Transstate Social Spaces and Development:
Exploring the Changing Balance between Communities, States and Markets

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Abstract

The main question addressed is how transstate groups and associations interact with states and markets in migrant-induced flows of financial remittances, knowledge, political ideas and interests across state borders. First, how has academic and policy thinking on development cast the role of transstate social groups and non-state organizations? Second, in what ways are the activities of transstate cliques, groups and organizations, which embody some of the community principles, complementary or incompatible with those of other institutions functioning according to the logics of states and markets? The questions raised relate to the more general question of the shifting balance of community, state and market under conditions commonly called globalization. The argument put forward in this analysis is that the new enthusiasm towards the crucial role of transstate communities and migrant organizations is an effort to fuse principles of “community” with those of the global “market”. Yet there are both compatibilities and incompatibilities of the community and the market principles. Moreover, the principles of transstate “community” and the national “state” may clash in the case of those who have chosen the exit option and also exert voice in the countries and localities of origin, because they partake in decision-making but are not affected by the consequences of these decisions. The first part of the analysis outlines the ideational shift to “community” as reference category for development thinking on the part of international organizations over the past decades. The second part discusses if and how migrant organizations and groups have been complementary or incompatible with state and market principles, using the examples of small kinship groups, village associations, networks of businesspersons, epistemic communities, and diasporas. The third part touches on the implications for further research and argues that the concept of transstate social spaces, that is, spaces “in between” the local and the global, but also between states, can be used as an instrument to shed light on the dilemmas of border-crossing democracy and citizenship.

Key words: Transstate Social Spaces, Development, Migrant Associations, Community, Market, State.
Transstate\(^1\) communities and organizations have been at the center of the optimistic visions of national and international economic development policy establishments. There are three elements of this new enthusiasm. First, the surge in remittances over the past three decades transferred by transstate migrants has given rise to a kind of euphoria. Migrant\(^2\) remittances constitute the newest “development mantra” among institutions like the World Bank, the French and the British government, and development NGOs (Kapur 2004). Remittances are perceived to be a nearly ideal form of “bottom up” development finance. Indeed, looking at overall numbers, annual remittances to developing countries more than doubled during the 1990s and have been approximately 20 percent higher than official development assistance (ODA) to these countries. And certainly migrant remittances have been on par with foreign direct investment in many parts of the developing world. Remittances have increased with the upward trend in the rate of transstate migration (United Nations 2004). Second, knowledge transferred through networks of scientists and experts from North to South are increasingly seen as “brain circulation” beneficial to all parties involved (cf. Findlay 2003). The transfer of ideas is seen as helping developing and transformation countries to participate in knowledge societies, which are the basis for innovation, productivity, and development. Third, even the transfer of political remittances, namely ideas regarding the rule of law, good governance, democracy, and human rights, has achieved a growing prominence in the aftermath of interventions into armed conflicts and efforts at reconstructing countries ravaged by civil war – evidenced lately in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Occasionally diasporas made up of exiles, refugees, and labor migrants are hailed as mediators in conflict resolution, for example in the cases of South Africa or Nigeria (cf. Shain and Barth 2003).

The positive role attributed to transstate migration and mobility may come as a surprise. After all, transstate migration has long been considered to be a development failure. It can be conceptualized as territorial or geographical exit upon failure of state and other institutions to deliver well-being and human security (cf. Hirschman 1970). Nowadays, however, international organizations led by the World Bank, NGOs, and nation-state governments increasingly tout remittances – financial capital, knowledge, and political ideas – as a solution to development. We have witnessed in the past decades a slow but steady increase in the proportion of transstate migrants as a percentage of the world population from one to two per cent in the 1960s to about three per cent in the current period. One of the expected consequences of this increase is that there should be a greater potential for transstate flows such as remittances. While the assumptions underlying the developmental effects are problematic, the focus here is different: not the impact on development as such but the role of migrants and mobile persons as transstate subjects. In an academic framework, certain categories of migrants have been re-conceptualized as transstate actors (cf. Faist 2004). Now international organizations and NGOs have followed suit.

The argument put forward in this analysis is that the new enthusiasm over the crucial role of transstate communities and migrant organizations constitutes an effort to fuse principles of “community” with those of the global “market.” Yet there are both compatibilities and
incompatibilities between community and market principles. Moreover, the principles of transstate “community” and the national “state” may clash -- those who have chosen the exit option also exert voice because they partake in decision-making but are not affected by the consequences of these decisions.

How, in fact, do transstate communities interact with the principles of states and markets in flows across borders and boundaries? First, how has academic and policy thinking on “development” cast the role of communities and non-state organizations? Second, in what ways are the activities of transstate cliques, groups, and organizations which embody some of the community principles complementary to or incompatible with those of other institutions functioning according to the logics of states and markets? Indeed, little is actually understood about what role transstate groups and organizations play vis-à-vis states and markets when it comes to the transfer of financial capital such as remittances and investments, knowledge, and political ideas. The perspective taken here is not one of global governance but of transstate subjects, starting with migrants and their communities. What is needed is an examination of the role of communities for development and the role communities actually play vis-à-vis other principles of social order such as the market and the state. The booming interest in the role of diasporas and transstate migrant organizations reflects changes in the concepts of development that guide the public policies of international and national institutions and NGOs. And the shift in attention may signal more fundamentally the changing balance of communities, states, and markets. Therefore, the problematique raised relates to the more general question of the shifting balance of community, state, and market under conditions commonly called globalization.

Heuristically, one may distinguish three principles of social order in an ideal typical way – community, state, and market. Here, the community principle refers to the notion that social order presupposes, or at least benefits from, the rights and duties that are attached to members of concrete communities of persons. Communities constitute the cement that integrates the members of concrete communities into values of trust, reciprocity, loyalty, and solidarity, bounded by rights and obligations of members toward each other. Rights and duties delimit the boundaries of communities, which may rest on diverse mechanisms such as kinship lineage, shared knowledge and values, belief in common institutions, or religious beliefs. The boundaries of the market are quite different in that dispersed competition is ideally driven by the interest of human agents in the purposive acquisition of individual goods without much or indeed any consideration of, or control over, what impact the pursuit of acquisitive purposes may have on others or on other persons’ future selves. The principle of state consists of hierarchical control, carrying out binding decisions in political communities. State authority is meant to serve the common good, in the case under consideration here culminating in the notion of development. Whereas communities are characterized by various notions of boundaries of “us” distinct from “others” and markets exist without geographical borders, states – at any rate in their modern incarnations since the Westphalian Peace – are defined both by clear territorial borders and boundaries set by their function to implement authoritatively binding decisions by the force of power and legitimacy. In short, community, market, and state are master mechanisms of social order characterized by incompatibilities yet also requiring one another for their function (Schmitter and Streeck 1985; cf. Offe 2001). Empirically, the community principle is studied through categories such as cliques, groups, and organizations of mobile people; the state principle by looking at government and publicly authorized actors; and the market principle by looking at firms.

