Inter-Religious Negotiations: A New Developmental Perspective

by

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ABSTRACT

Morality and religion can be seen as internally related value systems: morality is concerned with everyday, cultural and political values, religion with ultimate values. Under the impact of the work of Jean Piaget, not only cognition, but also morality and religion have been conceptualized and researched as following a developmental progressive path in a person’s life time. However, the religious landscapes and value systems in Western societies have experienced changes toward a variety and complexity of developmental trajectories which pose challenges to the progressive developmental model and require new conceptual and methodological responses in the scientific study of religion and morality. It appears that our perspectives for understanding and our instruments in empirical research need an adjustment. Based upon James Fowler's faith development theory, but with reference to recent proposals in structural-developmental and life-span developmental psychology, I propose a model of religious styles which, in the first place, is the attempt to better account for the complexity of religious development, including its psychodynamic, interpersonal, life-history and life-world related dimensions. This model has consequences and includes also a perspective on moral development – which I shall explicate in regard to the attitudes toward the strange and unfamiliar religion and value system. Hundred years after William James' famous book, the question of the variety of religious experiences deserves new consideration and reflection, but the variety and complexity may have increased since then – also beyond North America and Western Europe.
It is obvious for religious persons and for theologians that religion and morality are interrelated. Even though there are strong reservations and thoughtful warnings against the reduction or resolution of religion to morality, it is a legitimate perspective to adopt the concept of values. Morality and religion then can be seen as related value systems: morality is concerned with everyday, cultural and political values, religion is concerned with ultimate values. We find such pattern of thought and argumentation in some theological works, but also in the developmental models that I will address in this presentation.

Reflection upon religion, theological study of religion and – in more recent decades – social scientific analysis of religion increasingly challenge the view of religion and value systems as stable, unchangeable facts, but as phenomena in a constant flux over time. The longer, the more clearly it has been acknowledged that religion is not a singular, but a plural; that religion appears in plurality; that religion is different in different cultures, that it is changing over time, that it is changing over the course of a life-time. The latter is the primary focus of my contribution here: it is concerned with understanding the growth and development of every-day values and of ultimate values in the course of human development.

The awareness that religion and morality change and transformation over the life-span is not completely new. In Western tradition, its roots reach centuries back. But in the first half of the 20th century, this perspective has been brought to wide acknowledgement. We owe to Jean Piaget what we may term a first developmental turn which has influenced also the understanding of morality and religion. The critique against and advancement of the Piagetian family of theories which we are witnessing in more recent years do not call into question the idea of development itself, but the specific explication in the Piagetian tradition. Many feel the need to re-think the models of development – also in regard to religion and morality. A second developmental turn is taking shape. That this new way of conceptualizing and investigating religious and moral development may open up new perspectives on inter-religious relations is the focal thesis of my presentation.

1 Values and Religion in Structural-Developmental Perspective: The First Developmental Turn and its Predicaments in Contemporary Culture

1.1 Piaget

We hardly find another name which is so prominently associated with developmental psychology as the name of Jean Piaget. His ingenious new concepts and his research have had great influence. We owe to the work of Piaget a very influential model of epistemological development in childhood and adolescence which has heavily influenced psychology, pedagogy, sociology, to name a few, but also theology. Half a century later, we see much criticisms and doubts in cognitive psychology. And indeed, there is some reason to doubt that what Piaget found in his observation of children in the Swiss mountains several decades ago is still true for our present-day children in German or in Turkish metropolitan areas.

While Piaget continues to be acknowledged as pioneer researcher in the field of children’s cognitive development, the assumptions about a context-independent, cross-domain invariant sequence of stages which replace each other has been challenged. It has been widely accepted that cognitive changes can occur in different areas of interest and independently of each other (Gerrig & Zimbardo, 2004) and that social and contextual influences on cognitive development are to be considered. Stages may describe development as evaluated with specific tasks and in specific domains (Bjorklund, 2000). Recent studies on children’s causal thinking suggest that an animistic stage may not be replaced by a following scientific stage, but that both views persist eventually into adulthood and will continue to be applied in specific areas of life (Subbotsky, 2000).

