Authors
Buechel, Berno
;
Hellmann, Tim
Department
Institut für mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung
Abstract:
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has not been studied systematically are the sources of inefficiency. We approach this gap by analyzing the role of positive and negative externalities of link formation. We find general results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be "too dense" in a well-defined sense, while situations with negative externalities, tend to induce "too dense" networks.
Keywords
Spillovers ;
Externalities ;
Game theory ;
Connections ;
Networks ;
Network formation ;
Stability ;
Efficiency
Buechel B, Hellmann T. Under-connected and over-connected networks. IMW working papers. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2008.
Buechel, B., & Hellmann, T. (2008). Under-connected and over-connected networks . Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Buechel, B., and Hellmann, T. (2008). Under-connected and over-connected networks. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Buechel, B., & Hellmann, T., 2008. Under-connected and over-connected networks, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
B. Buechel and T. Hellmann, Under-connected and over-connected networks, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2008.
Buechel, B., Hellmann, T.: Under-connected and over-connected networks. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2008).
Buechel, Berno, and Hellmann, Tim. Under-connected and over-connected networks. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2008.
@misc{2315804,
abstract = {Since the seminal contribution of Jackson \& Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has not been studied systematically are the sources of inefficiency. We approach this gap by analyzing the role of positive and negative externalities of link formation. We find general results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be "too dense" in a well-defined sense, while situations with negative externalities, tend to induce "too dense" networks.},
author = {Buechel, Berno and Hellmann, Tim},
issn = {0931-6558},
language = {English},
number = {400},
publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Bielefeld},
title = {Under-connected and over-connected networks},
year = {2008},
}
TY - GEN
ID - 2315804
TI - Under-connected and over-connected networks
AU - Buechel, Berno
AU - Hellmann, Tim
PY - 2008
AB - Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has not been studied systematically are the sources of inefficiency. We approach this gap by analyzing the role of positive and negative externalities of link formation. We find general results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be "too dense" in a well-defined sense, while situations with negative externalities, tend to induce "too dense" networks.
KW - Spillovers
KW - Externalities
KW - Game theory
KW - Connections
KW - Networks
KW - Network formation
KW - Stability
KW - Efficiency
IS - 400
PB - Universität Bielefeld
SN - 0931-6558
U3 - PUB:ID 2315804
UR - http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-400.pdf
UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13569
ER -
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