This analysis focuses on various transstate subjects, i.e., groups and organizations of mobile persons, including families, village groups, epistemic communities, and diasporas. Such transstate social formations mobilize very diverse forms of capital: financial capital such as money in the form of remittances and/or investments; knowledge and professional experience; and political ideas, such as ideas on forms of government, rights and responsibilities, and democracy. Financial capital, knowledge, and political ideas can be mobilized within the bounds of social capital, namely through various forms of reciprocity and solidarity (cf. Portes 1995 and
Portes et al. 2002), sometimes called “social remittances” (Levitt and Nyberg-Sørensen 2004).

Analyzing the role of transstate subjects requires a transstate approach to mobility which goes beyond the traditional binary concept. The conventional binary concept emphasizes emigration from and immigration to particular countries – with possible re-migration to the countries of origin. By contrast, transstate migration and mobility should be understood as manifold processes linking together countries of origin, destination, and onward migration. The focus should be not only on migrants who settle for a meaningful period of time abroad but also on those persons who engage in short-term mobility. Such social spaces are characterized by dense and continuous transactions across borders (Portes et al. 1999; cf. Basch et al. 1994) because, irrespective of where they settle, persons may entertain transstate ties that have impacts for the respective countries. Examples of social spaces formed by migrants and mobile people are transstate families, hometown associations, epistemic communities of experts and scientists, global religious congregations, as well as ethnic and even national communities. This goes well beyond simply considering the category of former transstate migrants who eventually settle in the North, return to the original country, or engage in onward migration.

Accordingly, the notion of development is understood here in the way that it is used by different kinds of transstate communities: in the case of transstate families as an informal insurance against economic risks and as an investment in their children’s future; in the case of village communities as the improvement of the infrastructure and the provision of local collective goods such as education and health; in the case of networks of businesspersons as opportunities for investment and optimal interest; in the case of epistemic communities the unhindered flow of knowledge; and in the case of national communities a high degree of political autonomy, sometimes even involving the formation of an independent nation-state. All of these notions resemble the overall lowest common denominator which the term development has carried since the late 1940s, namely the vague hope of progression and betterment for those parts of the world deemed “underdeveloped” (for a trenchant critique, see Escobar 1995). A transstate approach means looking not only at developing countries and countries in transformation but also at highly industrialized countries. In the latter case, there is value added in, for example, the contributions of migrants to social insurance and welfare state provisions, the closing of labor market gaps in the informal service economy, and the values of democracy and human rights transported by the highly skilled.

The first part of this analysis outlines the ideational shift to “community” as a reference category for development thinking on the part of international organizations and OECD country governments over the past three to four decades. The second part discusses the role of the three principles of social order, in particular community vis-à-vis state and market in development processes, and looks at how migrant organizations and groups have been complementary or incompatible with state and market principles. Transstate analysis involves studying the ties that cross emigration and immigration states, sending and receiving regions, and must transcend the interdependence between closed units in opening up transstate social spaces. The third section of this analysis touches on the implications for further research and argues that the concept of transstate social spaces, that is, spaces “in between” the local and the global, but also between states, can be used as an instrument to shed light on the dilemmas of border-crossing democracy.

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3 Of course not all transnational migrants or mobile persons develop dense and continuous transnational ties. Some of them really cut their roots; such as most ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe who migrated in the late twentieth century. Another problem of transnational research has been over-aggregation. Migrants as actors across borders are mainly conceptualized in research and public discourse as “diasporas.” This term tends to treat migrants from a given emigration state as a whole, e.g., the Indian diaspora or the Chinese diaspora. This is problematic in three ways. First, it implies a one-sided relationship in focusing only on the country of origin. This dovetails with the traditional definitions of diaspora which implies forced dispersal, and does not open our eyes to two-way relationships. Second, a religious or national diaspora group may not capture self-understanding. For example, not all migrants from Turkey consider themselves Turks; some would self-identity as Kurds. Third, there are different levels of aggregation: families, villages, regions, nations, and cross-cutting allegiances, such as religions. One needs to unpack the notion of diaspora and make room for different types of transnational communities of practice. Here, the term is reserved for self-ascribed large national political communities.
and citizenship without relying simply on state-centered notions. Of course it goes without saying that states themselves – in contrast to more recent ideas on the balance between state, market, and community in development – have to be brought back in to the analysis to unearth opportunity structures for the emergence of transstate social spaces and thus the role of transstate groups and associations in development policy.

The conceptual evolution of the role of community in development

The importance of community as a pillar of development has increased over the past three decades. The more recent focus of development policy on transstate subjects in the context of increasing remittances of migrants fits with a context in which the role of the state and the market have been fundamentally reevaluated by international development organizations. There has been an obvious shift of thinking in the international development policy establishment, which has rediscovered transstate migration as a set of processes involving the transfer of resources from developed to developing countries. For example, international institutions such as the World Bank, but also national organizations and governments, have attributed an increased role of communities and transstate communities in particular in development processes (cf. Biao 2005). Long ago, John Kenneth Galbraith described migration as “the oldest action against poverty” (Galbraith 1962; cit. in House of Commons 2004). This hunch seems to rest on solid foundations in economic theory. If one were to liberalize transstate migration, large gains, perhaps equivalent to those envisaged in the WTO’s current “Development Round,” could accrue. Ideally, migration will decrease under a global system of free trade for all factors of production, including labor, because of factor price equalization, that is, the tendency of wages to equalize as workers move from poorer to richer regions of the world. According to neo-classical theory, this would mean that trade and migration are substitutes: countries that have relatively cheaper labor export labor-intensive goods or workers. Over time, differences in the prices of goods and the wages of workers should be reduced with freer trade (see, e.g. Fischer, Martin and Straubhaar 1997). One of the by-products would be a significant drop in the wage level and probably welfare state provisions in highly industrialized immigration countries (cf. Hamilton and Whaley 1984). This is also one of the reasons we do not see unfettered movement, that is, migration without borders, but instead rather strict boundaries of welfare states as to the inclusion of newcomers.

As expected, there have been critical voices calling into question overly simplistic expectations and spurious causalities. Certainly, remittance flows through migrants and transstate communities are not a panacea for development problems. After all, the onset and success of development processes depend, among other things, on macro-structural conditions, such as land reform, a favorable investment climate, an efficient, transparent, and non-corrupt bureaucracy and system of governance – to mention only a few of the most obvious candidates. Overall, the evidence for development effects is contradictory and fragmentary. Much of the analysis that support beliefs about the overall costs and benefits of migration is based on “micro”-level research and cannot conclusively demonstrate the validity of “macro”-level conclusions. It is deeply problematic to extrapolate from micro-level evidence to macro-level outcomes without specifying the mechanisms of the aggregation processes. With respect to knowledge transfer, it may be of little practical value for emigration countries, immigration countries, and mobile person simply to rename what used to be called “brain drain” as “brain gain.” Such a facile

