Immigration, integration and the ethnicization of politics
A review of German literature

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From ‘social problems’ to citizenship

Since the 1960s research on immigration and integration in the Federal Republic of Germany has evolved from an emphasis on ‘social problems’ of labor migrants (Ausländerforschung) to questions of immigration control, citizenship and ethnic pluralism (‘multiculturalism’). Early research on migration in the 1960s and 1970s dealt with the specific problems associated with the recruitment of labor migrants, i.e. their labor market position, housing, education and the transition from school to work of their children and the economic effects of ‘guestworker’ employment on the German economy (Reuter & Dodenhoeft 1988). This research gradually became connected to a wider historical perspective on migration, including emigration from Germany in the 19th century and immigration of groups such as Poles in the late 19th century, forced laborers during World War Two, expellees during the Cold War and labor migrants since the 1960s (cf. Bade 1984, 1992). With the settlement of labor migrants in the 1970s and 1980s, the steep increase of asylum seekers, and a renewed influx of ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) from Eastern Europe during the 1980s and early 1990s, immigration has come to occupy center stage as a policy issue. In the course of these developments came the realization that Germany is a ‘de-facto immigration country’ (Heckmann 1981), or an ‘undeclared immigration country’ (Thränhardt 1988). It was only gradually that political science research in Germany began to address the distribution of membership and citizenship rights in the German polity – with a primary focus on political rights and naturalization.

High levels of immigration in Germany have been accompanied by long-term structural developments, such as a restructuration of labor markets, the ‘crisis of the welfare state’ and seminal events such as German unification. In the early 1990s political conflict and academic debates on immigration and integration came to focus on the asylum question. The debate on asylum that went through several cycles in the 1980s and early 1990s drew attention to the question of immigration control and the consequences of migration for the welfare state. These developments raise questions such as: Why has the debate on immigration in Germany centered around the question of political asylum? Moreover, the gradual settlement of labor migrants (‘guestworkers’) in the 1970s and 1980s raised the question of naturalization
and access to citizenship rights. Has the German regulation of citizenship, based on the blood principle (*ius sanguinis*), stood in the way of political integration of de-facto immigrants? What are suitable institutional mechanisms to 'manage' a multiethnic society, e.g. minority rights, cultural autonomy, and affirmative action? Not only political rights of immigrants have become contentious. Also, as the emerging debate on 'welfare chauvinism' suggests, social rights of migrants are being contested. Is there such a thing as 'welfare chauvinism', the fear among groups in the native population (and settled immigrants) that certain new immigrant groups take away jobs, housing and social services? Is there a widespread unwillingness among the native population to share economic and social resources with certain immigrant groups defined as 'others'? Does 'welfare chauvinism' point towards an ethnicization of politics, i.e. the construction and mobilization of ethnic boundaries around issues of distribution of welfare state resources? Are we in the midst of experiencing the emergence of 'new' cleavages built around ethnic identity that add another dimension to 'old' politics (e.g. capital/labor)?

All these questions pertain directly to the distribution and contestation of rights, duties and membership in polities. If the distribution of membership and citizenship rights is the crucial problem that international migration poses for political science (Walzer 1983), the achievements and shortcomings of previous research are quite obvious. First, whereas literature has dealt with questions of political citizenship rights and membership (*Staatsangehörigkeit*), it has not devoted sufficient attention to social citizenship rights and the corresponding problems posed by the internationalization of labor markets and the granting of social rights in national welfare states that are 'closed systems' (Freeman 1986). This observation also applies to literature outside Germany: Most efforts have dealt with political citizenship (Brubaker 1992). Second, if it is true that migration raises the question of the distribution of social rights on the domestic level, the international and transnational contexts have to be considered. Research on immigration in Germany has not placed the political debates on asylum, 'multiculturalism' and xenophobia in an interactive perspective that analyzes the unequal distribution of resources and its connection to ethnicization of politics in welfare states of the 'North' to emigration and socio-economic inequalities in countries of the 'South'.

This review essay addresses the questions raised regarding immigration control, integration of migrants via political and social rights, and the concomitant ethnicization of welfare state politics during the 1980s and early 1990s. The overall focus is on the distribution of citizenship and membership and the political conflicts surrounding the conflicts around rights. First, the discussion examines regulation of immigration. Second, it turns to issues of political and social rights of immigrants, dealing with problems of naturalization and the welfare state and immigration. Third, the review focuses on political conflicts that have gone hand in hand with high levels of immigration, the ethnicization of politics. Here, ethnicization means the political construc-
tion and/or mobilization of boundaries between social groups that draw on ethnic markers. Ethnic markers and feelings of ethnic commonality – in Max Weber’s words ‘ethnische Gemeinsamkeit’ (cf. Weber 1976: 237, 244) – are ‘artificial’ and constructed phenomena and are used and mobilized in political conflicts. The discussion concludes with some reflections on future research that concern the transnational aspects of immigration and integration. Eventually, if transnational social policy is seen as a means of immigration control, a question is raised about the transnationalization of social rights that have previously been granted exclusively at the level of individual national states.

