ‘transnational families’ and families engaged in transnational practices are fruitful conceptions for analysing emplacement within transnational social fields (cf. Rubel & Rosman 2009).

The Bosnian families that I encountered during my research project fitted both categories: there were nuclear families that had migrated as a family to Finland, but who maintained rather close ties with relatives in Bosnia and elsewhere in diaspora, and there were families that were dispersed by the exile, but which still maintained family ties across nation state border. To some extent, this is a question of definition: migrants’ own understanding of their
‘immediate families’ did not necessarily coincide with official definitions of family, a point to which I will return below.

A big part of transnational family practices may be characterized as ‘forced transnationalism’ (Al-Ali & Koser 2002); when people are not able to conduct more localized family life, often due to restrictive state policies, they are forced to keep up their family ties across nation state borders. Some other cases of dispersed families result from strategic considerations of seeking better opportunities and pooling family resources (e.g. Ong 1999; Eastmond 2006a & b). The former was often the case with my Bosnian informants: when they were not able to bring to Finland all their family members, due to restrictive family unification policies, they were forced to create forms of relating across nation state borders. In such processes, the institution of family is necessarily set in flux. Simultaneously, such forms of relating forge intimate relationships to several geographic locations, i.e. to all those localities where family members live. In the Bosnian case this meant, most often, recreating or strengthening ties with the country of origin while living in Finland, but sometimes it meant also relating to other places in diaspora where family members had settled\textsuperscript{59}.

In the world characterized by what Aihwa Ong calls ‘flexible accumulation’ in late global capitalism (1999) with concomitant insecurities and upheavals, families and kinship networks provide the ultimate safety network for many people. Migratory groups, often with uncertain and limited access to state provided welfare systems both in their countries of origin and in their new countries of settlement, rely often heavily on their families for both economic and emotional safety. These realities explain partly the enduring importance of family institutions. In such circumstances, people often devote their efforts to ‘family welfare projects’ rather than larger political schemes, be they refugee families with lived experiences of loss and ultimate insecurity (Eastmond 1998, 2006 a & b) or enterprising business class seeking possibilities for accumulation (Ong1999).

\textsuperscript{59} My Bosnian informants had family members scattered to many Western European countries, such as Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Austria, as well as to the United States and Australia. Some these places could rather easily be visited from Finland, especially Sweden, while others are more difficult to reach. In those cases, family members were most often met while visiting Bosnia.
Family is also the institution that regulates effectively individual’s emotional life (Chamberlain 2009). This is at the heart of families’ ability emplace. Social and economic articulate with the intimate and emotional in family life, producing powerful configurations.

Families are the sites where relations to new countries of settlement are negotiated at the most immediate level, in everyday life practices. Simultaneously relationships to countries of origin are often negotiated in/through family life, (as well as relations to other significant locations). But families as institutions structure the flow of every-day life: there are often gendered and generational expectations concerning family members. Such expectations, however, are often set in flux when families migrate. There is always a tension between family as a structuring institution and family as a process evolving in time.

**Families as structuring institutions**

Anthropological research attests to the fact that there are different ways to understand and live family and kinship (e.g. Carsten 2000 & 2004; Stone 2001). Families as institutions, however, always entail normative expectations concerning relationships between family members and modes of conduct towards each other. One could argue that the culturally shaped family formations are significant vehicles for transferring cultural patterns from countries of origin to new countries of settlement. Ways of structuring family relations embody cultural understandings which are carried across transnational space, but they often get transformed along the way. (e.g. Werbner 1990; Ong 1999).

Expectations to take care of family members, especially of children, of the elderly and those in special need are, in most cases, at the heart of family formations. Such normative expectations effectively keep family ties alive across geographical distances in migratory situations. The ways in which the expectations are met, or not met, vary from case to case. In most cases, however, welfare state policies in receiving countries do not recognize obligations to family members living in countries of origin (or elsewhere outside the state in question).

Labour migration has, for a long time, created dispersed families held together by expectations of care-giving across distances. As a consequence, there are different modes of 'long-distance parenting' (see e.g. Hochschild 2003; Vertovec 2009: 61-64), as well as modes of taking care of the elderly left behind in countries of origin (Izuhara & Shibata 2002; Zechner 2008). Sending remittances to countries of origin, a practice that has grown to have
significant societal importance in many post-conflict and refugee-sending countries, is fuelled in most cases by normative expectations to support family members.

Among the Bosnian diaspora, meeting such expectations meant, in its simplest form, that family members living in Western European countries send money and goods regularly to their relatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina – a country that in the post-1995 period is lacking state provided welfare systems (see e.g. Jansen 2007). Especially elderly people are dependent on their children living outside of Bosnia for basic maintenance; similarly unemployment as well as sickness may produce situations of dependency. Such practices recreate and maintain familial bonds, while they simultaneously transform them. Regular remittances from Western Europe to relatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina create modes of dependency and new hierarchies of power among family members, as well as tensions and grievances. While those within Bosnia, depending on money sent by their relatives may resent their dependency, those obliged by normative expectations to keep on sending money, may resent the continuous financial burden (Huttunen 2010).

Such complex patterns of mutual dependence highlight the limitations of the concept of integration. While many of my Bosnian informants in Finland were rather well integrated in the conventional sense, as they speak good Finnish and are employed in rather well paying industrial jobs, their life is complicated by their relationships with Bosnia. Their original strong will to return to Bosnia as soon as the conflict there would calm down was suppressed, first by the slowness of the recovery from the war in Bosnia; later the continuous dependency of relatives in Bosnia on their remittances made such considerations difficult for many. While their personal histories and kin relations, as well as inherited property in some cases (see below), ties them back to Bosnia, actual means for making a decent living for themselves, their children as well as for larger family and kin circle, keeps them in Finland. At the same time, many relatives in Bosnia would be willing to leave for Western Europe to improve their situation, but current restrictive immigration policies towards non-EU citizens makes it difficult for them even to get a tourist visa, let alone work permit (see e.g. Jansen 2009). Thus, family members who ended up on different sides of the EU border during the Bosnian war encounter powerful institutional structures that radically shape their life trajectories. Intimate relations are negotiated over such dividing lines.

Families and kinship as organized cultural systems emplace men and women differently. Empirical research describes certain cultural systems that produce mobile men and sedentary women: in some cases men move in transnational space while women and children lead more localized lives either in the country of origin or in the country of settlement.
But there are other social systems that produce transnationally mobile female subjects while men tend to stay behind, such as the Philippines (e.g. Margold 2004) and contemporary Russia (e.g. Tiaynen 2008). Careful contextual analysis of the gendered cultural logics embodied in kinship and family practices in each case may shed light on the dynamic emergence of particular transnational fields: such analysis may help us understand why there are more migrant men than women form some places and vice versa from others.

