Faith Development
and a Way beyond Fundamentalism

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Fundamentalism – A Working Definition

It may be adequate to begin a psychological paper on fundamentalism with a reminder that fundamentalism cannot be reduced to individual beliefs and behaviour; fundamentalism is rooted in and related to a tradition. Therefore it may be helpful to inquire as to the origins of that tradition in order to clarify the concept and arrive at a working definition. When we trace fundamentalism’s basic orientations back to its origin, to the point where the first US-American Protestants proudly identified themselves as fundamentalists, the emerging new movement appears as a reaction against developments in science, in society, but even more rigorously in theology and in religious leadership. From the early times, fundamentalists have felt the necessity to defend some basic claims (Sandeen, 1970; Ammerman, 1991; Marty and Appleby, 1992): inerrancy or infallibility of the holy scripture as a whole; literal understanding of, and authoritative belief in, a selection of basic propositions (which, in early Protestant fundamentalism, included virgin birth, bodily resurrection and the return of Jesus); rejection of the results of modern science wherever they contradict fundamentalist teachings; and the claim that only people subscribing to these fundamentals are truly religious. From this self-description, it is obvious that fundamentalism is a reaction to modernity. To speak indiscriminately of fundamentalism as anti-modernism (Meyer, 1989) or even of a clash of civilisations (Huntington, 1996), however, can be questioned (Riesebrodt, 2000), since the fundamentalist reaction to the processes of modernisation itself is using rather advanced modern scientific arguments, means of communication and organisational strategies. If we want to speak of anti-modernism, then it should be qualified as modern anti-modernism (Küenzlen, 1996). In a wider philosophical perspective, fundamentalist revivals appear as indications of disturbances to which the project of modernity is exposed. With reference to Lyotard’s (1988; 1993) analysis, we could say that the smooth teleological meta-story of modernity, which is a meta-story of
development, is challenged by post-modern disturbances. Such disturbances also include individual and global fundamentalisms.

Focusing on the structural characteristics, we arrive, in basic agreement with Almond, Sivan and Appleby (1995) and Grünshloß (1999), at the following working definition: “fundamentalism” is the modern anti-modernist reaction of a religious group or movement to selectively perceived threats in modern science and society and a selective recurrence to (parts of) a holy text or an absolutist tradition to which inerrancy is ascribed, thereby leading to a dualistic-Manichean demarcation of one’s own group against the Evil or the reign of Satan, open for a millenialist eschatology, and demanding submission to an infallible hierarchy of a charismatic leadership. Of course, not all details of this working definition apply to every instance of fundamentalism to the same extent, but the structural perspective of this definition allows cross-cultural and global comparison.

The global occurrence of fundamentalist developments calls for a global perspective. The Chicago Fundamentalism Project (Marty and Appleby, 1991; 1993a; 1993b; 1994; 1995) has made a major contribution to such a global perspective on fundamentalism across cultures and religious traditions. In the meantime, however, the connotation of extremism and terrorism has become the first association when we hear the word fundamentalism. We need to think twice to realise that there may also be fundamentalists who are not Muslim, but Christian, and that there are even fundamentalists who are not much interested in politics at all. At the background resides also the awareness that religious attitudes are the basis of fundamentalism — as a necessary, even if perhaps not sufficient condition.

To reverse the tendency of associating fundamentalism primarily with extremism, with social and with psychological problems, Hood, Hill and Williamson (2005) have recently proposed a psychological conceptualisation of fundamentalism, which promotes a clear and simple core definition and suggests understanding fundamentalism in its own terms. At the core of fundamentalism, Hood et al. propose, is the specific relation to a text: a holy book, sacred verses, and the text of a tradition of religious teachings. While for the majority of the ordinary faithful and for the clergy or monk, a serious commitment to the privileged text is expected, the specific fundamentalist relation to such a text consists in total submission of everything else — the interpretation of other passages of the holy book, one’s religious tradition, and the entire religious and everyday behaviour — to a supreme authoritative text. This supreme text emerges from a selective focus on certain passages. Hood et al. suggest calling such exclusive textual focus “intratextuality” and thus proposing an “intratextuality model” for understanding fundamen-

talism. Intratextuality requires that “the text itself determines how it ought to be read” (Hood et al., 2005: 22).