To place German literature in comparative perspective, an effort is made to evaluate the studies in light of comparative European and North American scholarship. Most German studies implicitly or explicitly refer to these literatures. For the most part this review does not include research on immigration into the former German Democratic Republic. Material on the GDR is very scarce because there was virtually no migration research under the communist regime. Mostly, migration research in the GDR focused on capitalist countries.¹

Immigration control

The opportunity or even the right to immigrate can be seen as the first step in acquiring citizenship in a national state. Although German governments, led both by Social and Christian Democrats, have staunchly refused to officially acknowledge a situation of immigration, there are discernible de facto policies of immigration and integration (Meier-Braun 1988). As already mentioned Germany is a de facto immigration country with regard to labor migrants (Gastarbeiter), asylum seekers, expellees (Vertriebene) in the 1940s and 1950s, and ethnic Germans (Aussiedler) from Central and Eastern Europe.

The politics and policies of labor recruitment, the development of immigration control as a distinct policy field in the late 19th century until the 1970s have been carefully documented and analyzed (Dohse 1985). Much less attention has been devoted to immigration and integration policies towards expellees from Eastern Europe and refugees from East Germany in the 1940s and 1950s (cf. Benz 1985) – and, later, ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe (mainly Poland and the former Soviet Union) in a comparative perspective, i.e. similarities and differences of immigration between labor migrants, ethnic Germans, asylum seekers and others. One thesis is that ethnic Germans are the most advantaged groups of all de facto immigrants due to Article 116 of the German constitution (Otto 1990). Article 116 and subsequent legislation gave ethnic Germans during the Cold War and after a quasi-automatic right of entry into the Federal Republic and access to German citizenship. In addition, they have received generous subsidies not available to other groups.
of de facto immigrants, e.g. language and vocational training courses to help them integrate into labor markets. However, it is a little known fact that recent laws and above all, regulatory measures have curtailed the number of ethnic Germans admitted into the Federal Republic. Thus, the number of ethnic Germans admitted fell from a high of about half a million in 1990 to about 220,000 in 1992. Israel and Japan also have similar laws of return that favour the descendants of former citizens in returning to the former sending country. Moreover, West European countries, such as the United Kingdom, changed their citizenship laws in 1981 and strengthened the blood principle as a criterion for immigration. It is questionable that we can speak of a German Sonderweg in regard to the special privileges ethnic Germans have in entering Germany. Yet, what is interesting about the preference of ethnic Germans over other groups of de facto immigrants is the fact that it is an imagined concept of ‘family’ (ius sanguinis) that is employed to legitimize their admission.

In Germany the political debate on immigration since the late 1970s has been a discourse on the right to political asylum. Research has dealt primarily with the constitutional issue of asylum and not with the causes of refugee flows and the reception of refugees in host countries (cf. Söllner 1992). Most asylum seekers in Europe apply for asylum in Germany. In no small part this was probably due to the fact that Germany guarantees a unique right for politically persecuted individuals. Quite a few analysts argued that because German asylum law is so liberal, it has led to very restrictive administrative rules and a comparatively low recognition rate (e.g. Cohn-Bendit & Schmid 1992: 243–275).

Empirically, the amendments to the regulations of political asylum during the 1980s – before the amendment of Article 16 in 1993 – were a prime example of non-intended consequences of short-term changes of these rules (Münch 1992: 64). For example, the financial burdens of paying for housing and food of asylum seekers rests upon the shoulders of local communities. Thus, in the early 1980s, work permissions were granted to asylum seekers in order to reduce the financial burden upon local communities. However, the granting of work permits to asylum seekers could have led to more asylum applications of those migrants who seek work in the Federal Republic of Germany. Thus, the liberal handling of work permits was restricted again until 1991 when asylum seekers were eligible for restricted work permits after a waiting period.

In general, we know very little on positions of political actors on issues of immigration and citizenship. Exceptions include Ute Knight and Wolfgang Kowalsky (1991) who analyze the positions of political parties on immigration in general. One of the results is that positions on immigration do not fall along established party lines and cleavages, such as ‘left’ vs. ‘right’ and ‘capital’ vs. ‘labor’. Münch (1992) finds that in the politics of asylum levels of government matter: the federal government has had much less incentive to act consistently compared to Länder and local governments. The latter
had to shoulder most of the costs for housing of asylum seekers. In sum, the actors and cleavages in immigration and integration policy have still to be analysed. An exception is Wolken (1988) who deals with the political debates on asylum. The nonrecognition of immigration has prohibited a debate on immigration regulation in the 1980s and early 1990s and helped to elevate the constitutional issue of asylum to the center of the politics of immigration (Faist 1994). However, there has been little systematic analysis of possible cross-cutting cleavages within political parties and other macro-political actors (Thränhardt 1993).

Even fewer studies have systematically used a normative perspective to debate arguments on immigration control. Addressing the debate on asylum, Micha Brumlik (1993) argues that there is, in principle, an absolute right to immigration. Like Bruce Ackerman (1980), he contends that immigration restrictions are only legitimate when the sheer number and the declared political will of immigrants undoubtedly lead to a threat to the survival of the liberal political order. Immigrants can only be turned back at the border when we can safely assume that the refusal of entry will not threaten their life. In essence, Brumlik presents a universalist position, i.e. those who want to restrict immigration have to shoulder the burden of proof. The ideal-type opposite to this universalist position is a national-particularistic position that puts the burden of proof upon the shoulders of individual migrants. For example, even the liberal German asylum law asks the individual refugee to prove that he/she was politically persecuted in the country of origin. A universalist position, however, would ask about the capacity of the receiving countries to take in refugees that have been the object of political or economic violence and cannot be helped in the country of origin. Seen in this perspective, Brunlik's plea to reverse the burden of proof would have profound implications for immigration policies.