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4 The regional distribution pattern looks as follows: Latin America and the Caribbean receive the most remittances ($30 bi), followed by South Asia ($18 bi), East Asia and the Pacific ($18 bi), the Middle East and North Africa ($13 bi), and Europe and Central Asia ($10 bi). Sub-Saharan Africa, including the poorest countries in the world, receives the smallest amount of remittances ($4 bi). In Latin America, remittances amount to 2 per cent of the GDP. Yet in smaller economies the proportion is much higher: 29 per cent of GNP in Haiti, in El Salvador, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic about 15 per cent of GDP (cf. Orozco 2002).
renaming overlooks the fact that there are indeed deleterious effects resulting from the emigration of so-called highly skilled professionals, such as the care drain in the health sector in Southern Africa, or the exit of natural scientists and engineers in the least developed countries, where there is little potential for replacing those who have left. Lastly, the involvement of exiles, migrants, and refugees in political development as carriers of ideas of human rights and democratization ignores the role that some of these groups may have played at the very core of perpetuating violent conflicts instead of resolving them; for example, the Tamil Tigers’ long-distance nationalism. It is noteworthy that the documents presenting the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) declared by the United Nations (UN) make no mention of any links between transstate migration or diasporas and development. Only a few of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) acknowledge migration or refugee flows and their connection to development. Yet all these caveats have not seriously challenged the emphasis on transstate subjects as carriers of development. Still, the role of transstate communities is mainly an emerging issue, discussed in more specialized forums such as the Global Commission on International Migration set up by UN General Secretary Kofi Annan.

Bringing “community” back into thinking on development policy can be seen as an incremental process which has occurred over roughly four successive stages. The first refers to the long period after World War Two in which development such as import substitution industrialization occurred under mainly state-led industrialization. Corresponding academic theories, such as modernization theory of the 1950s and 1960s, did not attribute a crucial active role to (small) groups and organizations – other than as recipients of massive cultural, political, and economic change (see, e.g. Huntington 1966). This state of affairs began to change, making a second stage, launched by the World Bank’s 1973 call for targeting development efforts to the “poorest of the poor.” This proclamation catalyzed a shift in focus away from growth and toward issues of redistribution and equity. Understandably, this ideational move involved an increasing emphasis on community participation in development. Whether labeled “farmer-first,” “bottom-up,” or “grassroots” development strategies, the focus was on decentralization, localization, and the satisfaction of basic human needs for food, shelter, health, and what we nowadays call human security.

The foregrounding of community coincided with increasing criticism of the “developmental” state and, above all, an attendant greater role of market principles. Organizations like the World Bank called for greater participation in the world market (McMichael 1996: 111), in marked contrast to policies inspired by dependency theory which advocated a partial dissociation from world market participation (e.g. Senghaas 1974). Influenced by events of the 1970s and 1980s such as the debt crisis in Latin America and the implosion of postcolonial states in parts of Africa and elsewhere, academic studies also emphasized the economic distortions effected by rent-seeking elites in command of predatory states (e.g. Bates 1988). International development institutions began to place more faith in the operation of more-or-less unfettered markets, and in the benefits of market-driven growth as promising for societies whose potential for economic growth had been stymied by what were considered inefficient state institutions. A shorthand description of this trend was the “Washington Consensus.” Indeed, international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pressured recipient governments to rely on price signals and little else for social coordination, thus advocating privatization, deregulation, and the demolition of labor rights and social subsidies (cf. Chang and Graebel 2003). In crafting policy, international development agencies increasingly bypassed developing country governments, choosing instead to rely instead on the mediation of international and local nongovernmental agencies.

The trend toward marketization coincided, perhaps awkwardly but certainly not incidentally, with an anti-étatist notion that development entailed the empowerment of communities and individuals themselves to undertake the “development project.” Obviously, the emphasis on local autonomy and grassroots participation was meant to provide a useful corrective to top-down development strategies of the past. In policy thinking, in short, the state
was retreating as a mechanism for creating social order and the community emerged as a compensating mechanism. In a paradigmatic conceptual innovation, the international development policy agencies began to use new concepts presumed to drive development – the concept of “social capital” being one of the most important (cf. Evans 1996). Conceptually, the notion of social capital hints at the marriage of the market and community principles. Resources inherent in social ties – such as reciprocity, trust, and solidarity – are thought to constitute capital which yields interest; for example, access to financial and other social resources. Major actors in development policy such as the World Bank and a myriad of NGOs propagated more participatory forms of development on the local level. Ideas of globalization “from below” have logically focused on diasporas and transstate communities. In this process, the role of the state as a principle of social order in development has changed as well. It is now a service provider for markets and partly communities, creating the very conditions for market exchange through non-corrupt rule-making, a stable bureaucracy, and the guarantee of minimum human, civil, and political rights (cf. Nuscheler 2004: 405-430). In a nutshell, political and legal structures provide the necessary infrastructure for economic growth (North 1990). Notions such as “good governance” and establishing the “rule of law” in the aftermath of the “third wave of democratization” (Diamond 1996) rule supreme in the universe of developmental concepts.

In sum, there has been indeed an ideational change in bringing community back in the development discourse and, most recently, transstate groups and organizations. While there is certainly a strong link between changing concepts and actual public policies, it is necessary to go far beyond the supposed role of community, state, and market to unearth the distinct roles of each set of principles of social order.

Community vis-à-vis market and state: complementarities and incompatibilities

While states authoritatively enforce borders and boundaries, and markets verge on a borderless world, communities as boundary markers occupy a distinct niche in creating social order across borders. The focus here is on how small kinship groups, village communities, networks of businesspersons, epistemic cliques, and diasporas interact with actors in states and markets.

**Financial capital as remittances: small kinship groups**

For many of the persons belonging to the smallest type of transstate group, namely families or kinship groups, border-crossing ties and living modes emerging out of migration may serve as a livelihood strategy, quite akin to income out of migration as an insurance mechanism (Nyberg Sørensen and Olwig 2002: 2). This involves split households in various states and shadow households. Monetary remittances frequently bind immigrants to their kin over long distances through ties of reciprocity and solidarity; for example, exchange between generations when children work abroad and support their elderly parents and other family members in the country of origin.

Instances of complementarity of community transactions with state and market principles are obvious. Transfers of family members signal the dual role of some immigrants as providers both for families abroad and for the coffers of the welfare state in the country of employment. In social insurance systems for old age pensions, for example, the younger average age of immigrants compared to the rest of the population leads to substantial transfers. A study on Germany in the late 1980s found that immigration generated positive short-run benefits in

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5 Social capital can be understood in two ways: (1) social ties as resources available to persons (Bourdieu 1983, Loury 1985); and (2) resources such as reciprocity and solidarity which are available to groups and thus enable cooperation (Putnam 1993).
selected sectors of the welfare state. The 3.6 million people who immigrated between 1988 and 1991 made significant contributions: according to this study, 100,000 immigrant employees generated 30 billion DM for social insurance against costs of only 14 billion DM – thus a huge surplus of 16 billion DM remained (Barabas et al. 1992). On the other side, transstate migrants may support kin in the country of origin. Such communities and states often lack state-organized social security systems; and if they exist, are inadequate to ensure a minimum standard of living.