The intratextuality model of Hood et al. (2005) can be related to our working definition, but in addition it has some commonalities with the faith development perspective on fundamentalism, which I propose in this paper. Intratextuality reflects the mythic-literal modus of understanding text and narratives. The intratextuality model helps us realise that not every passage of a holy text is taken equally authoritatively and literally, but rather only selected passages, which however are then bestowed with supreme authority. But the faith development perspective adds to and modifies the understanding of fundamentalism in terms of the intratextual model in two respects: it emphasises a developmental perspective which is neglected in the proposal of Hood et al., and it integrates and explains the fundamentalist mode of understanding in a spectrum of hermeneutical patterns — thus it takes hermeneutics more seriously. In fact, faith development theory describes a development in hermeneutics.

Even though fundamentalism relates to a tradition, it could not emerge, survive, and spread without the support of individual psychic and religious structures. Thus we have some reason to call attention to its relatedness to individual biographical development. Fundamentalism has roots in religious socialisation and religious development. This justifies an approach to the field of psychology in the search for models and explanations, which may help us to understand the emergence of fundamentalist systems of individual beliefs. The faith development perspective may give some indications for a biographical reconstruction, but also for an account of the individual’s opportunities to change and to find ways of biographical transformation, ways beyond fundamentalism. If translated into developmental terms, some elements of our working definition will become meaningful for a psychological-developmental understanding as well. But in regard to developmental psychology, we have to raise some questions first.

**Fundamentalism and Developmental Psychology**

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**Posing the Question**

If we refer to developmental psychology, primarily the Piagetian tradition stands in the foreground. Kohlberg’s model for moral development and Fowler’s model of faith development have emerged in this

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1. Fowler’s theory of faith development has emerged in the late 1970s at Harvard in the context of Kohlberg’s theorising and research on moral development in the tradition of Piaget’s cognitive-structural model of development. Fowler’s standard publication
tradition and need to be investigated in regard to their contribution to conceptualising fundamentalism. Within these frameworks, fundamentalism obviously falls into the characterisation of Mythic-Literal Faith (Stage Two) and corresponds to a pre-conventional level of a stage two moral judgment.

But this stage two correspondence falls short in regard to the account for adult fundamentalism. To understand adult fundamentalists, we have to deal with far more complex and puzzling questions: How does it fit together that a person, on the one hand, is able to deal with everyday situations successfully on the basis of practical reason and, for example, is able to design and control technological machines of high complexity – a significant number of fundamentalists are university graduates – and that the same person, in matters of collective and personal future, meaning, and religion resorts to the most simple answers and suppresses questions and doubts? In terms of developmental theory: How can we understand that a person is able to perform formal operations in most domains which are relevant for everyday life and that this same person is not able, or not motivated, to apply formal-operational thinking to existential questions, but takes every word of a guru or fundamentalist leader as the revelation of truth? Traditional Piagetian developmental theories, especially when they are accommodated to Kohlberg’s perspective, face a predicament here, because the theory does not account for regression, and – despite some awareness of horizontal and vertical décalage\(^2\) – a “structural whole” is assumed for a developmental stage.

The cognitive-structural theories of development in their traditional shape of a structural, hierarchical, sequential, and irreversible logic of development can be seen as the developmental psychology variant of the modern meta-story. If unchanged, they neither fully account for fundamentalism in adulthood, nor can they provide us with an explanatory framework for the individual fundamentalist revivals and conversions. A solution, therefore, derives from a modification of the developmental model, which has emerged in more recent years and should allow us to take account of and explain the developmental dynamics of fundamentalism.

**Fowler’s Faith Development Theory and Fundamentalism**

Before discussing advancements and alternatives, let us turn to Fowler’s work and examine his understanding of fundamentalism in more detail: this may qualify our negative conclusion. While in *Stages of Faith*, a portrait of sequential faith development has been presented which is coherent across domains or aspects and does not include regression (though Fowler talks about “recapitulation” of earlier stages\(^3\)), there is some account for fundamentalist turns in Fowler’s later writings. In *Faith Development and Pastoral Care* (Fowler, 1987), Fowler also applies his theory of faith development to religious communities and talks about “modal levels of development” of these communities. Fowler (1987: 85) identifies fundamentalist communities as the communal equivalent to the Mythic-Literal Faith (Stage Two). Childhood and adult forms of stage two faith have common features. Among these are: “literal interpretations of symbols and events,” “absence of an ability to understand interiority” of oneself and others, and “lawfulness and order are imposed on the universe […] by recourse to the idea of moral reciprocity.” From these passages, we derive some confirmation that Fowler associates fundamentalism with his Stage Two of Mythic-Literal Faith.