Moreover, Brumlik contends that immigration should be allowed unless it can be shown that immigrants pose a threat to the liberal political order. It is unclear, however, when a threat to the liberal political order exists. For example, are Islamic fundamentalists a threat to Germany democracy? In practice, the existence of such a rule could even increase possibilities for right-wing and xenophobic movements to influence the debate over immigration in calling any kind of unwelcome migration a threat to the political order.

Rainer Bauböck (1992) argues that it is ultimately not the threat to the political order, i.e. political rights, but the threat to social rights that could legitimate immigration control. As labor markets have become more transnational, the balance of regulation of these markets, that rests upon the cooperation of labor unions, employer associations and state institutions, could be threatened. Bauböck could be read to argue that high levels of immigration create an overabundance of cheap labor. Employer associations, for example, would have an incentive to opt out of the regulation of labor markets. Unions, in turn, would lose economic and, finally, political power.
In turn, this could lead to a levelling of social rights for all concerned and/or to specific labor market segments for migrants. It is plausible that high levels of immigration could result in competition for selected groups of native workers, i.e. there is the threat of wage dumping. Thus, high levels of immigration could lead to increased socio-economic inequality between groups in the labor market. Over the past century unions in all Western countries have used this argument to restrict labor immigration. Thus, Bauböck has pointed towards the problem that welfare states granting social rights to their citizens (and the part of the foreign population) are nationally bounded and thus ‘closed’ systems. This closing on the level of the national state is in direct contrast to the internationalization of labor markets. Therefore, Bauböck makes an argument for both immigration restrictions to prohibit a potential threat to social rights in the receiving countries and an extension of social rights in the transnational segments of the labor market.

Other writers have argued in a utilitarian manner that immigration is much needed in order to protect the level of social rights and benefits in Germany. Some proponents have advanced demographic arguments. They argue that the ageing of the German population in the foreseeable future will lead to shortages in labor markets. This, so the argument goes, will have effects upon the social insurance system, the heart of the German welfare state. Since there will not be enough active labor force participants in the future due to over-ageing of German society, there will be shortcuts in the social security system. Therefore, the remedy would be to have controlled immigration to compensate for this likely effect (Geißler 1991). However, whether or not ‘controlled’ immigration would have those beneficial effects for the German social security system is by no means clear. For example, the thesis depends on a continued capacity of German labor markets to absorb new migrants.

Most policy proposals that deal with immigration control are oriented at the models of the ‘classical countries of immigration’, the United States of America, Canada, New Zealand and Australia. Thus, for example, some researchers propose immigration laws for those who want to immigrate into Germany for economic reasons and include in quotas groups such as political refugees, quota refugees, relatives of immigrants, immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (with slots reserved for ethnic Germans); and an open channel to which everybody can apply (Thranhardt 1992: 146–153). Bade proposes institutions to administer this kind of immigration, including a federal agency for immigrant affairs, a system of ombudspersons, and research institutions (Bade 1992: 442–455). The overall-argument made by these authors is that immigration policy becomes more ‘calculable’ for the public at large. Quotas would be set by parliament in consultation with important societal groups.

In general, these proposals also favor a European harmonization of immigration and asylum policies. However, this summary call for increased coordination harmonization of immigration policies is a double edged sword: In
the case of the unique liberal German asylum law harmonization has actually meant a further tightening of entry for refugees.

**Integration and membership: contested citizenship in the social and political sphere**

Citizenship rights constitute a necessary requirement of access to membership and thus influence the life-chances of immigrants. Overall, recent German literature has focussed on two concepts of citizenship as membership. It contrasted an ethnic understanding with a republican understanding. In general, the normative assumption in much of the literature has been to look upon *ius sanguinis* as an exclusionist concept of citizenship that denies even the children of migrants born in Germany from German citizenship and thus creates a permanent class of politically disenfranchised pariahs. Instead, the authors discussed below hold that a republican understanding of political citizenship requires the principle of *ius soli*, i.e., those born in Germany should have easy access to German citizenship. The main thrust of the discussion on political citizenship has thus been the nexus between nationalism and democracy. The principle of 'ius sanguinis' is held to be an expression of a nationalist understanding of citizenship, whereas 'ius soli' is understood to be an expression of democratic distribution of political rights. Thus, the argument contends with the position of a group of mostly legal scholars who argue in favor of the current understanding of German citizenship (cf. Rauscher 1987).

Lutz Hoffmann (1990) contrasts an ethnic and a republican understanding of citizenship as membership. He contends that an ethnic understanding of citizenship is not adequate for a de facto country of immigration such as the Federal Republic of Germany. According to Hoffmann recruiting migrants without giving them adequate rights and citizenship status has created a situation in which a further denial of accepting Germany as a country of immigration would ultimately deform the democratic character of the German republic. He sees an ethnic nationalism (*völkischer Nationalismus*) as the root cause of an inadequate and schizophrenic collective identity of the Federal Republic that has recruited foreign workers but has not responded adequately to the process of their settlement. Hoffmann reconstructs the historical evolution of ethnic nationalism in Germany over the past two centuries. The juxtaposition of an 'ethnic' and a 'republican' ideal of citizenship and understanding of nation is reminiscent of Kohn's (1944) concept of Eastern and Western nationalism (*Kulturation versus Staatsnation*), and has also been used by authors such as Roger Brubaker (1992) to compare the German and the French traditions of citizenship, the former rooted in German idealism, the latter in the republican tradition of the French revolution. Brubaker starts his analysis from the observation that the rate of naturalization of immigrants in France is higher than in Germany. What authors such
as Hoffmann and Brubaker neglect is the history of exclusion of newcomers and minorities in national states that have had a republican tradition, e.g., France and the United States. As Smith (1988) has convincingly argued, republican ideals were successfully used to exclude women and ‘racial’ minorities such as African Americans from the political sphere, well into the 20th century.

