@misc{2315479,
  abstract     = {We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable (Theorems 1 and 3). Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence (Theorem 2). In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.},
  author       = {Haake, Claus-Jochen and Klaus, Bettina},
  issn         = {0931-6558},
  language     = {English},
  number       = {372},
  publisher    = {Universit{\"a}t Bielefeld},
  title        = {Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts},
  year         = {2005},
}

TY  - GEN
ID  - 2315479
TI  - Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts
AU  - Haake, Claus-Jochen
AU  - Klaus, Bettina
PY  - 2005
AB  - We consider general two-sided matching markets, so-called matching with contracts markets as introduced by Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), and analyze (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable solutions. We show that for matching with contracts markets the stable correspondence is monotonic and implementable (Theorems 1 and 3). Furthermore, any solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and monotonic is a supersolution of the stable correspondence (Theorem 2). In other words, the stable correspondence is the minimal solution that is Pareto efficient, individually rational, and implementable.
KW  - Matching with contracts
KW  - (Maskin) monotonicity
KW  - Nash implementation
KW  - Stability
IS  - 372
PB  - Universität Bielefeld
SN  - 0931-6558
U3  - PUB:ID 2315479
UR  - http://www.imw.uni-bielefeld.de/papers/files/imw-wp-372.pdf
UR  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:hbz:361-7662
ER  -