Cultural understandings of ‘proper families’ or ‘proper family life’ are partly encoded in practices of inheritance. Such practices are very concrete ways of forging relationships to place. Inheriting a house or land in the country of origin works as an anchorage when migrating (Fog Olwig 1997; Huttunen 2009a). In many cases, patterns of inheritance are gendered. My own research among Bosnian diaspora between Finland and Bosnia-Herzegovina has shown how such gendered patterns of inheritance influence considerations over return to Bosnia, and how they create tensions within families. In rural Bosnia, as in many others places, sons traditionally inherit the family houses from their fathers, and they bring their wives to these houses and households (Bringa 1995). As a consequence, men seem to be much more eager, at least in principle, to return to Bosnia than women. Men’s ownership of houses ties them more concretely back to their countries of origin and local communities there, while women seek emplacement in new countries of settlement through employment and bringing up children (Huttunen 2009a; on gender in Bosnian diaspora, see also Al-Ali 2002a; Jansen 2008).

The example above suggests, however, the flexible and negotiated nature of gender relations within families. Migration sets gender relations necessarily into flux: men and women have to renegotiate their relationships in new circumstances, when such crucial practical matters as employment and child care may be organized in totally different way from the country of origin (see also Vertovec 2009: 64-66).

Generation is another common structuring element within families. Parental authority over their children is an almost universally recognised phenomenon, even if the nature and extent of the authority, as well as the forms of showing respect to elders and parents, varies culturally and contextually.

Research literature widely attest to the fact that in families that migrate parents’ authority is often contested (e.g. Merolla 2002; Timera 2002; Levitt and Waters 2002). The simple fact that children growing up in new countries of settlement learn the local languages as well as
the nuanced norms of conduct much quicker than their parents often undermines parental authority. Such embodied knowledge also 'emplaces' children differently from their parents in relation to the new country of settlement. Inter-generational tensions within migrant families are sometimes discussed as a problem of integration. In a transnational framing these may be understood also as generationally differentiated modes of emplacement within families. Simultaneously they implicate ongoing transformations within migrant families.

This leads to a new set of questions: how does the ‘second generation’ build relationships to their parents’ countries of origin? (Fisher 1986) The ‘second generation’ is an emerging field of inquiry within transnational studies (Levitt and Waters 2002, also Cole & Durham 2007).

“Relativizing”: Kinship and family as processes and strategies

As the discussion above already suggests, families as structuring institutions should not be understood as static unchanging forms. Anthropological literature on kinship since 1990’s has emphasized that kinship should be understood as a process rather than simply as a structure: people actively live and make kinship within culturally regulated domains (e.g. Carsten 2000 & 2004). When discussing families in transnational context Deborah Bryceson and Ulla Vuorela coin the term relativizing to describe “the variety of ways individuals establish, maintain and curtail relational ties with specific family members” (Bryceson & Vuorela 2002, 14), thus referring to such dynamic understanding of kinship.

This definition points to the fact that family and kinship relations are not something simply given, but something that people actively mould and negotiate: some relationships are more important than others. It is worth noticing that relationships may also be curtailed or altogether cut off or disconnected. Geographical distance puts pressure on relationships: maintaining them across nation state borders and long distances requires effort. Simultaneously cutting off some relationships may become easier than when leading more localized lives. Distance opens up new needs for investing in active relation building and maintenance on the one hand, and possibilities for manoeuvring and manipulating relationships on the other.

To marry someone from the new country of settlement means forging a kinship or family relationship to that location. In some cases, such a marriage may be seen as a strategy for connecting oneself and one’s family to the location, as in most countries the state recognises marriage as a legitimate ground for residence. Practices of marital connecting are, however,
much more complex. Marriage is not only a legal, but also a social, cultural and emotional institution.

Marriage with somebody from the new country of settlement connects one, in most cases, to local social networks in effective ways. Marriages with locals are often powerful vehicles for emplacing people to their new countries of settlement, as they open both legal, social, emotional and cultural worlds in new ways. Children born in these marriages affect the process of emplacement further. Marriages with locals open up the possibility for relativizing for the larger family group as well, forging new relations and opening up possibilities to tapping into new languages of belonging to the place.

Many marriages, however, are contracted across nation state borders, within the transnational space. There are established practices for bringing brides from the countries of origin or arranging marriages across nation state borders among many migrant communities (e.g. Werbner 1990; Vuorela 2002; Rubel & Rosman 2009). Internet era has opened up new possibilities for finding partners within transnational social spaces (Schmidt 2004). Such practices keep the transnational space alive. Simultaneously, they create or recreate social relationships in the countries of origin. In some extreme cases, such as the Palestinian occupied territories, marrying someone from the country of origin may even work as a strategy for regaining (lost) rights of access to one's country of origin (Isotalo 2005). Frontiers of 'relativizing' are multiple in the globalizing world of migration.

Marriages across nation state borders are, however, heavily controlled by state functionaries. Even if marriage with a citizen is almost universally recognized as a warrant for residence, different nation states have various rules and regulations concerning cross-border marriages. There are also various practices that aim at testing the truthfulness or veraciousness of cross-border marriages: spouses are often subjected various techniques of interrogation, concerning intimate and personal matters. Moreover, various legal and financial documents are required, which creates inequalities between couples with varying class backgrounds. State functionaries retain power to decide over life trajectories of cross-border families to significant extents, and simultaneously state institution intrudes into the private sphere of conjugal relationships.

Within the Bosnian community in Finland, during the period of my fieldwork, some marriages were contracted with local Finns, while the majority of marriages were contracted among Bosnians – either with Bosnians resident in Finland or with Bosnians from Bosnia. Especially young Bosnian men travelling to Bosnia for summer holidays formed relationships with young
local women and later brought them to Finland as wives. While marriages with local Finns opened up kinship networks in Finland, marriages with Bosnians from Bosnia forged new affinal relations in the country of origin, and often simultaneously created new familial obligations there. Obligations towards the Finnish kin seemed to be less demanding on financial terms, as the Finnish kin were rather affluent or at least taken care of by local state provided welfare systems, while kin living in the ailing Bosnian economy were often in need of financial support.

Marriages are not, of course, the only kinship relations that actively mould processes of emplacement. Also other family and kinship relations in transnational space are selectively enacted. There are relatives brought in to take care of children in new countries of settlement or to work in family businesses. There are elderly parents in countries of origin that are taken care of, or not taken care of (Izuhara & Shibata 2002; Zechner 2008). There are siblings, cousins, nieces and nephews, aunts and uncles that may or may not be actively included in regular cross-border networks. The possibilities of such inclusions are regulated by state policies allowing certain practices and prohibiting or at least impeding others. All these relations mould the processes of emplacement, in relation to countries of origin, new countries of settlement as well as to possible other locations within each transnational social field.