The limits to this dual role lie in the flow of remittances across the life-cycle of migrants. These are not necessarily steady flows. There is a general understanding in the literature that remittances are likely to decline over time as migrants may become more committed to the country or region of settlement (declining in the case of settlement in the immigration country; absence upon return). On average, there is a peak period of three to five years in which remittances are sent, often followed by a decline at the point at which a migrant achieves permanent resident status abroad. Needless to say, such a pattern is not inevitable and may be affected by the macro-economic and macro-political context and life events among migrants and their families.

A further element of complementarity is macro-economic. Some emigration states, especially those with large amounts of remittances and those in which such transfers reach high proportions as a percentage of GDP, have come to use the amount of current and future remittances to upgrade their creditworthiness in the financial sector. In this way, migrants’ solidarity and reciprocity with their shadow households residing in the country of origin have become a “hard-currency receivable” used as a “tradable security” to secure foreign loans for economies whose creditworthiness has been downgraded in the international market (Guarnizo 2003).

The apparent incompatibility in the case of these transactions do not directly concern the activities of families themselves but the ways in which small kinship groups compete with banks and other market institutions that constitute formal remittance channels. Briefly put, market giants may, in some instances, compete with solidarity systems, such as the unofficial and sometimes illegal hawalla and hundi transaction systems. The latter are organized on trust among, for example, members of religious communities, and are used in manifold situations. These systems allow migrants who wish to transfer remittances to do so without incurring high fees. The sending end transmits information to the receiving end, and the remittances are issued immediately – based on reciprocal trust. These forms of transactions clash with the more recent involvement of large financial corporations in the control of the transfer of remittances worldwide. For example, Western Union and MoneyGram controlled as of 1996 as much as 97 percent of the remittance market and 81 percent of the estimated 43,000 outlets in the US (Guarnizo 2003: 686). While the US-Mexican market is dominated by larger corporations, remittances to South Asia seem to take place through unofficial channels. A study in Bangladesh, for example, showed that 40 percent of remittances are sent through informal hundi sources, 4.6 percent through friends and relatives, 8 percent are carried by hand by migrants when they return, and only 46 percent go through official sources. For Pakistan, senior bankers estimate the real flow at between US$ 8-10 billion of which only US $1 billion is actually sent through official channels (Hugo 2003: 9). In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, various Western governments have closed down unofficial channels, arguing that they were used for illicit money laundering and explicit terrorist purposes (cf. Mellyn 2003).

The compatibility between community transactions and state efforts to tap these transactions is also questionable. It is often assumed in studies on remittances that the migrants concerned emigrated more or less voluntarily. Little attention is paid to refugees, or more precisely, those who had few degrees of freedom in exiting. Contentious state-citizen relations in the original emigration countries may go a long way in shedding light on the resistance to emigration states’ efforts to tap remittances, especially where one of the motivations to emigrate was to flee the influence of authoritarian governments. Moreover, if migrants feel that governments are simply seeking to tax their diaspora, the compliance to indirect taxation is
called into question. In the case of Eritrea, the young state tried to tax expatriates at two percent, the so-called “healing tax,” in the late 1980s. Later, the state used the funds remitted to finance the war with Ethiopia.

The protection of rights in immigration countries may not be an incompatibility problem since in most of them basic human rights and labor rights standards apply – yet with significant differences when comparing EU countries with the Middle East (Gulf) and high-growth Asian economies. In the latter, the rights of migrant labor seem to be much less protected, at least at least in so far as formal protections are concerned (Weiner 1986). The situation in emigration countries involves more than just problems of implementation. Clearly, there is a direct interest in remittances. And countries such as the Philippines have gone so far as adjusting their educational and health care systems to export workers and services (Martin 2004), a strategy that implies a maximization of emigration. At the same time the legitimation of political rule requires emigration countries to attend to the human, civil, and social rights of migrant labor abroad. The tension between “numbers” versus “rights” clearly has a bearing for the conditions under which members of kinship groups, especially those employed in critical sectors such as domestic services and construction, are able to negotiate the terms of their employment (cf. Rodriguez 2002).6

In important ways incompatibilities affect small groups, which are changing as a result of learning during the migration process itself. In some cases, the “feminization of migration” resulted in the very transformation of gender relations which constituted the backbone of the migratory arrangements in small and large kinship groups. In Bangladesh, the migration of women to Malaysia led to changes in social practices. Malaysia is considered a role model for Bangladesh, and is also a Muslim country. Once the flow of women from Bangladesh to Malaysia had started, young women sought to emigrate, resulting in increased economic independence. Those engaging in migration gave loans to other women and also participated in the labor force in Bangladesh. Since female labor force participation in Malaysia is relatively high, migrant and even non-migrant women adopted some of the same practices in Bangladesh (Dannecker 2005). Yet we also know of other cases in which transstate practices exacerbated gendered power structures, especially when control over financial remittances rested with men (cf. Mahler and Pessar 2001 on El Salvador). These examples suggest that transstate groups should not be regarded simply as unitary actors in all respects but rather as social collectives connected by sometimes conflicting social and symbolic ties.

**Financial capital as investments: village associations**

A perspective on village communities makes transstate transactions for the most part trans-local, that is, local-to-local relations across state borders. Examples are numerous, and village communities come in diverse shapes, such as home-town associations in the case of Mexico, returnee associations in Jamaica, or charitable foundations in Egypt. Such communities provide significant resources for community development at the local level by, for example, involving themselves in providing construction materials for their home town church, raising money to improve water and sewage systems or health and education services, helping to organize relief efforts following natural disasters, or channeling remittances, especially in the Americas.

While traditional emigration countries, such as Italy, have long had policies and programs for (former) citizens living overseas, it is only relatively recently that emigration states have reshaped their relationship to hometown associations, often in a reactive way (cf. Goldring 2002 on Mexico). An even newer phenomenon is the interest shown by international organizations in

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6 There is a clear distinction between legal employment under which workers have recourse to legal protection, and illegal employment, which does not include social rights. While this is an important divide, employment relationships offer different opportunities for various categories of migrants. For example, for workers sent abroad as contract labor still employed by companies in the countries of origin, social rights in the country of temporary employment may not be of utmost importance. Also, seasonal workers may not have the flexibility they wish if employed under worker programs since employers usually hire those they consider most docile (cf. Faist 2003).
the possibility that transplanted village communities could be useful in more than the maintenance of culture but might also play a significant role in the economic development strategy of the emigration country (Lucas 2001). The complementarity of activities of hometown associations and state efforts can easily be seen in the ways that communities and states cooperate in improving the infrastructure in hometown regions. A well-known example is Mexico’s “3-for-1 program,” a model for the much-touted public-private partnership initiatives in development policy (PPP). Each $1 of remittances from hometown associations in government approved development projects receives an additional $1 in matching funds each from federal, state, and local governments. Other examples relate to tourism from immigrant communities to the “old country,” constituting a major earner for countries from Ireland to Vietnam. Clearly, as with family remittances, hometown associations privilege certain places. Frictions between communities and states emerge when hometown associations have pursued political goals at variance with those of local, regional, or national governments. The response of states has been repression and surveillance of emigrants abroad on the one hand but on the other hand, stronger efforts, at times, to cater to the interests of the diaspora, for example, by delivering services through consular institutions or campaigning abroad, as in the case of Mexico, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in the USA.