Jürgen Habermas (1992) presents arguments to debunk the notion that citizenship should be based upon ethnic and cultural criteria, such as assimilation into German culture. In his view there is an historical relationship between nation and citizenship; yet, this does not preclude an understanding of membership that is based on participation in the polity and not on the assimilation to a particular culture. Thus, Habermas favors a participatory approach to membership and rights in a polity. He balances the right to self-determination of each nation state – often advanced by communitarian arguments – and the rights of migrants to participate in the community in which they settle and have access to full membership.

Dieter Oberndörfer (1989), a specialist in international relations, also moves beyond the exclusive focus on the (republican) national state to discuss the nexus between cosmopolitan human rights that have pre- and supra-national validity and the republic as a principle of political organization whose main purpose it is to guarantee and enforce human rights. Oberndörfer transcends the understanding of the national state as a closed system and asks questions about citizenship in a world of transnational migration and a national organization of the distribution of membership and rights.

Bauböck (1993) takes into account the transnational aspect of migration. First, he urges easier access to citizenship for de facto immigrants. On the other hand, he also supports the concept of denizenship (Wohnbürgerschaft) that would grant certain political rights also to long-term foreign citizens. Since immigrants (first generation) rarely break their ties with the country of origin (e.g. sending remittances), Bauböck also conceives of an emigration citizenship (Auwandererbürgerschaft). The extension of denizenship (rights) could be one way to protect the status of extracommunitari in a unifying European Community. The problem with denizenship is, however, as critics have pointed out, a potential ‘devaluation’ of national citizenship. Schuck and Smith, for example, hold a dichotomous concept of citizenship (1985). In their view the extension of denizenship could lead migrants not to apply for citizenship in the country of settlement at all. Nevertheless, those European countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands who have granted denizenship rights to migrants, for example voting rights on the local level, seem to have had positive experiences in regard to political participation of the immigrants involved (Rath 1990).

Quite unlike its use in Canadian politics and its meaning in Australian politics (cf. Weber 1987), multicultural society in the German context has not primarily referred to a specific strategy to promote languages and cultures of immigrants. Rather, it has served as a roof for all those very divergent
views that reject assimilation strategies that were promoted by the federal government during the 1980s. Multiculturalist positions span a wide spectrum ranging from a vision of non-conflictual ethnic relations and cultural autonomy for immigrant groups to more concrete proposals to integrate policies of asylum, immigration and integration. In the literature we find at least two views. First, there is what could be called a liberal position. It corresponds to positions represented by an 'open republic' (Oberndörfer) or an 'unfinished republic' (Hoffmann), i.e. arguments that ground membership in a polity in a republican tradition. A practical implication of this position would be a transition from the dominant concept of *ius sanguinis* to *ius soli* as a basis for membership. According to this view ethnic groups should not have special privileges in the public domain, e.g. ethnically-specific educational institutions. A second position in the multiculturalist debate, put forward within the Green Party, has emphasized the cultural autonomy of ethnic groups, a view that conflicts with a liberal argument because it ultimately implies that ethnic groups have wide-ranging autonomy in cultural affairs (cf. Die Grünen 1990).

Two practitioners in the field who are associated with the ‘Office of Multicultural Affairs’ of the city of Frankfurt, have written the most comprehensive study of the ‘experiment of multicultural democracy’. They speak of ‘the multicultural society . . . (as) an immigration society’ (Cohn-Bendit & Schmid 1992: 137). This description refers to the argument that high levels of immigration, ensuing social conflicts and violence are constitutive elements of Germany that has always been an immigration country. Their study raises questions such as: Is it desirable to aim for a plural society with autonomous cultural rights and even special privileges for discriminated ethnic (immigrant) minorities? Or should policies be guided by the principle of equal treatment of all ethnic groups, irrespective of their position in the political and socioeconomic hierarchies?

Talking about ‘the experiment of a multiculturalist democracy’ also means considering specific German difficulties in dealing with ethnic pluralism. German laws and regulations of membership in the polity have meant that even second-generation immigrants are foreigners. Thus, some of the ‘classic’ solutions to deal with ethnic conflicts cannot be applied, e.g. territorial and cultural autonomy, civil or political rights movements (e.g. *SOS Racisme* in France), and demands for ‘affirmative action’ (Heckmann 1992: 240–41; cf. Kimminich 1985). Since de facto immigrants have been excluded from political (voting) rights, it is not surprising that we do not find them in the formal political sphere although they have become members of established parties, e.g., the Social Democratic Party. As in other European countries, the first generation of Turkish de facto immigrants, for example, have focussed primarily on politics in their homeland. This tendency is changing slowly: Immigrants are becoming more active in the politics of educational and social policy on the local level (Özcan 1989). A field that has received much less attention is the political integration of former ‘guestworkers’ in unions and
in institutions of economic democracy at the company level (Kühne et al. 1988).