1.2 Kohlberg

With some delay, but the more powerfully, the first developmental turn has arrived in the domain of morality and values. In the 70s and 80s of the last century, no scholar of morality and
values, especially in educational psychology, could ignore the new theory of moral development of Lawrence Kohlberg. And we should not forget that, at the core of Kohlberg’s project, there was the concern for justice and social acceptable behavior in prisons and schools (Kohlberg, Scharf, & Hickey, 1971; Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972). Thus the model of an optimistic, progressive six-stage-development from a pre-conventional through a conventional to a post-conventional level of moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981; 1984) has attracted much attention and has fueled the optimism to find the key for the advancement of the project of modernity and a just society. No less a person than Jürgen Habermas came to assist Kohlberg with an argumentation in terms of communicative action and universal pragmatics (Habermas, 1981; 1983).

It was also Kohlberg’s initiative to specify and defend the criteria for structural-developmental stage theories – criteria which he claimed to be genuinely Piagetian. Kohlberg (1969; Kohlberg, Levine, & Hewer, 1983) suggested the differentiation between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ stage theories in order to separate the structural-developmental grain from the ego-psychological chaff, in accordance with the seal of approval given by premises of the logic of development, premises that set forth a sequence of stages, describing irreversible, invariant, hierarchical, and structural wholes. And, it is noteworthy, that the research team around Kohlberg engaged in cross-cultural research which included longitudinal studies in Israel (Kohlberg, Snarey, & Reimer, 1983) and Turkey (Kohlberg & Nisan, 1982).

When we remember this optimistic beginnings, it is the more surprising how strong the critique of Kohlberg’s model has developed, including the reproaches that the theory of moral development does injustice to women, while ignoring real-life dilemmas (Gilligan, 1979; 1982; 1983; Brown & Gilligan, 1992), that it inadequately excludes content dimensions (Döbert, 1986), that it has put the cart of cognition before the horse of life history (Noam, 1985; 1990), that it ignores the narrative constitution of morality (Tappan & Brown, 1989; Tappan & Packer, 1991), to mention the most important. After Kohlberg’s death in 1987, we witness a decline of interest in Kohlberg’s moral development theory; curricula and textbooks not only in the U.S.A., but also in Europe are much more reserved against moral development theory now. In a final analysis, I maintain that the cognitive-structural stage theory of moral development has maneuvered itself into a purist one-dimensional bottleneck and has encountered predicaments in contemporary culture, and thus needs revision and expansion to account for more complexity and variety of moral development. While I am not part of the (former) moral development research community, but rather an interested observer from the faith development camp, I therefore agree with most of the critical arguments and creative proposals such as the stronger inclusion of the interpersonal dimension, the psychodynamic depth dimension and the decisive integration of function. Thus I have learned much from the works of Gil Noam (1985; 1988a; 1988b; 1988c; 1990; 1993; 1996; 1999; Noam & Borst, 1994; Noam, Chandler, & LaLonde, 1995; Noam & Fischer, 1996), James Day (1991a; 1991b; 1991c; 1991d; 1993; 1994a; 1994b; 1996; 1999; 2001), Mark Tappan (1990; 2001; Tappan et al., 1989; Tappan et al., 1991), but I am also attentive to more recent proposals of a neo-Kohlbergian approach (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 1999a; 1999b). But the critical Kohlberg discussion reconfirms my own critical reading of faith development theory and other cognitive-structural theories of religious development, and raise the questions of whether they adequately have adopted the criteria for ‘hard’ cognitive-structural stages and whether it is justifiable to apply the Kohlberg criteria for hard stages unquestioningly to ‘religion’.

1.3 Fowler

To the first developmental turn belongs the adoption of the Piagetian perspective for religion and the attempt to account for changes of religion and religious understanding over the life-span. The early work of Ronald Goldman (1964) need to be mentioned here and also the work of Fritz Oser (1980; 1984; 1991; Oser & Gmünder, 1984a; Oser & Gmünder, 1984b; Oser & Reich, 1996). I shall focus here however on the works of James Fowler. From my perspective, he has included, from the start – and at the risk of being called a “soft stage” theorist – greater complexity in his model. I will try to demonstrate this briefly.