Kinship is not, however, the only idiom of making relations: friendship and collegial relations are other easily recognized sets of relationships that are important in processes of emplacement, both in local and transnational settings. E.g. youth groups in urban environments may be important for processes of emplacement in new countries of settlement for young people (Mayer 2009). On the other hand, retaining old friendships in countries of origin may be important forms of relating to that place. Friendships are not, however, institutionalized in the same way as kinship, and friendship relations are not recognized by state policies like kinship relations. Friendship opens up informal spaces for emplacement, rather than legal-official statuses to claim rights. The meaning of different forms of friendship is a rather understudied realm within migration and transnational studies.

**Policies of managing emplacement**

Family as an institution is always shaped by other institutions, the state being the most obvious. But transnational families are also shaped by international migration management.
Here, I will make some brief comments on the ways in which family life is intertwined with other institutional forms.

The state institutions have, of course, the power to control entry to its territory, and to regulate legal residence there. And, as Aihwa Ong (1999) reminds us, states are also strategic actors in the era of global capitalism, and they change their policies to respond to changes in the global market place. In most Western European countries this means at the moment encouraging ‘work-related immigration’ and controlling other forms. Here the state’s power to regulate processes of emplacement is at its most obvious.

As observed above, many transnational families are such exactly because of restrictive state policies denying the entry for some family members. In Western European countries, families are often defined as nuclear families in state legislation and in regulations concerning migrants’ right to family unification. In many cases, however, migrant people themselves include in their families also other members not recognized by their current states of residence. As a consequence, they need to find ways to keep their ‘familyhood’ across state borders, in transnational practices. This is an example of the ways in which state policies organize family life in a very profound sense and produce ‘transnational families’.

State policies, however, channel importantly the processes of migrants’ emplacement in other, less obvious ways as well. The ways in which states work both in the country of settlement, and in the country of origin shape the forms of life within transnational fields.

There are many nuanced ways in which state policies enter family life and organize relations within families. State policies allocate rights and duties, and in so doing arrange family relations. This is, at least partly a class-specific question: some migrants are more exposed to state policing than others. E.g. in Finland, both spouses in migrant families needing welfare state support are expected to participate in language and ‘societal knowledge’ training, and both get their own allowances individually. This may be a deviation from previous arrangements within the families, and it may have consequences on familial relations. Such changes may be experienced as liberating or as threatening by people themselves.

There are also explicit normative discourses on gender relations to which migrants are exposed in their new countries of settlement (Yang 2009; Tuori 2009; Huttunen 2009b). For migrants themselves, these discourses are in dialectical relationship to gender discourses in their countries of origin. Gender, within and outside of families is one of the realms in which
processes of emplacement are negotiated. It is also a realm controlled by state policies in many nuanced ways.

But the state comes into being through various activities, agencies and policies that may have differing consequences for migrants' lives. Some of the policies may be contradictory from migrants' perspective. For example, one and the same person may be exposed simultaneously to state-run integration programmes and to state-sponsored refugee repatriation schemes. This happened to Bosnians in Finland in the early years of this millennium. There were repatriation programmes aimed as Bosnians willing to return permanently to Bosnian, while at the same time state policies promoted migrant integration (Huttunen 2010). These policies send contradicting messages: one is encouraging integration to the new country of settlement, while the other is encouraging return to the country of origin. What is common to both these policies is a sedentary understanding of living, and no recognition of transnational practices: migrants should live either here or there, but not sharing their time and resources between both. Within families, this means sometimes geographical dispersal in order to pool family resources, and in some cases to build possibilities for return to the country of origin (cf. Black & Gent 2006; Eastmond 2006a).

The mobility of people is managed by various international agreements and powerful institutions. They give us the legal and institutional frameworks for mobility, and channel huge amounts of resources. Migrant groups are differently exposed to these policies: some are managed within refugee aid schemes, while others are controlled by labour mobility regulations.

This global system of management also gives us the language to talk about, and think about migration. It gives us the categories that are often criticized (e.g. Malkki 1995; Hayden 2006), but which still organize our understanding of migration: refugees, asylum seekers, labour migrants and globally mobile professionals are categories with which we organize our understanding of mobility. Each category opens up a different space within the international mobility management system and vis-à-vis various state policies. People may seek to be identified within certain categories in order to facilitate emplacement in certain states/places.

Families' and family members' strategies for emplacement in various localities articulate with the machinery of the international migration management. Emplacement through family life can never be fully understood without placing the processes within such powerful international political frameworks.
Conclusions

Emplacement should be understood as a complex process of interlinking everyday life activities and mundane practices with various local and global structures and policies. Some of the policies are seen as restrictive and others as enabling by migrants themselves.

Families in their different forms are the most immediate institutions structuring processes of emplacement. Within transnational fields, relations to various places are often negotiated through family and kinship structures. When analyzing families as institutions, there is always a tension between families as structuring institutions and families as process-like and dynamic configurations unfolding in time and over space. Within the unpredictable global economy, family and kinship networks provide both economic and emotional safety net for many migratory people with limited access to state provided modes of welfare. The key to the resilience of the family institution lies in the way in which the emotional and intimate articulate with the social and economic in family and kinship practices. Moreover, cultural understandings are embodied in many family relations, and as such they provide links between countries of origin and countries of settlement. But, like everything cultural, also modes of family life are renegotiated in new circumstances, such as settlement in new countries. Paying close attention to the ways in which families as institutions both shape processes of emplacement, and are shaped by them, provides keys for understanding the nuanced processes of emplacement within transnational fields.

At the heart of current debates on multiculturalism, there is a question of how to understand ‘culture’. Should (immigrant) cultures be seen as self-perpetuating closed systems, or as process-like changing configurations with porous boundaries, enabling various forms of cultural hybrity to take place (cf Hannerz 2003; Prato 2009; Wise & Selvaraj 2009). I have argued here that families as deeply cultural institutions are flexible and changing, incorporating elements from various cultural contexts. Family life in new countries of settlement is never simple reproduction of previous patterns, but rather an unfolding process of ‘relativizing’, both locally and across national borders.
References


Chapter 12

Transmission in the Family and Intergenerational Dynamics
in Relation to Transnational Migration

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With the participation of Khalid Mouna

This paper deals with the changes that affect the familial institution under the influence of transnational migration. The levels of family organization taken into account refer to the processes of transmitting symbolic assets within the transnational family unit and the intergenerational dynamics. The concept of transmission can be defined as “all the processes through which a human group insures its continuity in time through successive generations” (Hervieu-Léger, 1997:131). In the context of this chapter, this concept refers to a fundamental function of the familial institution: socialization, that is to say, the diffusion of values, rules, norms and practices, in a word – a culture, with the aim of insuring continuity. Socialization is considered here, according to P. Berger and T. Luckmann’s views, as a process of self-construction in relation to the others, involving complex dynamics of selection, negotiation, and re-appropriation.