Furthermore, when Fowler wants to explain the continuation of Mythic-Literal Faith into late adolescence and adulthood, he introduces a differentiation of domains. In regard to adolescents, Fowler (1987: 86) says:

> Where religious norms and beliefs have been enforced with rigidity and forms of emotional coercion, this construct of moral reciprocity becomes a more permanent fixture in their souls. Though they […] may reject the God of the quick-payoff universe at the level of cognitive self-understanding, emotionally they get stuck in the structures of the Mythic-Literal stage. They

\(^2\) Of 1981, *Stages of Faith* proposes a model of religious development as progressing through six stages. Thereby, development is assumed to progress simultaneously across seven aspects of faith (which include: Form of Logic according to Piaget, Perspective-Taking according to Selman, Moral Judgment according to Kohlberg, and furthermore: Bounds of Social Awareness, Locus of Authority, Form of World Coherence and Symbolic Function). While the first four stages of faith (Intuitive-Projective Faith, Mythic-Literal Faith, Synthetic-Conventional Faith and Individuative-Reflective Faith) parallel Kohlberg’s stages of moral development, Fowler’s two higher stages of faith, Conjunctive Faith and Universal Faith, include normative-prescriptive implications from theology and philosophy. For our focus here on an explanation of fundamentalism, the parallels between Kohlberg’s and Fowler’s developmental models in the first four stages are more important than their differences.

\(^3\) In Chapter 23, we find the notion that a recapitulation of earlier stages may be necessary and helps to promote faith development.
move on into adolescent and eventually adult roles and relationships without
the emotional freedom and the capacity for intimacy that are required for
mutual interpersonal perspective taking. Often they operate in the areas of
relations and religion with the kind of naive manipulation which first arose
as a result of the embeddedness of the Mythic-Literal stage in the structure
of its own interests, needs, and wishes.

And when talking about adult fundamentalists, Fowler makes the
distinction between the emotional and religious domain, on the one
hand, and the occupational world, on the other:

In fact, we see a fair number of persons—usually men—who may exhibit
considerable cognitive sophistication in their occupational worlds (as physi-
cians or engineers, for example) but who in their emotional and faith lives
are rather rigidly embedded in the structures of Mythic-Literal faith and im-
perial selfhood.

Thus, when dealing with fundamentalism, Fowler himself has care-
fully introduced a differentiation between domains.

Finally, in his paper for the APA Symposium 1999 on “Religious
Development beyond the Modern Paradigm” (Fowler, 2001), and in
response to the author’s presentation (Streib, 2001b), Fowler has pro-
posed to assume four types across and within the stages of faith. Fowler
distinguishes: the totalising type, the rational critical type, the conflicted
or oscillating type, and the diffuse type. The difference between these
four types may be understood as a difference in certainty by which
world views are held. It is obvious, however, that Fowler’s four types
have some similarities with features of the Stages: When the totalising
type projects authority in a leading person, narrative or belief, it resem-
bles features of the Mythic-Literal Faith. The totalising type can be
identified in fundamentalist and authoritarian individuals. The rational
critical type combines characteristics, which are expected in indi-
viduative-reflective faith, and opens a perspective towards symbolic
interpretation and second naiveté, which we expect in conjunctive faith.
The conflicted or oscillating type and the diffuse type refer, at least par-
tially, to Stage Three in which, instead of an explicit and reflected