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1 Also Selman (1991; cf. Selman & Schultz, 1988), in concern for the troubled child and focussing on the therapeutic intervention in pair therapy to foster intimacy and autonomy, had come to extend the structural-developmental framework of social-cognitive perspective taking and include a functional perspective.
What most colleagues have in mind when they refer to James Fowler’s (1981) faith development theory is this: It is a stage theory which suggests that faith development proceeds through six stages: intuitive-projective faith, mythic-literal faith, synthetic-conventional faith, individuative-reflective faith, conjunctive faith and may culminate in universalizing faith. If faith development theory is studied in more detail, Fowler’s conceptualization of ‘faith’ appears as complex, inclusive concept. Faith consists of seven aspects and thus research has seven windows to a person’s faith. These aspects or windows include: the form of logic according to Piaget; perspective-taking according to Robert Selman (1980) and the form of moral judgment according to Kohlberg. Fowler has added four aspects to more fully account for faith: locus of authority, bounds of social awareness, form of word coherence, symbolic function.

What is usually not known or rather ignored, even in the discourse on faith development theory, is the fact that Fowler is aware and explicitly accounts for an even greater complexity of religious development. A figure, published in 1982, indicates this multi-dimensional portrait of faith development (see Fowler, 1982). Here Fowler includes after ‘biological and cultural time’, the dimension which his theory mainly is about: ‘operational structures of knowing and valuing in faith’; but then, he moves on and refers to other factors such as: ‘structuring power of contents’, ‘life structure’, the ‘dynamic unconscious’, and the ‘force field of our lives.’ If we start with this figure, we have a completely different image of faith development theory and see a great openness for complexity in Fowler’s theory.

Nevertheless, faith development theory and research are rather restricted to the analysis of the cognitive operational structures in faith. And this is the center of my theoretical critique and advancement of Fowler’s theory which I will explicate below. However, there are not purely theoretical puzzles and predicaments, but there are phenomena in the religious landscape and changes in contemporary culture which indicate that a revision is necessary, that we may need a second developmental turn.

### 1.4 Predicaments of Structural-Developmental Theory in Explaining Religion in Contemporary Culture

As predicaments of structural-developmental theories of religion for providing a sound explanation, I mention two: the problem to explain stagnation – which we encounter frequently in the so-called adolescent atheism, but also in many adults who have no tendency of development beyond stage two or three. Where is the force of development? Where is the logic of development? A plausible explanation could be: it is due to a loss of function. My focus however has been what I mention as second puzzle and predicament: the explanation of fundamentalism.

To understand fundamentalists, we have to deal with puzzling questions like these: How does it fit together that a person, on the one hand, is able to deal with everyday situations successfully on the basis of practical reason and, for example, is able to design and control technological machines of high complexity – remember that a significant number of fundamentalists are graduates from our universities –, and that the same person, in matters of collective and personal future, of meaning, in matters of religion resorts to the most simple answers? In terms of developmental theory: How can we understand that a person is able to perform formal operations and to apply individuative-reflective thinking in most dimensions of every-day life and that this same person takes every word of a guru or fundamentalist leader as the revelation of truth and understands religious text literally and legalistic? Traditional developmental theories, and thus Fowler’s theory, lack an explanation, because they do not account for regression, or partial regression, since they are assuming a ‘structural whole.’

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2 The spiral figure (from Fowler, 1981, p. 275) is a good visualization (see figure in the Appendix 5.2).
3 For this, the heptagon figure (from Fowler, 1980) is instructive (see figure in the Appendix 5.3).
4 See figure in the Appendix 5.4.
5 This is the critique and explanation put forth by Rainer Döbert (1991) in regard to Oser’s theory of religious judgment; but his argument does affect and include, to great extent, also Fowler’s theory.
2 Variety and Complexity of Religious Development: A New Perspective on Religion after the Second Developmental Turn

2.1 Multi Dimensions of Religious Development

We need another developmental turn. This has been my argument in the first part of this paper in which I refer to some puzzles and predicaments in Piaget’s, Kohlberg’s and Fowler’s developmental theories. This second developmental turn however should highlight the variety and complexity of human development, especially – and this is my focus here – in the domains of religion and morality.

This new perspective first implies a critical evaluation of stage theory, more specifically: of the criteria for “hard” stage theories according to Kohlberg. While the claim of universality has not been maintained throughout all developmental theorists (e.g. Fowler explicitly has renounced this claim), structural difference, hierarchical integration, sequentiality / irreversibility, and structural wholeness are maintained. In light of the recent discourse in developmental psychology, however, it is not plausible any more to view a developmental niveau or a stage as being a structural whole. On the contrary, it is complex and sometimes more than one styles occur simultaneously. The new perspective then implies the account for greater variety and complexity of development – which first and foremost means the inclusion of additional dimensions of development. We do not have to reinvent the wheel completely: there are theories out there which suggest just this. I need to be selective here, but I want to at least direct your attention to a list of inspiring debates and proposals which may be instructive for a second developmental turn.