We will use two terms to analyze the dynamics of intergenerational transmission of Moroccan migrants in France with two frames of reference: first, the transnational space, second, transnational mobility. These two notions are intrinsically linked. Indeed it is through this space and migrants mobility between the country of origin and the host country that the stakes of family transmission are revealed.

Transnational migration is not analyzed here as a particular case or a synonym of international migration. Our process consists in interrogating migrants social practices. We question the migrants relations between their country of origin and the country where they live and work, possibly in a diaspora context, but we also address the organization and creation of new cultural and economic patterns as well as the actors strategies.
In the space of transnational migration, the transmission of familial cultural elements appears in a peculiar perspective. Transnational migration does not only mean crossing national boundaries. It also implies circulation within historically determined cultural spaces. We can approach it as a process of shuttling between two different cultural worlds. Groups and individuals involved in such a process happen to face diverse codes, rules, values and cultural representations, and so they have to make adjustments and reorganizations as regards these different cultural contexts.

In migrant families, such various cultural codes impact on the way parents can manage what they consider to be ‘their culture’. It also affects the socialization of children and the way they deal with the rules, norms, values and practices of parental culture. This familial transmission can prove to be very uncertain when socialization outside the family presents a breach with socialization inside the family. But of course, these impacts are more or less important according to historical contexts and the concrete living conditions of migrant families.

In what ways can cultural transmission within the family unit be influenced by transnational mobility through particular social dynamics (positions and interactions in the different units of the transnational space) and contact with various cultural contexts? How does the transnational space modify the objects and modalities of transmission? Since transmission takes place within the family organization through the interaction of the different actors, how do the constraints of transmission in the transnational space impact on the relations of family members toward family rules, values and practices? How far do such constraints affect the participation in familial cultural objects?

To address these questions which are the framework of this chapter, we mostly refer to what is going on in the French-Moroccan transnational space. As different kinds of transnational mobility unfold in historically defined places, the transnational perspective must consider the concrete framework of its objects. The transnational mobility of a French trader in Dubai or an American artist in Marrakech undeniably differ from those of an Algerian construction worker in Marseille or a Senegalese street vendor in Rome. It is not only socio-economic

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60 Transnational migration presented here is not analyzed as a particular case or a synonym of international migration. Our process questions migrants social practices. It questions the relations that migrants establish between their country of origin and the country where they live and work, possibly in a diaspora context, but also the organization and creation of new cultural and economic patterns as well as their strategies as actors.
differences which cause the diversity of that mobility, but also other basic facts: for example, if we consider just macro-sociological determinants, the modes of social representation here and over there of the migrant and his own group, the ways the governments manage his presence (here) or his absence (there), the types of interactions with social groups in his transnational space. All that implies the necessity to consider transnational facts in a historic perspective.

We argue that the requirements to manage this situation of being in multiple universes of rules, values and belongings give rise to a reorganization of parental codes, as well as they settle and develop new ways to interact with these codes. Unlike the representations coming from integration sociology which dominate research on families and North Africans in France (infra), the action of the family does not take place only in regard to the immigration society. In fact this action is determined by interactions with all the social units of its transnational space located both in the country of origin and the host country. Familial elaborations concerning transmission and cultural participation constitute some of the responses to the constraints of the transnational space. So, from this point of view, the family is a place where the participation of the individual in different social units of the transnational space is negotiated and constructed.

To account for this process, we have mobilized ethnographic data about Moroccan families in the South-West of France. The cultural elaborations presented here have to be regarded as one modality, among others experienced by Maghreb migrants in France, of the management of various constraints imposed by the transnational space. We will examine cultural reconstructions within the family by starting from two aspects: first, the relation to religious issues and second, the relation to gender issues concerning young girls condition. But before dealing with the core of our object, we will present a framework treating some relevant characteristics of transnational mobility, particularly in the French-Maghreb context, from different points of view: social history, state policy, and their treatment by social sciences.

**Transnational mobility in the French-Maghreb space**

The French-Maghreb space presents a special situation to approach our object. As concerns North African migration to France, scientific representations often reflect social representations (notably media and political ones). Populations coming from the Maghreb
come into question, and even are sometimes objects of fears and suspicions about their future and the consequences of their presence in France (infra).

It is important to recall the relationship between colonial history and transnational mobility in this space (R.Montagne no date, A.Baroudi 1978, Y.Alouane 1979, L.Taha et al.1983). The presence in France of several millions of people from the Maghreb is due to a process that started during the colonial period (1830 for Algeria and the early twentieth century for Morocco and Tunisia). Hundreds of thousands of soldiers and ‘colonial workers’, as they were called in that time, coming from North Africa, were introduced into France during the two World Wars and the following years of reconstruction. The social representations here and over there of the actors mobility in this space attest the weight of colonial memories (Nouschi 1984, S.Ayad 1984, Belbahri 1987, Galissot 1997, Cesari 19984, B.Stora 1999). Immigration and colonization allowed a long-lasting asymmetrical interaction between the different cultures and societies of this transnational space.

Today these Maghreb migrants maintain strong ties with their societies of origin. The best known aspect of these ties consists of remittances sent in the frame of familial solidarity, which constitute an important resource for the countries of the Maghreb. Morocco, for example, ranks fourth in the world (after India, Mexico and the Philippines) in terms of financial transfers, according to a World Bank report in 2002 (Khachani 2004:181). There, in 2003 these transfers constituted the main resource in foreign currency, greatly surpassing the revenue from the strategic tourism sector (Khachani 2004:180). The contribution of Moroccan migrants in France represent 40% of total transfers sent by Moroccans abroad (Khachani 2004:192). Maghreb migrants are also responsible for a lot of initiatives for the development of the society of origin. So in recent years the French-Moroccan space has been the witness of the growth of developmental organizations and associations which, in many cases, include the participation of second generation migrants. Developmental initiatives taken by migrants and their children mobilize business partners and investors, both from the immigrant and emigrant countries (Lacroix 2003, Dumont 2005). Other ties are forged with the society of origin, mostly through marriages and periodic visits. The geographical proximity of France and the Maghreb has created a transnational space that can be easily bridged. The cheaper price of various means of transportation between the two shores of the Mediterranean, especially low-cost airfare, facilitates this mobility. Several French and Maghreb telephone operators have integrated these intense transnational dynamics into their commercial strategy by offering products adapted to the market. Such a mobilization indicates that transnationalization in the French-Maghreb space has become a major stake both for individuals and institutions.
The attitudes of the states involved in the French-Maghreb transnational space towards mobility oscillate between identity management at a distance (for the states of origin) and the option of assimilation for the receiving country. The emigrating countries develop devices aiming to maintain their citizens allegiance. In Morocco, three governmental bodies are dedicated to migrants: a ministry, an advisory board, and a foundation. Through a plethora of religious, linguistic, socio-cultural and economic actions, the State hopes to maintain and reinforce migrants ties to their country of origin. Algeria boasts a ministry in charge of Algerians abroad and these Algerians are entitled to vote for presidential elections. The codes of nationality in the three Maghreb countries have been changed in order to break away from the old tradition of patriarchal alignment that ruled access to citizenship for mixed couples children, and also to allow women married to foreigners to transmit their nationality.