Little attention has been devoted to the distribution of social rights. Hubert Heinelt (1993) places his analysis in the context of Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology of welfare regimes. He argues that in 'conservative and continental' type regimes (e.g., Germany) discrimination against immigrants is more an effect of status attribution by the state (citizenship laws and status regulations) than in 'liberal' regimes. In 'liberal' regimes (e.g., United States) discrimination is much more determined by market processes than in Germany. More specifically, he argues that the organization of the German national state allowed it to distinguish human rights from citizen's rights. The latter do not only include political but also social rights. He goes on to claim that in those national states that have organized access to membership on the principle of *ius soli* (e.g., France) the problem of integration is not so much on the level of rights but more in terms of social discrimination based on ascriptive ethnic criteria. Heinelt presents evidence from the German case. He looks at social rights and benefits that different immigrant groups receive. There is a hierarchy based on access to membership. For example, due to German citizenship law, ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe have full access to social rights, whereas asylum seekers do not.

This argument can be specified in two ways. First, those migrants who hold a permanent residency permit have access to a similar set of social rights as German citizens and ethnic Germans (Franz 1989). In regard to social rights, the difference between *ius soli* and *ius sanguinis* is only relevant with regard to ethnic Germans. Regarding temporary labor migrants and asylum seekers, there are similar hierarchies of access to social rights for migrants even in 'liberal' regimes such as the United States that are characterized by *ius soli* regulations (Fuchs 1991: 477–481). In sum, the laws of welfare states as different as the United States and Germany are characterized by access to social rights for immigrants with a permanent residence permit that is not closely related to political membership.

Second, the distinction between discrimination through the 'market', on the one hand, and the 'state', on the other hand, does not further our understanding of processes of integration, inclusion and exclusion of immigrants in labor markets, social services and benefit systems. Rather, as comparative empirical studies have shown, different types of welfare regimes go hand in hand with distinct forms of politico-economic inclusion and exclusion. In a study of the transition from school to work among Turkish and German youth in the Federal Republic and Mexican American and European American youth in the United States during the 1980s, one of the main findings was that the policies of a regime made a difference to exclusion. In a class-based corporatist social and labor market policy system immigrants mainly suffered from unemployment (Turks in Germany) while in an ethnically-segmented pluralist regime the main form of exclusion has been income poverty (Mexican Americans in the USA) (Faist 1993).
Horst Afheldt (1993) claims that continued high levels of East-West and North-South migration do indeed pose a threat to certain indigenous groups in the labor and housing market and in social services. According to Afheldt these developments call into question the 'welfare state rule' in German politics (Sozialstaatspostulat), i.e., the attempt of the welfare state to decrease income inequalities, guarantee a certain level of equality of opportunity and thus secure economic integration of its citizens. However, there are no empirical studies to substantiate this far-reaching and gloomy conclusion. On the basis of scarce empirical studies, it could be hypothesized that certain marginalized groups in the labor market – indigenous and immigrants (e.g., former Turkish 'guestworkers') – compete with new immigrants in the housing and labor market. The studies that do exist show that in recent years (1988–1991) new immigrants were successfully integrated into labor markets, and overall, contributed to more revenues than costs to the welfare state (cf. Barabas et al. 1992).

The interesting question then concerns the perception of immigrants as economic competitors and their perceived willingness or unwillingness to assimilate to the culture of the country of settlement. Historically, in Western Europe, North America and Australia, labor unions have been the most vigorous proponents of immigration control. Unions saw high levels of immigration as dangerous signs of wage dumping and increased competition in the housing market. In Germany, during the 1960s, unions were part of a neo-corporatist policy-making mechanism that regulated the recruitment and integration of what were deemed to be temporary 'guestworkers'. The politics of immigration were not conflictual between the three main actors in labor markets, unions, employer associations and state institutions such as the Ministry of Labor. During the 1980s, in the context of high levels of immigration, especially of ethnic Germans and asylum seekers, a perceived crisis of the welfare state, and the difficulties of German unification, a new debate over the effects of immigration emerged. In the 1980s it was not unions but (right-wing) populist parties and politicians that were the main actors urging immigration restrictions based on xenophobic appeals.

Ethnicization: the construction of ethnic boundaries

One of the most challenging problems concerns the construction of boundaries between groups that are reflected in perceptions of 'we' and the 'other'. After World War II immigration of expellees, ethnic Germans, labor migrants and asylum seekers into Germany has gone hand in hand with the construction of boundaries. In the 1980s and early 1990s the rise of right-wing populist parties, the discourse on racism, and the steep increase in violence against certain groups of migrants such as Turks and asylum seekers are only the most visible forms of an increased importance of boundary formation towards 'others'. One example of boundary formation and mobiliz-
ation is the use of religion and culture (Islam) in defining Turkish de facto immigrants: Muslims are thought to be unwilling to assimilate to German culture and thus not deemed to be fit to become German citizens. Another example is the distinction between 'political' refugees and 'economic' refugees: Only 'political' refugees are thought to have a legitimate claim to social benefits (e.g., Sozialhilfe). All these examples hint at boundaries that separate 'us' (the Germans?) from 'them' (certain immigrant groups).

Nevertheless, there are few theoretical and empirical studies on boundary formation that take Frederik Barth's (1969) work seriously. He suggested that ethnic markers such as language, religion and 'culture' are the manifestation of boundaries that separate insiders from outsiders. The literature discussed in the following section offers some hypotheses that could be pursued in further systematic empirical research.