The field of developmental psychology is broader than it appears on the first impression. There have been sub-currents and heavy criticism of Piagetian/Kohlbergian conceptualizations. Here I should at least mention the lively discussion on post-formal operations (Commons, Richards, & Armon, 1984; Alexander & Langer, 1990; Cartwright, 2001; Kramer, 2000; Sinnott, 1994; Sinnott, 1998) and wisdom (Staudinger & Baltes, 1994; Sternberg, 1998; Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Kramer, 2000; Sternberg, 2000; Pasupathi, Staudinger, & Baltes, 2001; Pasupathi & Staudinger, 2001), the growing awareness and research on cross-domain variance (Boyer, Bedoin, & Honore, 2000; Labouvie-Vief & Diehl, 2000). All of these perspectives have developed critical standpoints and alternatives to structural-developmental theory. But also, at least in some of these perspectives, we detect another current: the awareness that human development may involve more than cognition. I share with Noam (1990) the suspicion that cognitive developmentalists have put the cart before the horse – the cart of cognitive competencies before the horse of life history.6

From this perspective, the life-span developmental perspective according to Baltes, Staudinger and Lindenberger (1998; 1999), deserves special attention.7 The life-span development perspective of Baltes and Staudinger may be inspiring and helpful for an advancement of understanding religious development, since it provides strong arguments and opens a perspective for the greater variety and complexity of human and religious development. This innovative contribution to developmental psychology can help us clarify the contours of a revised model of human and religious development, because …

a. it allows us to take a step back from mono-causal, unidimensional and unifunctional explanations which have been an all too heavy burden on the shoulder of Piagetian theories, e.g. the Piagetian “logic of development” with its assumption that cognition is the motor of development;

6 "It is my view that cognitively based theorists have overlooked the central structuring activities of the self by defining the epistemic self as the sole representative of structure. In the process, I believe, the cart was placed before the horse, life history became content to the structure of the epistemic self... Epistemology replaced life history." (Noam 1990: 378)
7 Baltes and colleagues suggest a more radical departure from extant theoretical models of development (cf. my contribution to the conference "One Hundred Years of Psychology of Religion", Streib, 2003c). Their proposal is an even more flexible construction of development, namely a model of “development as selective age-related change in adaptive capacity” which, in contrast to the traditional monolithic view of development as universal growth toward a single end point, accounts for cross-domain differences. Consequently, the new model accounts for both losses and gains in development.
b. it suggests integrating the dimension of function and the psychodynamic and symbolic-narrative content dimensions;

c. it suggests a life-span perspective from the start and thus takes for granted the integration of adult life and old age;

d. it re-opens the factor field of human development and religious development for a fresh approach of scientific exploration – e.g., by suggesting that we consider the dynamics of compensation.

2.2 The Religious Styles Perspective

My general intention is a re-examination of contemporary developmental psychology as it concerns and is concerned with religious orientation. Fowler’s faith development theory will be the focus of my discussion, because his theory is one of the more recent progressions of developmental psychology into the domain of religion and has enjoyed world-wide attention, initiating and inspiring the considerable number of more than 80 dissertations and research projects (Streib, 2003a). Fowler’s theory can serve, in its strengths and deficits, as an instance for developing questions and possible solutions. My concern is with integration and accounting for complexity, and also there, I find features in Fowler’s work to expand on. Because Fowler’s faith development theory is the most comprehensive one among the contemporary models of religious development and is also open for the inclusion of innovative perspectives, I have chosen it as the basis for elaborating a new perspective on religious development and applied it in concrete forms of theory and research.

2.3 Brief Introduction to the Religious Styles

My own proposal thus has its focus on Fowler’s faith development theory and research (Streib, 1991; 1997; 2001a; 2003c; 2003b; 2005a). I call my proposal the ‘religious styles perspective’ – which already should indicate that I do not maintain all of the Kohlberg criteria for a (“hard”) developmental stage. Kohlberg’s criteria are not the basis and fundament of my developmental model any more. This does however not mean to relinquish concern with stages of faith or stages of moral judgment altogether, but it means to embed and integrate them into a more comprehensive and complex framework of styles. The styles, in my definition, include additional dimensions such as, most importantly, the interpersonal dimension (self-other dimension) for which I refer to Gil Noam’s and other’s works, and the psychodynamic dimension (self-self dimension) for which I refer specially to the perspective of Ana-Maria Rizzuto (Rizzuto, 1979; 1991; 2001).