On the other hand, in the countries of immigration the kind of integration proposed to migrants is based on a normative conception advocating individual integration. According to this conception, integration is the outcome of a process through which the candidate to integration renounces his/her ‘traits of origin’, or at least hides them and accepts or adopts those of the receiving society (Kilani 1994, Roy 1993, Etienne 1987). “A good immigrant is one that disappears either by going back to his homeland or by becoming French, Republican and secular”. This is the way B.Etienne (1987:294) described the model of integration for foreign people in France. This conception shaped recruitment policies regarding foreign workers during the massive waves of migration. These policies followed an “ethno-cultural logic” favoring the immigration, then settlement of people of European origin, considered to be more easily integrated than African or Asian nationalities, due to their larger “cultural proximity” to the French (Weil 1991). Migrants from North Africa have always been regarded as non-desirable and temporary because of the “major civil incompatibility” between Islam and the French society (Weil 1991). The option labeled “immigration choisie” (selective immigration) advocated by the French government instead of “immigration subie” (non selective immigration) follows the same selective logic.

Social sciences in France have not remained completely unaware of these representations of North African migration and their future evolution. There was a long period of concealment of the migratory fact, which can be explained by the fact that the intellectual debate between contractualists and supporters of a racial definition of the nation (which gave birth to sociology in France) firmly persisted for half a century (Noirel 1988:34). The founding fathers of sociology in France developed a view about the nation which avoids any questioning of what constitutes the basis of national belonging and stipulates the rupture of the primordial identity and dilutes the origins of the individual into an abstract form of belonging (Harrami
Immigration was not openly constituted as a sociological object until the 1960's after the end of war in Algeria. Since then migration research has known a considerable boom. In spite of diverse ways to construct themes and scientific objects, research is still dominated by integration paradigm (Simon 1999), the works about it being the most important quantitatively. For political reasons, Maghreb migrants hold an important place in integration research. The assessment of their integration in the French society is founded on an analytic pattern which places them between two cultures: the culture of origin qualified as Maghreb, and the host culture. These two cultures are postulated as antagonistic, the contents of either are defined with opposing characteristics: modernity/tradition, women’s emancipation/submission, secularism/Islamic primacy, individualism/sense of community, a scientific technological cultural model/ a religious cultural model, etc…Integration experiences a weakening of the influence of the original culture when it is confronted with the host culture. This integration is measured by indicators (behavior, opinions, etc…) which reflect either of the two postulated cultures confronting each other. The more the immigrant displays features of the host culture and similarities with the native population, the better he/she integrates. This way of thinking about migrant integration has been the subject of different critical analyses. Such a construction cannot account for the manipulations-transformations to which the different codes are subjected in actual concrete situations. (Mauriel 1979, Oriol 1984, Sayad and Veille 1985). Besides, these studies proceed as if society, this permanent creation (Balandier 1986:70), was a finished product and the migrants had to get adapted to. On the whole, research on Maghreb integration adheres to the same logic that supported the sociological concealment of the migratory object during the first half of the last century. If the attitude of the founders of French sociology and anthropology towards transnational migration was driven by a concern for preserving a certain idea of the French nation while moving away immigration from the field of scientific research, today their successors contribution consists in orienting research in a way that excludes any reconsideration of the triumphant idea of the nation (Harrami 2001:87).61

Here, our focus is on the social experience of cross-mobility, and not on static populations. So we want to emphasize the difference between the classical approach of immigration in its twofold relation to migrant sending and receiving countries, and the themes of the diaspora

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61 In spite of the emergence of the post-structuralist thought that attempts to decenter the thought and the subject and institute a theory of disconstruction, this theory has had no influence on the debate about immigration and integration.
as a social frame of globalization or contemporary multiculturalism. The specific experience of mobility in the transnational space brings about specific social effects, for example on gender relations and relations between different social classes. Migration refers to a set of problems due to mobility. In a bi-directional movement, migrants go to the receiving country and regularly return to their country of origin. As a consequence of this continual mobility, they invite relatives and friends for some time. In the frame of these “circulations”, the stakes of religious transmission (like values, rules organizing gender issues: infra) are challenged, questioned and negotiated. Beyond this actual or virtual mobility through letters, parcels, audio and video cassettes, photos, e-mails, we also interroge “the moral economy” referring to the background of migrations.

**Religious Issues**

In the French conception of integration, Islam has always been regarded as an obstacle to integration. Islam is believed to pose a problem for at least two reasons. The first problem concerns a few trends deemed as a danger to the foundation and values of the Republic and to social cohesion. In *La France de l’intégration. Sociologie de la nation en 1990*, D. Schnapper mentions these components while inviting the Maghreb population of France to reconsider them: « It is necessary for the Maghreb population in France to reinterpret two dimensions of their traditions: first the private right of Islam and, in particular, the provisions about women; second the lack of separation between public and private domains, and between religious and political domains, contrary to the secular tradition of French politics” (1991:142). What is curious is that this reference does not refer to representations and religious practices in individual daily lives, but to some streams of Islamic political and juridical thinking. This sociologist’s process consists in projecting categories of Islamic thought on his subject, but they are not the same categories of religious thought as for migrants, or Islam as it is lived and experienced by the people concerned (Hammès 1989). In fact, Islam, just like other religions, only exists in action, that is to say as “thought in use”, and not as “a system of thought” (Ferrié 1991:232). It is essential to make a distinction between religion as it can be found in religious texts and religion as it is actually lived, and to focus on the latter, that is to say the way the actors appropriate and use the religious principles and prescriptions. What is really part of religion from migrants point of view is a set of religious practices: prayer, fasting during Ramadan, circumcision for male children, ritual slaughter and sacrifice for Eid Al Adha (Harrami 1998:99) Of course these practices give rise to some organized demands here and there, mostly for worship places. And even on the level of
these collective actions, the components mentioned by D. Schnapper are far from constituting an object of mobilization, adhesion or even knowledge for migrants.