4 Correspondence of these four types can be drawn to the typology of religious
attitudes which have been described by Hutsebaert (1996) with reference to Wulff
(1991) and which have been clarified further in other publications (Desimpelaere,
Sulas, Duriez, and Hutsebaert, 1999; Fontaine, Luyten, and Corveleyne, 2000). These
four types are: a. Orthodoxy, b. External Critique, c. Symbolic Belief, d. Historical
Relativism. Solid correspondence can be seen between Fowler’s totalising type and
Hutsebaert’s orthodoxy type; b. between Fowler’s rational critical type and Hutse-
baert’s symbolic belief type; c. between Fowler’s conflicted or oscillating type and
Hutsebaert’s relativistic type. Only for Hutsebaert’s type of external critique there is
no exact equivalent in Fowler’s typology.

system, we expect an implicit system. Beyond the detection of parallels,
we can assume that, in a specific type, certain features of an earlier stage
are present or re-emerge with particular strength. Thus the assumption
of a revival of earlier stages characteristics within later stages— as kind
of heterodyne process— can be seen as consistent with Fowler’s recent
combination of types with stages. When Fowler suggests reckoning
theoretically with a spectrum of all four types on every faith stage, he
may be understood as suggesting to attend to the potential stage-specific
variations of fundamentalist orientations.

These are two lines of thought in Fowler’s work, which I regard as
the most explicit approaches to an explanation of fundamentalism in
light of his theory of faith development. They do not call into question
his theory of stages of faith; however, they indicate his cautious devia-
tion from a purist Kohlbergian type of structural-developmental model.
Here I can pick up a thread and agree with Fowler’s proposal “that we
develop a theory of types that can cross-cut stages, but not replace
them” (Fowler, 2001: 169). But I am convinced that the conceptualisation
of stages of faith and of development will not remain the same
when we take on this project. There is much evidence from neo-
Piagetian and postformal theory to work on a revision, to specify critical
points and—for my part—to talk about faith styles.

Necessary Revisions of Faith Development Theory

My critique of faith development theory centres on the problem of
overestimating cognitive development as the motor of religious de-
velopment, thus excluding dimensions of content, experiences, and func-
tion of religion. As I have stated elsewhere (Streib, 1991; 2001b), the
overburdening of cognitive development leads to the disregard for
dimensions which are just as crucial for the constitution and develop-
ment of religion: the psychodynamic-intrapersonal dimension (the
psychodynamic of the self-self-relationship); the relational-interpersonal
dimension (the dynamic of the self-other relationship); the interpretative,
hermeneutic dimension (the dynamic of the self-tradition relationship);
the life-world dimension (the dynamic of the self-social world relation-
ship).

5 Gil Noam’s metaphor of the cart (cognitive competencies) which the theories of
cognition have placed before the horse (life history) refers also and above all to the
neglect of the emotional, psychodynamical dimension. This critique also concerns the
cognitive-structural theories of religious development. A more substantial regard for
the psychoanalytical and psychosocial would lead to displace the cognitive-structural
view as the exclusive key theory. Noam’s aim is thus “going beyond Piaget” (Noam,
1990).
Biography in a broader, multi-perspective understanding requires that we give primacy to interpersonality, social relations, and life-world as the basis for life-history. This focus on basically interactive, relational processes includes attention to the development of object relations in a psychoanalytic perspective. From this point of view, I appreciate the extensive references to psychoanalytic contributions about infancy and early childhood which Fowler (1996) includes to offer a rich description of the early stages. While I agree with his portrait of the origin of faith in early childhood, I suggest that this portrait of faith and faith development be expanded on the other stages or styles of faith. I therefore do not agree, without qualifications, with Fowler’s (1996: 57) statement that the faith stages could still be “held to be invariant, sequential, and hierarchical”; and I doubt especially that a stage can be understood as a “structural whole.” The principle of “structural wholeness” has been established by Kohlberg. But Carpendale (2000) argues, with reference to Chapman (1988) and others, that Kohlberg’s “structural whole” is neither identical nor consistent with Piaget’s earlier work, and that Piaget should not be blamed for Kohlberg’s misreading. For my line of argument, I suggest reckoning with cross-domain variance of styles.