A condensed definition reads: Religious styles are distinct modi of practical-interactive (ritual), psychodynamic (symbolic), and cognitive (narrative) reconstruction and appropriation of religion which originate in relation to life-history and life-world and which, in accumulative deposition, constitute the variations and transformations of religion over a life time, corresponding to the styles of interpersonal relations. A multi-layeredness of religious styles which can be designated as internal pluralism corresponds to the determined multi-perspectivity. The so-called ‘milestone model’, brought into discussion by Jane Loevinger (1976), is therefore better suited to illustrate religious style development than stage-wise, ascending models. The ‘milestone model’ draws the respective style as a rising curve which, while descending again after a culminating point, persists on a lower level, while the subsequent styles attain their own climaxes (see figure in the Appendix 5.5). From such a developmental perspective, there are no plausible reasons why a certain style should not, at least as a precursor, develop earlier than structural-developmental theories normally assume. In addition, the potential relevance of a certain style can continue after its biographical peak.

Theoretical and first empirical accounts of the religious styles perspective have proven effective in regard to adolescent’s fascination with magic (Streib, 1996; 1999), children’s drawings

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8 I have published a summary of 20 years of research in faith development, my own proposal to advance and modify research in faith development, and a new edition of the Manual for Faith Development Research (Streib, 2003a; 2005a; Fowler, Streib, & Keller, 2004). Here I can only refer to these texts.

9 For a description of the religious styles, see the brief characterization in the article “Faith development theory revisited (Streib, 2001a).
and inter-religious negotiation in the classroom (Streib, 2001c), and also in particular for a new understanding of fundamentalism which I understand as a revival of earlier developmental styles, especially of the reciprocal-instrumental or do-ut-des style, and finally for an understanding of deconversion – the characteristic version of which includes the healing of the fundamentalist desire to revive earlier styles.

2.4 A New Explanation of Fundamentalism

As first fruitful result of the religious styles perspective, I would like to present a new developmental explanation of fundamentalism. The puzzling questions which I have raised above can be resolved, if we view them in terms of the religious styles: If we do not assume that stage two attitudes and thinking styles – which are particularly characteristic of fundamentalism – are not abandoned and overcome at the advent of new and more advanced developmental niveaus, but reside into the background, into deeper layers of our psychic resources where they are available when there is need to apply them, then one could imagine and understand the simultaneous vitality of more advanced styles of reasoning in some domains of life and the presence of mythic-literal or do-ut-des patterns in the existential domain. A split of religious styles, a clash of styles, or, as I prefer to call it: a revival of earlier styles are the interpretation of fundamentalism in terms of religious styles.10

3 Inter-Religious Attitudes and Negotiations

Besides the new interpretation of fundamentalism, I would like to present – and put up for discussion – a new approach to inter-religious attitudes and negotiations which spring from the religious styles perspective. This has some parallels with the explanation of fundamentalism, but addresses a separate domain. In this third part, I shall explicate the religious styles perspective with a special focus on one aspect in the field of religious values: the attitudes toward the other religion. This is of particular importance for inter-religious relations and inter-religious learning. This new perspective has to stand the test of practical situations in German and in Turkish society, school and religious organizations in which Muslim-Christian relations are at stake.11

3.1 Styles of Strangeness and Familiarity

The best way of introducing the model of inter-religious negotiation styles and the related styles of strangeness and familiarity is explaining the Table (see Appendix 5.1). Corresponding to the religious styles according to Streib (2001a) in the right column, the styles of inter-religious negotiation are presented in the left column; they advance from bottom to the top from xenophobic and imperialistic mono-religious negotiation styles through implicitly and explicitly multi-religious negotiation styles to a dialogical or inter-religious style. Corresponding to the inter-religious negotiation styles, styles of experiencing strangeness and familiarity are presented in the middle columns. Strangeness is seen to advance from xenophobic anxiety and xeno-polemic fear through an unspecific sense of dissonance, then through a style of clear-cut otherness and finally to a style of attractive, but challenging and demanding object in the sense of encounter with a phenomenon which resists assimilation.12 These two left columns may suffice to understand the developmental schema.