Yet there are incompatibilities which clearly go beyond mere divergence of interests and pose more fundamental dilemmas. Transstate organizations and groups are able to join exit and voice, and do so through geographic mobility and strengthening transstate ties. While the complementarity of exit and voice may be applauded from a normative point of view, such as the increased empowerment it thus provides for those who are mobile, the transnationalization of political participation creates tensions between mobile and relatively immobile people and associations. There is a basic dilemma arising out of the democratic principle that those who take decisions should also be part of those affected by them – yet although transnationals are participating in decision-making, when it comes to the consequences of decisions they act as third parties. This fundamental dilemma is particularly striking in transformation countries, such as Mexico, which have built up an infrastructure reaching out to emigrants abroad. There is a wide array of instruments. These range from the Paisano Program, consular registrations (matricula), and the Institute of Mexicans Abroad to efforts to institutionalize dual citizenship and political rights, such as dual nationality (1996) and the possibility of extraterritorial voting in national elections (2005). Such programs are actually likely to stimulate and promote transstate associations. And they thus advance transstate forms of citizenship. On the local level in particular, however, such transstate forms are not insignificant because, quite often, substantial parts of the so-called community of origin are residing (temporarily) abroad. The latter is an effect of chain migration. The problem is not quite as pernicious on the national level because usually a much lower percentage of the overall population is engaged in transstate migration. The dominant pattern of transstate migration is that there are few migrants from most places and many from a few places (locales) – taking states as the broader unit of analysis. In essence, transnationalization enhances the combination of exit and voice on a sustained basis and therefore contributes to the unequal chances for exercising political rights.

Financial capital as investments: networks of businesspersons

Emigrants and the children of emigrants living abroad are sometimes seen by the governments in the country of origin as “effective middlemen” (China) who play a crucial role in brokering foreign investments or investing themselves. Yet it is also a common assumption that development defined as economic growth does not depend primarily on the inflow of financial capital but on entrepreneurial spirit (Hirschmann 1947). Businesspersons as communities of practice may foster an atmosphere in which an entrepreneurial spirit of the “Protestant” and other kinds conducive to economic success might grow (Weber 1958). Cases at hand are emigrants from mainland China, Taiwan, and India. Overseas Indians who settled in Silicon Valley in the USA, for example, contributed to the rise of the region around Bangalore as the hub of the Indian industry in information technology. Indian emigrants who worked as highly skilled
specialists in Silicon Valley invested in the burgeoning Indian IT industry. Software specialists in India were already employed by overseas companies to process data and develop programs. The Indian investors from Silicon Valley added another dimension in setting up companies in India. Other multinational companies from the USA and Europe followed suit (cf. Cornelius, Espenshade, and Salehyan 2001). The Taiwanese experience parallels this case (Tseng 2000).

In these cases of a large and well-educated tertiary sector of citizens living abroad, the potential for foreign investment is high. Again, about 20 million citizens from India live abroad, a diaspora second in size only to that of China. It is estimated that the income of this category amounts to more than a third of India’s GDP. It is therefore no surprise that this category, called “non-resident Indians” (NRI), as a community provided about 10 per cent of foreign direct investment (FDI) in India and a sizable part of venture capital. The People’s Republic of China may serve as a case par excellence: about 50 per cent of FDI comes from some 30 million overseas Chinese. Successive Chinese governments have created incentives for capital investment by overseas Chinese in selected enterprise areas (e.g., Saxenian 2002). Undoubtedly, global production chains, in this case software development and processing, have made investments like these more feasible and more profitable. Yet we know very little about the networks and cliques businesspersons entertain among each other and with bridging brokers in the emigration country. We need to know more about how businesspersons act as brokers, as communities in between -- sometimes called “transstate workers” or “temporary returnees” who work in emigration and immigration regions and play a role asmiddlemen linking businesses in the two regions with their personal networks and technological and market know-how. It seems plausible to assume that quite a few expatriates investing in their countries of origin have insider advantages, such as knowledge of the language and local customs, and are likely to enjoy the trust of bureaucrats who administer economic planning (cf. Rauch 2001).

Governments have implemented a host of policies to attract both highly skilled emigrants from abroad as returnees and entice those who stay overseas to maintain productive links. For example, the Indian government offers tax incentives for expatriates, and tries to use their expertise, advice, and ideas to equip Indian companies, and to create opportunities for overseas Indian companies. One symbolic but highly visible instrument has been a special resident status for expatriate businesspersons, akin to dual citizenship. This status has created added entry options for privileged groups.

This example already hints at potential incompatibilities between communities of practice and states. The Chinese state, for instance, encourages cross-border flows of financial capital but certainly objects to the import of political ideas via expatriates. Expatriates’ ideas concerning liberalization of the political regime and a greater recognition of human rights and democratic ideals have certainly not been welcome, albeit the groups involved in the transfer of economic versus political capital are not one and the same, students vs. businesspersons.

The thorny issue of the selectivity effects of development via transnationalization is here even more obvious than in cases of remittances. States and economic elites join to sponsor investments, perhaps to the detriment of certain sectors of education and the economy. The Indian government, for example, has heavily sponsored advanced institutes of learning, the Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT). No such concerted effort can be discerned when it comes to basic education. Certainly, in this case the federal and provincial states have created the preconditions necessary for the communities of businesspersons to offer services and investment. Such a coalition of states and communities of businesspersons in planning and implementing foreign direct investments makes it farfetched to consider such processes “bottom up” development (cf. Bhagwati 2003).

For immigration countries, immigrant or ethnic entrepreneurship may be part of beneficial transstate business ties. Canadian based studies have shown that a doubling of skilled migration from Asia saw a 74 percent increase in Asian imports in Canada (Page and Adams 2004). Ethnic entrepreneurship may also be instrumental in creating jobs for immigrants and natives. Markets
may expand in two directions. First, nostalgia among immigrants for the foods and products of the country of origin creates markets for those products in the immigration country, fostering local production and international trade (e.g., Turkish immigrants in Germany). Second, migrant entrepreneurs may invest in the countries of origin and thus contribute directly to economic development abroad. Although there is heated debate over the exact benefits provided by so-called ethnic niches, enclaves, and ethnic markets and for which category (e.g., ethnic entrepreneurs vs. co-ethnic workers; cf. Sanders 2002), migrant entrepreneurship is a prime example of financial capital following persons, or more precisely, capital accumulated by those persons first attracted abroad by capital. In all these processes, social capital is a crucial bridging mechanism.

