Department
Institut für mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung
Abstract:
We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution power within winning coalitions. These distributions induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the semistrict core, dependent on conditions we impose on the solution concept. It turns out that a bounded power condition, which connects exogenous weights and the solution, is crucial. It generalizes a condition termed "absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions" that was previously used to derive core existence results.
Keywords
Coalition formation ;
Semistrict core ;
Simple games ;
Winning coalitions
Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Stable governments and the semistrict core. IMW working papers. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2006.
Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C.-J. (2006). Stable governments and the semistrict core . Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Dimitrov, D., and Haake, C. - J. (2006). Stable governments and the semistrict core. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C.-J., 2006. Stable governments and the semistrict core, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, Stable governments and the semistrict core, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2006.
Dimitrov, D., Haake, C.-J.: Stable governments and the semistrict core. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2006).
Dimitrov, Dinko, and Haake, Claus-Jochen. Stable governments and the semistrict core. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2006.
@misc{2315530,
abstract = {We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution power within winning coalitions. These distributions induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the semistrict core, dependent on conditions we impose on the solution concept. It turns out that a bounded power condition, which connects exogenous weights and the solution, is crucial. It generalizes a condition termed "absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions" that was previously used to derive core existence results.},
author = {Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen},
issn = {0931-6558},
language = {English},
number = {378},
publisher = {Universit{\"a}t Bielefeld},
title = {Stable governments and the semistrict core},
year = {2006},
}
TY - GEN
ID - 2315530
TI - Stable governments and the semistrict core
AU - Dimitrov, Dinko
AU - Haake, Claus-Jochen
PY - 2006
AB - We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution power within winning coalitions. These distributions induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the semistrict core, dependent on conditions we impose on the solution concept. It turns out that a bounded power condition, which connects exogenous weights and the solution, is crucial. It generalizes a condition termed "absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions" that was previously used to derive core existence results.
KW - Coalition formation
KW - Semistrict core
KW - Simple games
KW - Winning coalitions
IS - 378
PB - Universität Bielefeld
SN - 0931-6558
U3 - PUB:ID 2315530
UR - http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-378.pdf
UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-9850
ER -
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