We start again from the bottom. Using violence to extinguish the un-believers, i.e. the adherents of another religion, is beyond – or below – the scope of a negotiation schema. But is has some parallels with the xenophobic and imperialistic mono-religious attitudes: Both rest on the assumption of the superiority of one’s own religion. The difference is primarily the choice of the means of how to put the attitude into action – whether physical force is used or verbal directives. Obviously, these lower styles of inter-religious negotiation have a close relationship to

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10 I have published my perspective on fundamentalism in terms of faith development and the religious styles perspective elsewhere (Streib, 1999; 2001b; 2001d; 2002)
11 I refer also to my previous and forthcoming publications on the subject of inter-religious negotiations and attitudes (Streib, 2001c; 2004; 2005b).
12 See for a thoughtful philosophical analysis of the strange in terms of a xenology, see e.g. the works of Waldenfels (1999; 1997b; 1997a; 1993; 1990) and Nakamura (2000).
fundamentalism, since the superiority claim for one’s own religion is mostly grounded in a literal understanding of religious texts and associated with the image of a taskmaster deity. The schema qualifies these xenophobic or imperialistic, xeno-polemic attitudes and actions as styles on the lower end of a developmental scale, but, at the same time, this shows possibilities of growth and development to more adequate styles.

It can be seen as progress, when the one-way requests for consent to one’s own religion and claims of superiority are transformed into a nice-weather-collaboration with the other in the service of mutual interest in harmony. We may call this style of inter-religious negotiation ‘implicitly multi-religious’, since it applies a kind of “soft” pluralism which is attracted to similarities in the other religion and experiences strangeness as kind of dissonance that is either ignored or overcome in harmonizing exotism. This, of course, is much better than using verbal or even physical force to produce consent to one’s own religion, but this is not the best style we may imagine.

Different from this – and still another step forward – is the style of explicitly multi-religious negotiation. The individuative and reflective capacities of this style result in “hard”-pluralistic notion of either a fundamental incompatibility of religious beliefs in which the strange religion is declared other, or in the discovery and maintenance of identity. This inter-religious communication may recognise inter-religious interdependence, but it is still preoccupied with guarding the self’s intimacy and authenticity. However this perspective is governed by the principle that every religious belief and tradition, though it may not appear consistent and plausible to me, has its own right and dignity. But also this “hard”-pluralistic multi-religious separation is not the best of all possible attitudes. We may envision an even better style, a better world.

We may expect the transformation into a dialogical style of inter-religious negotiation which, in appreciation for the other as a gift, is open for self-critique and learning through the encounter with the strange. On this level, the strange is not regarded as something we are able to fully comprehend and “grasp”, but as something which remains challenging, curiosity-eliciting and demanding. Something which offers a surplus.

3.2 Inter-Religious Attitudes and Inter-Religious Learning – An Outlook

The table presents a spectrum of ideal types of inter-religious negotiation styles which, on the one hand, rests upon and implies a teleology, a hierarchical order of styles, an expected direction of development – and thus a program for inter-religious learning. Progress consists in increasing complexity of reasoning and understanding the ‘strange’, the ‘other’. This means three things: an increasing recognition of the strangeness of the strange, an increasing account for the dignity of the strange, but also an increasing appreciation of the gift which the strange has to offer.

On the other hand, and to ward off misunderstanding, I do not assume that it is possible to make the case for a clear-cut ‘logic of development’ focussing on cognitive structures. It would be mistaken to assume that the preference of one inter-religious negotiation style over another does depend solely on the one and only structural-developmental progress of cognitive competencies of perspective coordination. Functions and the context have at least an equal impact. Therefore these different styles of inter-religious negotiation do not occur purely, as “structural wholes,” and regression is possible. Earlier styles may and do in fact return and can have a revival. It also deserves to be noted that there is no reason to assume that a certain person would solely apply one style in all situations and in interaction with all partners. Conversely, it heavily depends on the situation and the kind of partner which style comes to be used.13

Nevertheless I assume that developmental progress and learning is possible to envision in the framework of this model. Progress and learning in inter-religious affairs proceeds however precisely