The second reason that explains the harmful effects of religion on Maghreb migrants integration, as well as on the host society, relates to the social structures of origin. The migrant sending societies are regarded as “a separate universe” fundamentally based on religious sacredness (Ferrié 1991:229, Berque 1988:30-31). These societies have not moved towards secularization and modernity. There, religion is expected to settle the least details of social life. Individuals socialized in these societies are supposed to give a crucial importance to Islamic prescriptions and rules. These dispositions acquired by the migrant in his society of origin can be transmitted to the children within the family unit, and impede their integration into a “secular” society where religion should be confined to the private sphere.

However, some indicators seem to show the start of an irreversible cultural process in new generations coming from immigrant families: young people do not practice prayer or respect religious food restrictions as much as their parents (Tribalat 1995). A researcher made an inquiry into youth of Maghreb immigrant families and wrote that “to enter into Islam seems to be a difficult decision to make, even though it implies a choice that is felt as inevitable (...) Indeed the new generations of young people (...) do not seem at all to be prepared for such a decisive situation that they postpone as long as possible (...) As France comes to be their true reference, they are already “lost for Islam” (Gonzales-Quijano 1988). For most young girls — says an anthropologist specialist of the Maghreb — religion does not seem to pose any particular problem; in fact not a single islamist was interviewed. But it appears that, even when religious practices are observed, they are viewed as private, without any political repercussions, and consequently they are not considered a hindrance to integration” (Lacoste-Dujardin 1992:84). Unless “a re-islamization of ‘les banlieues’ i.e. some Paris suburbs” (Gonzales-Quijano 1988) happens to stop this disaffiliation from “the hard core” of the migrant culture (i.e. Islam), the children of migrant families will be on the way to “Frenchization”. This propensity for scientific discourse on migration to turn into a reassuring discourse gave rise to strange forms of conceptualization of the relationship to Islam for those concerned. Such is the case with classifications like “identifying islam” (Lacoste-Dujardin 1984), that is to say an Islam that does not appear but on the level of the individual’s sense of belonging and does not affect his participation in the French society; or “cultural Islam” (Weibel 2000:11) also called “peaceful Islam” (Withol de Wenden 1995:76), meaning a moderate Islam in opposition to a “fundamentalist political Islam”; or an “active Islam” that would be a “softer variation of Islam” (Weibel 1998:222) or a “positive Islam” (Babes 1997) in comparison, no doubt, with a “negative Islam”.
So there would be a rift between socialization and transmission within the family and socialization in extra-familial environments (at school, in the street, at work, etc...). Actions taken by the family are negated by the actions of society, which leads to the loss of several key elements of parental culture and, as a consequence, steers the family towards integration into French society. Starting from indicators often selected from religious texts or by approximation, and not from the social practices of the family, the loss of family cultural heritage is pointed out.

What is not taken into account in this reasoning is the importance of dynamics engaged within the family in response to the constraints of the transnational space. What seems to be missing too in integration research is that the emergence of the rule starts a transaction process between the various protagonists. The rule, far from being a steadfast fixed data to take or leave, is the basis for complex negotiations and adjustments. The consequence is that the forms of its observance and its transgression are constantly being defined and redefined. G. Balandier rightly notes that “the universe of rules” leaves room for cheating” (...). Structural systems where all the modalities of social action would be set and institutionalized would turn into impossible systems; to remain viable, they must include a domain of choice, and so of freedom, in such a way that the individual might find the possibility to intervene according to his calculations and strategies” (Balandier 1971; 62 and 63). So the rules and values exhibited by actors reveal information only on obvious official levels, on the prescribed order and not on the actual order. They are definitely relevant clues to the characteristic modalities of self-presentation and self-representation of a group, but they cannot inform us about the real social practices of this group.

Religious transmission, as all the relations to religion, does not depend only on family/society interaction. In fact, groups of religious socialization are continually on the increase and include original immigrant communities, as well as other transnational organizations using new communication technologies (Internet and satellite stations) and associative networks. The action of these groups can mitigate the failings of the familial transmission system due to the lack of joint efforts of socialization from the family and the social environment, while conveying new religious Islamic products different from the familial culture. As there are no systematic inquiries, it is difficult to assess the impact of these transnational groups of religious socialization on the people concerned. Nevertheless, certain practices and rigorous attitudes, possibly coming from these groups, such as wearing the burqa (which is currently arousing an intense debate in some European countries), or even the representation of Islamism as an ultimate identity (infra), remain confined to a very small minority.
The data collected in Moroccan families in France indicate that, even though canonical rules stipulate to start respecting religious obligations at the age of puberty, it is up to social conventions to define which obligations a child must observe. Such is the case of prayer, for example, as this practice is linked to social maturity, and not to physiological puberty as prescribed by the canonical law. Social maturity for families means access to a stage of life when the individual is regarded as an adult (rajl) opposed to adolescent (or rather teenager, ‘darri’). In theory, a person is no longer considered adolescent when he/she founds a family and has children. As long as he/she has not reached this stage, he/she is still young unless his/her age is revealed. Thus, the observance of prayer by a young person informs about his/her relation to religion that must be brought to light by the analyst. And if the linear integration pattern is applied, the non-observance of prayer does not mean a loss of parental religion and assimilation to the host culture. In fact, it might simply express an adhesion to the parental representation, considering that the practice of prayer concerns those who are socially mature. However R.Linton – one of the great representatives of so-called culturalist anthropology – specifies that each culture defines modalities and forms of its members participation in the elements proposed. The anthropologist thinks it is very important to study individual behavior “according to the particular cultural requirements imposed by his/her society in regard to his social position” (Linton 1967: 53).

The necessary accommodations to the host society and to all the social units of their transnational space lead families to continually review the conditions and forms of children’s participation in the religious elements of their culture. Families manage the expectations of all these units. Children must be able to appear as Muslims and claim to be Muslims anywhere in the transnational migratory space. The management of different social units constraints and expectations leads to the reorganization of the religious sector of parental culture on two levels: the notion of religious belonging and basic practices of worship.

First, primo-migrant parents promote a very flexible concept of affiliation to Islam. This sense of belonging is based on family genealogical history, and not on religious knowledge or practices (Harrami 2003). Non conformity to religious rules does not affect his/her individual status as a Muslim. (talfu)”That is why migrant children are always viewed by primo-migrants as Muslims, despite the reprobation they may provoke in the parental group. “The Islamic law does not apply to them, but they are Muslims. They have just forgotten. They are lost” as a migrant said. (Harrami1998:247). This representation of the Muslim is dominant among migrant children who distinguish between religious practice and religious affiliation. Consequently the Muslim identity is either easily claimed and seen as a supreme identity
capable of replacing and containing the other types of adhesion (affiliation to Moroccan national territory, affiliation to French national territory, etc...) or this identity is subject to reservations and a weaker form of adhesion (Harrami 1998:249).