A fundamental debate underlying the analysis of ethnicization is the relevance of ethnic identity and ethnic differentiation in modern states. Esser (1988) argues that continued functional differentiation of society will ultimately erode the basis for differentiation along ethnic lines. In contrast, Nassehi (1990) contends that in functionally differentiated societies the problem of integration is intrinsically related to ethnic differentiation. He views ethnic differentiation as a function of social integration of modern societies. According to Nassehi ethnic differentiation may play a role above all in those situations in which economic conflicts occur, e.g., access to jobs and other goods determining life-chances. Nevertheless, ethnic differentiation is not the only or the main process that accompanies responses to functional differentiation and crises in modern societies. In this view ethnic differentiation, e.g., the formation of ethnic identities, serves as a basis for social integration in excluding 'others', i.e., foreigners, ethnic Germans, 'racial' minorities, and asylum seekers. Nassehi concludes his discussion with an interesting historical claim: He observes that ethnic conflicts and self-identification may have less of a social integrative function in the late 20th when compared to the late 19th and early 20th century. Causes may be found in a prospering welfare state, the cultural liberalization of society and the individualization of personal life-histories. However, in the face of mounting opposition to immigration in Western national states and ethnicization of conflicts around jobs, housing and social services, we may fruitfully reverse this hypothesis and thus use it as a point of departure for further inquiries into contemporary processes of ethnicization: High levels of immigration and conflicts over distribution of social goods in welfare states may well present the fertile ground in which an ethnicization of welfare state politics has taken place in recent years.

Following Max Weber, Gero Lenhardt (1990) argues that the formation of ethnic identity is a result of complex processes of rationalization. He thinks that the bureaucratization of daily life through bureaucratic agencies of the modern state indeed furthers ethnocentrist tendencies. Lenhardt draws upon Glazer and Moynihan's (1975) account of affirmative action policies.
In the United States, affirmative action legislation gave excluded minorities (e.g., African Americans and Hispanics) a wedge to claim rights, e.g. access to jobs. In turn, those negatively affected (e.g., white males) mobilized and charged ‘reverse discrimination’. Lenhardt hypothesizes that in this case the welfare state itself has been a source of ethnic differentiation and what we have called ethnicization of politics. For example, in enforcing the rights of historically discriminated ethnic and racial minorities in access to jobs and housing, the American welfare state bureaucracy uses the very same ethnic and racial markers to define who has and who has no right to preferential treatment. These situations can serve as a point of departure for political entrepreneurs to rally around ethnic and racial markers, both potential beneficiaries and potential losers.

Lenhardt’s account of the welfare state as a source of ethnicization of politics applies to the United States. Closer at hand, German unification is a very good example to illustrate the structural conditions under which ethnicization of welfare state politics may take place. On the one hand, German unification may have led to an increased xenophobic reaction to ‘others’, for example asylum seekers and de facto immigrants of Turkish descent (cf. Bielefeld 1991). On the other hand, the problems associated with unification, for example conflicts over the burdens of ‘rebuilding’ what used to be the German Democratic Republic, may lead to a regionally based ethnicization between the populations in the East and the West of Germany (Offe 1992). In both instances ethnicization is not necessarily associated with an outwardly aggressive nationalism in German politics. Thus, for example, some analysts have described nationalism after German unification not as a form of exaggerated national feeling or an ideology with externally expansionist tendencies. Rather, Funke speaks of a ‘fragmented and defensive nationalism’ that is directed against domestic and not external ‘enemies’. The targets of this nationalism include selected groups of foreigners, such as Sinti and Roma, asylum seekers and Turkish ‘guestworkers’. In Funke’s view this reactive form of nationalism arises in the context of the perception of crisis (e.g., unemployment and disorientation in the process of German unification, and latent dispositions of nationalism (1991: 7–8).

We know very little about the actual construction of boundaries or the mobilization of ‘difference’. Manfrass (1991: 211–230) gives some indication in his analysis of political discourse around immigration and integration in France and Germany. In a comparative study of North Africans in France and Turks in Germany (in which Manfrass takes the commonalities of immigration situation in European countries as a point of departure), he finds very similar arguments in both countries. Boundaries towards ‘others’ gather around religion, i.e. Islam in regard to North Africans in France and Turks in Germany. Much more research is needed to uncover the continuities and novel developments in constructing ethnic difference in Germany in the context of high levels of immigration (cf. Leveau & Ruf 1991).

One of the forms of the political organization of ethnicity, i.e., ethniciz-
ation of politics, that has received much public and academic attention has been the resurgence of nationalist populist political parties and steeply increased violence against certain groups of foreigners in Germany. Looking at the rise of right-wing populist parties offers one way to trace the significance of the politicization of migration issues.

The following discussion will deal with the emergence of right-wing populist parties such as the Republicans (Republikaner) and the Deutsche Volkunion (DVU). Populism, most analysts agree, is characterized by a mixture of demands that point towards both radical democracy and reactionary political views (Backes 1990). Often, populism does not fit the left/right pattern of political cleavages. Populism has anti-elitist and anti-intellectual characteristics, i.e. the 'healthy common sense' of the masses is held in stark opposition to the rule of experts and elites. Populist positions also claim that 'special interests' have to be subordinated to what is perceived and defined by populist entrepreneurs to be the general will. Thus, populist positions have strong antipluralist tendencies, combined with a penchant for simple solutions for complex problems and an idealization of a distant and supposedly much better past. Issues such as immigration and integration that cut across established class and religious cleavages (the main cleavage lines of 'old politics' in Germany) are thus attractive themes around which populist rhetoric may rally supporters.