Knowledge: epistemic communities

Epistemic communities of scholars and experts are exemplary communities of practice without propinquity. Scientists and professional experts share common models, theories, and sometimes even life styles characterized by high geographical mobility. Recently, major political actors such as international organizations and governments have started to focus on not only the emigration or re-migration or return of highly skilled professionals but also on the formation of transstate networks. This shift of perspective is partly a result of the fact that while many of the highly skilled do not return to the regions of origin, they nonetheless form border-crossing epistemic networks in which the countries of origin are sometimes involved. For example, half of all foreign students who earn PhDs in the USA are still in that country five years later. The OECD (1998) estimates the total brain drain from developing countries to OECD countries to be about 12.9 million persons, with 7 million in the USA alone. The flip side is a massive outflow from emigration regions: according to the World Bank Africa, for example, lost one third of its executives between 1960 and 1987 (Stalker 1994). In short, the role of knowledge exchange for economic growth and development has regained importance over recent years; indeed, resource transfers across countries are nowadays discussed within the framework of the knowledge society (Stehr 1992). There are numerous claims about the importance of knowledge transfer and scientific cooperation for development (World Bank 1999). In connection with public policies, there have been increased efforts to connect migration policies to research policies in the developing states, transformation states, and industrial countries (e.g. BMZ 2001:12).

It is noteworthy that academic analysis of the developmental consequences of the mobility of highly skilled persons has paralleled political expectations: in the 1960s, a majority of analyses entertained the idea of a “brain gain” for developing countries, and mobility was seen as a resource for modernizing developing countries. In the 1970s and 1980s, the reverse was true, that is, the more critical view of the “brain drain” carried the day, with the underlying assumption that emigration was harmful to developing countries. This is not surprising because such studies situated the phenomenon within the dependency literature paradigm. In the course of the 1990s, the dominant academic and political mood shifted again. Experts and politicians from industrial countries in need of highly-skilled technological specialists now assert that there is a “brain circulation,” an apparently neutral term (cf. Appleyard 1999). There are claims about mutual benefits for all actors involved, for the highly skilled as well as for the emigration and immigration countries themselves, such as the creation of jobs in the software industry and increasing capital investment from abroad. In highly industrialized countries public policies directed toward recruiting highly skilled migrants now routinely also include efforts to attract international students. Subsequently, some OECD countries such as Germany have recently changed their legislation to allow international students to remain or to re-enter, once they have completed their studies. At the same time, countries of emigration have begun to take initiatives to reverse the “brain drain.” Examples include the Indian government’s efforts to sponsor investments by expatriates in the Information Technology (IT) sector.

There are various possible outcomes of brain transfer – (1) brain drain followed by brain gain, (2) brain drain, and (3) a “global brain chain.” In the first case, brain drain followed by
brain gain, there is usually deficit at exit, followed by possible gains not only for migrants and immigration countries but also for emigration countries. The emigration of the highly skilled may be advantageous for those remaining in the country of origin, when educated people leave and report back that they have been economically successful. Such communication creates an incentive to those left behind to improve their knowledge and social capital, for example, by investing in higher education. Such processes may happen on a large scale, but only a small percentage of those whose capital assets have improved will actually leave, while the rest will stay in the country of origin and benefit from improved education in the home country (Stark and Wang 2001). In the case of brain drain, there is no replacement capability, an outcome that seems to affect the poorest countries especially. Prominent empirical examples include the so-called (health) “care drain” from Zambia, Liberia, and Zimbabwe. Nurses and medical doctors from these and other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa fill the gaps in the health systems of developed countries although the deficits in their countries of origin are very large, not least because of the AIDS/HIV pandemic in Southern Africa. Meanwhile, health care systems in OECD countries reap the benefits. In the UK, for example, 1 out of 10 persons working in health care came from developing countries in the early 1990s. By 2002, within a period of ten years, more than 5 out of 10 originated in overseas regions outside the UK.7 The third possibility is a global brain chain or “staged cascade” which may involve both brain drain and brain gain. A noteworthy example is medical doctors who move from Canada to the USA, who are, in turn, replaced by South Africans in Canada. At the far end of the chain, Cubans physicians relocate to South Africa.

In immigration countries notions of economic globalization have led to an increased effort by companies and states to attract post-secondary international students and future scientists. OECD countries have thus changed their legislation, moving from a red card to a red carpet strategy. The hunt for knowledge workers is nonetheless reminiscent of “body shopping” and the poaching of workers, a well-known strategy employed by many countries emulating the success of economic leaders, e.g. eighteenth-century England attracting workers from the Netherlands (cf. Chang 2002). The difference is, however, that nowadays it is not the countries catching up that engage in poaching but those who are furthest ahead. The USA is currently the only country with a positive balance vis-à-vis all the other countries in the world at the same time. Persons of foreign origin make up 12 percent of the entire highly qualified segment of the US labor market. Nonetheless, this share is similar in other OECD countries. Thus, while in simple numbers the contribution of the developing world to the developed is relatively marginal, it is nevertheless strategically important since it eases shortages in the labor market in the target countries.

For developing and some transformation countries the volume of skills involved is sizeable. What constitutes a small proportion of personnel in the North is a large one for the South. For instance, about one third of researchers and engineers originating in developing countries works in OECD countries. Generally, transformation countries, such as the People’s Republic of China, have greater leverage and may succeed in re-attracting their intellectuals. Also, proportionally fewer and fewer Chinese students go abroad to study (Meyer 2005). Overall, there is mounting evidence that some epistemic communities of scholars and experts also reach back into countries of origin (see, e.g., Barré et al. 2003; Meyer and Charum 1995). Obviously, we observe a complementarity of community on the one hand and market and state on the other hand in the case of brain gain, while an incompatibility exists in case of brain drain, such as the care drain out of least-developed countries.

Interestingly, there are clear limits to state sponsorship and hierarchical control of epistemic communities. Currently, roughly forty such networks are documented throughout the world, involving about thirty-five developing countries. These networks concern activities such as joint

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7 Another possibility associated with the mobility of the highly skilled is “brain waste,” that is, professionals who are employed as domestics in immigration countries (e.g., Filipino nurses in Gulf states in the household sector), or highly skilled workers who return to their country of origin but cannot find employment at their skill level, such as natural scientists who do not have access to appropriate laboratories. The worst case scenario is called “brain desertification.” In this case the highly skilled do not return and do not sustain any ties with those who stayed in the countries of origin.
research projects, information exchange, technology transfers, joint ventures, or training sessions. Many of these epistemic communities are based on the idea that return is not the only alternative to a skills exodus. For them, there is an alternative transstate option. Not only national governments but also international organizations are engaged in setting up such networks, as reflected in, for example, policy programs like the United Nations Development Program’s “Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals.” The policy involves the production of databases of skilled nationals overseas who may be willing to engage in particular development projects. Another example is the International Organization of Migration’s (IOM) “Migration for Development in Africa” (MIDA) program, which seeks to mobilize the skills of African nationals abroad for the benefit of Africa’s development. Yet emigration of the highly-skilled can be beneficial only if there is already a minimal stock of highly qualified people. Otherwise, there is no replacement capacity. An indication of this is that about 250,000 African-born professionals work outside Africa, and 100,000 non-African professionals in Africa are employed by UN agencies or through NGOs.