Second, the reorganization of the religious sector of parental culture concerns worship observances. In the transmission process, all religious practices are not given the same importance. Family control on these practices follows a system of classification placing at the top of the scale: fasting during Ramadan, circumcision, the prohibition of pork (and alcohol for non-religious reasons in the case of girls: infra), while pushing the following ones down to a lower level: prohibition of alcoholic consumption (for male children), religious celebrations, charity, prayer, and the prohibition of carrion meat. Only fasting and abstinence from pork require children’s effective participation from an early age. The other religious practices are essentially governed by the laws of hachma (modesty, social decency) like the prohibition of alcohol, some are not even subject to any significant social control (like breaking the rule prohibiting carrion meat consumption), others have to be observed when the child reaches the stage of social maturity (all the other practices mentioned). This hierarchical organization of religious practices also takes account of the constraints of the transnational migratory space. The observance of some practices that might prove to be restrictive for a young person or inconsistent with “youth culture” of the whole society, or difficult to respect outside the family, is regarded as corollary to the person’s social maturity, and consequently do not concern a young person (like the five daily prayers). On the other hand, the practices that provoke a strict control within the cultural community in France as well as in the Maghreb are given extreme importance (like fasting during Ramadan, circumcision, and pork prohibition). This social control is all the more effective when grandparents come to France and stay for some time; they insure the continuation of traditions of the original country. The transnational social control of the community needs to be taken into account as it is proved in the different treatments of children’s relation to the religious rule prohibiting alcohol. Generally a “moderate” transgression of the rule by boys is not considered to be a worry. In the case of girls, it is a sign of grave moral depravity (not a transgression of a religious rule) that can seriously affect the family’s honor (infra).

The Young Girl’s Condition

Women’s status in the migrant culture seems to pose a serious problem for the host society as for integration (Lacoste-Dujardin 1992:6 and following). From the point of view expressed in the dominant discourse (in the media, in the scientific and political discourse), this aspect,
as well as Islam, represents the expressions of an ethnic feature of the Maghreb in France. Maghreb families, like their societies of origin, are seen as a hell for women. “Most of the discriminations against migrant women come from the tradition, which is often on the same line as religious texts, rather than from the host society” (Minces 2004:17). Women’s condition is due to a Maghreb patriarchal tradition, ideologically and legally supported by Islam. The scientific assessment of women’s condition in the countries of origin often proceeds by mingling different levels of legal, social, political realities under consideration, systems of representation and social practices, official order and actual order, and finally leads to a stereotyped image of the Maghreb woman “submissive”, minor”, “passive”, "dispossessed of her body” (Harrami 2006:89).

On this point too, the scientific discourse about the evolution of Maghreb migrants in France tends to be reassuring. Time can but favor a process of convergence with the French society (Todd 1994). If families try to transmit their cultural inheritance, the children already keep at a distance from this inheritance (Tribalat 1995). For young generations, “socio-cultural integration is progressing, in contrast with economic integration” (Withol de Wenden 1999:236). Girls can but refuse patriarchal despotism and adopt the open options offered by the French society. Their only possible choice is “modernity”, given the underprivileged status they are likely to have in their family culture (Minces 2006, 1986, Taboada-Leonetti 1982). The traditional familial model persistent in newcomers will erode in young generations (Zaleska 1982 :177). Some other researchers combine the effects of children’s socialization in the French society and some changes affecting the family organization (nuclear family, men’s social discredit due to unskilled jobs and unemployment) and they anticipate an unavoidable degradation of men’s traditional role and women’s condition improvement (Bouamana,S et Saad Saoud, H.1996).

Reorganizations in the religious domain are also perceptible in the field of gender social relations. We need only compare two levels of these relations: on the one hand, the values flaunted by parents, and on the other hand, their own actual behavior and their children’s conduct in relation to these values.

So from the common point of view in Maghreb families representations, women's behavior reveals the values and status of their group. That is why the common opinion is that girls in migrant families must be supervised. They must conform to specific behavioral norms typical of bnat-s annas ("girls from good families"). In addition to the absolute prohibition of sex out of marriage, they must avoid any behavior that might possibly lead to a violation of this rule – or simply be interpreted as such by people around them – such as smoking, drinking, going
to nightclubs, hanging out with boys, etc... Any occurrence of behaviors considered to be symptoms of moral depravity tarnishes the girl and her family’s social image. Migrants express this prejudice with words like tusikh lujah (a stain on the face), hachma (shame), and ar (dishonor). All the terms used in such cases refer to the idea of dishonor. It follows that the principles ruling women’s sexuality and social status are intrinsically tied to the honor of the familial group. A woman’s dishonorable act carries with it dishonor for the whole family. Men are considered in charge of this honor while women are regarded as the “syndrome” of honor and shame. Honor represents a group or an individual’s virtue, force and values. So honor is not only a guide for actions, it is also a social expression of the actor’s value (groups or individuals): “A woman’s status determines the status of all the men that are linked to her in any way. These men share the burden of the consequences of what happens to her, and therefore they also share the responsibility for the protection of her virtue” (Schneider 1986:217). Young males behavior in matters of sex and marriage is not subject to any real control or supervision and has no effect whatsoever on the social image of the family. If the son is involved in marital practices that do not conform to the rules of honor (marrying a bant azzanga “street girl”, or in some cases marrying a non-Muslim or non-‘Arab’), it may provoke some sort of reprimand, but it is not likely to endanger the family’s reputation. The common opinion is, as a father says, that after all, “a man is a man (arrajl ‘arajl). The offspring always follow the father (…). A man always comes back (when he gets married out of his ethnocultural group) while a woman, if she leaves, she never comes back. She belongs to her husband’s social group” (Harrami 1998:395). It is of paramount importance that a young girl remains within the limits prescribed by the group in matters of marriage.

