Authors
Çiftçi , Baris
;
Dimitrov, Dinko
Department
Institut für mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung
Abstract:
In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.
Keywords
Shapley value ;
Semi-value ;
Banzhaf value ;
Hedonic game ;
Simple game ;
Strict core
Çiftçi B, Dimitrov D. Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control. IMW working papers. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2006.
Çiftçi , B., & Dimitrov, D. (2006). Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control . Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Çiftçi , B., and Dimitrov, D. (2006). Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Çiftçi , B., & Dimitrov, D., 2006. Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
B. Çiftçi and D. Dimitrov, Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2006.
Çiftçi , B., Dimitrov, D.: Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2006).
Çiftçi , Baris, and Dimitrov, Dinko. Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2006.
@misc{2315533,
abstract = {In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.},
author = {\c{C}ift\c{c}i , Baris and Dimitrov, Dinko},
issn = {0931-6558},
language = {English},
number = {384},
publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Bielefeld},
title = {Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control},
year = {2006},
}
TY - GEN
ID - 2315533
TI - Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control
AU - Çiftçi , Baris
AU - Dimitrov, Dinko
PY - 2006
AB - In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.
KW - Shapley value
KW - Semi-value
KW - Banzhaf value
KW - Hedonic game
KW - Simple game
KW - Strict core
IS - 384
PB - Universität Bielefeld
SN - 0931-6558
U3 - PUB:ID 2315533
UR - http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-384.pdf
UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-9969
ER -
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