While systems of training and research are predominantly organized along national lines, epistemic communities often evade the narrow principles of the “national interest.” An important case in point is the network Red Caldas, set up by the Colombian government in the early 1990s (Chaparro et al. 2004). This experience suggests the importance of specialized research communities, built along decentralized networks, which have a genuinely transstate orientation. In the first phase, the government set up centralized radial networks, which developed later into epistemic communities with a decentralized character. In this stage the project developed along national nodes from the early- to the mid-1990s. The government established national nodes in all countries around the globe which had a critical mass of Colombian graduate students and researchers -- all in all 27 countries and 874 researchers and graduate students were involved. Working groups formed which brought together researchers in Colombia, Colombian researchers in the various countries abroad, and researchers from developed countries who were interested in these topics. Red Caldas maintained a registry of such projects. In the second half of the 1990s it turned out that both researchers based in Colombia and those abroad did not congregate so much around the national nodes but congealed in specialized epistemic communities. Also, Red Caldas evolved into a “network of networks” when support from the center – the government – diminished. The national nodes practically disappeared in the late 1990s. The epistemic communities in which researchers associated with Colombia actually participated had a more clearly defined membership and defined activities, and were characterized by a more participatory rather than hierarchical model. In sum, the state-centric effort to establish transstate epistemic communities along national lines failed, while decentralized networks succeeded in attracting natural and social scientists.

Epistemic communities and the associated flows of knowledge are an excellent example of the different principles of providing goods in communities, markets, and states. Communities provide club goods, as distinct from private goods and public goods. While public goods and thus the common good provided by states are in an ideal typical way characterized by the twin principles of non-excludability and access for all, that is, non-exclusiveness, private goods are at the opposite end. Club goods are in between in that non-members can actually be excluded. However, based on membership, the goods provided are indeed collective (cf. Breuer, Faist and Jordan 1995). Put briefly, it is the boundaries between members and non-members that matter most in the provision of club goods. In the case of epistemic communities knowledge is akin to a club good, situated in between knowledge as a public and a private good. On the one hand, the increasing knowledge flows across borders, helped by the rapid dissemination and adoption of information and communication technologies, suggest that knowledge, an essential value for development, can be considered a public good. On the other hand, knowledge is a private good, reflected in the importance of industrial property rights (IPRs) and other forms of knowledge appropriation. Obviously, the production of and the access to knowledge is selective. Transstate epistemic communities provide mechanisms for the translation of science into knowledge as a factor of production and decision-making. Certain forms of knowledge are generated through
communities of practice of like-minded people or peers who work in a given field or on a given topic. Epistemic communities are also connected to extension workers and end-users (so-called stakeholders). In short, epistemic communities of practice are organizational forms for producing and accessing “protected knowledge” that circulates freely only within these communities, and accessible only to members. Members of such communities thus occupy the function of “strategic groups” (Evers and Schiel 1988), connecting knowledge as a private and a public good.

Political ideas and interests: ethno-national communities

The third form of capital transfer constitutes the most visible threat to the compatibility of transstate communities and states, namely politico-cultural capital exchanged in ethno-national communities. Three categories of transstate communities in particular pose three degrees of potential challenge to the so-called homeland or country of origin or country of emigration: refugees/exiles, stateless diasporas, and state-based diasporas. The role of all three categories clearly goes far beyond the flow of financial capital (e.g., financing rebel armies, cf. Collier and Hoeffler 2000) and goes to the heart of the definition of interests and identities of political communities. States are not only based upon organizational infrastructure and various mechanisms of legitimate rule-making and rule implementation but also on common elements of identity which underpin political communities such as nations. Refugees, émigrés, and members of stateless diasporas at first sight seem to be challengers or even competitors of existing (emigration) states. The transfer of politico-cultural capital takes various forms, ranging from the activities of émigrés aimed at the improvement of human rights in their countries of origin to long-distance nationalism, which strives to form a new nation state. Long distance nationalism, in particular, can be traced back to the early days of the nation-state. One of its critics, Lord Acton, called diasporas “the nursery of nationality.”

Refugees and exiles have often had significant impact on political development, by mediating between competing groups or providing resources for reconciliation and reconstruction. Prominent examples include the South African diaspora’s role in the anti-apartheid movement and the more recent engagement of the Ugandan and Nigerian diasporas. In these cases the rhetoric mobilizing such efforts has been good governance and rule of law, the implementation of human rights and democratization. No less important is the role played by refugee and exile communities that have fuelled conflicts in the countries of origin from abroad, such as Kosovo Albanians (cf. Hockenos 2003), the Mujahedin in the case of Iran, or Chechen freedom fighters. A higher degree of politico-cultural coherence can be found among “stateless” diasporas whose declared intention is the founding of a new nation-state or at least achieving a high degree of autonomy in the declared homeland. Such communities are represented by organizations or liberation movements which are in clear conflict with the former homeland, as the cases of some Kurdish and Tamil communities attest (cf. Van Hear 2003).

At first sight a higher degree of complementarity is apparent in the case of “state-based” and established diasporas, such as the Armenian, Chinese, and Palestinian diasporas in the USA and Europe. Sometimes such established diasporas are considered by the homeland as strategic assets, as in the Chinese government’s view of highly skilled “overseas Chinese.” The notion that homeland and diaspora constitute one people is especially strong for relatively weak, new, or reconstituted states, in conflicts with other states or groups, e.g., Armenian-Azeri (cf. Shain 2002). One may argue that national diasporas who participate in the foreign affairs of a country of settlement move from being disenfranchised groups to one with an entry ticket into mainstream society and politics (e.g., Shain 1999 on US-American foreign policy). Yet strong diasporas and fledgling home states produce a complex setup of international and transstate politics, which goes beyond the notion of “two level games” (Putnam 1988). The concept of two-level games considers both domestic political constituencies and the counterpart’s minimum demands. Intervention by strong diasporas implies an extension into a three level game, especially in conflict perpetuation and resolution. Moreover, established diasporas may play a
crucial role in the definition of “national interest” and “national identity,” both of which are flexible, rather than static, constructs. Interests of the diaspora and the home state may significantly diverge, and are not a unified whole. Forms of transstate identity may connect both homeland and host country. There are instances of transstate identities of a nationalist kind, as in the case of Poland and Ireland and their diasporas in the United States which formed in the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth centuries. In exceptional cases, some interpretations of the transstate identity may be detached from a national identity and thus compete with statist transnationalism, as in the idea of a Jewish diaspora not centered on the state of Israel but in a transstate or even global diaspora (Boyarin 1994).

All of this suggests that a transstate perspective on national interests and national identities can support, compete, or even challenge the congruence of a people, territory, and authority in a state. One of the challenges goes beyond this trinity. If transstate communities conceive of themselves as diasporas connected to a nation-building project, such as Kosovar Albanians in the late 1990s, they usually portray themselves as ethnically homogenous entities; in short, a Volk based more on common cultural heritage than subjective predispositions of citizens toward a state and a constitution. There is an inherent tension between the concept of state usually advocated by nationalist diasporas according to which the members constitute a Volk, on the one hand, and a democratic concept which sees the political community made up of all its varied citizens, on the other hand.