The German literature on populism offers two, not necessarily exclusive interpretations of the rise of right-wing populist renaissance that shed some light on the connection between immigration and the political mobilization of 'ethnic' markers. A first explanation emphasizes socio-economic changes as an explanation for the rise of right-wing populist dispositions among the population and the support of these parties (cf. Betz 1991). This literature deals with two sets of explanatory factors. First, rapid and large-scale changes have led to a 'two-third society' (Zweidrittel-Gesellschaft). For example, segmented or dual labor markets have developed in Western states. This segmentation is further exacerbated by changes in the global division of labor. These labor markets are split into future-oriented sectors with secure well-paid jobs and peripheral, declining sectors with jobs that are characterized by the constant threat of unemployment. These socio-economic changes produce victims, e.g. the long-term unemployed and the marginally employed. Second, increased insecurities during the individual life-course are thought to contribute to increasing disorientation. According to this view the educational revolution and increased demand for well-educated labor has resulted in a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, 'postmodern individuals' have a wider range of choice available. On the other hand, the cost of the expansion of options is the loss of stability and security in the life-world. In short, labor market dualization and the individualization of risks and opportunities have resulted in increased insecurity, fear and feeling of powerlessness among the 'victims of modernization'. In particular, this applies to the victims of modernization, i.e. long-term unemployed, those employed in
marginal positions, high school dropouts. This view sees rightwing populist appeals to be most successful among members of these groups, i.e. those groups are most receptive to right-wing populism that feel most threatened by economic, cultural and social decline. By implication those are thought to be least receptive who belong to the core of the modern welfare state.

Obviously, this kind of explanation is highly reminiscent of attempts to explain the electoral success of NSDAP in the early thirties (Geiger 1930). If this hypothesis has some validity, we should be able to find a close connection between social-structural characteristics and vote for the Republikaner. Roth (1990) found a higher propensity to vote republican among voters with lower levels of education and social status (cf. Hennig et al. 1991: 154–55). However, there are higher than average levels of support for right-wing parties among other groups as well, e.g. among the self-employed.

One of the main proponents of this view, Wilhelm Heitmeyer has applied this perspective to explain violence against foreigners among youth (1992). Nevertheless, his own data does not support his hypothesis that low self-esteem combined with marginal educational or labor market positions, low levels of secure group attachment and negative views of one's own future is positively correlated with a tendency to carry right-wing dispositions (Bommes & Scherr 1992: 216). Rather than pursuing interpretations that deterministically reduce the dispositions to support right-wing populism to changes in individual life-chances and personality deficits, other analysts have asked to which groups populist rhetoric may appeal and why. Right-wing populists are not thought to be the mere victims of modernization. Thus, for example, Bommes and Scherr (1992: 210–11) perceive of populist discourse and arguments as a pool in which individuals from very different backgrounds find attractive arguments. The support of populist arguments cannot simply be reduced to specific socio-economic situations and the specific personality traits of persons. This view would allow us to introduce political actors, such as governments and parties, in the process of ethnicization of politics.

A second explanation for the emergence of right-wing populism emphasizes structural changes in the party systems and correlated 'value' changes as root causes. Leggewie (1989), in his study of the Republikaner, argues that the disintegration of major parties, in particular the Christian Democrats (CDU), offered a political vacuum into which right-wing parties have swiftly moved since the early 1980s. Leggewie’s premise is that the German Christian Democrats were not a conservative party such as the British Tories. Instead, the CDU combined three wings: national-conservatives, catholic labor and economic liberals. The Republikaner seized their political opportunities when these three wings disintegrated. Leggewie goes on to claim that this development involves a certain ‘normalization’ of German politics, the party system is beginning to look like that of other Western democracies. Leggewie’s analysis points towards common European trends in the development of right-wing parties. However, we learn nothing about why the Republikaner were so successful in ‘ethnicizing’ German politics. Minkenberg (1992) in-
interprets the emergence of right-wing parties in Germany as a reaction to value change on the left. This view has been inspired by Ronald Inglehart’s seminal studies on value change in Western democracies across generational cohorts. In Minkenberg’s perspective the ‘postmodern’ left has a ‘new right’ as a concomitant counterpart. The emphasis of populist rhetoric on individual incentive is paralleled by an exaggeration of individualism in the ‘postmodern’ left. For Minkenberg both the ‘new left’ and the ‘new right’ are phenomena of ‘new politics’. For example, the hallmark of parties such as the Republikaner is that they do not attempt to mobilize a distinct socially definable group. From this observation Minkenberg concludes that new right-wing parties espouse a one-dimensional ideology, i.e. a populist strategy that appeals to a variety of groups. However, from this analysis we learn very little about the actors who are involved in right-wing populist politics and their strategies of mobilization around issues such as immigration and the defense of the welfare state.

