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# Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control

Çiftçi B, Dimitrov D (2006)
Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 384. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
243.36 KB
Working Paper | Published | English

Authors
;
Department
Institut für mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung
Abstract

In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.

Keywords
Strict core ; Semi-value ; Shapley value ; Banzhaf value ; Simple game ; Hedonic game
Year
2006
ISSN
0931-6558
File Name
384.pdf 243.36 KB
MD5 Checksum
27ca178a5b448858b1878b8efd13163f
Access Level
Open Access

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##### Cite this
Çiftçi B, Dimitrov D. Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 384. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2006.
Çiftçi , B., & Dimitrov, D. (2006). Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control (Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 384) . Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Çiftçi , B., and Dimitrov, D. (2006). Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 384, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Çiftçi , B., & Dimitrov, D., 2006. Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, no.384, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
B. Çiftçi and D. Dimitrov, Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, vol. 384, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2006.
Çiftçi , B., Dimitrov, D.: Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 384. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2006).
Çiftçi , Baris, and Dimitrov, Dinko. Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2006. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. 384.
@misc{2315533,
abstract     = {In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.},
author       = {\c{C}ift\c{c}i , Baris and Dimitrov, Dinko},
issn         = {0931-6558},
language     = {English},
publisher    = {Universit{\"a}t Bielefeld},
title        = {Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control},
url          = {http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-384.pdf},
doi          = {10.2139/ssrn.948414},
volume       = {384},
year         = {2006},
}


TY  - GEN
AB  - In this paper we study hedonic coalition formation games in which players' preferences over coalitions are induced by a semi-value of a monotonic simple game with veto control. We consider partitions of the player set in which the winning coalition contains the union of all minimal winning coalitions, and show that each of these partitions belongs to the strict core of the hedonic game. Exactly such coalition structures constitute the strict core when the simple game is symmetric. Provided that the veto player set is not a winning coalition in a symmetric simple game, then the partition containing the grand coalition is the unique strictly core stable coalition structure.
AU  - Çiftçi , Baris
AU  - Dimitrov, Dinko
ID  - 2315533
KW  - Strict core
KW  - Semi-value
KW  - Shapley value
KW  - Banzhaf value
KW  - Simple game
KW  - Hedonic game
PB  - Universität Bielefeld
PY  - 2006
SN  - 0931-6558
TI  - Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control
U3  - PUB:ID 2315533
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.948414
UR  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-9969
VL  - 384
ER  -

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