In agreement with Noam’s perspective of interpersonal development, I also suggest understanding religious development as the interrelation of “themata” and “schemata” – thus as a complex process of a plurality of entangled factors. “Themata” are present in the individual as remembered experiences – and sometimes traumatic experiences – from previous life-history, which call for a response. “Themata” of course change as the interpersonal, social and societal relations change over a lifetime. “Schemata” are styles which the person applies in processing experiences of self, others and the world and thus also in responding to, or working on, the “themata.” From existing structural-developmental theories, we have descriptions of various schemata or styles and of their developmental sequence, but it is necessary to note that, rather than forming a structural whole, these schemata or styles may vary across domains.

Two recent contributions also point in this direction. With Cartwright (2001), I maintain that cognitive development is not necessarily coherent across the different domains, but may be domain-specific and occur at any point in a lifespan, depending on individual experience. Thus I tend to agree with Cartwright’s assumption that individuals’ subjective experiences, including social interactions, contexts, and life events, stimulate the processes of moving beyond prior stages of development and engaging in new models of thought (Cartwright, 2001: 217). Likewise, Clore & Fitzgerald (2002) suggest that faith development is “additive and integrative, rather than a sequence of abandonment and acquisition.” Clore & Fitzgerald state that:

It is not likely that individuals would drop elements of faith that have given them meaning [...]. More integrated levels do not destroy the integrity of lower levels, but transform them and incorporate them into the new integration [...]. Rather than a sequential set of displacements, faith involves a progressive integration of new elements into an existing base. This may yield a synthesis that contains apparent contradictions, and our analysis suggests that individuals resolve these contradictions in unique ways, but they do not abandon core elements of their faith. (Clore and Fitzgerald, 2002: 104)

With reference to Commons et al. (1984), Labouvie-Vief (1992) and Sternberg & Berg (1992), Clore and Fitzgerald maintain that “more developed persons do not repudiate prior stages; they discover new ways to adopt earlier ways of knowing.”

This will have decisive consequences for the concept of fundamentalism. But before I explicate these consequences, I will briefly give an outline of my own theoretical revision of faith development.

The Faith Styles Perspective

The faith styles perspective rests on a relational concept of faith; it is based on the assumption that interpersonal relations and their (psycho-) dynamics are both indicators and promoters of religious development.

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6 Here again, I can refer to Noam’s (1985; 1988; 1996; Noam, Powers, Kilkeney, and Beedie, 1991) critique and moderation of the exclusive attribution of developmental dynamic to the development of cognition, and his fresh approach to the developmental dynamic in terms of interpersonal relations.

7 Here I refer to the psychodynamic tradition represented by Erik Erikson’s (1968) and Ana-Maria Rizzuto’s (1979; 1991; 1996) work and to their contribution to an understanding of life-history. Rizzuto’s contribution is of special importance because she has integrated the development of God representations into her psychodynamic view. Religious development appears to emerge in a new light, when the mother-child dyad is understood as the origin of religion, when the transitional space between caretaker and child and the transitional objects which arise here are assumed to be the origin of the God representations.

8 Clore and Fitzgerald (2002: 105) even go as far as to “question the advisability of designating an individual by one or another dominant stage.” And indeed, their correlation matrix indicates strong overlap of faith development profiles of different levels – which may be taken as evidence that stages (or levels) never occur purely as if previous faith orientations would be abandoned. However, I doubt that this correlation matrix can ground the far-reaching assertion that there is no “dominant stage” for a person at a certain time.
The concept of “style” suggests placing more emphasis on the factors of life-history and life-world or religious development (Noam, 1985, has made use of the “style” concept in this sense as well). Elsewhere (Streib, 2001b), I explicare the concept of faith styles by highlighting three of its most decisive dimensions: a. the self-other dynamic as related to the psychodynamic history of “themata”; b. the narrative character of biography; and c. the life-world aspect which qualifies life-history as milieu sequence.

My condensed definition says that faith styles are distinct modi of practical-interactive (ritual), psychodynamic (symbolic), and cognitive (narrative) reconstruction and appropriation of religion which originate in relation to life-history and life-world and which, in accumulative deposition, constitute the variations and transformations of religion over a lifetime, corresponding to the styles of interpersonal relations. A multi-layeredness of faith styles that can be designated as internal pluralism, corresponds to the determined more-perspectiveness. The so-called “milestone model,” brought into discussion by Loewinger (1976), is therefore better suited to illustrate faith style development than stage-wise, ascending models. The “milestone model” draws the respective style as a rising curve, which, while descending again after a culminating point, persists, on a lower level, while the subsequent styles attain their own climaxes. From such developmental perspective, there are no plausible reasons either for why a certain style should not, at least as precursor, develop earlier than structural-developmental theories normally assume, but especially for why a potential relevance of a certain style continues after its biographical peak.