The fate of the offspring is, for all their community in the host society where they live as well as in the original society, a criterion to assess the success of migrants plans and the degree of parents respectability. The close watch of different groups of allegiance located here and over there is an essential data in family life. This watch, which in fact is a transnational social supervision by the community, has been made possible by the housing policies for migrant populations which concentrate people from the same geographic origins (the Maghreb) in confined spaces (‘H.L.M’ or council flats, for example), so that it created a community based on common linguistic religious elements, gathering the three nationalities of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) (Harrami 1998:67). The very rapid development of new communication technologies, by reducing distance and providing means of contact, has greatly increased the implication of groups living in the society of origin on migrant families in France. Transnational family ties remain very important. In addition to sending remittances as a display of solidarity, migrant families often play the role of intermediary and mediator when conflicts arise between members of the large family in the native country. The family
network settled over there is still a major reference. Social recognition is mostly expected from this group. In this context of transnational social supervision, families must take into account various groups of relatives located in both societies, emigration and immigration societies. All that shows that the success of migrants projects does not depend only on criteria of economic success, but also on the preservation of the moral capital. The family’s ability to maintain its cohesion and safeguard its children against “negative influences” (delinquency for boys, disregard for sexual modesty and honor for girls) is a vital reference for the protection of the economic and moral capital. So the family space is “the object of a very powerful dual relation between ‘here’ and ‘over there’, and the flow of goods, people and information from one side of the Mediterranean sea to the other is an essential data in family life” (Streiff-Fenart, 1999:55).

As concerns the rules and values governing the girls’ status, the parents have to face a triple challenge. First, there are the groups of primordial loyalty (community networks of neighbors, familial networks in the society of origin, etc…) who consider young girls chastity important. Second there is the host society that does not share the same representations about chastity and grant girls an institutional right to escape from family control (appealing for justice, placement in foster homes, etc…). Third, young girls pressing demands for spaces of freedom to realize their aspirations officially prohibited in the family value system. How can parents cope with these three types of contradictory social pressures?

According to our ethnographic data, the management of these pressures is achieved, first by revising the rules about honor and setting up new rules likely to temper the climate of suspicion and supervision which implies the fear of ‘ar (shame). Then a new value with moral connotation is brought forward, involving the young girl’s personal responsibility. So she is her own guardian, and no longer watched over by the family. Mothers repeat to their daughters again and again: “Your father trusts you, do not bring him dishonor!” In other words “You are privileged compared to other girls, your father trusts you, you must not disappoint us, you must prove that we were right to trust you and this confidence is well deserved”. Later when the young girl is to get married, she must do her best to avoid scandal for her family, whether by proving she is still a virgin (if not, she must marry the man who had sex with her or find a man willing to marry a non-virgin) or by avoiding marriage to a man from a group prohibited for social or religious reasons (non-Muslims, and according to her family, non-Arabs, non-Moroccans, etc…). But to trust a girl also means that the family has to be clever in the girl’s supervision. Migrants think a good father is the one who knows how to use his authority (as a man, a husband and a father) and is clever enough to make his family accept his rules without endangering the cohesion of his household. Parents realize that a
blind excessive authority, as well as laxness, may be dangerous. So in order to maintain the
girl's loyalty to parental order, the father keeps off any confrontation with his daughters and
lets the mother manage day-to-day problems, preserving his efficacy in case of more serious
problems. Parental control can turn out to be not so strict as soon as the young woman
leaves home for legitimate social reasons (work, studies). If she is autonomous and lives
apart, parents carefully avoid visiting her, or give advance notice before going so as to give
her time enough to hide all that is socially considered to be a sign of “moral depravation”.
The principle adopted by fathers to maintain their authority is to avoid any situation that might
affect the respectful father-daughter relationship, for example, in case he should find a
boyfriend in her home, catch her smoking, find alcoholic drinks, etc...Provided the girl is
protected from gossips of her ethno-cultural group in France, and consequently of her group
over there as the news flow rapidly between the two sides of the Mediterranean, she is left in
peace. What matters is that she does not create any scandal in the family (getting pregnant
before marriage and wanting to keep the baby, marrying a man outside the family code, not
being virgin, which might lead to a crisis on the wedding night). For the rest (any minor
deviance), the best is to remain unaware. In this way, the parents prevent major clashes by
turning a blind eye on minor transgressions (Oriol 1986:46). In short the negotiations
opposing daughters and parents , the regulating pressure of the dominant society and the
ethno-cultural network lead to the consequence that the respect of the rules about chastity
are governed by a logic of undeclared cooperation between daughters and parents. The girl
is “allowed” to discreetly contravene some behavior rules. In return, the parents avoid
situations that might cause a serious rift and ensure their daughter’s loyalty in situations
where their authority is publicly tested (marriage, for example). The limits to know how far
rules can be infringed vary according to the individuals who decide for themselves. Young
girls behave not only in relation to the limits set by the parents (i.e. spare the family a
scandal), but also to their own capacity of handling the situation of infringement they happen
to experience (Harrami 2008:242-243). So they just have to“ do what is prohibited and hide it
(…) to act in such a way that the persons they are the most grateful to are those who are the
least aware of their actual behavior” (Ferrié and Radi 1990:233).

Conclusion

The different parts of this article point out the central role of the transnational space in the
reorganization of the family institution. We have attempted to show how interactions of the
families with various social units of their transnational space lead them to continually review
the objects of transmission and the conditions of children participation in these objects. As
concerns the families presented here, intergenerational dynamics about these objects lead to a clever management of cultural transmission and children participation in the rules and values considered by parents as expressions of their collective identity. Besides we have centered our analysis on the aspects which require most regulations and interventions from different groups and units of this space: the Maghreb group in France, the majority group, groups and communities located in the emigrating society, etc., that is to say Islam and woman’s condition.

For parents, religious values and rules are indicators of identity, signs of differentiation from the majority group. For the migrant receiving society, these values and rules express the strangeness of Maghreb populations and are the indicators of Maghreb ethnic features in France. For the communities located in the society of origin, these values are fundamental. Transnational social control concerning these rules is more and more efficient due to increasing possibilities of real and/or virtual circulation between here and over there. The responses emerging from an interaction of parents and children actions result in forms of soft adhesion to the original tradition. So in the religious domain we can see a separation between knowledge and practice on the one hand, and belonging on the other hand. It is the principle of genealogical filiation that determines belonging to the religion of parents, and not the child situation as concerns religious knowledge and practice. Such a readjustment accompanies the stratification of religious elements into more or less important elements.

The part of this paper about the young girl’s condition is a second example of adjustments to the social units of the transnational space. For the Maghreb group in France as well as for affiliated groups in the society of origin, the values instituting the young girl’s chastity are absolutely essential. But from the point of view of the girls concerned and that of the majority society, these values are restricting and make a break with the trends of French society. The answer to the various social receptions of these values is that young girls can stealthily transgress the rules concerning their relation to the extra-family space. They must only participate in the control of shame, and consequently be able to manage any infringement situation in which they might happen to be involved.

To conclude, what poses a problem in French society today is not the integration of Maghreb migrants in French society, but the solutions given to this problem. Between universalism and imperialism, French society has always chosen the solution of complete assimilation. Now, in the contemporary world where distance is no longer important, the assimilation pattern cannot still remain the reference for integration.
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