Outlook: transstate social spaces and states

This analysis has suggested some of the ways in which communities play a role in transnationalization and development in pointing out interaction with other principles of social order, especially market and state. The units covered by the term “community” and transstate social spaces themselves are under constant reconstruction. Moreover, the changing relationship and demarcation line between market, state, and community is itself a product of contentious politics and public policies (Stratton and Orchard 1994). Two issues need to be considered in further research: first, the reconstruction of transstate groups, associations, networks, and organizations; second, the changing role of how states open and restrict transstate social spaces. The former helps to avoid the essentialization of transstate subjects and to counter the tendency of both academic research and policy-making to reconstruct transstate collective subjects as unitary actors. The latter focus is necessary to clarify the changing role of states. More attention needs to be paid to how states structure transstate social spaces, for example, through the regulation of transstate migration.8

The empirical examples discussed here suggest that transstate collectives, such as groups, associations, organizations, and diasporas, cannot be treated as unitary actors if one wants to understand the tensions inherent in transstate spaces and the implications for the conceptualization of transnationalization. Certainly, the opportunities for transstate actors have changed in the process of globalization, not only for migrant-based collectives (cf. Evans 2000). Because of the apparent increase in interconnectedness through long-distance communication, facilitated face-to-face communication and interaction through travel and interaction, and the diffusion of ideas and knowledge, social life across the borders of states has become more dense and extensive. The spaces “in between” states have multiplied. Some of the cherished concepts of migration research need to be questioned because they may not be adequate to capture more fluid life-styles, modes of action, and collective behavior. The lives of migrants are not necessarily characterized by one-time settlement and commitment to one society or associations and groups in one society. Therefore, dichotomous distinctions such as “origin” vs. “destination” and “emigration” vs. “immigration” no longer hold, if only because many traditional emigration

8 For an analysis of how market processes interact with migration in the case of two tightly intermeshed economies, see Wise and Covarrubias (2005).
countries have become both transit and immigration countries, Turkey being a typical example. Less obviously, other dichotomies such as “temporary vs. permanent” or “labor migrant vs. refugee” also no longer hold if the goal is to map trajectories of mobile populations. One first step has been a renewed interest in the notion of social space. This has implied, among other things, the need to conceptualize migration beyond its demographic construction as “flows” and “stocks” of people and to look at the “in between places.” This train of rethinking should not stop at other important notions such as citizenship. Clearly, transstate social spaces do not necessarily imply that communities of origin and communities of destination are congruent in terms of interests and ideas. As mentioned above, transnationals who do not permanently reside in the community of origin may hold very different notions of development from those “at home.” This problem of incongruence has not been paid sufficient attention in terms of its conceptual implications. For example, notions such as transstate citizenship are used to describe political participation, rights, duties, and belonging of transstate migrants through mechanisms such as hometown associations. But an important element of citizenship is equal political freedom, the principle of democracy -- a principle that holds that those taking decisions (voice) should not be able to exit at will. While we may still want to use the term citizenship in a transstate context, we would want to avoid the ecological fallacy of simply transposing concepts from the nation-state level to transstate social spaces.

Nonetheless, the concept of the nation-state is critical to defining the opportunity structures in transstate social spaces and transactions connected to development. Contrary to assumptions about the declining role of the state principle vis-à-vis market and community, states do play an active role in shaping the very conditions for transstate subjects engaged in development issues. The relationship of community to what is called globalization has been even more obvious in the efforts of national governments to reshape immigration policy. In a departure from the 1960s, public policies now focus not only on return migration as a way to development but on the sponsorship of transstate networks. Policymakers in advanced welfare states in OECD countries have connected immigration with the future of social provisions. Facing a demographic transition of considerable magnitude, one line of argument sees immigration as a contribution to rejuvenate labor markets, maintain population size to ensure future economic growth, and soften the transition to other forms of old-age pension schemes and rejuvenating labor markets. In short, the issue of replacement migration (UN Population Division 2000) has climbed up the ladder of policy instruments in the contemporary restructuring of welfare states. One of the justifications for using immigration for economic purposes and thus clearly defining the “national interest” in European countries is the effort to recast the effects of transstate migration for developing countries. This trend is nowhere as visible as in the issue of migrants with a tertiary education.

Contemporary immigration policy in the OECD world, as we have seen, is partly concerned with competition for the best brains in the world, in efforts to attract not only highly skilled workers as permanent or temporary settlers for sectors such as information technology, but also international students. This investment in knowledge will help, it is believed, to weather the storms of global economic competition and the increasing competition among institutions of higher education and research (see, for example, Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission Zuwanderung 2001 in Germany). Increasingly, the obvious criticism of the brain drain effect of such policies is countered by references to the actual evidence and potential rewards of brain gain. The French and the British governments, for example, have rationalized the selective recruitment of highly skilled experts by introducing cooperative development schemes (cf. House of Commons 2004).

Such trends lie not only in the economic dimension of social order but also in the political realm. New international political constellations after the breakdown of the Communist world, the long-term spread of human rights and democracy as normative meta-discourses, and the rampant implosion of political order in some parts of the developing world have led to an ever increasing number of armed interventions, such as those that are often justified on humanitarian
grounds or to counter terrorism. Western powers have intervened to end conflicts in the non-OECD world, and have engaged in post-war reconstruction efforts on a large and still expanding scale. These efforts require an army of experts to build the rudiments of rule of law, sometimes from scratch, as in Afghanistan, for example. One of the crucial management questions has been the selection of personnel for such ventures. There is an ongoing debate on whether to look for refugees and exiles of the “first generation” who are likely to be intimately familiar with the situation based on their own experience, or to seek out younger persons, such as the children of migrants “with a migration background,” who may not be personally involved (see, for example, von Carlowitz 2004).

These considerations on the role of states already suggest that the changing role of the state in development policy thinking and actual policies should go beyond its function in maintaining boundaries, that is, infrastructural tasks for markets. Indeed, states play a much more activist role in development policy in addition to and beyond providing macro-economic conditions. To take but one example, the border control policies of immigration countries are intimately connected to enabling and restricting transstate mobility of persons and the potential of transstate groups and associations. The European Union (EU) moved its policies from fighting “root causes” to the conditionality of development aid (cf. European Commission 2002). At the 2002 European summit in Seville the leaders of the member states agreed that each future association or cooperation agreement which the EU/EC concludes with any country should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration. Yet the EU’s effort to link migration control to external aid is somewhat lopsided in favour of the control side. The largest share of the budget was allocated to “management of migration flows,” that is, strengthening border control and mitigating illegal or irregular migration. Even more explicit are contracts between immigration and emigration countries on a bilateral level, which rest on emigration countries being willing to take back rejected asylum seekers and to control undocumented migration. The lead was taken by Italy when it offered temporary work permits and official development aid to willing countries such as Albania and Tunisia. It is noteworthy that the EU and its Mediterranean rim may be a special case not comparable to other forms of supranational organization because the EU has engaged in a logic of expansion creating the need for increased border control functions for the set of countries adjoining the current EU borders – so far linked to the prospect of joining the EU in the long run. It is of utmost importance to consider not only direct development policies but also indirect and powerful mechanisms like border controls and thus internal boundaries of states. It is within such opportunity spaces that transstate social spaces emerge and are populated by transstate groups and associations.
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