In respect to our topic, I want to mention only the description of one style, the Instrumental-reciprocal or “do-it-des” faith style. This style makes use of the development of an inner self as distinguished from an outer self, when the child becomes aware of his or her own needs and interests as opposed to those of other people. Thus one’s own needs and desires can become part of a reciprocal exchange. In regard to religion, the do-it-des reciprocity is the basic pattern for both the interpersonal and the God-human relation: “good” is what God and the authority persons wish and demand; “bad” is what results in punishment and mischief; means of trade are obedience and fulfillment of religious commandments. The psychodynamic challenges concentrate on the crisis of “initiative vs. Guilt,” but also already on “Industry vs. Insecurity.” The God representation, to refer to Rizzuto’s terms, concentrates on more or less aggrandized parental images. Fowler’s characterisation of this style’s pattern of understanding as “mythic-literary” describes another aspect: religious images and feelings are integrated in a story, and myths play an important role. An awareness of the metaphoric or symbolic difference, however, may not be developed, which would allow changing details of the story or religious rule. Literally everything happened precisely as told in the story; literally everything has to be observed exactly as the religious rules prescribe.

It is obvious that this description of the reciprocal-instrumental style portrays the fundamentalist world view and attitude. However, we do not call children fundamentalists, but we regard these styles as adequate in infancy and childhood. Only their continuity or revival in adolescence and adulthood is characteristic of fundamentalism – and this requires reckoning with a mixture of styles simultaneously, as I will explain now.

While the characterisation of the various faith styles takes up essential explications from Fowler’s stages, by qualifying them with reference to Noam’s interpersonal styles and Rizzuto’s psychodynamic perspective on God representations, we see it is especially the model of development, which has been revised. Since the faith styles model takes into account the multi-layeredness of religious orientations at a certain point in lifetime, it cannot maintain certain structural-developmental assumptions, which can be summarized in three theses:

- While faith styles can be distinguished on the basis of structural differences (though also by content difference, for example), we cannot a priori assume that faith styles present a structural whole.

- While faith development describes a sequence of hierarchical integrations, we cannot a priori assume that faith development is invariant, sequential, or irreversible; on the contrary, regression needs to be taken into account.

- Faith is universal by definition, but the claim of universal validity, especially in regard to gender differences and cross-religious differences, needs to stand empirical test and investigation.

It is especially with the assumption of structured wholeness – which needs to be dropped for faith development – that we do not want to a priori preclude variance across domains. Not all mental activities in every domain can be assumed to function according to one and the same basic operational structure. If we include emotional states and functional aspects, we may encounter the presence of more than one developmental schema simultaneously. Different developmental achievements may be activated differently depending on the situation, the audience, the task, and the emotional condition. The individual may resort to the reactivation or revival of earlier developmental styles in his or her response to specific tasks and situations, especially to crisis situations, anxiety and ultimate questions. From this assumption, a new explanation of fundamentalism emerges.
The Revival of Faith Styles: A New Explanation of Fundamentalism

It is not only fundamentalism that calls for a revision of the developmental framework, but fundamentalism is an important example on which to demonstrate both the need and the efficiency of a revision of the structural-developmental perspective.

At a certain time in life, a certain style appears to be prevalent and to structure most of the religious activity and correspondingly most of one’s interpersonal and social relations. Beyond the surface of everyday praxis and reconstruction, however, the previous styles are not eliminated, but rather they have disappeared and may have been forgotten. As in geological layers where previous ages of our planet are invisible from the surface, but nevertheless present and available, earlier faith styles are present and available in our psychic resources. But unlike geological layers, earlier faith styles may call for attention, require working-through, demand integration, need revisiting and reflection. Under healthy conditions, this working-through means both distanciation and integration in order to consolidate the present style. The ability to play with and deal with - reflexively and sometimes ironically - one’s own and others’ earlier styles is the indicator of a healthy integration. In some cases, however, earlier faith styles are re-vitalized and regain part of their unquestioned and un-reflected power. I suggest calling this re-emergence of earlier styles a revival of earlier faith styles. This is most obviously the case in fundamentalist biographies.

