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Stable governments and the semistrict core

Dimitrov D, Haake C-J (2006)
Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 378. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
231.50 KB
Working Paper | Published | English

Authors
; UniBi
Department
Institut für mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung
Abstract

We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution power within winning coalitions. These distributions induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the semistrict core, dependent on conditions we impose on the solution concept. It turns out that a bounded power condition, which connects exogenous weights and the solution, is crucial. It generalizes a condition termed "absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions" that was previously used to derive core existence results.

Keywords
Winning coalitions ; Semistrict core ; Simple games ; Coalition formation
Year
2006
ISSN
0931-6558
File Name
378neu.pdf 231.50 KB
Access Level
Open Access

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Cite this
Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Stable governments and the semistrict core. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 378. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2006.
Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C. - J. (2006). Stable governments and the semistrict core (Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 378) . Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Dimitrov, D., and Haake, C. - J. (2006). Stable governments and the semistrict core. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 378, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
Dimitrov, D., & Haake, C.-J., 2006. Stable governments and the semistrict core, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, no.378, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld.
D. Dimitrov and C.-J. Haake, Stable governments and the semistrict core, Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, vol. 378, Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2006.
Dimitrov, D., Haake, C.-J.: Stable governments and the semistrict core. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics, 378. Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld (2006).
Dimitrov, Dinko, and Haake, Claus-Jochen. Stable governments and the semistrict core. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld, 2006. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. 378.
@misc{2315530,
abstract     = {We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution power within winning coalitions. These distributions induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the semistrict core, dependent on conditions we impose on the solution concept. It turns out that a bounded power condition, which connects exogenous weights and the solution, is crucial. It generalizes a condition termed {\textacutedbl}absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions{\textacutedbl} that was previously used to derive core existence results.},
author       = {Dimitrov, Dinko and Haake, Claus-Jochen},
issn         = {0931-6558},
language     = {English},
publisher    = {Universit{\"a}t Bielefeld},
title        = {Stable governments and the semistrict core},
url          = {http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-378.pdf},
volume       = {378},
year         = {2006},
}


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AB  - We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous weight vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution power within winning coalitions. These distributions induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game. We formalize the notion of semistrict core stability, which is stronger than the standard core concept but weaker than the strict core notion and derive two characterization results for the semistrict core, dependent on conditions we impose on the solution concept. It turns out that a bounded power condition, which connects exogenous weights and the solution, is crucial. It generalizes a condition termed "absence of the paradox of smaller coalitions" that was previously used to derive core existence results.
AU  - Dimitrov, Dinko
AU  - Haake, Claus-Jochen
ID  - 2315530
KW  - Winning coalitions
KW  - Semistrict core
KW  - Simple games
KW  - Coalition formation
PB  - Universität Bielefeld
PY  - 2006
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TI  - Stable governments and the semistrict core
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