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13 For example, as Selman and others have observed, children use different negotiation styles in interaction with peers from those they apply in interaction with adults. “Relationships with peers, although never ideally equal, have greater likelihood of having more symmetry and reciprocity, which facilitates relationships that are more likely to come to be, or to come sooner to be, structured by cooperation and collaboration. This view suggests that adolescents may more readily develop and use reciprocal or collaborative strategies in the context of their interactions with peers, and then perhaps transfer these skills to negotiations with adults.” (Selman et al., 1988: 222)
through the encounter with the other, the strange – in increasingly adequate understanding and attitude, however. Based on this model, it is not the recommendation to reduce or eliminate strangeness, but to ‘cultivate’ it – in the sense that, as noted above, the strange owns a dignity and has to offer a surplus, a gift. Experiences of strangeness toward one’s own religion belong to and promote such learning.

In closing, I point to the heuristic value of this model in understanding religious communities, school classes and public opinion. If it is true that there is permeability and flexibility in adopting one or the other style – depending upon the situative context, we have to reckon with flexibility in the learning situation, but also with flexibility toward regression or revival of less advanced attitudes and styles. It is, from my perspective, possible to interpret the changes in Dutch and German public opinion after the assassination of Theo van Gogh in fall of 2004: If we had a scale to operationalize this developmental scheme, I assume that we could demonstrate that the scores in the Netherlands and in Germany have dropped significantly. It is an open question – and not an easy one to answer – what we can do to promote development effectively in the face of such back-drop of inter-cultural and inter-religious attitudes. But our societies would need such developmental progress desperately. And the model of inter-religious negotiation styles offers a model which is up for discussion.

4 Reference List


Streib: Inter-Religious Negotiations


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5 Appendices

5.1 Table 1. Styles of Inter-religious Negotiations, Strangeness and Familiarity

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<td>Dialogical</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Familiarity as Selfhood (‘oneself as another’) (Ricoeur 1990); Sense of strangeness also toward one’s own religion</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Explicitly Multi-Religious</td>
<td>Strangeness as Otherness</td>
<td>Familiarity as Identity</td>
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<td>Interpretation of the strangeness of the other religion as otherness, as object of reflective assimilation or rejection</td>
<td>Familiarity as Identity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Familiarity as Identity of reflective identification with one’s own religion and selective identification with the other religion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implicitly Multi-Religious</td>
<td>Strangeness as Dissonance</td>
<td>Familiarity as Resonance</td>
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<td>Convention-based, implicit sense of strangeness toward the other religion to which it is reacted with rejection, harmonizing, or exotism</td>
<td>Familiarity as Resonance</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Familiarity as resonance with the religion of the other – while strongly holding on to the religion of one’s own group</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Imperialistic Mono-Religious</td>
<td>Strangeness as Xeno-Polemic Fear</td>
<td>Familiarity as Un-Reflected Egocentrism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Experience of the strangeness of the other religion and reaction to it with xenopolemic fear</td>
<td>Familiarity as Un-Reflected Egocentrism and egocentric suppression of alternatives to one’s own religion</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Familiarity as Xeno-Polemic Anxiety</td>
<td>Egocentric Lack of Alternatives</td>
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<tr>
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<td>The other religion, as every experience of the foreign, results in xenophobic anxiety. Consequences: blind aggression or escape</td>
<td>‘Blind’ egocentric familiarity with one’s own religion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Xenophobic Mono-religious</td>
<td>Strangeness as Xenophobic Anxiety</td>
<td>Egocentric Lack of Alternatives</td>
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<td>Egocentric Lack of Alternatives</td>
<td>Subjective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Blind’ egocentric familiarity with one’s own religion</td>
<td>Subjective</td>
</tr>
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Dialogical

Explicitly Multi-Religious

Implicitly Multi-Religious

Imperialistic Mono-Religious

Xenophobic Mono-religious
5.2 Figure 1. Stages of Faith – Fowler’s (1981) Spiral Model

5.3 Figure 2. The Seven Aspects of Faith – Fowler’s (1980) Heptagon
5.4 Figure 3. Toward a Model of the Dynamics of Adult Faith

Toward a Model of the Dynamics of Adult Faith

A. Time in a Person's Life
B. Operational Structures of Knowing and Valuing in Faith
C. Structuring Power of the Contents of Faith
D. Life Structure
E. Powerful Role of the Dynamic Unconscious
F. Forces Field of Our Lives


5.5 Figure 4. Religious Styles (Streib 2001)