While, as stated above, traditional developmental theories lack an explanation for the phenomenon of fundamentalist turns in the individual, because they do not account for regression but are assuming a structural whole, the faith styles perspective suggests an understanding: fundamentalism is the prevalence or the revival of literal understanding, of anxiety toward a taskmaster deity, of the “do-it-des” juridical structure, a prevalence or revival of the reciprocal-instrumental style and perhaps the subjective style. These advance to shape the approach to religious matters, while other styles, which have already been developed and are used in other dimensions of a person’s life, are not applied to religion. A conflict of styles occurs.

The model, which I have presented, may help to understand not only the development of fundamentalism, but also its obtrusive stability: the earlier styles do not only re-emerge, but they become predominant in matters of religion. Parallel to the understanding of fundamentalism as modern anti-modernism, I do not regard the “do-it-des” style as being the same as it used to be in infancy and childhood, but later style patterns, mutual or systemic, merge with the re-emerging residuals. Not only a revival but also a kind of “heterodyning” of styles occurs. This explains why the fundamentalist orientation is more stable, more rigorous, and more cruel: it bestows the earlier styles with the power of mutuality in-group relation and/or the power of systemic-rational arguments. But this blend or heterodyning of faith styles is not completely stable. In some cases, the mutuality or the individuative reflectiveness resists complete submission and surrenders to the fundamentalist demand. The person experiences a clash of styles. Persons who are about to leave the fundamentalist orientation, especially, develop an awareness of the clash of styles up to the point where it becomes intolerable.

The Way beyond Fundamentalism

This explanation of fundamentalism within the framework of faith styles then opens up a new perspective on how the fundamentalist orientation can be overcome. The way beyond fundamentalism means further development, means faith development (Streib, 2001a). It means to develop and grow especially in these domains where the earlier styles of development had their powerful revival. It means to develop out of the literal and egalistic understanding of text and tradition, to overcome the dualistic demarcation and submissiveness to absoluteness and unquestioned hierarchy. It is obvious, however, that this notion of development is not focused solely on cognitive operational structures and is not opposed to learning; rather, it is a consolidation of development exactly in these domains where the revival has occurred. Healing here means to nurture and strengthen the present style of mutuality or individuative-systemic reflexivity and its application in religion as well. Then the process of re-working earlier, fundamentalism-generative style dimensions becomes possible. Healing means the ability to tell and retell, to read and re-write the story of one’s life in one’s latest available style (Streib, 2000).

For this new model for understanding the genesis of fundamentalism and its possible decline and overcoming, evidence from empirical research would be desirable. Because the theoretical framework is rather new, we cannot expect much research at this stage. The Bielefeld-based cross-cultural study of deconversion has included a significant number of fundamentalist subjects (interviews from deconverts from fundamentalist religious organisations – 23 in the USA and 22 in Germany – but also current members in these religious organisations – 88 in the USA and 142 in Germany). Narrative analysis, faith development analysis

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9 See http://www.homes.uni-bielefeld.de/religionsforschung for more details on previous and recently concluded research.
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and quantitative data analysis help us better understand not only fundamentalist turns but also the transformational potential which has led most of our deconverts beyond fundamentalism. Results from our study indicate that deconverts from new religious fundamentalist organisations differ from those who are still members in these organisations: deconverts have higher scores on Openness for Experience (NEO-FFI), they score higher on personal growth (Ryff Scale), and they score higher in faith development. This may suggest that deconversion from new religious fundamentalist orientations goes hand in hand with an increase in openness for experience, personal growth and faith development.

To conclude, as long as we give exclusive priority to the structural-developmental model with its assumptions of a structural, sequential, irreversible, and hierarchical logic of development and of structural-holistic stages, the developmental perspective on religious development cannot provide a sufficient framework for understanding fundamentalism. The model of faith styles opens a perspective on the development and structure of fundamentalism and a perspective on development beyond fundamentalist revivals.

Bibliography


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