Processes of ethnicization of politics are characterized by constructing and mobilizing boundaries against selected groups of immigrants and/or ethnic and racial minorities. One hypothesis could be that the attraction of populism is the connection between the ‘defense’ of the welfare state and the exclusion of selected groups of immigrants from social benefits who did not participate previously in the social security system. Populist rhetoric fuses the neoconservative discourse of individual merit with an appeal to secure the welfare state against intruders who threaten to erode the economic and cultural foundations of society. Thus, on the one hand, populist parties have indeed taken up the rhetoric of individual merit that was a hallmark of neo-conservative rhetoric during the 1980s in Western Europe and North America (cf. Andersen & Bjørklund 1990). On the other hand, populist discourse in Germany and other Western European countries has not-called for a rollback of the welfare state as neo-conservatives did in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Rather, it has helped to elevate the defense of the welfare state benefits (e.g., old age pensions) against ‘floods’ of immigrants to a much-discussed issue on the political agenda. The Front National in France seems to have been the most successful instance of populist agenda setting in regard to immigration and the welfare state. Partly, this has also been the theme of the German Republikaner. It is in this sense that we could speak of ‘defensive welfare chauvinism’. Therefore, in order to understand more about the connection between the resurgence of populism and agenda-setting in regard to immigration, we also need to consider distributional conflicts in welfare states. There seems to be a repertoire of issues related to distributional conflicts in the welfare states which populist arguments have used to mobilize boundaries of ‘us’ versus ‘them’. These boundaries are not necessarily directed against immigrants and could very well include domestic groups.

What is new is certainly not ethnicization. Yet, the context in which the politicization of ethnicity occurs has been undergoing significant changes. Citizens in the (German) welfare state have claims to resources. For a large
part these claims are founded on participation in the labor market. According to the prevailing equivalency principle (Äquivalenzprinzip), pensions, for example, are paid to those who have earlier contributed to the funds. In a situation in which these claims have become contested, it is not surprising that those who have not 'earned' their right, e.g., asylum seekers, are not considered to have legitimate claims on the resources of the welfare state. However, not all immigrant groups who have not 'earned' their right are thought to have illegitimate claims. For example, the claims of ethnic Germans have been much less contested so far than those of asylum seekers. In sum, the definition of citizenship and the understanding of membership do play an important role in who is admitted and who gets what set of citizenship rights – but also whose claims are contested.

**Perspectives for future research: beyond the national state**

In sum, German political science research has not dealt self-consciously with immigration and integration of immigrants as processes of the distribution and contestation of rights. In view of current conflicts around immigration and integration and distributional conflicts in the welfare state, the issues of rights and membership deserve more attention than they have received so far.

This review has almost exclusively focused on domestic aspects of the transnational phenomena of immigration, integration and ethnicization. For the most part researchers have looked at the national (welfare) state as a closed system that has not been an integral part of transnational migratory processes. Thus, academic debates and research in Germany have neglected the foreign policy, international and transnational characteristics of migration (for exceptions, see Lohrmann & Manfrass 1974 and the review of the state of art by Blaschke 1993). The relationship between migration and international relations covers states and individuals in both sending and receiving countries and the patterns discernible at the level of the international system and its regional subdivisions.

Given the central role of the debate over the constitutional right to asylum for political refugees, it is particularly astonishing to notice how few studies deal with the refugee problem in international perspective. Research on the causation of refugee flows and the sociological definition of refugees is just emerging (Opitz 1988; Blaschke & Germershausen 1992).

Suggestions for further research on immigration can be derived from Abram de Swaan's work (1992) who views international migration as one of the processes that intimately connect social policies of developed and developing countries. Among other things de Swaan explores the reasons the 'rich' countries in the North might have in supporting the evolution of a transnational social policy regime, e.g., helping 'poor' countries in the South to institutionalize a minimal structure of social service delivery. If it is true
that from a normative point of view the protection of social rights in the
North can be seen as a legitimate reason to control immigration from the
South then the question does not solely concern the contested granting of
social-rights to migrants in the countries of the North. It also concerns social
rights of populations in the South.

Notes

1. There were some significant differences between East and West Germany in regard to the
size of the migrant population and their regions of origin. Compared to about seven percent
of the total population in the Federal Republic foreigners in the East constituted only one
percent. They can be subdivided in three categories. First, contract laborers from other
socialist countries (e.g., Cuba, Vietnam, Mozambique); second, students; and third, a small
group of political asylants from states in which communists were persecuted (e.g., Chile) (cf.
Krüger-Potratz 1991; on the legal status of migrants before and after unification, see Cu

2. Asylum seekers come to Germany by asking for political asylum: ‘Every politically persecuted
individual has a right to asylum.’ (Art. 16 II 2 GG) Germany is unique in that it grants an
individual claim to asylum for all those who are politically persecuted. Germany has, by
international standards, an exceptionally liberal asylum law, guaranteeing entry and an
individual right to a lawful procedure (Rechtsweggarantie, guaranteed by Art., 19 IV 1 GG)
that extends beyond the institutional guarantee of the Geneva Convention. The Geneva
Convention grounds asylum in the prerogative of sovereign states while German Basic Law
gives individuals a claim to asylum. On a juridical level the positions taken were those who
wanted to replace Article 16 by an institutional guarantee (Hailbronner 1987) and those who
wanted to keep it in its original form (Pfaff 1992). Article 16 was replaced by a new Article
16a that took effect in July 1993: Among other restrictions all those asylum seekers can now
be turned back at the border and thus would not have a constitutionally guaranteed right to
asylum who entered the Federal Republic from neighboring ‘safe countries’ (all neighboring
countries have been declared to be ‘safe countries’), those who came from countries declared
to be ‘free of persecution’ (e.g. Romania, Hungary, Ghana, India), and those asylum seekers
whose application was already denied in member states of the European Community.

3. ‘The critical focus of investigation from this point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that
defines the group, not the cultural stuff that it encloses . . . If a group maintains its identity
when members interact with others, this entails criteria for membership and ways of signalling
membership and exclusion’ (Barth 1969: 15).

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